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Summary  
This Doctoral Thesis sums up the carrying out of the research work and the 
results obtained from the safety analysis starting from the concept of ‘Safety 
Management System’ applied to Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS). 
With reference to the incoming integration of RPAS into not segregated airspaces, 
the future real case of specific category flight operations within the U-Space has 
been more precisely considered and studied. 
The basic idea for the research derived from the guidelines issued by ICAO in 
the Annex 19 (2013) stating that every aeronautical operator shall implement a 
‘Safety Management System’ within its own organization to be authorized to fly 
into the civil airspace: this indication applies to incoming RPAS operators too 
(ICAO Document 10019). 
The Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems are a subset of unmanned aerial 
systems composed of the unmanned aerial segment (the aircraft), the ground 
segment (a station or a remote portable radio controller) and the command and 
control radio link (C2) used by the human pilot to control and manage the aerial 
platform from ground. 
The aviation authorities and, in general, the aviation community, guessing the 
potential high economic value of RPAS flight operations recognized that it could 
be adequately exploited only allowing their full integration into the civil airspaces. 
Starting from these premises, a comprehensive safety analysis has been 
performed identifying and assessing safety hazards and possible mitigation 
provisions and thus implementing two risk matrices: the first one has been draft 
reasoning on the safety hazards related to the full integration of RPAS into 
uncontrolled airspaces (U-Space served); the second one has been draft reasoning 
on the safety hazards related to the full integration of RPAS into controlled 
airspaces (ATM served).  
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In accordance with the definition of Safety Management System (the 
continuous activity of identifying, assessing and mitigating risks to maintain their 
effects at or below an acceptable level), the content of the U-Space risk matrix has 
been used to layout a more advanced risk mitigation provision modelled as a rule-
based ‘Expert System’. The model has been focused on the implementation of the 
basic stage of an ‘Expert System’, that is its knowledge basis built as a collection 
of rules. The rules have been designed to be activated or not by specific 
precursors of previously analysed hazards and to alert the remote pilot on 
incoming risks in real time. In addition, they have been thought to provide 
him/her or the RPA flight control system (in case of fully automated RPAS flight 
operations) with real time decisional support about the most proper mitigation 
action to apply against the hazard occurring during a specific category flight 
mission in the not segregated airspace below 500 feet. 
The above mentioned steps of the research have been used to define a 
proposal for a comprehensive RPAS functional architecture oriented towards 
mitigation of flight risks in the U-Space and to critically review the current 
technical solutions proposed to operatively deploy the incoming U-Space service.  
The research on safety analysis on RPAS has been completed with an 
example of application of the STPA (‘System-Theoretic Process Analysis’) 
hazards analysis technique to show more recent methodologies beside the 
traditional and consolidated ones used in this research.  
Finally, the impacts of the performed safety analysis on Italian RPAS 
regulation have been evaluated through a critical review of its state of art 
performed in the light of the results got from the safety analysis object of the 
research. 
Beside the above described main topic of this work, considerations on safety 
and operative requirements for hybrid RPAS fed by hydrogen fuel cells have been 
carried out due to the necessity of enhancing remotely piloted aircraft systems 
endurance and range to really allow their full integration into civil non segregated 
airspaces. 
The following points are hereinafter definitely highlighted as original added 
values of this work: starting from a regulation gap and, at the moment of 
performance of the present study, poor literature availability about, the performed 
study is an example of a safety analysis starting from a real case study and 
capable to fit with multiple RPAS in the U-space. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
1.1  Objective of the research 
The present research work takes origin from the idea of implementing a 
‘Safety Management System’ (SMS) for Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems 
(RPAS). RPAS are aircraft without the pilot on board, but located on a remote 
pilot station and remotely conducting the flight operations through a portable 
radio command or a ground station and using commands, controls and displays 
(fed by telemetry data sent by the aerial platform) similar to those installed in the 
cockpit of manned aircraft.  
According to the new vision of ICAO Annex 19, in addition to the historical 
eighteen annexes already in use, aircraft and aerial operations safety management 
is elevated at the level of State responsibility and every user of the airspace shall 
demonstrate to have implemented and to routinely apply an SMS to manage safety 
of own assets and aerial activity [1]. RPAS operators undergo these guidelines as 
manned aircraft operators. 
More precisely, the idea of implementing a ‘Safety Management System’ for 
RPAS descends from the ICAO regulation reported at paragraph 7.3.2 of Doc. 
10019, ‘Manual on Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS)’ issued in 2015 [2] 
and stating that:  
 
‘7.3.2 Irrespective of the type of operation (e.g. private, corporate, 
commercial), all RPAS operators must be certified by the State. One of the 
requirements for certification is expected to be that the RPAS operator has 
implemented an effective SMS.’ 
  
The responsibility for safety is inferred to the State [1] which has to issue a 
State Safety Program (SSP) that every aeronautical operator has to comply with to 
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be authorized to use the civil airspace. An SSP is an integrated set of regulations 
and activities aimed at improving safety. This obligation is now extended to 
RPAS operators too as incoming new actors of the current aviation scenario. The 
RPAS operators are equalized to any other operator of the manned aviation 
community and the RPAS safety shall be managed as for manned aircraft.  
The ‘Safety Management System’ or SMS is a comprehensive and systematic 
approach to safety management. In aeronautics it started to be applied from the 
mid-1990s [3]. It relies on the systematic and continuous identification of the 
performed activity safety hazards (ground and aerial) and on keeping the related 
safety risks under a proper acceptable level defined in terms of probability of 
occurrence and severity of consequences [3]. 
As furtherly stated by Doc. 10019 at paragraph 6.2.2. [2]: 
 
‘The RPAS operator must comply with all requirements established by the 
State of the Operator regarding its operation. These requirements should be 
consistent with the size, structure and complexity of the RPAS operator’s.’ 
 
The safety requirements issued by the State of Registry of the RPAS and the 
related applicable SMS shall fit the RPAS operator type and category and 
structure of operations size and complexity: remote piloted aircraft systems deeply 
differ from manned aircraft in terms of size and technical features and in terms of 
type and way of conduction of flight operations. This aspect will be properly 
highlighted in this work when necessary. 
The definition of ‘Safety Management System’ and the contingent need for 
the implementation of an SMS suitable for RPAS organizations and operators 
have been recognized as a proper topic for a new research work: the performance 
of the safety analysis of the risks and mitigation actions related to the integration 
of RPAS into the civil airspace.    
This thesis consists of seven Chapters and eight sections in Appendix 
(Appendixes A ÷ H). The First Chapter describes the concept of RPAS, the 
aviation operating scenario where they will be integrated in, the approach chosen 
by the European Aviation Authorities to manage their incoming in the civil not 
segregated airspace. The Second Chapter sums up the theoretical fundamentals of 
safety risk analysis in aviation that has been used in the safety analysis object of 
the research. The Third Chapter reports the content of the performed safety risk 
analysis considering both operations in the uncontrolled not segregated airspace 
(between 0 and 500 feet of altitude) managed by the U-Space service and 
operations in the controlled not segregated airspace managed by ‘Air Traffic 
Management’ (ATM). From this point onwards, the thesis has been focused on the 
flight operations that will be performed in the uncontrolled space served by the U-
Space: in fact, this scenario will be the first to be arranged by the European 
Aviation Authority (EASA) and therefore, at the moment, it has been of cogent 
interest for this research. The Fourth Chapter introduces the ‘Expert Systems’ 
focusing on the rule-based ones and describes the design of the knowledge basis 
derived from the U-Space risk matrix. The Fifth Chapter describes and discusses 
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the proposal of an RPAS architecture oriented to safety risk mitigation of specific 
category flight operations under the U-Space service; further, it reviews current 
proposals of infrastructures elaborated in Europe to operatively deploy the U-
Space service. The Sixth Chapter describes and discuss an example of application 
of the ‘System Theoretic Process Analysis’ (STPA) safety analysis methodology 
to the RPAS flying into non segregated airspaces hazard scenario. The Seventh 
Chapter, critically reviews the current Italian RPAS regulation on the basis of the 
performed safety analysis. Finally, the ‘Conclusion’ Chapter reconsiders the 
performed research work highlighting novelties with respect to current state of art 
about the research topic, limitations of the carried out choices and possible future 
developments.  
With reference to the sections in Appendix: Appendix A reports the FMECA 
analysis results; Appendix B reports the RPAS safety of operations related human 
factor analysis results; Appendix C reports the FTA analysis results; Appendix D 
reports the safety risks analysis results (U-Space and ATM risk matrices). As 
above stated, after the risk matrixes implementation, the research has been 
focused on the flight operations that will be performed in the uncontrolled space 
served by the U-Space: therefore from this point onwards, Appendix E reports the 
Bow Tie schemes on mitigation provisions with reference to the U-Space risks 
(the most significant hazards have been considered only); the Appendix F reports 
the rules composing the ‘Expert System’ knowledge basis derived from the U-
Space safety risk matrix. As additional topics to the main theme of the performed 
research, Appendix G reports the results of the application of the STPA hazard 
analysis to an example of specific hazard scenario; the Appendix H reports and 
discusses a proposal for operative and safety requirements for an hybrid RPAS 
(fed by hydrogen fuel cells) model.  
1.2 Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS) 
A ‘Remote Piloted Aircraft System’ (RPAS) is an aircraft conducted by a 
pilot remotely located (typically on ground, or also on other aircraft) and not on 
board the aircraft through a command and control (C2) radio link. The RPAS are 
a subset of ‘Unmanned aircraft systems’ (UAS) [4]. In fact, UAS can be 
manually, automatically or fully autonomously piloted: in the first case the aircraft 
is remotely controlled by the human pilot; in the second case it is managed by the 
on board autopilot, but with the pilot able to take the control of the aircraft in 
unexpected conditions; in the last one the flight is performed without allowing any 
pilot intervention. With reference to this categorization, the research object of this 
thesis has been performed in accordance with the following ICAO regulation [2]: 
 
As a general consideration, Article 8 of the ‘Convention on International Civil 
Aviation’:  
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‘No aircraft. capable of being flown without a pilot shall be flown without a 
pilot over the territory of a contracting State without special authorization by that 
State and in accordance with the terms of such authorization….’. 
 
As a further more detailed guideline, paragraph 2.2 of [4]: 
 
‘Only the remotely-piloted aircraft (RPA), …, will be able to integrate into the 
international civil aviation system in the foreseeable future. The functions and 
responsibilities of the remote pilot are essential to the safe and predictable 
operation of the aircraft as it interacts with other civil aircraft and the air traffic 
management (ATM) system. Fully autonomous aircraft operations are not being 
considered in this effort, nor are unmanned free balloons nor other types of 
aircraft which cannot be managed on a real-time basis during flight.’ 
 
The RPAS are composed of the ‘Remote Piloted Aircraft’ (RPA), in this 
thesis also referred to as aerial segment or aerial platform, the ‘Remote Pilot 
Station’ (RPS), in this thesis also referred as the ground segment, the ‘Command 
and Control Radio Link’ (C2L) ([2], [4]). The remote pilot can operate the aerial 
platform using a hand-held portable radio controller, simpler (Figure 1 [5]), for 
RPAS comparable to toys or (Figure 2 [6]) more advanced, for RPAS for civil 
professional/commercial use, or a complete remote ground control station (even a 
multi-console one) (Figure 3 [7]), this last one typical of RPAS for military use, at 
the moment. The RPS hosts the controls to fly the RPAS and manage the flight 
(also on the basis of displays of telemetry data, sent by the RPA on the downlink 
channel). The RPS can be located inside or outside, stationery or mobile (that is 
installed in a moving vehicle/ship/aircraft, again with reference to military 
applications in most cases, at the moment) [4]. The radio link can be simple or 
redundant; it mainly consists of the uplink channel to send command signals to 
the RPA and the downlink channel to receive telemetry data from the RPA; it can 
be designed to control and manage the aircraft from direct ‘Radio Line of Sight’ 
(RLOS) to ‘Beyond Radio Line of Sight’ (BRLOS) [4]. In RLOS case the RPAS 
transmitting and receiving antennas are within mutual radio link coverage and 
signals can be exchanged in a comparable timeframe. In BRLOS, the radio link is 
supported by satellite systems or terrestrial networks to maintain the ground and 
aerial segments in contact and in some applications (military ones) more RPS can 
be used to manage very complex and long endurance operations; the necessary 
timeframe to make RPA and RPS communicate is further beyond the one of the 
RLOS case. The BRLOS operations are characterized by a higher communication 
delay than RLOS ones [2]. The interruption of communication between the 
ground and the aerial segments is indicated as ‘lost link’ condition. 
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Figure 1 – Example of RPAS portable remote controller [5] 
 
Figure 2 – Example of rugged RPAS portable remote controller [6] 
 
 
Figure 3 – Example of RPAS Ground Control Station [7] 
An RPA system usually comprehends the following subsystems [2]: 
• The Launch and Recovery equipment for RPA take-off and landing 
(like, for example: catapult, winch, rocket, net, parachute, airbag) 
• The Flight Control Computer (FCC), the Flight Management 
Subsystem (FMS) and the Autopilot 
• The Navigation Subsystem 
• The Propulsion Subsystem 
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• The Communication Subsystem, including equipment to allow the 
remote pilot to communicate with Air Traffic Control (ATC), and 
systems to support Radionavigation 
• Surveillance subsystem, to allow the RPA to be tracked by primary 
and secondary surveillance systems or through the use of ‘Automatic 
Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast’ (ADS-B) equipment 
• The Power subsystem 
• The Electrical Distribution subsystem 
• The Structures 
• The Health Monitoring Subsystem 
• The ‘Flight Termination Subsystem’ (FTS) designed to manage an 
intentional controlled RPA flight termination in case of emergency 
The RPAS are a more diversified technology than manned aircraft as shown 
by the categorizations reported hereinafter: 
• With reference to weight and performances reachable with current 
technology, the RPAS are classified as shown in Table 1 [8]: 
From Table 1 [8], a more synthetic classification of RPAS according 
to MTOW can be derived as follows [9]: 
o Mini RPAS: MTOW from 0 up to 14 kg 
o Small RPAS: MTOW from 15 up to 199 kg 
o Medium RPAS: MTOW from 200 up to 1999 kg 
o Heavy RPAS: MTOW above 2000 kg 
The Light RPAS are considered in this thesis; with reference to the 
above reported list; ‘Light RPAS’ are those ranging from Mini to 
Moderate RPAS with upper limit equal to 150 kg MTOW, 
according to European/Italian regulation. 
• With reference to the wing configuration, the RPAS are classified as 
follows ([9], Figure 4 [9]): 
 
o Fixed wing RPAS 
o Free wing RPAS  
o Rotary wing RPAS 
o Tilt wing/rotor RPAS 
o Tail sitters 
 
 
 
 31 
 
 
Table 1 – UAS/RPAS classification [8] 
UAS/RPAS  
Category 
Acronym Range [km] 
Flight  
altitude [m] 
Endurance 
[hours] 
MTOW [Kg] Currently flying 
TACTICAL  
Nano η < 1 100 < 1 < 0,025 YES 
Micro μ or ‘Micro’ < 10 250 1 < 5 YES 
Mini Mini < 10 
From 150  
to 300 
< 2 < 30 YES 
Close Range CR From 10 to 30 3000 2 to 4 150 YES 
Short Range  SR From 30 to 70 3000 3 to 6 200 YES 
Moderate Range MR From 70 to 200 5000 6 to 10 1250 YES 
Moderate Range 
Endurance 
MRE > 500 8000 10 to 18 1250 YES 
Low  
Altitude Deep 
Penetration 
LADP > 250 
From 50  
to 9000 
0.5 to 1 350 YES 
Low  
Altitude Long 
Endurance 
LALE > 500 3000 > 24 < 30 YES 
Moderate 
Altitude Long 
Endurance 
MALE > 500 14000 24 to 48 1500 YES 
STRATEGIC 
High  
Altitude Long 
Endurance 
HALE > 2000 20000 24 to 48 12000 YES 
SPECIAL PURPOSE 
Unmanned 
Combat Aerial 
Vehicle 
UCAV Around 1500 10.000 Around 2 10000 YES 
Lethal LETH 300 4000 3 to 4 250 NO 
Decoy DEC From 0 to 500 5000 < 4 250 NO 
Stratospheric STRATO > 2000 
Within 20000 and 
30000 
> 48 TBD NO 
Exo-stratospheric EXO TBD > 30000 TBD TBD TBD 
SPACE SPACE TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD 
 
 
Figure 4 – RPAS classification according to wing configuration [9] 
• Finally, with reference to the propulsion subsystem configuration, the  
RPAS can be classified as follows [10] and [11]: 
• Turbojet fixed wing RPAS 
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• Turboprop fixed wing RPAS  
• Reciprocating fixed wing propeller (electric propulsion) RPAS 
• Vertical Take-Off and Landing RPAS (VTOL RPAS) 
• Airship (Lighter than Air)  
1.2.1 Economic added value expected from RPAS 
The integration of RPAS with manned aircraft is strongly encouraged by the 
scientific, technical and industrial community both for the ‘disruptive’ features of 
this technology and for the economic added value expected from it. The lack of 
the pilot on board RPAS opens the way to more different airframe configurations 
and more risky applications than manned aircraft: this issue potentially allows 
valuable developments of the RPAS market with expected economic return 
around 10 billion Euro annually by 2035 and over 15 billion Euro annually by 
2050 ([12], [13]).  
The possibility to fly aircraft without the pilot on board goes back to the years 
of the Second World War. In 1944 ICAO officially acknowledged the existence of 
UAS in the Chicago Convention. After the war, since 1950s, such aerial vehicles 
have been used almost exclusively for military purposes. Recent conflicts and 
peace-keeping operations around the world have further demonstrated and 
confirmed their operational capabilities from a military point of view. 
Consequently, during the European Summit on the Future Defence Policy hold on 
the 19th December 2013 a formal commitment was made to further enhance the 
European RPAS military assets capability but a new interest has been clearly 
expressed for civil use of  RPAS [14]. 
Years from 2005 to present day have been a very fertile period to make RPAS 
tecnology feasible and more economically viable and competitive in the civil 
market thanks to the introduction of novel lighter and more resistant materials and 
thanks to new software, communication, data processing and miniaturisation 
tecniques applicable to RPAS too [13].  
The remotely piloted aircraft are expected to bring benefits from their 
extensive application in many sectors (agriculture, infrastructures monitoring, 
etc.), allowing the decrease of human beings fatal injuries or death when aerial 
works must be performed; the expected birth of new professional figures (remote 
pilots, remote aircraft manufacturers, analysts of RPAS payload data, etc) and 
extension of interests of exixting economic sectors into remotely piloted aircraft 
industrial sector have been already occurring (like, for example, insurances) [14]. 
The key to reach such economic advantages will be the full and safe 
integration of RPAS into not segregated airspace alongside manned aircraft ([12] 
and [14]) unifying and uniforming the different rules and industrial standards in 
force across the European Union states and, in addition, enforcing the continental 
RPAS market with respect to other markets in the world. In fact, the current 
European RPAS market still suffers from the fact that the regulations for RPAS 
below 150 kg of MTOW (light RPAS) is fragmentary having been left to the 
responsibility of the single Member States [14], while the ‘European Aviation 
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Safety Agency’ (EASA) takes care for RPAS above 150 kg of MTOW only [15]. 
In the next future it is intention of the European Union to regulate all RPAS used 
in the Member States and strongly fostering the light RPAS market for civil use 
[15]. 
Hence, the current work of European Aviation Authorities is addressed both 
to identify affordable risk models to face and mitigate the hazards related to the 
integration of RPAS with manned aircraft and to create a new set of common 
regulations, industry standards and market product requirements to allow the 
industrial development, distribution and safe flight operations of RPAS across 
Europe. 
According to its formal mission, ICAO is addressing RPAS regulatory 
framework at worldwide level. It has set-up a specific panel to prepare SARPS for 
RPAS integration into the airspaces. Following the first available guidelines 
issued by ICAO on RPAS, the ‘European UAS Standards Coordination Group’ 
(EUSCG), including, among the others, the ‘Single European Sky ATM 
Research’ (SESAR), the ‘Joint Authorities for Rulemaking on Unmanned 
Systems’ (JARUS) and the ‘European Organization for Civil Aviation 
Equipment’ (EUROCAE) (mainly for the definition of industry standards) are 
working to issue a common regulation for RPAS safe flight operations in Europe 
([12]).  
This work on regulation will allow the concrete development of a new 
European global and competitive RPAS market; this will also overcome other 
difficulties like the fact that, at the moment, third countries, such as the United 
States, do not accept the European validation process and consequently the RPAS 
products, especially if carried out by non-aviation authorities [14].  
The European RPAS industries, go from start-ups to small/medium sized 
companies arriving until global players. This layout reflects the wide range of 
available unmanned systems from micro aerial platforms of few tens of grams of 
maximum take-off weight to those of size and performance comparable to an 
Airbus 320 commercial liner aircraft [14]. 
In conclusion, RPAS represents a great potential to change the civil aviation 
and society [16], provided that aviation authorities, governments and industries 
will develop the best regulatory framework to allow their full but safe integration 
with manned aircraft. 
1.2.2 RPAS applications 
With reference to civilian applications, RPAS have been basically conceived 
to carry out the so called ‘3D’ duties that is operations that can be ‘Dull’, ‘Dirty’ 
or ‘Dangerous’ [4] for the human pilot of manned aircraft. The civilian 
applications of RPAS have been successively extended to commercial, scientific 
and security sectors developing and sharpening monitoring, communication and 
imaging functions [4] through the use of more and more sophisticated payload 
sensors.  
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The following are typical civilian applications of RPAS technology [17]: 
monitoring/inspection of pipelines, railroads, highways, traffic flows, coastlines, 
solar or windmill plants, oil rigs, oil spills, flood risk, forestry, snow pack 
avalanches, ice packs, clouds, volcanoes, nuclear plants; logistics for the delivery 
of goods; wildlife inventory, through the performance of aerial mapping and 
survey, cinematography, fire prevention and assessment, biological agents 
detection, archaeology, crop dusting, sport or music events surveillance, 
photogrammetry, tidal zones mapping, meteorology; performance of public 
safety, search and rescue and security operations. 
1.2.3 Full integration into the civil airspace 
Currently, the RPAS are authorized to fly into segregated airspaces that is 
limited portions of airspace outside and separated from manned aircraft routes in 
such a way that interference with manned aircraft and the risk of mid-air 
collisions with them is maintained at a reasonable acceptable low level or it is 
potentially completely avoided.  
The change requested to really achieve the economic benefits expected from 
the RPAS market is the complete merging of RPAS with manned traffic, that is 
the RPAS full integration into the civil not segregated airspace. As previously 
stated, for the moment, in accordance with ICAO guidelines (paragraph 2.2 of 
[4]), remotely piloted aircraft managed on a real time basis during flight 
operations only will be fully integrated in the civil airspace. Automatic or 
semiautomatic operations (a mixture of automatic and manual operations) will be 
allowed in the civil airspaces, but not fully autonomous operations. Operations of 
autonomous RPAS will be allowed in the civil airspaces only if strictly necessary, 
under special provisions and/or using segregated subspaces (paragraph 2.2 of [4]); 
in any case, this arrangement will not be equivalent to a full integration of RPAS 
into civil airspace and it has not been considered in this thesis. 
Within the integration of RPAS with manned aircraft, compensations for the 
absence of the human pilot on board shall be put in action in order to replicate 
his/her ‘See and Avoid’ capability that is the capability to see other aircraft or 
ground-based natural and man-made obstacles during flight operations and avoid 
collisions with them. The human pilot of manned aircraft usually accomplishes 
such task relying on his/her sight and on board flight instruments (like TCAS for 
example) or being supported by air traffic controllers who provide the on board 
crew with proper flight levels and instructions to maintain proper separation from 
other traffic.   
The full integration of RPAS into the civil airspaces will be addressed by the 
following general principles:  it will be gradual but it will occur in the medium 
term (within 2030 according to [12]); the manned aircraft transport system will 
not adequate to RPAS: the opposite will occur; RPAS will have to adequate to 
manned aircraft transport system rules [18]; a minimum set of safety requirements 
will have to be met by RPAS to safely operate with manned aircraft [4]; the 
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presence of RPAS alongside manned aircraft shall not impact the current safety 
level reached by the aerial transport sector.  
1.2 The current operating aerial scenario 
The current aerial operating scenario where in the medium term RPAS will be 
fully integrated with manned aircraft has been gone under deep changes in the last 
years mainly due to the increase of commercial traffic.  
The civil airspace management is changing to fit with a new global 
management strategy due to the mentioned expected growth of commercial traffic 
volumes: the ‘Global Air Traffic Management’ (GATM) [19]. The novel elements 
of GATM that are of interest for RPAS integration into the airspace are 
hereinafter reminded and briefly described because these issues will be involved 
in some cases in the safety risk assessment object of this thesis. 
The integration of RPAS into the civil airspace is a matter of management of 
these new users flight operations within the airspace. Currently the civil airspace 
is divided into two main subcategories: controlled airspaces and uncontrolled 
airspaces [20]. Within the controlled airspaces the air traffic controller has the 
responsibility to support the pilots to maintain recommended horizontal and 
vertical separations from other aircraft, from ground, from bodies of water and 
from any other natural or man-made obstacle along the flown track. In this case, 
the pilot has to follow the controller clearances/instructions. Further, the pilot 
periodically communicates with the controller about the relevant circumstances of 
interest during the given phase of flight. In the uncontrolled airspace, without 
ATC service, the pilot is responsible for the safe conduct of the aircraft using 
available flight information and advisory traffic services [20]. As it will be better 
described in the next paragraphs, RPAS will fly both within controlled and 
uncontrolled airspaces according to the type of planned sortie. The lack of the 
human pilot on board the RPAS introduces relevant safety critical issues to the 
above described scenarios. 
Notwithstanding the new management strategies to optimize the use of the 
civil airspace facing the expected traffic volume increase, the safety of navigation 
always remains the main priority; the following sums up the novel elements 
brought by the GATM guidelines. 
The new global airspace will act as an integrated single continuum airspace 
able to host both manned and remotely piloted aircraft up to transiting space-
vehicles; it will be arranged to overcome current limitations like congested voice 
communications or too much rigid structured routes; the airspace, the airdromes 
and the human operators, supported by more advanced decisional tools based on 
real time technology and accurate information will provide a flexible and scalable 
integrated service. Manned or unmanned vehicles trajectories will be managed as 
dynamic four dimensions (4D) trajectories; the interactions among them or other 
issues will be managed as temporary hazards to achieve the best outcome with the 
minimal deviation from the user-requested flight trajectory, whenever possible. 
The new integrated service will be adaptable to accommodate a variety of air 
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activities, volumes of traffic and levels of service. The restrictions to the use of a 
volume of airspace will be assimilated to transitory conditions; the airspace 
boundaries will be adjusted to traffic flows and not accordingly to national 
boundaries anymore. Aerodromes, as integral part of the system, will be managed 
in order to reduce runaway occupancy and optimizing on air flight time. The 
airspaces and aerodromes demand and capacity will be balanced through an 
efficient management of air-traffic flow, weather and assets information. The mid-
air conflict management, potentially further enhanced by the incoming integration 
of RPAS, will be a critical aspect of this balance and will influence the traffic 
synchronization, the separation provision and the collision avoidance. All the 
airspaces will be matter of the ATM and will be thought as usable resources. Its 
allocation and organization will be flexible and based on the principles of access 
and equity [19]. 
The conflict management will be managed following a three levels strategy: 
the first level of strategic conflict management will be achieved balancing the 
airspace organization and management, demand and capacity, and traffic 
synchronization components; the second level of conflict management will be the 
separation, that is the tactical process of keeping manned and unmanned aircraft 
one away from the other applying the appropriate separation minima; the third 
level of conflict management will be the collision avoidance and it will have to be 
activated when the separation mode (above mentioned second level) has been 
compromised. Technological surveillance systems based on cooperative aerial 
traffic like ‘Automatic Dependance Surveillance - Broadcast’ (ADS-B) or 
traditional ground-based surveillance systems suitable for not cooperative traffic 
too will support the real time traffic management between cooperative/not 
cooperative RPAS and manned aircraft [19]. 
The meteorological information service will be a function integrated in the 
ATM system and it will be exploited to optimise flight trajectories [19]. 
The evolution of ‘Area Navigation’ (RNAV) procedures will furtherly play a 
primary role. In fact, they are navigation procedures which permit aircraft 
operations on any desired flight path within the coverage of a station-referenced 
navigation aid or within the limits of the capability of self-contained aids, or 
according to a combination of them. With RNAV advent, aircraft are no more 
constrained to an airway [21]. This issue specifically addresses more and more to 
leave rigid structured routes towards an optimised use of the airspace volume and 
thus helping to easily host the future expected growth of commecial traffic. 
‘Required Navigation Performance’ (RNP) certified equipment are necessary on 
board the aircraft to fly RNAV procedures and following the desired more 
efficient path with exceptional accuracy and with noticeable saving of fuel [20]. 
The RNAV procedures are a subset of ‘Performance Based Navigation’ (PBN) 
procedures that defines aircraft RNAV equipment performance in terms of 
accuracy, integrity, availability, continuity and functionality required for the given 
operation in the context of a particular airspace concept, when supported by the 
appropriate navigation infrastructure [22]. A different level of accuracy is 
required to RNAV/PBN navigation system depending on whether the considered 
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route is an oceanic one or the route leading the aircraft during the approach phase 
towards an aerodrome (Figure 5 [22]). Among such equipment, the ‘Global 
Navigation Satellite System’ (GNSS) [23] is of interest for the RPAS safety 
analysis object of this thesis. The Global Navigation Satellite Systems are satellite 
based navigation systems. Thanks to their higher precision and lower costs are 
successfully supporting traditional ground based navigation aids like Primary and 
Secondary Surveillance RADARs (PSR and SSR, respectively) [24]. The 
navigation satellite systems rely on GPS and GLONASS costellations (managed 
by USA and Russian Federation respectively), both compliant with ICAO Annex 
10 performance requirements on aeronautical telecommunications [25]. They 
broadcasts a timing signal and a data message that includes the satellite ephemeris 
data. The aircraft are equipped with GNSS receivers that use these signals to 
calculate their range from each satellite in view, and to fix their three-dimensional 
position and time. A GNSS receiver is mainly composed of an antenna and a 
processor to compute position, time and, eventually, other information depending 
on the application. The receiver needs measurements from a minimum of four 
satellites to establish three-dimensional position and time. The accuracy depends 
on the precision of the measurements from the satellites and the relative positions 
and geometry of the satellites used [25]. The current exixting core satellite 
constellations alone do not meet strict aviation requirements. In order to reach this 
aim for each phase of flight, the core satellites need for technological 
enhancements. Three solutions are currently avalable [25] named ‘Aircraft.-Based 
Augmentation System’ (ABAS), ‘Ground-Based Augmentation System’ (GBAS) 
and ‘Satellite-Based Augmentation System’ (SBAS), the last one of interest for 
RPAS and considered in the safety analysis object of this thesis. as follows [25]. 
Satellite-Based Augmentation Systems uses ground stations to verify the validity 
of satellite signals and calculate corrections to enhance accuracy; then it delivers 
those data to the users via ‘Geostationery Earth Orbit’ (GEO) satellites. In Europe, 
the Satellite-Based Augmentation System in use is the SBAS EGNOS; the level 
required for aviation is indicaed as ‘Safety of Life’ (SOL) service level [26]. It 
provides a very precise satellite guide to aircraft into the European Airspace with 
a lateral/vertical accuracy of 16/20 meters against a 220/400 meters of traditional 
navigation aids and an horizontal alert limit/vertical alert limit of 40/50 meters 
against 556 meters/‘not applicable’ of traditional navigation aids respectively. The 
signal availability is 99% [25]. The EGNOS system, composed of a Space and a 
Ground segment, is more accurate than other navigation aids beause it collects 
data from the GPS constellation through the network of ground stations located in 
Europe and named ‘Ranging & Integrity Monitoring Stations’ (RIMs). Each GPS 
satellite is monitored by multiple RIMs. The monitorig stations transmit the GPS 
data to four ‘Mission Control Centres’ (MCC) that generate the augmented signal; 
this one, that is the signal with accuracy enhanced by the corrections and the 
integrity messages is transmitted by the six ‘Navigation Land Earth Stations’ 
(NLES) to the EGNOS geostationary satellites to be broadcasted to the users. The 
users aircraft shall be equipped with an EGNOS receiver on board. In space, the 
EGNOS is supported by three telecommunication geostationary satellites [25]. 
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With reference to PBN requirements, the EGNOS accuracy is defined as the 
difference between the measured and the real position, speed or time of the 
receiver (measured on 95% of the time of use); the EGNOS continuity is the 
capability of the system to provide confidence thresholds as well as alarms in the 
event that anomalies (confidence threshold bigger than alarm limits for a period of 
15 sec) occur in the positioning data; the EGNOS integrity is the capability of the 
system to work without any interruption; the EGNOS availability is the 
percentage of time during which the signal fulfils the accuracy, integrity and 
continuty criteria [26]. 
 
Figure 5 – An example of RNAV/PBN requirements application [22] 
1.3 Integration of RPAS in Europe: the EASA risk centric 
approach 
In Europe, the ‘European Aviation Safety Agency’ (EASA) regulates safety 
of aerial transport and within this issue it cares for RPAS safe integration into the 
airspace. In 2017 EASA officialised its approach on this topic issuing a ‘Notice of 
Proposed Amendment’ (NPA) to prepare the emission of a new RPAS Basic 
Regulation [26].  
EASA proposes an approach to the integration of RPAS into the airspace 
based on the following hypotheses [12]:  
• It will be an operation-centric risk-based approach based on safety risk 
evaluation 
• It will be gradual but it will be completed in a relatively short period 
of time (2035) 
• It will be performance-based 
• It will be sensitive to privacy, data protection and security issues 
With reference to the operation and risk-centric approach, EASA defines three 
categories ([18], [27] and [28]) of RPAS flight operations that will be described in 
the next paragraphs: 
A. Open category 
B. Specific category 
C. Certified category 
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The ‘State’ RPAS, that is RPAS used for military, customs, police, 
firefighting and other similar applications are not included into the EASA 
regulation [27] and will not be included in the risk analysis discussed in this 
thesis. 
The three above mentioned categories have been defined taking into account 
the ground and air risks that can be introduced by the integration of RPAS into not 
segregated airspaces ([27] and [28]. Due to the absence of the pilot on board, the 
risks introduced by RPAS are shifted outside the aircraft, while for manned 
aircraft the risk is evaluated both for people inside the aircraft and for people that 
can be killed and infrastructures that can be damaged/destroyed in case of 
catastrophic accidents occurrence. The RPAS ground risk refers to the risk of 
collision with natural obstacles or man-made (eventually sensitive) infrastructures 
and with the risk of injury or death of people on ground if hit by an RPAS or by 
parts or debris of an RPAS. The RPAS air risk refers to the mid-air collision risk 
with another manned or remotely piloted aircraft. In the last years, the air risk has 
increased in parallel with the greater and greater diffusion of RPAS both for 
professional use and for leisure. 
1.3.1 Open category 
The open category operations will be those performed using model aircraft or 
small RPAS of maximum take-off weight until 25 kg for leisure and conducted 
until 400 feet of altitude and in RLOS only ([27], [28] and [29]). If the RPAS 
operation will exceed one or more of these limitations, it will be classified as a 
specific category operation.   
Thanks to the above mentioned prescriptions, the open category operations 
are intended as low risk operations by definition and therefore they will not be 
discussed in this thesis. 
1.3.2 Specific category 
The specific category operations will be those exceeding at least one of the 
limitations defined for the open category ones. The typical commercial operations 
expected from RPAS will undergo this category. The specific category operations 
will be characterized by a risk level to be assessed case by case to gain the 
authorization to perform it ([27], [28]). Proper standard risk scenarios with 
associated mitigation actions are under definition by EASA ([27], [28]) to 
alleviate the Member State from administrative burden for providing 
authorizations to operators. 
The specific category operation is object of the risk analysis discussed in this 
thesis. 
1.3.3 Certified category 
According to EASA, the certified category will comprehend very complex 
operations characterised by very high risk comparable to those of manned aircraft, 
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like, for example, operations involving large or complex RPAS operating 
continuously over unsheltered crowd of people or operating beyond visual line of 
sight (BRLOS) in high-density airspaces; RPAS used for people transportation or 
used for dangerous goods transportation, etc. ([27], [28]). 
1.3.4 EASA/EUROCONTROL concept of operations 
The operation-centric approach proposed by EASA ([27], [28]) is further 
detailed by the ‘Concept of operations’ (CONOPS) proposed by 
EUROCONTROL [18]. The roles of the two distinct Authorities is hereinafter 
highlighted: EASA will manage and care for the rules the RPAS will have to 
respect to enter and safely use the civil airspace; EUROCONTROL is designing a 
proper concept of operation to assure the safety of RPAS navigation into the 
airspace as summed up in Figure 6 [18]. 
 
 
Figure 6 – RPAS integration in the civil airspace: EUROCONTROL concept of operation [18] 
The civil airspace has been ideally arranged in three subspaces where the 
RPAS operations will be allocated as follows:   
• The subspace between 0 and 500 feet from ground; it will be called 
‘Very Low Level’ (VLL) subspace: the related flight operations will 
be performed not under ATC control in an uncontrolled airspace  
• A subspace between 500 feet of altitude from ground and flight level 
FL600 (60000 feet/around 18300 meters of altitude): this subspace is a 
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controlled airspace served by ATC (in line with the services expected 
for the different airspace classes, from A to G) 
• A subspace beyond FL600: it will be called ‘Very High Level’ (VHL) 
subspace; the operations will be performed beyond FL600 or UIR, that 
is beyond the conventional upper limit of the controlled airspace 
From the EASA perspective (safety of flight operations), the following 
aspects of the afore mentioned EUROCONTROL concept of operations can be 
highlighted as follows ([18], [28] and [29]): 
• ‘Very Low Level’ (VLL) subspace: the open category and specific 
category flight operations will be allocated in this portion of the 
uncontrolled airspace; as above indicated the open category operations 
are not of interest being categorized as low risk operations by 
definition; the specific operations will identify with RPAS commercial 
operations characterized by a medium level of operating risk. The 
adjective ‘commercial’ is also used to highlight the nature of these 
RPAS operations that will be deeply different from Open category 
operations 
• Subspace between 500 feet of altitude from ground and flight level 
FL600: the RPAS certified operations, characterized by definition by a 
very high level of operational risk, will be mainly allocated in this 
portion of the airspace  
• Subspace beyond FL600: certified category RPAS operations 
characterized by very high endurance and range (up to several months) 
will be mainly allocated in this portion of the airspace. The operations 
like those performed by Google balloons up to RPAS flying above 
Mach number airspeed are examples of the sorties allocated in this 
subspace  
From the EUROCONTROL perspective (safety of flight navigation), the 
following further subdivision into classes of operations of the afore mentioned 
EUROCONTROL CONOPS can be highlighted as follows ([18] and [29]): 
•  ‘Very Low Level’ (VLL) operations subspace:  
o Class I operations: it will host EASA Open category 
operations performed by EASA Class A RPAS ([27] and 
[28]); the requirements for RPAS are the following ones: 
 The RPAS shall have 3D self-separation capability 
 The RPAS operations are conducted in RLOS only 
 The RPAS shall have geo fencing software 
functionality to ensure separation from No-Drone 
Zones (NDZ)  
 The declaration of operation is mandatory 
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 The flights can be performed for recreational purpose 
only [29] 
o Class II operations: it will host EASA specific/certified 
category operations; the requirements for RPAS are the 
following ones: 
 The RPAS shall have 3D self-separation capability 
 The RPAS shall have surveillance capability through 
the use of 4G chips or other equivalent devices 
 The RPAS shall have free flight capability 
 The RPAS operations can be conducted in RLOS 
and/or in BRLOS  
 The RPAS shall be equipped with barometric 
measurement equipment for BRLOS operations 
 The declaration of operation is mandatory 
 The flight missions can be performed for survey, for 
video recording/photo shooting, search and rescue 
purposes and similar aims 
o Class III operations: it will host EASA specific/certified 
category operations; the requirements for RPAS are the 
following ones: 
 The RPAS shall have surveillance capability  
 The RPAS shall have free flight capability or it shall 
be capable of  flying along structured routes 
 The RPAS operations can be conducted in BRLOS  
 The RPAS shall be equipped with barometric 
measurement equipment for BRLOS operations 
 The declaration of operation is mandatory 
 The flight missions can be performed mainly for 
transport purposes 
o Class IV operations: it will host EASA specific/certified 
category operations; the requirements for RPAS are the 
following ones: 
 The surveillance capability may be required or not 
according to the mission requirements 
 The RPAS will remain clear of manned traffic 
 The risk assessment will be required 
 The flight authorization will be released according to 
risk assessment results  
 These operations class will include very specialized 
sorties like civil, State or military very specific flight 
missions 
• Operations between 500 feet of altitude from ground and flight level 
FL600 subspace: 
 43 
 
o CLASS V operations: it will host EASA certified category 
operations only; the requirements for RPAS are the following 
ones: 
 The flight plan including information about the type 
of unmanned aircraft, the planned ‘Contingency 
Procedure and a contact phone number shall be filed 
before starting the mission 
 The RPAS shall meet the CNS airspace requirements 
 The RPAS shall establish and maintain two way 
communication with ATC  
 RPAS operator ability to contact ATC in case of: C2 
link loss, emergency and controlled termination of 
flight  
 The RPAS will remain clear of manned traffic  
 The RPAS will have detect and avoid capability 
cooperative with existing ACAS systems 
 The RPAS shall be able to perform VFR/IFR 
operations outside the pan-European network 
 The RPAS is not required to have SIDs and STARs 
capability 
 The RPAS operations at the aerodrome will be 
accommodated through separation of launch and 
recovery 
 These operations class will manly include missions for 
transport purposes and military sorties 
o CLASS VI operations: it will host EASA certified category 
operations only; the requirements for RPAS are the following 
ones: 
 The flight plan including information about the type 
of unmanned aircraft, the planned ‘Contingency 
Procedure and a contact phone number shall be filed 
before starting the mission 
 The RPAS shall meet the CNS airspace requirements 
 The RPAS shall establish and maintain two way 
communication with ATC  
 RPAS operator ability to contact ATC in case of: C2 
link loss, emergency and controlled termination of 
flight  
 The RPAS will remain clear of manned traffic  
 The RPAS will have detect and avoid capability 
cooperative with existing ACAS systems 
 The RPAS shall be able to perform VFR/IFR 
operations within the pan-European network 
 The RPAS is required to have SIDs and STARs 
capability 
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 Any kind of RPAS certified operation will be allowed 
in this class of operations 
o ‘Very High Level’ (VHL) operations subspace: it will host 
EASA certified category operations only: 
 The flight plan shall always be filed before mission 
starting 
 The RPAS shall meet the CNS airspace requirements 
 A regional centralised system shall overview the 
ongoing flight operations 
 The RPAS operator shall contact the ATC to inform 
them about emergency re-entry into controlled 
airspace 
 The RPAS operator shall contact the ATC to inform 
them about emergency re-entry modalities (deflating 
balloons or orbital descending) 
 This class of operations will be used to perform 
stratospheric commercial flight with unmanned 
aircraft of flight balloons 
 The departure and arrival procedures shall be defined 
1.3.5 Traffic management service for RPAS 
The integration of RPAS into the airspace will impact existing Air Traffic 
Control/Management infrastructures and operators within both not controlled and 
controlled airspaces. For this reasons, EASA and EUROCONTROL foresee two 
different levels of traffic management service for RPAS operations: 
• The Specific operations within the VLL subspace will benefit from the 
so called U-space service; in the VLL subspace primary and secondary 
RADARs are not effective in tracking aircraft movements and in any 
case the tracked RPAS would appear as very small and cluttered bright 
dots on the air controllers displays thus resulting in totally ineffective 
images for safety purposes 
• The Certified operations will start from the VLL subspace (take-off 
and climb), then they will continue in the controlled airspace (cruise) 
until eventually exceeding the upper limit of the controlled airspace 
(cruise) before the descending to conclude the mission: therefore they 
will fully benefit from the ATM service like manned aircraft and will 
be under RADAR or navigation satellites coverage 
The main technical features of U-Space also referred as UTM (Unmanned 
Traffic Management service) and ATM services are of interest for the safety 
analysis object of this thesis, therefore they are hereinafter briefly described. 
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U-Space service 
The U-space is defined by SESAR1 [30] as a set of new services and specific 
procedures defined to support the safe, secure and efficient access of a large 
number of RPAS to the civil airspace.  
The U-space, that still does not exist, will rely on a high level of digitalisation 
and automation of functions, spread whether on ground and on board the RPAS. 
Its framework will provide proper services to support daily routine RPAS 
operations and a clear, safe and effective interface towards manned aviation, 
towards air traffic management and air navigation service providers and towards 
aviation authorities. In accordance with the ICAO concept of full integration of 
RPAS into the civil airspace [4], the U-space will not be a defined volume of 
airspace, segregated and designated for the use of remotely piloted aircraft only 
but it will be implemented to smoothly allow their operation within all possible 
operating environments and airspaces. For simplicity, in the first phases of the U-
space deployment, that is the scenario considered in this thesis, it can be 
reasonably assumed that the U-space physically coincides with the above 
mentioned VLL subspace defined from ground level to 500 feet of altitude ([18], 
[29]).   
The U-space will be functionally designed and technically implemented 
according to the following key principles [30]: 
• To ensure the safe operation of RPAS users both in the airspace and 
on ground 
• To provide a scalable, flexible and adaptable system to promptly 
respond to expected future evolution of RPAS operations demand, 
volume, technology, etc. 
• To enable high-density operations with multiple automated RPAS 
under the supervision of fleet operators 
• To guarantee an equal and fair access to all users to the airspace 
• To encourage the exploitation for RPAS of up-to-date services 
addressed for the moment to manned aviation only like, for instance, 
GNSS-SBAS navigation services 
• To guarantee a low cost enhancement of the U-Space through the 
adaptation to the aeronautical standards of infrastructures and 
services coming from other industrial sectors: for example, the 
4G/LTE/5G networks, the cloud platforms and the ‘Internet of 
Things’ (IoT), accordingly moreover to the high level of automation 
and digitalization foreseen for the U-Space 
• To ensure protection of RPAS from cyber threats 
• To ensure a minimal environmental impact 
• To ensure privacy protection 
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The U-space will host and facilitate RPAS flight operations from simple tasks 
like the delivery of goods, to aerial work to very complex services like the urban 
air mobility. 
The U-space will be rolled up according to the following stages [30]: 
• U1: Provision of the U-space foundation services of e-registration, e-
identification and geo fencing  
• U2: Provision of the U-space initial RPAS flight management services  
including, for example, flight planning, flight approval, flight tracking, 
airspace dynamic information service, and procedural interfaces with 
the air traffic control  
• U3: Provision of the U-space advanced services to support more 
complex RPAS operations in dense areas and including capability for  
conflict detection management and assistance even using automated 
‘detect and avoid’ (DAA) functionalities and more reliable 
communication datalinks 
• U4: Provision of the U-space full services comprehensive of integrated 
interfaces with manned aviation, supporting the full operational 
capability of U-space and relying on very high level of automation, 
connectivity and digitalisation for both the RPAS and the U-space 
system 
The following example taken from [30] is hereinafter briefly reported as a 
practical example of the type of operating scenarios where safety hazards object 
of the assessment discussed in this thesis can occur (Figure 7 [30]): 
1. RPAS mission set up: the operator chooses an RPAS from his/her own 
fleet to deliver a package from a village to a urban centre 40 
kilometres away. The RPAS will be e-registered; therefore ATM 
information like NOTAMs, forecasts etc. will be immediately 
available for the selected RPAS and matched with it and with its 
airworthiness and emergency mitigation features 
2. Submission of the flight request and receipt of the acknowledgement: 
the proposed RPAS planned routes are compared to applicable 
regulations and airspace requirements and eventually reviewed to fit 
with other RPAS conflicting routes; the resulting 4D trajectory is 
proposed for acceptance; it is accepted by the RPAS operator with an 
acknowledgement and re-sent to him/her. During the flight the RPAS 
will broadcast its unique identifier to be tracked for all the sorties 
receiving update information and alerts on contingent traffic and 
meteorological conditions (for example) 
3. Performance of the flight operation: the DAA functionality is available 
and usable for example to avoid birds or other contingent mid-air 
conflicting traffic; an alert about the presence on the RPAS route of a 
police state RPAS to monitor a cars accident and the approaching of 
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an helicopter ambulance is sent to the RPAS geo-fence system 
(consequently updated with reference to the given NOTAM) to 
prevent it to enter the temporary restricted area  
4. RPAS mission completion: the RPAS safely reaches the planned 
destination and deliver the payload parcel; it can take-off again to 
perform the successive flight sortie  
 
Figure 7 – U-space [30] 
ATM service  
In addition to the description of airpace incoming upgrade to a global full 
integrated service provider reported in Paragraph 1.2, the following information 
useful for the risk analysis of RPAS operations under ATM service are furterly 
detailed: 
• The manned aircraft are currently identified using transponder codes 
that allow aircraft tracking by ground based RADAR systems; the next 
step will be equipping all airspace users with ADS-B devices; the 
aircraft (included RPAS) will be able to detect each other thanks to the 
broadcast surveillance capablity typical of this new kind of 
transponder. This functionality is supported by GNSS satellite-based 
system and in particular by GALILEO-EGNOS SOL service in the 
controlled airspace above Europe [31] 
• According to [30] and [31], the manned aircraft flights are performed 
under ‘Visual Flight Rules’ (VFR flights) or ‘Instrumental Flight 
Rules’ (IFR flights). The VFR flights do not require the use of flight 
instrumentation; the IFR flights require the use of flight 
instrumentation. The ATC authorizes the execution of both VFR or 
IFR flights after having examinated the associated flight plan 
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• The ATC includes technical offices that provide meteorological 
forecasts to pilots. Meteorological forecasts are statement of expected 
meteorological conditions for a specified time or period, and for a 
specified area or portion of airspace [33] 
• The airpaces are divided and ruled as follows (Table 2 [34]): 
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Table 2 – Airspace classes definition [34] 
Class 
Type of flight 
served 
Service 
provided 
Separation 
provided 
Radio 
communication 
requirements 
ATC 
clearance 
Notes 
A IFR only 
Air traffic  
control service 
All aircraft 
Continuous,  
two ways 
Yes Controlled airspace 
B 
IFR 
Air traffic  
control service 
All aircraft 
Continuous,  
two ways 
Yes Controlled airspace 
VFR 
Air traffic  
control service 
All aircraft 
Continuous,  
two ways 
Yes Controlled airspace 
C 
IFR 
Air traffic  
control service 
IFR from IFR 
IFR from VFR 
Continuous, 
 two ways 
Yes Controlled airspace 
VFR 
- Air traffic 
control 
service for 
separation from 
IFR 
- VFR/VFR 
traffic 
information 
VFR from IFR 
Continuous,  
two ways 
Yes Controlled airspace 
D 
IFR 
Air traffic 
control service 
including 
information 
about 
VFR flights 
(traffic 
avoidance 
on request) 
IFR from IFR 
Continuous,  
two ways 
Yes Controlled airspace 
VFR 
Traffic 
information 
between 
VFR and IFR 
(traffic 
avoidance on 
request) 
Nil 
Continuous,  
two ways 
Yes Controlled airspace 
E 
IFR 
Air traffic 
control service 
and 
traffic 
information 
about VFR 
flights 
IFR from IFR 
Continuous, 
two ways 
Yes Controlled airspace 
VFR 
Traffic 
information  
as far as 
practical 
Nil 
Continuous,  
two ways 
Yes Controlled airspace 
F 
IFR 
Air traffic 
advisory 
service; 
flight 
information 
service 
IFR from IFR 
as 
far as 
practicable 
Continuous,  
two ways 
No 
Uncontrolled 
airspace 
VFR 
Flight 
information 
service 
Nil No No 
Uncontrolled 
airspace 
G 
IFR 
Flight 
information 
service 
Nil 
Continuous,  
two ways 
No 
Uncontrolled 
airspace 
VFR 
Flight 
information 
service 
Nil No No 
Uncontrolled 
airspace 
1.3.6 The SESAR research program  
Both in Europe and in the United States two similar research initiatives are 
on-going to study the reorganization of airspace management according to the 
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new guidelines issued by ICAO on the Global Air Traffic Management [23]. The 
European research program is the ‘Single European Sky Air Traffic Management 
Research Joint Undertaking’ [35] (SESAR-JU, now going on as 
SESAR1/SESAR2020); the US research program is called NextGen. This thesis 
will consider the European research program only with its relationship with the 
full integration of RPAS into the European not segregated airspace.   
The SESAR research program, following the European Commission’s 
‘Roadmap for the integration of civil RPAS into the European aviation system’ 
issued in 2013, launched its first research activity on RPAS integration into not 
segregated airspaces through nine demonstration projects [36]. Many universities, 
research centres and small/medium enterprises were called to take part to this 
initiative. The purpose was to perform real flight tests with RPAS in non-
segregated airspace to identify and to assess potentialities and limitations of 
current regulations, technologies and infrastructures with respect to the incoming 
challenge of the integration of RPAS into controlled airspace. 
 
Among the above mentioned projects, the RAID demo project1 [37] will be 
hereinafter described more in detail as source for the idea of implementing a 
comprehensive risk matrix as first output of the safety analysis on hazards related 
to the integration of RPAS into not segregated airspaces.   
The RAID demo project 
The RAID demo project experimental activity was focused on simulation and 
flight testing activity of RPAS merged with manned aircraft in the controlled not 
segregated airspace. It has been performed by a consortium composed of the 
following actors:  
                                               
1
 Disclosure note: The activities hereinafter cited have been carried out in the 
frame of the project RAID and co-financed by the ‘SESAR Joint Undertaking’ 
(SJU) as part of RPAS Demo projects of the SESAR Program (2013 SESAR 
SJU/LC/0087-CFP). The opinions expressed in this thesis reflect the PhD 
Candidate views only and the SJU shall not be considered liable for them or for 
any use that may be made of the information contained herein. 
The PhD Candidate was not personally involved in the execution of the 
experimental activity described and discussed in the RAID demo project document 
reported in [37]; nevertheless, due to the topic of the PhD research activity, and 
by mean of the Supervisor Professor Francesco Grimaccia, She has been 
authorized by Engineer Edoardo Filippone from the ‘Centro Italiano Ricerche 
Aerospaziali (CIRA) to access the RAID demo project final report content.  
Professor Francesco Grimaccia and Engineer Edoardo Filippone took part to the RAID 
experimental activity as Advisor of Nimbus S.r.l. and as Responsible Manager for CIRA activities 
in the demo projects respectively. 
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• The ‘Centro Italiano Ricerche Aeropaziali’, (CIRA) Research Centre, 
which was also the coordinator responsible of the whole experimental 
activity 
• The Malta Air Navigation Service Provider, MATS, which provided 
support to the activity for the aspects related to the air traffic control 
• The University of Malta 
• Nimbus S.r.l., an Italian small/medium enterprise, which provided the 
RPAS used during the experimental activity 
• Deep Blue S.r.l., an Italian small/medium enterprise, which provided 
support to the activity for the aspects related to human factor and 
operations 
• NAIS S.r.l., an Italian small/medium enterprise, which provided 
support to the activity for the aspects related to cybersecurity 
The flight activity was performed from April 27th to May 6th 2016; each flight 
sortie started taking off from the airport of Capua close to the CIRA infrastructure 
and flying within the delimitated airspace shown in Figure 8 [37]. 
 
 
Figure 8 – RAID demo project flight test area (from [37]) 
Twelve flight tests were performed to collect data and information about a 
variety of elements related to the integration of RPAS with manned aircraft under 
ATC control. Among the others, the sudden intrusion of manned or unmanned 
aircraft on the RPAS route was physically tested as very critical scenario from a 
safety perspective. The aircraft used during the experimental activities were the 
following ones [37]:  
• The CIRA Optionally Piloted Vehicle FLARE OPV TECNAM P92 
Echo-S VLA aircraft: it was remotely piloted from ground or directly 
piloted by the human pilot on board to alternatively play the role of 
unmanned or manned aircraft flying in the airspace  
• The Storm RG CS-VLA aircraft: it simulated the manned intruder  
• The PPL 612 RPAS: it was provided by the Nimbus S.r.l.; it simulated 
the unmanned intruder 
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Table 3 shows the flight tests sorties where safety hazards occurred ([37], 
[38]).  
 
Table 3 – RAID test sorties with elements relevant to safety ([37], [38]) 
   Flight #* 
Type of 
involved 
traffic 
FLARE in 
RPAS Mode 
(Time window) 
Safety hazards 
DAA/ 
ADS-B  
failure 
C2Link failure 
Limitation  
in human 
performances 
Weather and 
terrain + 
DAA/ADS-B 
failure  
Weather and 
terrain + C2 link 
failure 
Loss of 
GNSS, DAA 
and C2 Link 
Systems 
1 
 
FLARE 
A/C only 
41‘ - - x - - - 
2 
 
FLARE 
A/C only 
22‘ - - x - - - 
3 
 
FLARE 
A/C only 
33‘ - - x x x x 
4 
 
FLARE A/C 
& Mini RPAS 
24‘ - - x - - - 
5 
 
FLARE 
A/C & 
manned VLA 
7‘ - - x - - - 
6 
 
FLARE 
A/C & 
manned VLA 
20‘ - - x - - - 
 
*Not original flight number. 
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Table 3 – RAID test sorties with elements relevant to safety ([37], [38]) (Cont’d) 
   Flight #* 
Type of 
involved 
traffic 
FLARE in 
RPAS Mode 
(Time window) 
Safety hazards 
DAA/ 
ADS-B  
failure 
C2 Link 
failure 
Limitation  
in human 
performances 
Weather and 
terrain + 
DAA/ADS-B 
failure  
Weather and 
terrain + C2 link 
failure 
Loss of 
GNSS, DAA 
and C2 Link 
Systems 
8 
 
FLARE 
A/C & 
manned VLA 
25‘ - - x x x x 
9 
 
FLARE 
A/C & 
manned VLA 
29‘ x x x x x x 
10 
 
FLARE 
A/C & 
manned VLA 
31‘ x x x x x x 
11 
 
FLARE 
A/C & 
manned VLA 
6‘ x x x x x x 
12 
 
FLARE 
A/C only 
20‘ x x x x x x 
 
The safety hazards of Table 3 ([37], [38]) have been assessed according to the 
criteria provided by ICAO Doc. 9859 [3] (these criteria will be described in 
Chapter 2) to draft a preliminary safety risk matrix (Table 4 [38]) as preliminary 
demo of the more comprehensive safety risk matrices implemented during the 
PhD research and reported in Appendix D.  
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Table 4 – Preliminary safety risk matrix [38] 
Hazard  
Risk assessment 
Safety risk 
probability 
Safety risk 
severity 
Safety risk 
assessment 
Tolerability 
Risk range 
description 
Recommended 
action 
DAA/ 
ADS-B  
failure 
Occasional (4) 
Catastrophic  
(5 or A) 
4A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut 
back operation 
promptly 
C2 link  
failure 
Occasional (4) 
Catastrophic  
(5 or A) 
4A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut 
back operation 
promptly 
Human factor: ATC 
high workload 
Occasional (4) 
Hazardous  
(4 or B) 
4B Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut 
back operation 
promptly 
Human factor: 
Remote pilot high 
workload 
Occasional (4) 
Hazardous  
(4 or B) 
4B Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut 
back operation 
promptly 
Meteorological 
conditions* 
- - - - - - 
Impact  
against  
terrain 
Occasional (4) 
Catastrophic (5 
or A) 
4A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut 
back operation 
promptly 
Jamming/ 
spoofing with 
DAA/ADS-B  
in failure 
Improbable (2) 
Hazardous  
(4 or B) 
2B 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
Moderate risk 
Schedule 
performance of 
a safety 
assessment to 
bring down the 
risk index to 
the low range 
if viable 
* For safety reasons, all RAID sorties were performed under visual meteorological conditions 
[37].  
1.4 The methodology  
In the previous paragraphs the necessary premises for the safety analysis 
object of this thesis have been described and discussed. In this paragraph, the 
methodology followed to carry out the overall research is hereafter detailed: 
A. Identification of the system to be studied and of its boundaries/interfaces 
with external environment: the system is the whole of the RPAS integrated 
with manned aircraft into the controlled/uncontrolled not segregated 
airspace. The elements of this ensemble are: the RPAS; the other manned 
or unmanned cooperative or not cooperative traffic also referred to as 
intruders; the airspace as infrastructure with its operating rules; the human 
factor intended as the RPAS remote pilot on ground, the manned aircraft 
pilot in command, the human beings on ground, the air traffic controllers; 
the third parties on ground intended both as natural obstacles and man-
made infrastructures  
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B. Definition of the concept of operation of RPAS into the not segregated 
airspace: it is the one defined on the basis of  EASA/EUROCONTROL 
state of art available documentation ([18], [28] and [29]) 
C. Hazards categorization definition: definition of a valuable hazards 
categorization following the RPAS functional guidelines defined by NASA 
and reported in [39] 
D. Reliability analysis: performance of FMECA and FTA analyses to identify 
single and combined failure causes of RPAS potentially leading to 
contingent hazards 
E. Human factor safety analysis: performance of RPAS related human factor 
safety analysis using SHELL and HFACS methodologies potentially 
leading to human factor related hazards for RPAS systems 
F. Hazard logs draft: draft of two hazard logs following the categorization of 
RPAS functionalities proposed by NASA in [39]: one related to the 
hazards expected to occur during specific category RPAS flight operations 
performed within the U-Space, from ground to 500 feet of altitude, in an 
uncontrolled airspace and the other one related to the hazards expected to 
occur during certified category RPAS flight operations performed mainly 
beyond 500 feet of altitude, within controlled airspaces served by ATM.  
G. Safety risk assessment execution: execution of the safety risk analysis and 
draft of two safety risk matrices named ‘U-Space risk matrix’ and ‘ATM 
risk matrix’  
H. From this point onwards, the safety analysis has been focused on the U-
space due to the fact that the RPAS operations performed into the VLL will 
be the first ones allowed to be executed  
I. Bow Tie analysis: the most significant hazards listed in the U-space matrix 
have been further analysed investigating threats that can cause the system 
operational drift from its baseline condition and the defences/barriers that 
can be applied to avoid catastrophic consequences occurrence; this stage of 
the safety analysis has been performed using the Bow Tie methodology 
[40]  
J. Rule-based ‘Expert System’ knowledge basis implementation:  the content 
of each hazard listed in the U-space matrix has been reconsidered and 
developed (when possible) into a rule or a set of rules composing the 
knowledge basis of a rule-based ‘Expert System’ [41]; the knowledge basis 
has been intended as fundamentals for the future implementation of a 
software based on artificial intelligence and capable of providing dynamic 
support to the remote pilot or directly to the RPAS (during fully automatic 
flight missions) in identifying precursors of high and medium risk hazards 
and mitigating their consequences thus avoiding catastrophic consequences 
occurrence  
K. ‘Expert System’ knowledge basis rules coverage verification: verification 
of the ‘Expert System’ knowledge basis rules from the perspective of 
system engineering verifying the coverage and consistency of the 
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elaborated rules against the hazards and failure conditions identified with 
the safety analysis 
L. RPAS high level functional architecture oriented towards in-flight hazards 
occurrence prevention and mitigation: drafting of a proposal for an RPAS 
high level functional architecture capable of counteract high and medium 
risk in flight hazards 
M. Review of the first available U-Space infrastructure proposed in literature 
and on the web: a critical review of the first available U-Space 
infrastructure proposed in literature and on the web and studied during the 
research has been carried out on the basis of the performed safety risk 
analysis  
N. Example of application of the ‘System Theoretic Process Analysis’ (STPA) 
[42] hazard methodology: an example of the application of this technique 
has been executed to directly evaluate its features as hazards analysis 
technique and to find out some examples of difference of this technique 
with respect to the traditional ones used in the research 
O. Italian RPAS regulation: critical evaluation of Italian RPAS regulation 
from safety perspective on the basis of the analysis carried out during the 
research  
P. Hybrid RPAS functional architecture proposal description and evaluation: 
performance of a brief digression on RPAS hybrid solutions to show and 
discuss safety and operative requirements for a high level hybrid RPAS 
functional architecture proposal 
1.5 Conclusions 
The full integration of RPAS into the civil not segregated airspace will allow 
a fruitful development of their European production both in Europe and 
worldwide. A common set of regulations and industry standards as well a 
comprehensive risk analysis to prevent the occurrence of catastrophic accidents 
are strictly necessary to support this integration.  
Starting from the recent new recommendations issued by ICAO on Safety 
Management System for aeronautical operators and the safety hazards 
preliminarily identified by the consortium led by CIRA within the SESAR RAID 
demo project flight test activity, the idea raised up to focus the research activity of 
the Doctorate on the performance of a comprehensive safety analysis of the 
hazards related to the integration of RPAS into not segregated civil airspaces. 
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Chapter 2 
Safety Management System: 
general overview 
2.1 Safety in aviation 
The safety in aviation is defined as the condition in which the possibility to 
harm human beings or to damage third parties properties is reduced to and 
maintained at or below an acceptable level using a continue process of hazard 
identification and safety risk management [3].  
Being aviation a complex industrial sector that will never be completely free 
of risks for its nature, the safety management acts as a dynamic provision to 
continuously fit to the contingent hazards.  
With time, safety in aviation has become a matter of culture as all the aviation 
stakeholders (manufacturers, commercial companies, etc.) are called to be 
responsible about safety continuously identifying and mitigating hazards. 
During the Twentieth century, safety in aviation evolved from the technical 
era, when aircraft accidents where due to mechanical failures of equipment, 
passing through the human factor era, when after that reliability of parts had been 
enormously enhanced, the responsibility of safety was moved to the pilots, until 
arriving to the current organizational era where safety has become a responsibility 
of the aviation organization [3]. For instance, with reference to commercial 
aviation, this means that the whole of personnel managing aerodromes and their 
infrastructures, air companies crews and air traffic controllers are committed to 
maintain at a safe level their assets during both on ground and in flight operations. 
The accident of Linate (8th September 2000) is an example of hazard occurrence 
with catastrophic consequences due to the lack of system safety at organizational 
level: the lack of RADARs to monitor Linate aerodrome ground movements, 
made the air traffic controllers miss the runaway incursion of a small aircraft that 
was hit by a commercial liner during its take-off run. Death of persons and 
damages to third parties on ground occurred as catastrophic level consequences.  
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Nowadays, safety in aviation is systematically managed applying ‘Safety 
Management System’ (SMS) criteria [3].  
Remembering the above mentioned definition of SMS and the recent ICAO 
regulations on safety management cited in Chapter 1, the core idea considered in 
this Doctorate has been the assessment of safety risks related to the operations of 
RPAS into the civil not segregated airspace, alongside manned aircraft, 
identifying possible hazards and mitigation actions to maintain operational risk 
below or at an acceptable low level, according to a qualitative assessment as 
described in Chapter 3. 
In this Chapter basic definitions of SMS concepts are exposed which have 
been used to perform the safety analysis object of this thesis and reported in 
Chapter 3.  
2.2 The Safety Management System 
The Safety Management System is based on four pillars [3]: 
• Safety policy and objectives 
• Safety risk management 
• Safety assurance 
• Safety promotion 
with the following meaning: the safety policy and objectives is the whole of 
an aviation organization management commitment, responsibility and 
accountability for implementing safety and maintaining safety. It consists of the 
identification and assignment of responsibilities to designated key safety 
personnel. The safety risk management is the continuous process aimed to identify 
hazards and to analyse, assess and control the associated risks. The safety 
assurance is the set of processes addressed to verify if the organization meets or 
exceeds the committed safety performance objectives thus providing it a 
monitoring of the adopted safety policy effectiveness. The safety promotion is the 
whole of actions performed to improve the organizational safety culture and its 
continuous improvement. 
The incoming of RPAS into the civil airspace will introduce disruptive 
changes in the aviation system that will have to be properly managed and 
mitigated. Considering the economic value of RPAS, the following applies 
(Figure 9 [3]): the best compromise shall be found between the provision of 
advanced mitigations solutions for safety of operations like avionic equipment and 
other technological solutions and the global RPAS economic value. The point is 
specifically crucial for light RPAS, that will be the first to be employed for 
commercial operations, and whose total cost (RPAS, operations, maintenance) 
shall have to remain strongly competitive with respect to manned aircraft (general 
aviation, helicopters) to allow their European market development fostering. 
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Figure 9 – Safety space definition [3] 
2.3 The Safety Management Risk 
The safety risk management is the former process of identification, 
assessment and mitigation of system safety risks. The crucial phase of the safety 
management process is the hazards elimination or mitigation (Figure 10 [3]). 
The methodology for hazards identification can be reactive, proactive or 
predictive. The reactive methodology is based on the study of incidents and 
accidents reports issued after the given occurrence; the proactive approach is 
based on the voluntary report on real-time inconveniences, on precursors of 
hazards or on hazards; the predictive approach involves data gathering to identify 
new possible hazards and outcomes investigating on the processes and the 
environment where the system under analysis operates [3].  
Considering that the integration of RPAS into the civil airspace is coming, but 
it is not yet a reality, the safety risk analysis reported in this document has been 
based on a predictive approach conjecturing the new hazards expected to occur 
when RPAS and manned aircraft will operate together in the same not segregated 
airspace.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 60 
 
 
Figure 10 – Safety Risk Management process [3] 
2.3.1 Risk analysis main definitions  
The risk analysis main definitions used in this work are the following ([3] and 
[43]): 
• Hazards: a hazard is the potential to cause harm; it can be a physical 
situation or a state of a system 
• Risk: the risk is a measure of the exposure of the system to the hazard. 
The risk is expressed both in terms of the quantification of the hazard 
consequences severity and in terms of the quantification of the hazard 
probablility of occurrence (or likelihood). From a mathematical 
perspective, the risk associated to an hazard is the product of the 
consequence severity and  the probablility of its occurrence  
• Accident: an accident is an unintended event or sequence of events 
that causes harm 
• Accident sequence: the accident sequence is the whole of a cause or 
initiating event that activates the hazard, the hazard occurrence, and 
finally the accident occurrence 
• Drift: it is the deviation of the system performance from its baseline  
• Practical drift: it is the deviation of the system behaviour from its 
baseline during its operation 
 61 
 
• Mitigation actions: they are the barriers and the defences of the system 
against the hazard occurrence and its consequences severity 
The above mentioned definitions are inextricably linked among them: the 
sudden failure of an equipment or system functionality or the violation of a 
procedure can provoke an hazard able to move the performance of the system 
from its baseline to a practical drift. If the hazard event occurs in such a way to 
trespass all the defences of the system, the incident or accident occurs.  
2.3.2 Types of risk management  
The risk assessment activity can be performed applying qualitative, 
semiquantitative or quantitative methodologies [43]: 
• Qualitative risk assessment: 
o Risk based judment for relatively minor hazards  
o Hazard identification techniques characterized by a qualitative 
evaluation of significance of the hazards like Failure Modes 
and Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) 
o Risk matrices with description of likelihood and consequences  
• Semi qualitative risk assessment, giving order of magnitude 
estimation: 
o Risk matrices with descriptions of likelihood and consequences 
supported by numerical interpretation 
o Assessment of layers of protection 
• Quantitative risk assessment: 
o Risks are numerical estimation in order to perform 
comparisons against numerical risk criteria at evaluation stages 
2.3.3 The risk management and assessment process  
The risk assessment is a decisional process The steps of the safety risk 
management process are the following ones (Figure 11 [3]): 
• Hazard identification 
• Risk analysis probability (likelihood) of occurrences evaluation 
• Risk analysis severity evaluation 
• Risk assessment 
• Risk tolerability evaluation 
• Risk mitigation/Risk control identification 
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Figure 11 – Risk management process [3] 
The hazard identification techniques 
The hazard identification techniques are ([3], [43]): 
• Empirical techniques: 
o Deductive techniques: Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Accidents 
Investigation and Analysis, Fault Hazard Analysis (FHA) 
o Inductive techniques: Event Tree Analysis (ETA), Failure 
Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Failure Modes and 
Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) 
• Creative/Intuitive techniques: 
o Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOPS) 
• Other techniques: 
Job Tasks Analysis, Operational Hazard Assessment, Scenario 
Analysis, What If Analysis 
Risk assessment 
For any given hazard, the safety risk assessment is function of the probability 
(likelihood) of occurrence and of the severity of its consequences. 
For each safety hazard identified, the safety risk probability of occurrence 
shall be evaluated according to the content of Table 5 [3] considering possible 
valid scenarios. 
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Table 5 – ICAO safety risk probability table [3] 
Likelihood Meaning Value 
Frequent Likely to occur many times (has occurred frequently) 5 
Occasional Likely to occur sometimes (has occurred infrequently) 4 
Remote Unlikely to occur, but possible (has occurred rarely) 3 
Improbable Very unlikely to occur (not known to have occurred) 2 
Extremely improbable Almost inconceivable that the event will occur 1 
 
For each safety hazard identified, the safety risk severity of consequences 
shall be evaluated according to the content of Table 6 [3]. The safety risk severity 
is ranked taking into account the potential worst realistic consequences 
conceivable for the hazard under analysis in terms of fatalities or injuries of 
human beings or damages of infrastructures. 
 
Table 6 – ICAO safety risk severity of hazard occurrence consequences [3] 
Severity Meaning Value 
Catastrophic 
Equipment destroyed 
Multiple deaths  
5 
Hazardous 
A large reduction in safety margins, physical distress or a workload such 
that the operators cannot be relied upon to perform their tasks 
accurately or completely 
Serious injury 
Major equipment damage  
4 
Major 
A significant reduction in safety margins, a reduction in the ability of the 
operators to cope with adverse operating conditions as a result of an 
increase in workload or as a result of conditions impairing their 
efficiency 
Serious incident 
Injury to persons  
3 
Minor 
Nuisance 
Operating limitations 
Use of emergency procedures 
Minor incident  
2 
Negligible Few consequences  1 
 
The determined safety indexes (Table 7 [3]) shall be compared against the 
reference safety tolerability indexes shown in Table 8 [3]/Table 9 [3]. 
 
Table 7 – Safety indexes [3] 
Risk probability 
Risk severity 
Catastrophic A Hazardous B Major C Minor D Negligible E 
Frequent 5 5A 5B 5C 5D 5E 
Occasional 4 4A 4B 4C 4D 4E 
Remote 3 3A 3B 3C 3D 3E 
Improbable 2 2A 2B 2C 2D 2E 
Extremely improbable 1 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 
 
  
 64 
 
 
Table 8 – Safety risk tolerability matrix [3] 
Tolerability description Assessed risk index Suggested criteria 
 
5A, 5B, 5C, 4A, 4B, 
 3A
Unacceptable under 
the existing 
circumstances 
5D, 5E, 4C, 4D, 4E, 
3B, 3C, 3D, 2A, 2B, 
 2C, 1A
Acceptable based on 
risk mitigation. It 
may require 
management 
decision 
3E, 2E, 1E, 
2D, 1D, 
1B, 1C,  
Acceptable 
 
 
 
Table 9 – (Alternate) safety risk tolerability matrix [3] 
Risk  
index range 
Description Recommended action 
5A, 5B, 5C,  
 4A, 4B, 3A
High risk 
Cease or cut back operation promptly if 
necessary. Perform priority risk mitigation to 
ensure that additional or enhanced 
preventive controls are put in place to bring 
down the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
5D, 5E, 4C, 4D, 4E, 
3B, 3C, 3D, 2A, 2B, 
 2C, 1A
Moderate risk 
Schedule performance of a safety assessment 
to bring down the risk index to the low range 
if viable. 
3E, 2E, 1E,  
 2D, 1D, 1B, 1C,
Low risk 
Acceptable as it is. No further risk mitigation 
required. 
 
Risk mitigation 
The risk mitigations can be investigated using the Bow Tie methodology 
(Figure 12 [40]). It is as a qualitative structured risk analysis methodology chosen 
for its simplicity of use. 
It combines the causes/threats and the consequences/defenses related to an 
hazard event; it logically links the fault tree analysis on the left side of the bow tie 
with the event analysis on the right side of it through the central knot depicted in 
the scheme. The knot represents the top event direcly related with the hazard 
under analysis. The physical meaning of the scheme is the following: the threats, 
if not balanced by the barriers can activate the hazard which can make the top 
event to occur; once the top event has occurred, the mitigation actions only can 
limitate the severity of consequences. Both on the side of the threats/causes and 
on the side of the consequences/effects, escalations factors can be considered for a 
deeper analysis.   
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Figure 12 – Bow Tie scheme [40] 
Residual risk 
The residual risk [3] is the degree of safety risk that still remains after having 
applied the mitigation factors/defences to restrict the consequences of hazard 
occurrence. The residual risk may necessitate additional risk control measures. 
The human factor: SHELL and HFACS models 
The human factor is still present using RPAS even if the human pilot is not 
physically on board the aerial platform. 
The human factor involved in the RPAS operations has been evaluated at high 
level from safety perspective using the SHELL (‘Software, Hardware, 
Environment, Liveware, Liveware’) model [3]; then the shades of the human 
behaviour that mostly can lead into hazards can be furtherly characterized using 
the HFACS model [44]. 
The SHELL model allows to identify the basic relationships between the 
human operator and the other system elements around him/her. This model reflets 
the fact that in a system every mismatch in the above listed relationships can 
cause a hazard (Figure 13 [3]). The boundaries of each block are not straight to 
indicate the adaptability (with limitations) of the human being to the system. 
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Figure 13 – SHELL model [3] 
The possible relationships foreseen by the SHELL model are: 
• Liveware – Hardware: this branch of the model deals with the 
relationships between the human operator and the physical attributes 
of equipment, machines and facilities  
• Liveware – Software: this branch of the model deals with the 
relationships between the human operator and the supporting systems 
used in the workplace like, regulations, technical manuals, checklists, 
publications, standard operating procedures, computer software, etc. 
Further, it includes issues like, recency of experience, accuracy, 
format and presentation, vocabulary, clarity and symbology 
• Liveware – Environment: this branch of the model deals with the 
relationships between the human operator and the internal and external 
environmental aspects of the workplace like, for example: light, noise, 
temperature, etc. (among the internal issues) and weather, vibrations, 
noise, etc. (among the external ones) 
• Liveware – Liveware: this branch of the model deals with the 
relationships between the human operator in the work environment 
both among persons belonging to the same category (crews, ATC 
controllers, engineers, maintenance operators) and among persons 
afferent to different groups. The advent of the ‘Crew Resource 
Management’ (CRM) concept and its application to ATC and 
maintenance personnel too has acted during time as a mitigation factor 
against operational errors and malpractices caused by the human factor 
The ‘Human Factor Analysis and Classification System 2000’ (HFACS), 
(Figure 14 [44]), provides a taxonomy to describe and classify human behaviour.  
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Figure 14 – HFACS scheme [44] 
It was initially implemented by Professor James T. Reason and successively 
furtherly developed by two researchers Shappel and Wiegmann [44], after having 
analysed about 300 aerial accidents. 
The human factor discipline studies the organizational factors, the crew 
behaviour, performance and management in terms of crew resource management, 
ergonomics and aeromedical issues, describing and systematically classifying 
them.  
For the purpose of this work, the focus is mainly on human errors and 
violations (and related barriers/mitigation factors). The difference between them is 
in the intent. In fact, the error is always unintentional, while the violation is the 
deliberate performance of an unsafe act by-passing rules, procedures, protocols 
and established practices within an organization [3]. 
The consequence of errors and violations is usually a non-compliance with 
regulations or operative procedures potentially leading to a practical drift and to 
the generation of an hazard. Errors are actions or inactions performed by the 
operator leading to deviations from organizational or operator’s intentions or 
expectations. Properly mitigation actions can be applied by the organisation to 
prevent operator errors from occurring even if human errors will always happen 
regardless of the level of technology used: rather they can be different or 
enhanced depending on the kind and complexity of available technology. Within 
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SMS application, the operators are encouraged by the organisation to report errors 
occurrence to analyse and classify them and provide proper barriers to reduce 
their occurrence [3].  
Errors are mainly classified as ([3], [44] and [45]): 
• Slips and lapses: they are failures in the execution of the intended 
action. Slips are actions that do no go as planned; lapses are faults of 
human beings memory  
• Mistakes: they are errors in the plan of an action; they occur when the 
execution of the plan in correct, but it did not lead to the expected 
outcome 
Possible safety strategies to prevent errors from occurrence or to try to 
eliminate them are the following ones [3]: 
• Reductions strategies: they are put in action to reduce or eliminate the 
factors that can contribute to the error; for example: provision of 
ergonomic solutions for the aircraft crew 
• Capturing strategies: assuming that errors will be made, such 
strategies are designed to prevent errors from occurring capturing 
them; for example: provision of checklists for aircraft pilots 
• Tolerance strategies: they are those that lead to design the system so 
that it can accept the error and contain the effects of its consequences; 
for examples: rendundances on fault tolerant technological systems 
The violations [3] are usually deliberate acts of wilful misconduct or omission 
resulting in deviations from established regulations, procedures, norms or 
practices. The cases in which the operators violate procedures looking for a 
shortcut are violations as well (violations in judgment: the operator performs the 
violation believing not to cause negative consequences with his or her actions). 
They are classified as follows [3]: 
• Situational violations caused by factors experienced in a specific 
context like time pressure or excessive workload  
• Routine violations: they are violations of procedures due to 
practicality/workability issues that become, over the time, the normal 
way of performing a task within a working group. Such violations are 
committed in those cases when behaving in compliance with the 
established procedures makes difficult completing the task. This may 
be due to, deficiencies in human-technology interface design and 
other issues that cause persons to adopt workaround procedures, 
which eventually become routine 
• Organizationally induced violations: they are such an extension of 
routine violations. They usually occur when an organization attempts 
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to meet increased output demands by ignoring or stretching its safety 
defences 
2.4 Conclusions 
The main definitions related to Safety Management System and Safety Risk 
Assessment have been presented in this Chapter. 
They have been used to perform the safety analysis on RPAS integrated into 
the not segregated civil airspace for performance of specific category flight 
operations.  
The complete safety analysis is described and discussed in the following 
Chapter 3.  
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Chapter 3 
The safety analysis for RPAS flight 
operations 
3.1 Introduction 
The aim of the performed research has been the safety analysis of the light 
RPAS integration into the civil not segregated airspace. According to the 
definition of Safety Management System, the research has been addressed to 
identify safety possible hazards and mitigation provisions related to the system 
under analysis.  
In this Chapter, the categorization and identification of hazards is presented 
and discussed until arriving to the implementation of the U-Space and ATM risk 
matrices. 
Then, the analysis is focused on the U-space matrix only for the further 
assessment of threats and mitigation provisions applying the Bow Tie 
Methodology. At this stage of the research, it has been decided to concentrate on 
the U-Space scenario only because in the next future it will be the first one to host 
the initial phases of the integration of RPAS with manned aviation.  
This part of the work is then preparatory for the implementation of the rules 
composing the rule-based ‘Expert System’ knowledge basis described in Chapter 
4. 
3.2 RPAS safety hazards categorization: a functional 
approach 
As indicated in Paragraph 1.4 two distinct hazard risk matrices have been 
implemented in this work: the U-space matrix showing the safety assessment of 
hazards expected to occur during specific category flight operations in the VLL 
subspace (([18], [28], [29]); these missions will be carried out by light RPAS with 
maximum take-off weight between 25 and 150 kilograms under U-Space service; 
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the ATM matrix containing the safety assessment of hazards expected to occur 
during certified category flight operations mainly between 500 feet of altitude and 
FL600 and beyond, using RPAS with maximum take-off weight indicatively 
between 150 and 600 kilograms and flying under ATC control (Table 2).  
A regulatory-based integrated system/functional approach has been chosen to 
categorize the groups of hazards and successively to identify them and proceeding 
with the analysis. This approach has been preferred due to the lack of historical 
data on RPAS for the relative infancy of this technology and the current variety of 
technical features of existing unmanned platforms. In literature, this choice is 
confirmed to be a proper one as highlighted by many Authors ([46], [47]). More 
precisely, the classification of RPAS functional requirements draft by NASA in 
[39] has been applied.  
The integration of RPAS into the civil not segregated airspace will involve 
operational, functional, performance and design requirements [39]. The 
operational requirements define what is necessary to the RPAS to operate in the 
airspace. The functional requirements define what tasks and functions the RPAS 
shall necessarily perform. The performance requirements indicate how well the 
RPAS shall perform such tasks and functions. The design requirements indicate 
how the RPAS shall be implemented from the highest to the lowest physical level. 
Derived from manned aeronautics, the following four main classes of 
functional requirements can be applied to the RPAS too with proper differences 
and peculiar characterizations (Figure 15 [39]):   
• Aviate 
• Navigate 
• Communicate 
• Avoid hazards 
They includes all functional requirements necessary for a routinely and safely 
incremental integration of RPAS into the civil airspace. With respect to manned 
aviation, the RPAS are characterized by a fifth class of additional functionalities 
(cross-cutting functionalities) defined through the previous mentioned four ones.  
Aviate’, Navigate’ and ‘Communicate’ are the basic functionality classes that 
every pilot must adhere to in order to use and properly manage an aircraft system 
[39]: the ‘Aviate’ functionality class deals with flying the aircraft; the ‘Navigate’ 
functionality class deals with flying the aircraft in the right direction from a 
starting point to an ending point; the ‘Communicate’ functionality class deals with 
communicating own intentions during the flight operations to others; the ‘Avoid 
hazards’ deals with the prevention of hazards occurrence with special care for the 
RPAS [39] due to the absence of the human pilot on board but with the intention 
nevertheless to ensure safety while integrating RPAS into the not segregated 
airspace; the ‘Cross-cutting’ functionality deal with the ‘Command and Control’ 
and ‘Contingencies Management’ functions [39]. 
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Figure 15 – RPAS functionalities for a routine and safe integration in the controlled airspace [39] 
 
3.2.1 Aviate functionality 
The aviate functionality [39] deals more in detail with the capabilities shown 
in Figure 16 [39]. 
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Figure 16 – Aviate functionality [39] 
Under normal conditions, the RPA shall be able to take-off/to be launched 
(with reference to some fixed wing RPA) and abort take-off/launch if a sudden 
obstacle appears on the potential take-off/lunch trajectory of the aircraft.  
The RPA manoeuvring functionality covers air and on ground manoeuvring 
capabilities. The first one consists of the aircraft capability to change its flight 
path in terms of heading, airspeed and altitude in the airspace, by mean of flight 
controls and of the propulsion subsystem. The second one deals with the 
capability of the aircraft to change its ground speed and path (direction of 
movement) with respect to the ground. The command signals to manoeuvre the 
RPA both on ground and on air are generated on ground by the remote pilot by 
mean of a proper human machine interface (HMI) and converted into radio signals 
to be sent to the aircraft via the Command and Control (C2) radio link. The HMI 
is represented by the longitudinal, lateral and directional flight controls and the 
throttle to manage the aircraft attitude angles and the engines respectively; the 
HMI can be usually implemented through a joystick and the pedals inside the 
ground station (Figure 1 [5]) or different level switches arranged on hand-held 
portable remote controllers (Figure 2 [6] or Figure 3 [7]). Within the aviate 
functionality, the remote pilot shall be able to monitor the flying aircraft through 
other HMI devices like displays fed by the RPA downlink telemetry to verify if 
the aircraft is operating as expected or if corrective actions commanded through 
on ground controls are requested. 
The cruise functionality deals with the RPA capability to perform not 
accelerated flight in steady state conditions holding altitude or heading or airspeed 
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or climbing/descending according to contingent causes or ATC clearances and 
instructions. 
The recovery functionality deals with the conclusion of the flight operation 
that the remotely piloted aircraft shall be able to perform both under normal and 
emergency conditions like a go around manoeuvre in case of aborted landing in 
final approach. 
The structural integrity is intended as an embedded characteristic of the RPA 
that must be demonstrated for airworthiness and that shall be warranted during 
each flight sortie for the whole of its length.  
3.2.2 Navigate functionality  
The navigate functionality [39] accomplishes the navigation performance into 
the airspace: the RPA shall be able to go from the initial position of its route to the 
final destination following the chosen route in the assigned times. In other words, 
the RPA shall be able to follow the four dimensional navigation path in terms of 
latitude, longitude, altitude and time (Figure 17 [39]).  
 
 
Figure 17 – Navigate functionality [39] 
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More in details (Figure 17 [39]), the RPAS system shall be able to manage 
and follow the mission plan to reach the final destination both in normal 
conditions and in case of contingencies and shall be able to manage them. The 
RPAS shall access the mission plan to identify the current navigation data, to use 
them and to modify them adding or erasing waypoints and routes to accomplish 
contingency or emergency variations to the given initial mission plan. Finally the 
mission plan shall be recorded and communicated to the traffic management 
service to interact with the controllers during the flight. 
The RPA shall be able to identify its current position in the airspace. More 
specifically, very high accuracy will be requested to RPAS when flying specific 
category operations within urban or other kinds of highly congested scenarios; the 
same can be stated for RPAS requested to perform certified category missions 
performing for example up to IFR flights ([18], [29]). 
The transition to destination is the capability to identify the next waypoint in 
the route according to the flight plan. Within the navigate functionality, the RPA 
shall produce and execute navigation command signals to follow the planned 
route both in normal and contingent or emergency conditions. The execution of 
navigation command signals is a subset of aviate functionalities: the navigate 
command signals are generated using flight controls. 
The RPA shall convey to ground its navigational state so that the remote pilot 
or the ATM can verify if the aircraft is following the desired path in the airspace 
or if corrections are necessary. 
Finally, the RPAS shall be able to update the flight plan during flight due to 
any variation with respect to the original one both during normal flight 
occurrences (adverse weather conditions, for instance) and during emergency 
flight occurrences (contingent failures, conflict management, etc.). The flight plan 
shall also be updated in case of missions lasting many hours or days as it could 
happen with HALE RPAS (intended in this work for civilian applications only 
and mainly regarding certified category operation only). This is a performance 
feature typical of RPAS only due to the absence of the human pilot on board; in 
this case, different crews would shift on ground to maintain the RPA operative in 
flight during the whole mission length.  
3.2.3 Communicate functionality  
The communicate functionality [39] deals with the ability to transmit/receive 
data voice or ADS-B transponder data with all the entities involved in any RPAS 
operation or impacted by it (other airspace users) so to perform the operation in a 
safe and reliable manner both for the RPAS and the other airspace users.  
The communication is defined either as internal within the RPAS and external 
with the ATC or other airspace users (Figure 18 [39]). 
 
 
 
 
 76 
 
 
 
Figure 18 – Communicate functionality [39] 
The communication internal to the RPAS is bi-directional: the command and 
control signals generated by the remote pilot are changed into signals to the RPA 
on the uplink channel. The RPA telemetry is transmitted from the RPA to the 
ground on the downlink channel. The RPA telemetry feed the on ground displays 
that help the remote operator to monitor the RPA and the flight. Among 
communication internal to the RPAS, a further separated channel shall be 
dedicated to flight termination functionality. Communication external to the 
RPAS is the one implemented to contact the ATC as required by 
EUROCONTROL concept of operations (with reference to certified operations in 
Class V and Class VI in the subspace between 500 Feet and FL600, and in Class 
VII in the subspace beyond FL600, [18] and [29]). 
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3.2.4 Avoid hazards functionality  
The avoid hazards functionality [39] is implemented for RPAS through a 
larger use of advanced technology than for manned aircraft due to the absence of 
the pilot on board (Figure 19 [39]). 
 
Figure 19 – Avoid hazards functionality [39] 
The RPAS will be integrated into the civil not segregated airspace introducing 
proper mitigation action to avoid: 
• Mid-air collision with manned aircraft 
• Mid-air collision with other unmanned aircraft 
• Collision with people on ground 
• Collision with infrastructures and third properties on ground 
With reference to Figure 19 [39], these concerns are reflected in the following 
functionalities: the avoidance of collisions with surfaces that deals with the risk of 
impact with terrain, bodies of water and obstructions on ground that is natural 
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obstacles like hills or mountains or man-made infrastructures like buildings, 
bridges, etc.; the RPA shall avoid mid-air collision with other aircraft in flight 
being detectable to other traffic so that other traffic too can avoid collision with it; 
furthermore the RPA shall be able to avoid the contingent threats indicated by the 
ATC or reported by the Collision Avoidance System installed on the RPA; the 
Collision Avoidance System shall detect potential conflicting traffic and track it; 
it shall evaluate the threats collision potential and prioritize them; finally, if it 
results necessary to avoid the collision in flight, it shall determine the correct 
avoidance manoeuvre, command it to the RPAS and make the aerial platform to 
execute it. The collision manoeuvre performance depends upon the RPAS aviate 
functionality with reference to the generation and execution of requested flight 
commands.  
With reference to weather, the RPAS shall replicate the same capability of 
adverse weather monitoring and avoidance as the human pilot does with the 
support of on board instrumentation on manned aircraft. The adverse weather 
awareness shall be maintained during the whole flight sortie. In case of adverse 
weather occurrence on the route, the RPAS shall be able to avoid it coordinating 
the most proper avoidance manoeuvre, commanding it to the aircraft and 
executing it by mean of the aviate functionality. In the most complex operations 
the RPAS shall communicate the weather avoidance manoeuvre to the ATC 
through the ‘Communicate’ functionality (certified operations in Class V and 
Class  VI in the subspace between 500 Feet and FL600, and in Class VII in the 
subspace beyond FL600, [18] and [29]) 
3.2.5 Cross-cutting functionalities 
The cross-cutting functionalities [39] deal with the RPAS command and 
control (C2 radio link) and contingencies management functionalities (Figure 20 
[39]). 
The command and control functionality comprehends the information 
exchange, the control of the RPAS operations, the prevention of unauthorized 
operations to occur and the provision of the link connectivity. 
The contingencies management functionality comprehends the RPAS health 
and status and contingencies management functionality in terms of system status 
monitoring and possible contingencies identification, prioritization and mitigation.  
The information exchange functionality comprehends the uplink 
communication functionality to send undamaged and uncorrupted timely 
command signals and controls to the RPA and the downlink communication 
functionality to receive undamaged and uncorrupted timely telemetry on ground 
(in the Ground Control Station or to a portable hand held device). The command 
signals and controls and telemetry shall be exchanged as defined to effectively 
provide the remote pilot with necessary and correct data at the right time to 
conduct flight operation in a safe way.  
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Figure 20 – Cross-cutting functionalities [39] 
The uplink communication data include data like the command signals to 
manoeuvre and control the RPA, the autopilot flight modes, the command signals 
for the payload sensors and the flight termination in case of emergency condition 
during flight; the downlink communication data include the RPA subsystems data 
related to their nominal operation, data useful for the remote pilot situation 
awareness (alerts and warnings), health and status data from on board RPA 
subsystems and eventually other data as needed.  The health and status parameters 
sent to the ground can contribute to enhance the remote pilot situational awareness 
and its safe conduct of the RPA during any flight mission. 
The command and control radio link shall be capable of prioritizing the 
messages according to their importance for the safe conduct of the flight. The high 
priority messages shall be sent to the aircraft or towards ground before or with 
less delay than lower priority messages. 
The C2 radio link shall not interfere with other telecommunication 
infrastructures present in the airspace and it shall be shielded from environment 
unintentional electromagnetic interferences neither it can result harmful to the 
current safety level of civilian radio communication (specifically within the 
airspace).  
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The C2 radio link shall allow the remote pilot, the ATC and any other 
operator of the airspace to distinguish the commanded and controlled RPA 
without any ambiguity. 
The ground infrastructure or portable devices and the C2 radio link shall be 
implemented in order to prevent any physical interference with the remote pilot or 
unauthorized use of the RPAS as well as malicious interference like jamming or 
spoofing. These last issues deal more specifically with security of the RPAS even 
if potentially leading to loss of control of the RPA they can cause safety related 
events with catastrophic consequences (mid-air collision with other aircraft or 
with obstacles on ground, etc.).  
The RPAS shall provide and maintain the C2 radio link connectivity during 
normal operating conditions against natural or manmade obstacles that can reduce 
the range of the radio signal and in any passage from ‘Line of sight’ to ‘Beyond of 
Line of sight’ conditions and vice versa or in case of RPAS control transition 
among ground control stations. This means that during the transition period itself 
from one ground station in control to another one the radio link with the RPA 
shall work correctly. 
The contingencies management functionality deals with the management of 
contingent failures, malfunctions or inconveniences that can occur during the 
RPAS operations. The RPAS shall manage the contingencies to reduce the 
likelihood and the severity of the consequences with reference to the RPA loss of 
control. Within this functionality the RPAS shall be able to identify the health and 
status signals of all its flight critical subsystems and functionalities and convey 
these information to the remote pilot. The specific contingent event shall be 
promptly notified to the remote pilot so that contingencies can be prioritized and 
proper command signals generated, sent to the RPA and executed. 
3.2.7 The safety risk assessment  
Following the aforementioned regulation-based approach, after having 
defined the RPAS functionalities according to [39], the safety hazards have been 
categorized as follows:  
• Safety hazards related to the RPAS aviate functionalities 
• Safety hazards related to the RPAS navigate functionalities 
• Safety hazards related to the RPAS communicate functionalities 
• Safety hazards related to the RPAS hazard avoidance functionality   
• Safety hazards related to the RPAS cross cutting functionality   
o Within cross cutting functionality, safety hazards caused by 
contingencies like: 
 Safety hazards deriving from single or combined 
technical failures 
 Safety hazards deriving from the human factor 
 Safety hazards derived from the weather 
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The contingent hazards due to RPAS single or multiple failures have been 
determined executing a complete ‘Failure Mode and Effects analysis’ (FMECA) 
and a ‘Fault Tree Analysis’ (FTA) on RPAS architecture respectively.   
The contingent hazards derived from the human factor have been identified 
performing a structured analysis using the SHELL and HFACS models. 
The use of a structured approach to lay down the basis for the safety hazards 
analysis is hereinafter further highlighted: the highest level hazards have been 
identified following a systematic categorization of RPAS functionality: hazards 
related to aviate, navigate, communicate and avoid hazards functionalities. The 
lowest level hazards caused by contingencies have been identified using 
structured analysis methodologies too: the FMECA analysis for single failures, 
the FTA analysis for multiple failures, the SHELL and HFACS model for human 
factor related hazards. A structured and systematic approach to RPAS hazard 
analysis helps to cover a wider spectrum of risk: in fact, many sources in literature 
confirm that incidents and/or accidents can be caused by a large variety of events 
among mechanical/electrical failures, human operator lacks and problems caused 
by adverse weather ([48], [49], [50])        
The safety hazards analysis is focused on the system ‘RPAS integrated in the 
civil not segregated airspace’ not on a specific RPA model: hence, a theoretical 
RPAS architecture comprehending the most subsystems and equipment has been 
used for the analysis.  
Failure Modes and Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) 
The Failure Modes and Effects and Criticality Analysis is a bottom-up 
analysis methodology that identifies the system components single failure modes, 
their effects on higher level of the system, and the detectability level and the 
resulting criticality level associated to each one of them. 
In this work the FMECA analysis has been performed according to the 
Military Standard 1629 Revision A [51].  
The RPAS architecture has been defined identifying each functional 
subsystem and equipment. The RPAS architecture under analysis has been 
defined from the highest to the lowest level as follows (Figure 21):  
• The airborne segment: the aerial platform/the aircraft 
• The radio link: the command and control radio link 
• The ground segment: a Ground Control Station or a hand-held 
portable radio controller 
Three kinds of architectures have been considered for the RPA (airborne 
segment) (Figure 21): 
• Rotor wing RPA (airborne segment) 
• Fixed wing RPA (airborne segment) 
• Hybrid RPA (airborne segment) 
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Figure 21 – RPAS higher level architecture 
The architectures of each kind of RPA from Figure 21 has been completely 
defined until the single components. Performing the FMECA, the repetition of the 
reliability analysis of the common functionalities or equipment among different 
aerial segments has been avoided: the most comprehensive analysis has been 
performed for the rotor wing RPA; considering fixed wing or hybrid RPAS only 
subsystems different from rotor wing RPAS have been considered.  
Following the guidelines of the standard 1629A [51], each RPA architecture 
indicated in Figure 21 has been detailed in terms of subsystems until arriving to 
the single equipment level definition (Appendix A: Figure 31, Figure 33 and 
Figure 35 respectively). A simple model for a typical specific category RPAS 
flight mission has been defined (Appendix A: Figure 32, Figure 34, Figure 36) to 
properly allocate RPA subsystems functionalities (Appendix A: Table 24, Table 
47, Table 62). The failure modes identified for each equipment has been 
characterized in terms of probability of occurrence, severity of consequences, 
effects, detectability methods, resulting criticality level and indication for 
mitigation provisions, in accordance with the Standard 1629A [51]. The failure 
mode probability of occurrence level has been ranked according to Table 19 [51]; 
the failure modes severity of consequences has been ranked according to Table 18 
[51]; the failure modes detectability has been ranked according to Table 20 [51]; 
the compensating provisions have been ranked according to Table 21 [51]; the 
criticality level has been ranked according to Table 22 [51].  
The probability of occurrence level of the identified failure modes has been 
assessed searching for data among the following sources:     
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• Indications for reliability found in literature (papers): it has to be noted 
that in most of cases parts of an RPAS or specific functionalities only 
were object of the analysis  
• Reliability data found in reliability handbooks like ‘DTIC Not 
Electronic Parts Reliability Data’ [52] and ‘Handbook of reliability 
prediction procedures for mechanical equipment’ [53] for 
mechanical/electrical components and ‘Military Handbook 217 
Revision F’ [54] for electronic components 
• ‘Mean Time Between Failures’ (MTBF) or ‘Mean Time To Repair’ 
(MTTR) data derived from RPAS equipment manufacturers data sheet 
• Arbitrary reasonable estimations, if no other matching references were 
available  
The above mentioned sources of reliability are referred to manned 
aeronautical systems or generally speaking mechanical systems; only data 
deriving from light RPAS equipment data sheet or found in literature inside 
papers where reliability analyses have been specifically performed on light RPAS 
did not need for correction to better represent light RPAS most probable reliability 
performances. In the other cases, proper corrective factors have been investigated 
and applied to take into account that the effects of environmental conditions 
induced by RPAS smaller dimensions with respect to hose of manned aircraft. In 
general it can be stated that current light RPAS failure rate are higher than heavier 
RPAS like the military ones; and the failure rate of military RPAS are in any case 
currently higher than for manned civil or military aircraft [55].  
For each considered failure mode, the criticality ranking is given by the 
product of the probability of occurrence level else expressed as ‘Probability 
Number’ (PN), the severity of consequences ranking else expressed as ‘Severity 
Number’ (SN) and the detectability else expressed as ‘Detection Number’ (DN) as 
follows [48]: 
 
Criticality ranking = PN × SN × DN  (1) 
 
The criticality ranking has been compared against the reference values of 
Table 22 [51] to classify the considered failure mode criticality as ‘High’ 
‘Moderate’ or ‘Low’ (‘Red’, ‘Yellow’ and ‘Green’ respectively). The criticality 
level is a measure of the harmfulness of the given failure mode:  the higher is the 
probability of occurrence, the higher is the severity of consequences and the more 
difficult is the failure mode occurrence detection in flight, the worst will be the 
practical/operational drift the RPAS will suffer during the flight operation until 
arriving to a catastrophic accident (with RPAS loss, deaths or damages to third 
parties and high economic loss).  
The assessed criticality levels have been used to collect and rank the 
identified failure modes from the highest critical to the less critical in a final 
comprehensive list (Appendix A: Table 81). This list has been furtherly skimmed 
to identify contingent hazards potentially deriving from assessed single failure 
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mode and used to fill in the U-Space and ATM hazards logs among contingent 
hazards due to RPAS single failure modes.   
The content of the FMECA analysis is reported hereinafter. The results of the 
complete analysis have been reported in Appendix A. 
The rotor wing airborne segment 
The rotor wing RPA/airborne segment is composed of the following 
subsystems (Figure 31): 
• Propulsion Subsystem 
• Power Subsystem 
• Electrical Subsystem 
• Flight Subsystem, subdivided into: 
o Navigation Subsystem 
o Air Data Subsystem 
o Flight Control Subsystem  
o Emergency Flight Subsystem 
• Mission Data Subsystem 
• Payload Data Subsystem 
• Communication Subsystem 
• Structures 
The Propulsion Subsystem 
The rotor wing RPAS Propulsion Subsystem is composed of rotor brushless 
electric motors fed by the electric current produced by the Lithium Polymer 
batteries. The electric motors angular speed is regulated commanding its variation 
by mean of the Electronic Speed Controls (ESCs). Each propeller is connected to 
the electric motor through a bearing spliced on the electric engine shaft. The 
propeller rotation generates the lift force to operate the rotor wing RPAS. 
The failure modes of the following equipment have been analysed: the ESCs, 
the electric motors, and the propellers (Figure 31).  
 
The failure modes of the ESCs can be (Table 25): seizing, degradation, 
overheating and burnout [56] (all the further relevant data and calculations have 
been collected in Table 79): 
• The probability of occurrence level of ESC seizing has been estimated 
as C (Occasional): for reference this failure mode has been assimilated 
to item B.2-a of [57] for which the probability of occurrence level has 
been estimated as ‘Medium’/’Occasional’ 
• The probability of occurrence level of ESC degradation has been 
estimated as follows: the ESC has been assimilated to a PCB whose 
global failure rate has been estimated using the following formula 
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from [53]: λp = λb × [N1 × πC + N2 × (πC + 13)] × πQ× πE = 0,00041 
× 1,0 × 1,0 + 1,0 × 1 + 13
 × 1,0 × 19,0 = 0,12 failures per 
million hours; according to [58] the failure rate reported in [53] and 
other similar technical documentation is referred to military 
components. The failure rate of the same component for a current 
RPAS will be different and it shall be re-sized. An indicative 
corrective factor equal to 29,31 has been chosen from [58] (figure 6; 
table 3, severity category 1B). Therefore a more realistic ESC failure 
rate will be 3,517 failures per million hours. The duration of a current 
typical RPAS mission can be 2 hours [58]. This value will be more 
accurate in future as soon as daily routine specific category RPAS 
mission will really occur. The calculated probability of occurrence of 
the ESC degradation is 7,03E-6. The overall ESC failure rate has been  
estimated as follows: from [58] (figure 6), the overall ESC corrected 
failure rate is 0,000125 failure per hour, that is 1,25E-04 failures per 
million hours. The resulting overall ESC probability of failure is 
2,49E-04 (during a complete flight mission of 2 hours). The ESC 
degradation failure mode probability of occurrence level has been 
evaluated as 0,028 (7,03E-6/2,49E-04) that is C (Occasional) 
• The probability of occurrence level of ESC overheating has been 
estimated as C (Occasional) due to the possibility of the electric 
motors prolonged use and assimilating this failure mode for reference 
to item B.2-a of [57] for which the probability of occurrence level has 
been estimated as ‘Medium’/’Occasional’ 
• The probability of occurrence level of ESC burnout has been 
estimated as C (Occasional), assimilating this failure mode to item 
B.2-a or B.2-d of [57] for which the probability of occurrence level 
has been estimated in both cases as ‘Medium’/’Occasional’ 
The loss or degradation of ESCs brings to degradation in rotor engines control 
of angular speed variation. This failure condition can lead to the loss of 
manoeuvrability of the rotor wing RPAS, therefore to its loss of control and 
ultimately to the system (RPA) loss. Hence, the severity of the consequences of 
the each ESCs single failure mode has been classified as ‘Catastrophic’. 
No means of detection of the above listed ESCs failure modes when the 
aircraft is in flight have been identified in literature. Therefore, the detection 
method has been classified as ‘None’ for the considered failure modes.  
The resulting criticality level of ESCs failure modes is ‘High’ (Table 26).   
 
The failure modes of the brushless electric motors can be due to (Table 25): 
stator housing (or casing) failure, bearing failure, windings failure, and armature 
shaft failure [53]; all the other further details and relevant data related to the 
calculations indicated hereinafter have been collected in Table 79: 
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• The brushless stator housing failure rate is 0,001 failures per million 
hours according to [53]. Applying the corrective factor [68] (figure 6; 
table 3, severity category 1B) and considering 2 hours of RPA flight 
mission, the brushless motor housing failure mode is 5,86E-08. The 
brushless electric motor overall failure rate has been estimated equal 
to 0,002125 failure/hours using figure 6 of [58]. The brushless electric 
motor overall probability of failure results equal to 4,25E-05 
(considering a complete flight mission of 2 hours). The brushless 
electric motor stator housing failure mode level is about 0,0014 
(5,86E-08/4,25E-05), that is D (Remote) 
• The probability of occurrence level of electric motor bearing failure 
has been estimated as C (Occasional) ([57], with reference to item 
B.3-a, for example for wear due to bad or lack of lubrication [59] and 
for which the probability of occurrence level has been estimated as 
‘Medium’/’Occasional’) 
• The probability of occurrence level of windings open circuit and short 
circuit failure modes has been estimated as D (Remote) ([57], with 
reference to item B.3-c, for which the probability of occurrence level 
has been estimated as ‘Low’) 
• The probability of occurrence level of the electric motor armature 
shaft failure has been estimated as D (Remote) 
The loss or degradation of the RPAS electric motors brings to degradation and 
loss of engine trust, loss of aircraft lift and ultimately to the system (RPA) loss: 
for this reason the RPAS motors failure modes have been classified as 
‘Catastrophic’. 
No means of detection of the above listed brushless electric motor failure 
modes when the aircraft is in flight have been identified in literature. Therefore, 
the detection method has been classified as ‘None’ for the considered failure 
modes.  
The resulting criticality level of engine failure modes is ‘Medium’ (Table 26).   
 
The failure modes of the propellers can be (Table 25): propeller structural 
failure, propeller connection failure and abrupt stop of the propeller [57]: 
• The probability of occurrence level of the propeller structural failure 
has been estimated as E (Extremely unlikely) [57] (Table 79) 
• The probability of occurrence level of the propeller connection failure 
been estimated as D (Remote) [57] (Table 79) 
• The probability of occurrence level of the abrupt stop of the propeller 
has been estimated as E [57] (Table 79) 
The loss of the propeller leads to the loss of lift and therefore to the loss of 
system manoeuvrability, system control and ultimately to the system (RPA) loss: 
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for this reason the severity of the consequences of the propeller failure modes has 
been classified as ‘Catastrophic’. 
No means of detection of the above listed propeller failure modes when the 
aircraft is in flight have been identified in literature. Therefore the detection 
method has been classified as ‘None’ for the considered failure modes.  
The resulting criticality level of propeller failure modes ‘Low’ (Table 26).   
The Power Subsystem 
The rotor wing RPAS Power Subsystem consists of ‘Lithium Polymer’ (LiPo) 
batteries that generate DC current to supply the RPAS engines and all the other on 
board electrical equipment (Figure 31). 
The failure modes of the following equipment have been analysed: LiPo 
batteries.   
 
The failure modes of the LiPo batteries can be (Table 27): short circuit, 
mechanical damage and fire ([57], [60]). 
• The probability of occurrence level of LiPo batteries short circuit has 
been estimated as C (Occasional) ([57], item B.1-a, with reference to 
internal short circuit and [57] item B.1-b, with reference to 
overcharging and over discharging and for which the probability of 
occurrence level has been estimated in both cases as 
‘Medium’/’Occasional’) (Table 79) 
• The probability of occurrence level of LiPo batteries mechanical 
damage has been estimated as C (Occasional) ([57], item B.1-b, with 
reference to mechanical damage and for which the probability of 
occurrence level has been estimated as ‘Medium’/’Occasional’) (Table 
79) 
• The probability of occurrence level of LiPo batteries fire has been 
estimated as C (Occasional) ([57], item B.1-b, with reference to 
extreme temperatures and for which the probability of occurrence 
level has been estimated as ‘Medium’/’Occasional’) (Table 79) 
The degradation or loss of LiPo batteries leads to the loss of the RPAS 
electrical engines and ultimately to the loss of propulsion and ultimately system 
(RPA) loss; therefore the severity of the consequences of the LiPo batteries failure 
modes has been classified as ‘Catastrophic’.  
The LiPo batteries electrical can be detected using devices like LiPo battery 
voltage alarms or buzzers [61]; the alarm/buzzer failure will alert the remote pilot 
as soon as the LiPo voltage decreases below a minimum threshold; in this case the 
failure mode is expected to be detected in flight through a visible/audible warning 
system. For the other two LiPo batteries failure modes no specific detection 
methods have been identified in literature.  
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The resulting criticality level of LiPo batteries failure modes is ‘High’ (Table 
28).   
The Electrical Subsystem 
The RPAS Electrical Subsystem mainly consists of balance cable, distribution 
cables and connectors to transport the electrical current from the LiPo batteries to 
all the RPAS electrical equipment/loads (Figure 31).  
The failure modes of the following equipment have been analysed: the 
balance cables (that is the breakout wires to access each cell of the LiPo battery) 
[62], the distribution cables and the connectors (Table 29).   
The failure modes of the balance cables can be short circuit and open circuit 
[63] (Table 29); all the other further details and relevant data related to the 
calculations indicated hereinafter have been collected in (Table 79): 
• The cable short circuit failure rate is 3,0E-08 [64]. No corrective 
factors have been applied to cables failure rate, as suggested in [58]. 
The calculated probability of occurrence of this failure mode is equal 
6,0E-08 (considering a complete flight mission of 2 hours). 
Assimilating the balance cables to generic electrical cables, the failure 
rate is equal to 0,6270 failures per million hours [52]. As said before, 
no corrective factors have been applied [58]. The calculated balance 
cable overall probability of failure is equal to 1,254E-06 (considering 
a complete flight mission of 2 hours). The balance cable short circuit 
failure mode probability of occurrence level is equal to 0,0478 (6,0E-
08/1,254E-06), that is C (Occasional) 
• The balance cable open circuit failure rate is 1,0E-05 [64]. No 
corrective factors have been applied to cables failure rate, as suggested 
in [58]. The calculated probability of occurrence of this failure mode 
is equal 1,999E-05 (considering a complete flight mission of 2 hours). 
Assimilating the balance cables to generic electrical cables, the failure 
rate is equal to 0,6270 failures per million hours [52]. As said before, 
no corrective factors have been applied [58]. The calculated balance 
cable overall probability of failure is equal to 1,254E-06 (considering 
a complete flight mission of 2 hours). The balance cable short circuit 
failure mode probability of occurrence level is equal to 15,949 
(1,999E-05/1,254E-06), that is A (Frequent) 
The degradation or loss of the electrical balance cables leads to the loss of the 
electrical current supply from the LiPo batteries; among the others, it leads to the 
loss of engines and ultimately to the system (RPA) loss. Therefore the severity of 
the consequences of the balance cables failure modes has been classified as 
‘Catastrophic’.  
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No means of detection of the above mentioned failure mode when the aircraft 
is in flight have been identified in literature. Therefore, the detection method has 
been classified as ‘None’ for the above mentioned failure mode.  
The resulting criticality level of balance cables failure mode is ‘High’ (Table 
30). 
   
The failure modes of a generic distribution cable can be short circuit and open 
circuit (Table 29); all the other further details and relevant data related to the 
calculations indicated hereinafter have been collected in Table 79: 
• The cable short circuit failure rate is 3,0E-08 [64]. No corrective 
factors have been applied to cables failure rate, as suggested in [58]. 
The calculated probability of occurrence of this failure mode is equal 
6,0E-08 (considering a complete flight mission of 2 hours). 
Assimilating the balance cables to generic electrical cables, the failure 
rate is equal to 0,6270 failures per million hours [52]. As said before, 
no corrective factors have been applied [58]. The calculated balance 
cable overall probability of failure is equal to 1,254E-06 (considering 
a complete flight mission of 2 hours). The balance cable short circuit 
failure mode probability of occurrence level is equal to 0,0478 (6,0E-
08/1,254E-06), that is C (Occasional) 
• The balance cable open circuit failure rate is 1,0E-05 [64]. No 
corrective factors have been applied to cables failure rate, as suggested 
in [58]. The calculated probability of occurrence of this failure mode 
is equal 1,999E-05 (considering a complete flight mission of 2 hours). 
Assimilating the balance cables to generic electrical cables, the failure 
rate is equal to 0,6270 failures per million hours [52]. As said before, 
no corrective factors have been applied [58]. The calculated balance 
cable overall probability of failure is equal to 1,254E-06 (considering 
a complete flight mission of 2 hours). The balance cable short circuit 
failure mode probability of occurrence level is equal to 15,949 
(1,999E-05/1,254E-06), that is A (Frequent) 
The degradation or loss of the electrical distribution cables leads to the loss of 
the electrical current supply from the LiPo batteries; among the others, it leads to 
the loss of engines and ultimately to the system (RPA) loss. Therefore the severity 
of the consequences of the balance cables failure modes has been classified as 
‘Catastrophic’.  
No means of detection of the above mentioned failure mode when the aircraft 
is in flight have been identified in literature. Therefore, the detection method has 
been classified as ‘None’ for the above mentioned failure mode.  
The resulting criticality level of balance cables failure mode is ‘High’ (Table 
30). 
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The failure mode of the connectors is electric arc due to mechanical 
disconnection (Table 29): 
• The probability of occurrence level of this failure mode has been 
estimated as C (Occasional) (Table 79) 
The sudden disconnection of cables form equipment (due to vibrations, 
fatigue or improper maintenance actions, etc.) can lead to electric arc and to fire 
on board the RPAS and ultimately to the system (RPA) loss. Therefore the 
severity of the consequences of the electrical connectors failure mode has been 
classified as ‘Catastrophic’.  
No means of detection of the above mentioned failure mode when the aircraft 
is in flight have been identified in literature. Therefore, the detection method has 
been classified as ‘None’.  
The resulting criticality level of the connectors failure mode is ‘High’ (Table 
30). 
The Flight Subsystem/Navigation Subsystem 
The RPAS Navigation Subsystem mainly consists of the ‘Inertial 
Measurement Unit’ (IMU) and the ‘Global Position System’ (GPS) receiver 
(Figure 31).  
The ‘European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service’ (EGNOS) receiver 
and the ‘Automatic Dependant Surveillance Broadcast’ (ADS-B) receiver have 
been virtually added in the architecture of a remotely piloted aircraft Navigation 
Subsystem, even if at the moment they are not included, to perform the 
FMECA/FTA analyses on these equipment too and thus successfully deriving the 
related hazards for a more comprehensive safety evaluation. The EGNOS receiver 
is more accurate and advanced than the GPS one in aircraft position determination 
and currently starts to equip the most updated civil manned aircraft; as stated by 
other Authors [65], the EGNOS can effectively support RPAS in performing 
precision navigation within urban or very congested flight environments. The 
ADS-B equipment, that will be mandatory on manned aircraft from 2020 onwards 
[66], will be recommended to RPAS too as basic equipment of the ‘Detect and 
Avoid’ subsystem to avoid mid-air collision with other aircraft. 
The failure modes of the following equipment have been analysed: the IMU, 
the GPS and EGNOS receivers and the ADS-B.   
 
The failure modes of IMU can be (Table 31): circuitry overload and 
calibration loss [58]; all the other further details and relevant data related to the 
calculations indicated hereinafter have been collected in (Table 79): 
• The probability of occurrence level of IMU circuitry overload failure 
mode has been estimated as D (Remote) ([57] with reference to item 
D.6-a and for which for which the probability of occurrence level has 
been estimated as ‘Low’) (Table 79) 
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• The probability of occurrence level of IMU loss of calibration failure 
mode has been estimated as C (Occasional) ([57], with reference to 
item D.6-b and for which for which the probability of occurrence level 
has been estimated as ‘Medium’/’Occasional’) (Table 79) 
The degradation or loss of IMU leads to mission degradation. Therefore the 
severity of the consequences of the IMU failure modes has been classified as 
‘Marginal’.  
No means of detection of the above mentioned failure modes when the 
aircraft is in flight have been identified in literature. Therefore, the detection 
method has been classified as ‘None’.  
The resulting criticality level of the connectors failure mode is ‘Medium’ and 
‘High’ (Table 32). 
 
The failure modes of the GPS receiver can be (Table 31): antenna failure, and 
malicious radio frequency interferences like jamming or spoofing; all the other 
further details and relevant data related to the calculations indicated hereinafter 
have been collected in Table 79: 
• The probability of occurrence level of GPS antenna failure ([67] with 
reference to item AOA24) has been estimated as follows: the 
probability of occurrence of this failure mode is 1,0E-04 ([68] 
referring to item LOA-14 of the FTA); the failure rate of a GPS 
equipment installed on board an RPA is equal to 6,0E-03 ([69] with 
reference to air cargo MTBF datum equal to 6000 hours); this datum 
has been corrected according to [58] (corrective factor equal to 22,095 
(2/0,105) from figure 6 and table 3); considering a standard flight 
mission of 2 hours, the probability of occurrence of the overall GPS 
failure has been estimated equal to 2,3290E-01; the GPS antenna 
failure mode is characterized by a probability of occurrence level 
equal to 0,0004294 (1,0E-04/2,3290E-01) that is E (Extremely 
Unlikely) 
• The probability of occurrence level of GPS signal jamming ([67] with 
reference to item AOA14) has been estimated as follows: the 
probability of occurrence of this failure mode is 1,0E-13 ([68] 
referring to item LOA-15 of the FTA); considering the above 
calculated overall GPS equipment failure equal to 2,3290E-01 (as 
above calculated), the GPS signal jamming failure mode is 
characterized by a probability of occurrence level equal to 4,2936E-13 
(1,0E-13/2,3290E-01) that is E (Extremely Unlikely) 
• The probability of occurrence level of GPS signal spoofing has been 
estimated as B due to the current lack of effective cyber threats 
counter measures 
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The GPS antenna failure can lead to mission degradation. Therefore the 
severity of the consequences of this failure mode has been classified as 
‘Marginal’. The GPS signal jamming and/or spoofing failure modes can lead to 
the loss of RPA system control and ultimately to the system (RPA) loss; therefore 
the severity of their consequences has been ranked as ‘Catastrophic’. 
The GPS antenna failure mode is expected to be detected in flight by the 
remote pilot for example though visual or audible warning.  
The GPS signal jamming consists of disrupting the control of the aerial 
platform using a transmitter tuned at the same frequency and modulation of the 
GPS receiver antenna installed on board the RPA, but characterized by such high 
power to override any signal sent to it [70]. It cannot be detected in flight, 
therefore ‘None’ detection method has been assigned to this GPS failure mode.  
The GPS signal spoofing consists of deceiving a GPS receiver by 
broadcasting incorrect GPS signals but structured as a set of normal GPS signals, 
or by rebroadcasting toward the RPA to be spoofed a normal signal captured 
elsewhere or set at a different time. The result is that the GPS receiver estimates a 
spatial position that is not the real one as it was in a position other than where it 
really is or it estimates to be at the correct spatial position but at a time other than 
the real one; the hacker chooses how to manage the attack [71]. This failure mode 
can be detected in flight by the remote pilot passing from automatic to manual 
RPA flight mode and comparing the desired route to follow with the one really  
followed by the aircraft. Therefore the detection method related to this GPS 
failure mode has been ranked as ‘Other methods’.   
The resulting criticality level of the GPS antenna failure mode has been 
ranked as ‘Low’ (Table 32).  
The resulting criticality level of the GPS jamming and spoofing failure modes 
have been ranked as ‘Low’ (Table 32). 
 
The failure modes of the EGNOS receiver can be (Table 31) ([72] and [73]): 
EGNOS receiver failure, loss of EGNOS signal continuity, loss of EGNOS signal 
integrity and EGNOS signal delay; all the other further details and relevant data 
related to the calculations indicated hereinafter have been collected in Table 79: 
• The EGNOS receiver failure rate is equal to 9,04E-06 ([74]; this 
datum has been corrected according to [58] (corrective factor equal to 
22,095 (2/0,105) from figure 6 and table 3); considering a standard 
RPAS mission of 2 hours, the probability of occurrence of this failure 
mode has been estimated as 3,994E-04; the probability of occurrence 
of the overall EGNOS equipment failure has been determined as 
follows: the EGNOS MTBF is equal to 40.000 hours from [73]; the 
failure rate is equal to 25,0 failures per million hours; this datum has 
been corrected according to [58] (corrective factor equal to 22,095 
(2/0,105) from figure 6 and table 3); considering a standard RPAS 
mission of 2 hours, the probability of occurrence of overall EGNOS 
equipment failure is 1,104E-03; the EGNOS receiver failure mode 
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probability of occurrence level is equal to 0,361 (3,994E-04/1,104E-
03E-05), that is A (Frequent) 
• The EGNOS loss of signal continuity probability of occurrence is 
equal to 9,04E-06 [73]; no corrective factors have been deemed to be 
applicable considering the properties of EGNOS signal as independent 
of the user; considering the above calculated overall EGNOS 
equipment probability of failure is 4,999E-05 during a standard RPAS 
mission,  the EGNOS loss of signal continuity failure mode 
probability of occurrence level is equal to 0,08 (9,04E-06/4,999E-05), 
that is D (Remote) 
• The EGNOS loss of signal integrity probability of occurrence is equal 
to 1,0E-09 [72]; no corrective factors have been deemed to be 
applicable considering the properties of EGNOS signal as independent 
of the user; considering the above calculated overall EGNOS 
equipment probability of failure is 4,999E-05 during a standard RPAS 
mission, the EGNOS loss of signal continuity failure mode probability 
of occurrence level is equal to 2,0E-05 (1,0E-09/4,999E-05), that is E 
(Extremely Unlikely) 
• The EGNOS loss of signal delay probability of occurrence is equal to 
3,2E-06 [74]; no corrective factors have been deemed to be applicable 
considering the properties of EGNOS signal as independent of the 
user; considering the above calculated overall EGNOS equipment 
probability of failure is 4,999E-05 during a standard RPAS mission, 
the EGNOS signal delay failure mode probability of occurrence level 
is equal to 0,0064 (3,2E-06/4,999E-05), that is D (Remote) 
The consequence of EGNOS receiver degradation or loss can be the RPAS 
mission degradation. Therefore the severity of consequences of the above 
mentioned EGNOS failure modes has been ranked as ‘Marginal’.  
The EGNOS failure modes are expected to be detected in flight, as it happens 
for EGNOS receivers installed on manned aircraft, through the use of ‘Built In 
Test’ devices and alerting systems [75].  
The resulting criticality level of EGNOS failure modes is ‘High’, ‘Medium’ 
and ‘Low’ in accordance with the estimated level of probability of occurrence 
level (Table 32). 
 
The failure modes of the ADS-B receiver can be (Table 31): loss of EGNOS 
position accuracy, GPS receiver unit failure, ADS-B out antenna failure, ADS-B 
out antenna deterioration, broadcast of distorted data, emitter/transponder failure, 
erroneous altitude data, data encoding error, loss of position data to be sent to the 
emitter, abrupt interruption of ADS-B service, abrupt lack of GPS data, 
degradation of accuracy of data sent by the satellite to the ADS-B, loss of satellite 
signal integrity, failure to detect manoeuvring aircraft, ground equipment failure, 
sudden loss of ADS-B data, ADS-B ground station failure, human error; all the 
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other further details and relevant data related to the calculations indicated 
hereinafter have been collected in Table 79: 
• The probability of occurrence of ADS-B loss of EGNOS position 
accuracy ([67], item AOA-21) is equal to 5,0E-02 [68] (with reference 
to item COAP-5 of the FTA analysis); the MTBF of ADS-B is equal 
to 20,000 hours [76]; the failure rate is equal to 5,0E-05; this datum 
has been corrected according to [58] (corrective factor equal to 22,095 
(2/0,105) from figure 6 and table 3); considering a standard RPAS 
mission of 2 hours, the probability of occurrence of this failure rate 
has been estimated as 2,207E-03; the ADS-B loss of position accuracy 
failure mode probability of occurrence level is equal to 22,654 (5,0E-
02/2,207E-03), that is A (Frequent) 
• The probability of occurrence of EGNOS receiver unit failure is equal 
to 9,04E-06 (as calculated for item NSS4b); the ADS-B overall 
equipment failure probability of occurrence is equal to 2,207E-03 (as 
above calculated); the ADS-B EGNOS receiver unit failure mode 
probability of occurrence level is equal to 0,1810 (5,0E-02/2,207E-
03), that is B (Reasonably Probable) 
• The probability of occurrence of ADS-B out antenna failure ([67], 
item AOA-25) is equal to 1,0E-04 [68] (with reference to item LOA-4 
of the FTA analysis); the ADS-B overall equipment failure probability 
of occurrence is equal to 2,207E-03 (as above calculated); the ADS-B 
out antenna failure probability of occurrence level is equal to 0,045 
(1,0E-04/2,207E-03), that is C (Occasional) 
• The probability of occurrence of ADS-B out antenna deterioration 
([67], item AOA-4) is equal to 1,2E-03 [68] (with reference to item 
COA-1 of the FTA analysis and solving the ‘OR’ Boolean operator); 
the ADS-B overall equipment failure probability of occurrence is 
equal to 2,207E-03 (as above calculated); the ADS-B out antenna 
deterioration probability of occurrence level is equal to 0,544 (1,2E-
03/2,207E-03), that is A (Frequent) 
• The probability of occurrence of ADS-B interruption of signal 
transmission due to RF interference ([67], item AOA-6) is equal to 
1,0E-02 [68] (with reference to item CAA-9 of the FTA analysis); the 
ADS-B overall equipment failure probability of occurrence is equal to 
2,207E-03 (as above calculated); the ADS-B interruption of signal 
transmission due to RF interference failure probability of occurrence 
level is equal to 4,530 (1,2E-03/2,207E-03), that is A (Frequent) 
• The probability of occurrence of ADS-B emitter/transponder failure 
([67], item AOA-7) is equal to 1,0E-04 [68] (with reference to item 
LOA-8 of the FTA analysis); the ADS-B overall equipment failure 
probability of occurrence is equal to 2,207E-03 (as above calculated); 
ADS-B emitter/transponder failure mode probability of occurrence 
level is equal to 0,453 (1,0E-04/2,207E-03), that is A (Frequent) 
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• The probability of occurrence of altimeter erroneous altitude data 
([67], item AOA-11) is equal to 1,0E-13 [68] (with reference to item 
COA-11 of the FTA analysis); the ADS-B overall equipment failure 
probability of occurrence is equal to 2,207E-03 (as above calculated); 
the altimeter erroneous altitude data failure mode probability of 
occurrence level is equal to 4,351E-11 (1,0E-13 /2,207E-03), that is E 
(Extremely Unlikely) 
• The probability of occurrence of ADS-B data encoding error ([67], 
item AOA-10) is equal to 1,0E-13 [68] (with reference to item COA-
11 of the FTA analysis); the ADS-B overall equipment failure 
probability of occurrence is equal to 2,207E-03 (as above calculated); 
the ADS-B data encoding error failure mode probability of occurrence 
level is equal to 4,351E-11 (1,0E-13/2,207E-03), that is E (Extremely 
Unlikely) 
• The probability of occurrence of intentional/unintentional jamming of 
ADS-B signal ([67], item AOA-14) is equal to 1,0E-13 [68] (with 
reference to item LAA-8 of the FTA analysis); the ADS-B overall 
equipment failure probability of occurrence is equal to 2,207E-03 (as 
above calculated); the intentional/unintentional jamming of ADS-B 
signal failure mode probability of occurrence level is equal to 4,351E-
11 (1,0E-13/2,207E-03), that is E (Extremely Unlikely) 
• The probability of occurrence of lack of ADS-B service ([67], item 
AOA-16) is equal to 1,0E-13 [68] (with reference to item LAA-10 of 
the FTA analysis); the ADS-B overall equipment failure probability of 
occurrence is equal to 2,207E-03 (as above calculated); the lack of 
ADS-B service probability of occurrence level is equal to 4,351E-11 
(1,0E-13/2,207E-03), that is E (Extremely Unlikely) 
• The probability of occurrence of inaccurate position datum sent to the 
ADS-B emitter ([67], item AOA-21) is equal to 5,0E-02 [68] (with 
reference to item COAP-5 of the FTA analysis); the ADS-B overall 
equipment failure probability of occurrence is equal to 2,207E-03 (as 
above calculated); the inaccurate position datum sent to the ADS-B 
emitter failure mode probability of occurrence level is equal to 22,654 
(5,0E-02/2,207E-03), that is A (Frequent) 
• The probability of occurrence of degradation of accuracy and integrity 
of data sent by the satellite to the ADS-B ([67], item AOA-22) is equal 
to 1,0E-09 [72]; the ADS-B overall equipment failure probability of 
occurrence is equal to 2,207E-03 (as above calculated); the inaccurate 
position datum sent to the ADS-B emitter failure mode probability of 
occurrence level is equal to 4,351E-07 (1,0E-09/2,207E-03), that is E 
(Extremely Unlikely)  
• The probability of occurrence of failure of ADS-B transponder/emitter 
on the RPA ([67], item AOA-27) is equal to 1,0E-04 [68] (with 
reference to item COA-10 of the FTA analysis); the ADS-B overall 
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equipment failure probability of occurrence is equal to 2,207E-03 (as 
above calculated); the failure of ADS-B transponder/emitter on the 
RPA failure mode probability of occurrence level is equal to 0,0453 
(1,0E-04/2,207E-03), that is C (Occasional) 
• The probability of occurrence of failure in detection of manoeuvring 
aircraft/RPA ([67], item AOA-23) is equal to 1,2E-03 [68] (with 
reference to item COAP-4 of the FTA analysis, solving the Boolean 
‘OR’ operator); the ADS-B overall equipment failure probability of 
occurrence is equal to 2,207E-03 (as above calculated); the failure of 
ADS-B transponder/emitter on the RPA failure mode probability of 
occurrence level is equal to 0,544 (1,2E-03/2,207E-03), that is A 
(Frequent) 
• The probability of occurrence of sudden loss of ADS-B data to ATC 
controllers without any notification ([67], item AOG-3) is equal to 
1,0E-05 [68] (with reference to item LAA-4 of the FTA analysis); the 
ADS-B overall equipment failure probability of occurrence is equal to 
2,207E-03 (as above calculated); the failure of ADS-B 
transponder/emitter on the RPA failure mode probability of 
occurrence level is equal to 0,00453 (1,0E-05/2,207E-03), that is D 
(Remote) 
• The probability of ADSB-IN receiving antenna deterioration ([67], 
item AI1) is equal to 1,0E-04 [68] (with reference to item LAA-7 of 
the FTA analysis); the ADS-B overall equipment failure probability of 
occurrence is equal to 2,207E-03 (as above calculated); the failure of 
ADS-B transponder/emitter on the RPA failure mode probability of 
occurrence level is equal to 0,0453 (1,0E-04/2,207E-03), that is C 
(Occasional) 
• The probability of ADS-B ground station failure is equal to 1,3E-04 
[68] (with reference to item LAA-1 of the FTA analysis solving the 
Boolean ‘OR’ operator); the ADS-B overall equipment failure 
probability of occurrence is equal to 2,207E-03 (as above calculated); 
the failure of ADS-B transponder/emitter on the RPA failure mode 
probability of occurrence level is equal to 0,00453 (1,3E-04/2,207E-
03), that is D (Remote) 
• The probability of performance of wrong pre-flight procedures on 
ADS-B is equal to 2,0E-04 [68] (with reference to item LOA-1 of the 
FTA analysis solving the Boolean ‘OR’ operator); the ADS-B overall 
equipment failure probability of occurrence is equal to 2,207E-03 (as 
above calculated); the failure of ADS-B transponder/emitter on the 
RPA failure mode probability of occurrence level is equal to 0,0906 
(2,0E-04/2,207E-03), that is C (Occasional) 
The consequence of ADS-B equipment degradation or loss can lead to the 
degradation of ‘Detect and Avoid’ subsystem functionality and to the risk of 
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occurrence of mid-air collisions. Therefore the severity of consequences of the 
above mentioned ADS-B failure modes has been ranked as ‘Catastrophic’.  
Following the ADS-B analysis reported in [66], some of the ADS-B failure 
modes listed in Table 31 cannot be detected in flight; other ones can be detected 
in flight. In the first case ‘None’ detection method has been assigned to the 
considered failure modes; in the second case it has been supposed that those 
failure modes can be detected through visual or audible warning addressed to the 
remote pilot (Table 31). 
The resulting criticality level of ADS-B failure modes has been ranked as 
‘High’, ‘Moderate’ and ‘Low’ in accordance with the estimated level of 
probability of occurrence (Table 32). 
The Flight Subsystem/Air Data Subsystem 
The RPAS Air Data Unit Subsystem comprehends the equipment to measure 
airspeed and barometric altitude flight parameters (Table 31). The failure modes 
of the Air Data Unit are (Table 33) [53]: incorrect signal, loss of signal, signal 
error along the transmission line, error on output signal, loss of power supply; 
calibration error all the other further details and relevant data related to the 
calculations indicated hereinafter have been collected in Table 79:  
• The probability of occurrence level of Air Data Unit incorrect signal 
has been estimated as follows: the related failure rate is equal to 2.0 
failure per million hours ([53], with reference to pressure sensors 
sensing elements failure); this datum has been corrected according to 
[58] (corrective factor equal to 22,095 (2/0,105) from figure 6 and 
table 3); considering a standard RPAS mission of 2 hours, the 
probability of occurrence of this failure rate has been estimated as 
8,837E-05. The Air Data Unit MTBF is equal to 400,000 hours [77]; 
this data is referred to manned aircraft equipment; the above 
mentioned corrective factor is applied to re-size this value; the 
estimated probability of overall Air Data Unit failure occurrence is 
equal to 1,105E-04; the Air Data Unit incorrect signal failure mode 
probability of occurrence level is equal to 0,8 (8,837E-05/1,105E-04), 
that is A (Frequent) 
• The probability of occurrence level of Air Data Unit loss of signal has 
been estimated as follows: the related failure rate is equal to 2.0 failure 
per million hours ([53], with reference to pressure sensors sensing 
elements failure); this datum has been corrected according to [58] 
(corrective factor equal to 22,095 (2/0,105) from figure 6 and table 3); 
considering a standard RPAS mission of 2 hours, the probability of 
occurrence of this failure rate has been estimated as 8,837E-05. The 
Air Data Unit probability of overall Air Data Unit failure occurrence is 
equal to 1,105E-04 as above calculated; the Air Data Unit loss of 
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signal failure mode probability of occurrence level is equal to 0,8 
(8,837E-05/1,105E-04), that is A (Frequent) 
• The probability of occurrence level of Air Data Unit signal error along 
the transmission line has been estimated as follows: the related failure 
rate is: λp = λb × πQ× πE = 0,026 × 1 × 16 = 0,416 failure per million 
hours ([54], with reference to line failure rate); this datum has been 
corrected according to [58] (corrective factor equal to 22,095 (2/0,105) 
from figure 6 and table 3); considering a standard RPAS mission of 2 
hours, the probability of occurrence of this failure rate has been 
estimated as 1,838E-06. The Air Data Unit probability of overall Air 
Data Unit failure occurrence is equal to 1,105E-04 as above 
calculated; the Air Data Unit error along the transmission line failure 
mode probability of occurrence level is equal to 0,0166 (1,838E-
06/1,105E-04), that is C (Occasional) 
• The probability of occurrence level of Air Data Unit signal error on 
output signal has been estimated as follows: the related failure rate is 
λp = (C1× πT + C2× πE) ×  πE ×  πL = (0,24 × 0,10 + 0,019 × 8) ×  
0,25 ×  2,0 = 0,088 failure per million hours ([54], with reference to 
computational devices/microprocessors failure rate); this datum has 
been corrected according to [58] (corrective factor equal to 22,095 
(2/0,105) from figure 6 and table 3); considering a standard RPAS 
mission of 2 hours, the probability of occurrence of this failure rate 
has been estimated as 3,888E-06. The Air Data Unit probability of 
overall Air Data Unit failure occurrence is equal to 1,105E-04 as 
above calculated; the Air Data Unit signal error on output signal 
failure mode probability of occurrence level is equal to 0,0352 
(3,888E-06/1,105E-04), that is C (Occasional) 
• The probability of occurrence level of Air Data Unit loss of power 
supply has been estimated as follows: from [52] the battery failure rate 
is 3,9453 failures per million hours; considering that on a rotor wing 
RPAS the power supply is made of LiPo batteries, it has been 
supposed that the loss of power supply rate can be assimilated to the 
battery failure rate. This value, applicable for ground based 
mechanical systems and in any case not for RPAS has been re-sized 
according to corrective factor equal to 29,324 (2,17/0,074) from [58] 
(figure 6 and table 3); considering an RPAS standard flight mission of 
2 hours, the probability of Air Data Unit loss of power supply has 
been estimated as 2,3E-04. The Air Data Unit probability of overall 
Air Data Unit failure occurrence is equal to 1,105E-04 as above 
calculated; the Air Data Unit signal error on output signal failure mode 
probability of occurrence level is equal to 2,094 (2,3E-04/1,105E-04), 
that is A (Frequent) 
• The probability of occurrence level of Air Data Unit calibration error 
has been estimated as follows: the related failure rate is λp = (C1× πT + 
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C2× πE) ×  πE ×  πL = (0,24 × 0,10 + 0,019 × 8) ×  0,25 ×  2,0 = 
0,088 failure per million hours ([54], including this failure mode 
within those due to computational devices/microprocessors failure); 
this datum has been corrected according to [58] (corrective factor 
equal to 22,095 (2/0,105) from figure 6 and table 3); considering a 
standard RPAS mission of 2 hours, the probability of occurrence of 
this failure rate has been estimated as 3,888E-06. The Air Data Unit 
probability of overall Air Data Unit failure occurrence is equal to 
1,105E-04 as above calculated; the Air Data Unit signal error on 
output signal failure mode probability of occurrence level is equal to 
0,0352 (3,888E-06/1,105E-04), that is C (Occasional) 
The degradation or loss of Air Data Unit leads loss of the RPAS barometric 
altitude and airspeed control, potentially leading to the system (RPA) loss. 
Therefore the severity of the consequences of the Air Data Unit failure modes has 
been classified as ‘Catastrophic’.  
No means of detection of the above mentioned failure modes when the 
aircraft is in flight have been identified in literature. Therefore, the detection 
method has been classified as ‘None’.  
The resulting criticality level of Air Data Unit failure is ‘High’ (Table 34).   
The Flight Subsystem/Flight Control Subsystem 
The RPAS Flight Control Subsystem manages the flight command signals 
sent by the remote pilot to control the RPA.  
A rotor wing RPAS Flight Control Subsystem is composed of the Autopilot 
and the ‘Detect and Avoid’ DAA subsystems (Figure 31). 
 
The failure modes of the Autopilot are hardware failures like failure of weak 
joints [78] caused by over temperature, lack of power supply, software error due 
to the lack of pass/fail signals (Table 35): 
• The probability of occurrence level of autopilot hardware failure has 
been estimated as D (Remote) (Table 79) 
• The probability of occurrence level of autopilot lack of power supply 
due to vibrations and damaged wiring has been estimated as D 
(Remote): for reference this failure mode has been assimilated to item 
D.5-b of [57] for which the probability of occurrence level has been 
estimated as ‘Medium’/’Occasional’ (Table 79) 
• The probability of occurrence level of autopilot software failure has 
been estimated as D (Remote) (Table 79) 
The degradation or loss of the Autopilot leads to the loss of RPA control and 
ultimately it leads to the system (RPA) loss. Therefore the severity of the 
consequences of the Autopilot failure modes has been classified as ‘Catastrophic’.  
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The Autopilot failure modes are expected to be detected in flight, through 
visual or audible warning devices for the remote pilot. 
The resulting criticality level of Autopilot failure modes is ‘Medium’ (Table 
36). 
 
The failure modes of the ‘Detect and Avoid’ (DAA) subsystem are: loss of 
ADS-B signal, EGNOS receiver failure and altimeter sensor failure: 
• The probability of occurrence level of loss of ADS-B signal has been 
estimated as C (Occasional) (as for item NSS4r of the FMECA analysis 
reported in Appendix A) (Table 79) 
• The probability of occurrence level of EGNOS receiver failure has been 
estimated as A (Frequent) (as for item NSS3a of the FMECA analysis 
reported in Appendix A) (Table 79) 
• The probability of occurrence level of altimeter sensor failure has been 
estimated as E (Extremely unlikely) (as for item NSS4g of the FMECA 
analysis reported in Appendix A) (Table 79) 
 
The degradation or loss of the DAA enhances the probability of missed 
detection in flight of other manned/unmanned intruders on the RPA mission track 
thus causing a higher probability of mid-air collision risk and ultimately of system 
(RPA) loss. Therefore the severity of the consequences of the DAA failure modes 
has been classified as ‘Catastrophic’.  
It is expected that the DAA failure modes can be detected in flight through 
visual or audible warnings addressed to the remote pilot. 
The resulting criticality level of DAA failure modes is ‘Low’ and ‘High’ in 
accordance with the estimated probability of occurrence levels (Table 36).   
The Flight Subsystem/Emergency Flight Subsystem 
The RPAS Emergency Flight subsystem terminates the flight in case of 
emergency loss of control of the RPA thus providing a basic mitigation against 
the fact that the human pilot is not on board the aerial platform. 
In case of loss of control, the flight of a rotor wing RPAS can be terminated 
cutting-off the power supply to the electric engines (use of the ‘Flight Termination 
System’ (FTS)) or activating the recovery parachute for a smoother falling down 
(if emergency occurs over urban/congested areas, for example) (Figure 31).  
 
The FTS Emergency subsystem failure modes are (Table 37): loss of 
dedicated radio link, lack of functionality and unlawful interference on the 
dedicated radio link: 
• The probability of occurrence level of the FTS loss of dedicated radio 
link failure has been estimated as C (Occasional) (Table 79) 
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• The probability of occurrence level of the FTS lack of functionality 
has been estimated as D (Remote) (Table 79) 
• The probability of occurrence level of the FTS unlawful interference 
has been estimated as B (Reasonably probable) due to the current lack 
of active defences against cyber threats (Table 79) 
The FTS Emergency Subsystem failure modes are expected to be detected in 
flight, through visual or audible warning devices for the remote pilot. 
The resulting criticality level of the FTS Emergency Subsystem failure modes 
is ‘High’ and ‘Medium’ according to the above reported estimated failure modes 
probability of occurrence levels (Table 38).   
 
The Recovery Parachute Emergency subsystem failure modes are (Table 37): 
loss of dedicated radio link, lack of functionality and unlawful interference on the 
dedicated radio link: 
• The probability of occurrence level of the Recovery Parachute loss of 
dedicated radio link failure has been estimated as C (Occasional) 
(Table 79) 
• The probability of occurrence level of the Recovery Parachute lack of 
functionality has been estimated as D (Remote) (Table 79) 
• The probability of occurrence level of the Recovery Parachute 
unlawful interference has been estimated as B (Reasonably probable) 
due to the current lack of active defences against cyber threats (Table 
79) 
The Recovery Parachute Emergency Subsystem failure modes are expected to 
be detected in flight, through visual or audible warning devices for the remote 
pilot. 
The resulting criticality level of the Recovery Parachute Emergency 
Subsystem failure modes is ‘High’ and ‘Medium’ according to the above reported 
estimated failure modes probability of occurrence levels (Table 38).   
The Mission Control Subsystem  
The RPAS Mission Control Subsystem manages the flight data (waypoints 
coordinates) and the flight plan.   
It mainly consists of the mission data storage unit (Table 31) which failure 
modes are: the loss of mission data/software error and the physical unit 
damage/degradation (Table 39): 
• The probability of occurrence level of the loss of mission 
data/software error has been estimated as C (Occasional) (Table 79) 
• The probability of occurrence level of the mission data unit hardware 
failure/physical degradation has been estimated as C (Occasional) 
(Table 79) 
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The consequences of loss of mission data is mission degradation; therefore the 
severity of the consequences has been estimated as ‘Marginal’. 
The Mission Control subsystem failure modes are expected to be detected by 
the remote pilot observing the navigation displays, therefore the detection 
methods related to these failure modes have been ranked as ‘Other methods’ 
(Table 39).  
The criticality of these failure modes is ‘Low’ (Table 40). 
The Mission Payload Sensors Subsystem  
The RPAS Mission Payload Sensors Subsystem is the whole of photo/video 
cameras and other specific sensors installed on board the RPA according to the 
technical purpose of the mission to record the data for which the specific 
commercial flight operation is performed: for example it can be an infrared 
photo/video camera to observe the thermal features of a building (Table 31).  
 
The failure modes of payload sensors are defined according to the considered 
specific device (Table 41): 
• The probability of occurrence level of the payload failure modes has 
been assessed as D (Remote) (Table 41); for reference these failure 
mode have been assimilated to item D.13-a/D13-b of [57] for which 
the probability of occurrence level has been estimated as ‘Low’ (Table 
79) 
The main consequences are loss of recorded data with no impact for the safety 
of the aircraft or degradation of the mission; therefore the severity of the 
consequences of the considered failure modes has been ranked as ‘Minor’.  
These failure mode are expected to be detected through automatic sensing 
devices. 
The criticality of the Mission Payload failure modes is ‘Low’ (Table 42). 
The Communication Subsystem  
The RPAS Communication Subsystem allows to transmit command signals 
from ground to the aircraft and to receive telemetry data from the RPA. It consists 
of the transmitting/receiving antenna on board the RPA (Figure 31). 
 
The Communication Subsystem failure modes are: failure of the transmitting 
antenna, the transmitter antenna fade; the receiver antenna failure and the receiver 
antenna fade (Table 43) [79]: 
• The probability of occurrence level of the transmitting antenna failure 
has been estimated as D (Remote) (Table 79) 
• The probability of occurrence level of transmitting antenna fade has 
been estimated as C (Occasional ([57], with reference to item D.7-d 
 103 
 
for which the probability of occurrence level has been estimated as 
‘Medium’/’Occasional’ (Table 79) 
The severity of consequences of RPAS transmitting antenna failure modes 
can potentially lead to the loss of the RPAS system; therefore it has been ranked 
as ‘Catastrophic’.  
No means of detection of the above mentioned failure modes when the 
aircraft is in flight have been identified in literature. Therefore, the detection 
method has been classified as ‘None’.  
The criticality of this failure mode is ‘Medium’ and ‘Low’ in accordance with 
the estimated probability of occurrence levels (Table 44).  
 
With reference to the receiving antenna [79].  
• The probability of occurrence level of the receiving antenna failure 
has been estimated as D (Remote) (Table 79) 
• The probability of occurrence level of receiving antenna fade has been 
estimated as C (Occasional ([57], with reference to item D.7-d for 
which the probability of occurrence level has been estimated as 
‘Medium’/’Occasional’ (Table 79) 
The severity of consequences of RPAS receiving antenna failure modes can 
potentially lead to the loss of the RPAS system; therefore it has been ranked as 
‘Catastrophic’.  
No means of detection of the above mentioned failure modes when the 
aircraft is in flight have been identified in literature. Therefore, the detection 
method has been classified as ‘None’.  
The criticality of this failure mode is ‘Medium’ and ‘Low’ in accordance with 
the estimated probability of occurrence levels (Table 44).  
The Structures Subsystem  
The RPA Structural Subsystem has not been analysed using the FMECA 
methodology because this methodology is not recommended in literature to 
investigate structures failure modes.  
Nevertheless, it is here highlighted that structural integrity shall be 
demonstrated and continuously maintained for the RPA airworthiness [39]. 
The fixed wing airborne segment 
The fixed wing airborne segment is composed of the following subsystems 
(Figure 33): 
• Propulsion Subsystem powered by a combustion jet engine or by a 
propeller engine 
• Fuel Subsystem 
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• Power Subsystem 
• Electrical Subsystem 
• Flight Subsystem, subdivided into: 
o Navigation Subsystem 
o Air Data Subsystem 
o Flight Control Subsystem (with servo units actuators and flight 
surfaces)  
o Emergency Flight Subsystem 
• Mission Data Subsystem 
• Payload Data Subsystem 
• Communication Subsystem 
• Structures (with landing gear) 
The FMECA analysis related to the above mentioned subsystems is hereafter 
described with reference to the typical elements of fixed wing RPAS airborne 
segment only: that is Propulsion Subsystem, Fuel Subsystem, Power Subsystem 
and Flight Control Subsystem. The FMECA analysis of equipment in common 
with rotor wing RPAS has not been duplicated. 
The Propulsion Subsystem 
The fixed wing RPAS Propulsion Subsystem can be of jet (jet engine with 
‘Engine Control Unit’ (ECU)) or propeller type (engine with ‘Engine Control 
Unit’ (ECU) and the propeller).  
 
The jet combustion engine consists of the engine and the ‘Engine Control 
Unit’ (ECU) (Figure 33).  
 
The engine control unit failure modes can be (Table 48) [80]: software error 
(during software/firmware upgrade, for example), mechanical failure, loss of on 
board computer or carburetor failure: 
• The probability of occurrence level of ECU software error has been 
estimated as D (Remote) [80] (Table 79) 
• The probability of occurrence level of ECU mechanical failure has 
been estimated as B (Reasonably Probable) [80] (solving the ‘OR’ 
operator of the FTA reported in figure 5) (Table 79) 
• The probability of occurrence level of on board computer has been 
estimated as E [80] (Table 79) 
• The probability of occurrence level of carburetor failure has been 
estimated as C (Occasional) [80] (Table 79) 
The ECU failure brings to the RPAS engines control loss and ultimately to the 
system (RPA) loss, therefore  the severity of the consequences of the ECU failure 
modes has been classified as ‘Catastrophic’. 
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No means of detection of the above mentioned failure modes when the 
aircraft is in flight have been identified in literature. Therefore, the detection 
method has been classified as ‘None’.  
The resulting criticality level of combustion jet engine ECU failure modes is 
‘High’, ‘Moderate’ and ‘Low’ according to the failure modes estimated 
probability of occurrence (Table 49).   
 
The jet combustion engine failure modes are (Table 48) [80]: engine control 
system failure, engine mechanical failure, engine fire, use of improper fuel, short 
circuit. A numerical value, has been associated to probability of occurrence level 
of single events from [80] to solve the above mentioned FTA. Such numerical 
level have been defined as average values from Military Standard 1629 Revision 
A guidelines for qualitative estimation of probability of occurrence levels (Table 
10). 
 
Table 10 – Numerical values associated 
to MIL-STD-1629 Revision A qualitative probability of occurrence level  
A Frequent 
> 0,20 of the overall 
probability of failure during 
the item operating time 
interval 
P > 2,0E-01 
B Reasonably probable 
> 0,10 and < 0,20 of the 
overall probability of 
failure during the item 
operating time interval 
P = 1,5E-01 
C Occasional 
> 0,01 and < 0,10 of the 
overall probability of 
failure during the item 
operating time interval 
P = 5,5E-02 
D Remote 
> 0,001 and < 0,01 of the 
overall probability of 
failure during the item 
operating time interval 
P = 5,5E-03 
E Extremely unlikely 
< 0,001 of the overall 
probability of failure during 
the item operating time 
interval 
P < 1,0E-01 
• The probability of occurrence level of engine control system failure 
has been estimated as C (Occasional) [80] (solving the ‘OR’ Boolean 
operator of figure 6) (Table 79) 
• The probability of occurrence level of engine mechanical failure has 
been estimated as A (Frequent) [80] (solving the Fault Tree of figure 
5) (Table 79) 
• The probability of occurrence level of engine fire has been estimated 
as D (Remote) [80] (Table 79) 
• The probability of occurrence level of use of improper fuel has been 
estimated as D (Occasional) [80] (Table 79) 
The loss of engine on fixed RPAS brings to the loss of control of the system 
and ultimately loss of (RPA) system: for this reason the severity of consequences 
of these failure modes has been classified as ‘Catastrophic’. 
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It is expected that there are no ways to detect the engine failure modes when 
the aircraft is in flight except for the ECU failure and the engine fire failure modes 
for which it can be expected to have proper visual or audible warning devices. 
The resulting criticality level of combustion jet engine failure modes is ‘High’, 
‘Moderate’ and ‘Low’ according to the failure modes estimated probability of 
occurrence levels (Table 49).   
 
 The combustion engine with propeller consists of the engine, the ‘Engine 
Control Unit’ (ECU) and the propeller.  
The combustion engine and ECU failure modes are the same as for the jet 
engine. The propeller failure modes can be: propeller structural failure, propeller 
connection failure and abrupt stop of the propeller (Table 50): 
• The probability of occurrence level of the propeller structural failure 
has been estimated as E (Extremely unlikely) [80] (Table 79) 
•  The probability of occurrence level of the propeller connection failure 
has been ranked as D (Remote) [80] (Table 79) 
• The probability of occurrence level of the abrupt stop of the propeller 
has been estimated as E (Extremely unlikely) [80] (Table 79) 
The loss of the propeller brings the loss of thrust, lift and ultimately the loss 
of the (RPA) system, therefore the severity of consequences of the related failure 
modes has been ranked as ‘Catastrophic’.  
No means of detection of the above mentioned failure modes when the 
aircraft is in flight have been identified in literature. Therefore, the detection 
method has been classified as ‘None’.  
The resulting criticality level of propeller jet engine ECU and engine failure 
modes is ‘High’, ‘Moderate’ and ‘Low’ according to the failure modes estimated 
probability of occurrence levels (Table 51). The resulting criticality level of the 
propeller failure modes is ‘Low’ (Table 51). 
 The Fuel Subsystem 
The fixed wing RPAS Fuel Subsystem consists of the fuel tanks, the pumps to 
pressurize the fuel and the pipelines to transport the fuel to the engines (Figure 33) 
 
The fuel tank can be mainly affected by a structural failure (Table 52):  
• The probability of occurrence level of fuel tank structural failure has 
been estimated as D (Remote) (Table 79) 
The consequences of this failure mode ranges from the loss of the propulsion 
system until the loss of the (RPA) system; therefore this failure mode has been 
ranked as ‘Catastrophic’.  
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No means of detection of the above mentioned failure mode when the aircraft 
is in flight have been identified in literature. Therefore, the detection method has 
been classified as ‘None’.  
 The resulting criticality level of this failure is ‘Low’ (Table 53) due to the 
estimated probability of occurrence.   
 
The fuel pump can be affected by mechanical failures (Table 52): 
• The probability of occurrence level pump mechanical failures has been 
estimated as D (Remote) (Table 79) 
The consequences of this failure mode ranges from the loss of the propulsion 
subsystem until the loss of the (RPA) system; therefore this failure mode has been 
ranked as ‘Catastrophic’.  
No means of detection of the above mentioned failure mode when the aircraft 
is in flight have been identified in literature. Therefore, the detection method has 
been classified as ‘None’.  
 The resulting criticality level of this failure is ‘Low’ (Table 53) due to the 
estimated probability of occurrence.   
The loss of the fuel pump is expected to be detected in flight using an 
automatic sensing device. The resulting criticality level of this failure mode is 
‘Moderate’ (48).   
 
The fuel pipelines can be mainly affected by structural failures (Table 52): 
• The probability of occurrence level of fuel pipelines structural failures 
has been estimated as E (Extremely unlikely) (Table 79) 
The consequences of this failure mode ranges from the loss of the propulsion 
subsystem until the loss of the aircraft system; therefore this failure mode has 
been ranked as ‘Catastrophic’.  
No means of detection of the above mentioned failure mode when the aircraft 
is in flight have been identified in literature. Therefore, the detection method has 
been classified as ‘None’.  
 The resulting criticality level of this failure is ‘Low’ (Table 53) due to the 
estimated probability of occurrence.   
The Power Generation Subsystem 
The fixed wing RPAS Power Generation Subsystem consists of the alternator 
to generate the alternate current on board the aircraft, the rectifier unit to convert 
the alternate current into direct current and the emergency battery as power 
backup equipment (Figure 33). 
 
The alternator failure mode is mechanical failures due to brushes/diodes 
failure occurrence (Table 54): 
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• The probability of occurrence level of the alternator mechanical failure 
has been estimated as C (Occasional) (Table 79) 
The consequences of this failure is the loss of the (RPA) system; therefore this 
failure mode has been ranked as ‘Catastrophic’.  
No means of detection of the above mentioned failure mode when the aircraft 
is in flight have been identified in literature. Therefore, the detection method has 
been classified as ‘None’.  
The resulting criticality level of this failure mode is ‘High’ (Table 55).   
 
The rectifier failure modes are overheating and chemical failure (Table 54): 
• The probability of occurrence level of overheating has been estimated 
as C (Occasional) (Table 79) 
• The probability of occurrence level of the chemical failure has been 
estimated as C (Occasional) (Table 79) 
The consequences of these failure modes bring to the loss of the (RPA) 
system; therefore the consequences of each one of these failure mode have been 
ranked as ‘Catastrophic’.  
No means of detection of the above mentioned failure mode when the aircraft 
is in flight have been identified in literature. Therefore, the detection method has 
been classified as ‘None’.  
 The resulting criticality level of this failure mode is ‘High’ (Table 55).   
 
The emergency battery failure modes are mechanical failure, thermal failure, 
chemical failure, electrical failure (Table 54):  
• The probability of occurrence level of the mechanical failure mode has 
been estimated as D (Remote) (Table 79) 
• The probability of occurrence level of the thermal failure mode has 
been estimated as D (Remote) (Table 79) 
• The probability of occurrence level of the chemical failure mode has 
been estimated as D (Remote) (Table 79) 
• The probability of occurrence level of the electrical failure mode has 
been estimated as D (Remote) (Table 79) 
The consequences of these failure modes bring to the loss of the (RPA) 
system; therefore the consequences of each one of these failure mode have been 
ranked as ‘Catastrophic’.  
No means of detection of the above mentioned failure mode when the aircraft 
is in flight have been identified in literature. Therefore, the detection method has 
been classified as ‘None’.  
 The resulting criticality level of this failure mode is ‘Medium (Table 55).   
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The Flight Subsystem/Air Data Subsystem 
The RPAS Air Data Subsystem comprehends the pitot air probe to measure 
absolute and relative air pressure and the Air Data Unit equipment to measure 
airspeed and barometric altitude flight parameters (Figure 33).  
 
The main failure mode of the air probe is clogging [57] due to ice or dust 
(Table 56):  
• The probability of occurrence level of air probe clogging has been 
estimated as B (Reasonably Probable) from [57] with reference to item 
D.8-a for a fixed wing RPA, for which this failure mode probability of 
occurrence level has been ranked as ‘High’ (Table 79) 
The clogging of the air probe leads to the loss of the RPAS barometric 
altitude and airspeed control, and potentially to the (RPA) system loss. Therefore, 
the severity of the consequences of this failure mode has been classified as 
‘Catastrophic’.  
No means of detection of the above mentioned failure mode when the aircraft 
is in flight have been identified in literature. Therefore, the detection method has 
been classified as ‘None’.  
The resulting criticality level of Air Data Unit failure is ‘High’ (Table 57).   
 
The failure modes of the Data Unit are [53]: incorrect signal, loss of signal, 
signal error along the transmission line, error on output signal, loss of power 
supply, calibration error (Table 56). The evaluations are the same as for the items 
ADSS1a÷f of previously considered for rotor wing airborne segments (Table 79). 
The degradation or loss of Air Data Unit leads to the loss of the RPAS 
barometric altitude and airspeed control, potentially leading to the (RPA) system 
loss. Therefore the severity of the consequences of the Air Data Unit failure 
modes has been classified as ‘Catastrophic’ for fixed wing airborne segments too.  
No means of detection of the above mentioned failure mode when the aircraft 
is in flight have been identified in literature. Therefore, the detection method has 
been classified as ‘None’.  
The resulting criticality level of Air Data Unit failure is ‘High’ and ‘Medium’ 
according to the estimated probability of occurrence levels (Table 57).   
The Flight Subsystem/Flight Control Subsystem 
The fixed wing RPAS Flight Control Subsystem manages the flight command 
signals sent by the remote pilot and transmit them to the flight surfaces to 
manoeuvring to reach the expected flight attitude.  
A fixed wing RPAS Flight Control Subsystem is composed of the Autopilot, 
the servo-actuator units to command the flight surfaces and the ‘Detect and 
Avoid’ DAA subsystem (Figure 33). 
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The Autopilot and DAA have been already treated for the rotor wing RPAS; 
the servo-actuator units subsystem failure modes are hereinafter detailed. 
 
The servo-units subsystem failure modes are (Table 58): bias, stuck surface, 
handover, floating surface, oscillatory modes, increased dead band/stiction, 
structural damage: 
• The probability of occurrence level of servo-units bias has been 
estimated as C (Occasional) [81] (where the probability of occurrence 
level of the considered failure mode has been ranked as ‘Medium’) 
(Table 79) 
• The probability of occurrence level of servo-units stuck-surface has 
been estimated as D (Remote) [81] (where the probability of 
occurrence level of the considered failure mode has been ranked as 
‘Low’) (Table 79) 
• The probability of occurrence level of servo-units hardover has been 
estimated as D (Remote) [81] (where the probability of occurrence 
level of the considered failure mode has been ranked as ‘Low’) (Table 
79) 
• The probability of occurrence level of servo-units floating surface has 
been estimated as C (Occasional) [81] (where the probability of 
occurrence level of the considered failure mode has been ranked as 
‘Medium’) (Table 79) 
• The probability of occurrence level of servo-units oscillatory modes 
has been estimated as D (Remote) [81] (where the probability of 
occurrence level of the considered failure mode has been ranked as 
‘Low’) (Table 79) 
• The probability of occurrence level of servo-units increased dead 
band/stiction has been estimated as D (Remote) [81] (where the 
probability of occurrence level of the considered failure mode has 
been ranked as ‘Low’) (Table 79) 
• The probability of occurrence level of servo-units structural damage 
has been estimated as E (Extremely unlikely) (Table 79) 
The severity of consequences of the above mentioned failure modes has been 
ranked as ‘Catastrophic’ because each failure mode brings to the loss of aircraft 
control and ultimately to the loss of the (RPA) system. 
No means of detection of the above mentioned failure mode when the aircraft 
is in flight have been identified in literature. Therefore, the detection method has 
been classified as ‘None’.  
 The resulting criticality is ‘High’, ‘Moderate’ and ‘Low’ according to the 
failure modes estimated probability of occurrence levels (Table 59). 
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The Structures Subsystem  
The RPA Structural Subsystem has not been analysed using the FMECA 
methodology because from literature this methodology is not recommended to 
investigate structures failure modes.  
Nevertheless, it is here highlighted that structural integrity shall be 
demonstrated and continuously maintained for the RPA airworthiness [39]. 
The rotor wing hybrid airborne segment 
The fixed wing hybrid airborne segment is composed of the following 
subsystems (Figure 35): 
• Propulsion Subsystem powered by electric motors fed by fuel cells 
and by the LiPo battery stack (as backup system) 
• Hydrogen fuel Subsystem 
• Power Subsystem 
• Electrical Subsystem 
• Flight Subsystem, subdivided into: 
o  Navigation Subsystem 
o Air Data Subsystem 
o Flight Control Subsystem 
o Emergency Flight Subsystem 
• Mission Data Subsystem 
• Payload Data Subsystem 
• Communication Subsystem 
• Structures  
The Propulsion Subsystem 
The hybrid RPAS Propulsion Subsystem consists of the hydrogen fuel cell 
powered line and of the LiPo batteries powered line. The fuel cell powered line is 
composed of the hydrogen tank, the fuel cell and the DC to DC converter which 
provides the electrical loads with the current at the correct values of voltage and 
intensity; the LiPo powered line consists of the LiPo battery stack and the DC to 
DC converter; the DC to DC power bus distributes the produced electrical power 
to all the RPA electrical loads (Figure 35). 
 
The hydrogen tank failure modes are structural damage and leakage (Table 
63): 
• The probability of occurrence level of the structural damage failure 
mode has been estimated as D (Remote) (Table 79) 
• The probability of occurrence level of the leakage failure mode has 
been estimated as D (Remote) (Table 79) 
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The consequences of these failure modes can be fire on board the RPA due to 
the presence of hydrogen and ultimately the system (hybrid RPA) loss; therefore 
the severity of consequences of these failure modes has been ranked as 
‘Catastrophic’.  
No means of detection of the above mentioned failure mode when the aircraft 
is in flight have been identified in literature. Therefore, the detection method has 
been classified as ‘None’. 
The resulting criticality level of this failure mode is ‘Medium’ (Table 64) 
according to the estimated value of probability of occurrence level.   
 
The fuel cell failure modes can be fuel cell membrane drying and water 
condensation inhibition [82] (Table 63): 
• The probability of occurrence level of the fuel cell membrane drying 
has been estimated as D (Remote) (Table 79) 
• The probability of occurrence level of the fuel cell water condensation 
inhibition has been estimated as D (Remote) (Table 79) 
The consequences of these failure mode ranges from the loss of the fuel cell 
functionality to the loss of propulsion until the loss of the aircraft system; 
therefore this failure mode has been ranked as ‘Catastrophic’.  
No means of detection of the above mentioned failure mode when the aircraft 
is in flight have been identified in literature. Therefore, the detection method has 
been classified as ‘None’. 
The resulting criticality level associated to these failure modes is ‘Medium’ 
according to the estimated value of probability of occurrence level (Table 64).   
 
The hydrogen can cause fire in particular due to casual presence of explosive 
gases like chlorine [83] (Table 63): 
• The probability of occurrence level of hydrogen fire has been 
estimated as C (Occasional) (Table 79) 
The consequences of hydrogen fire are the (hybrid RPA) system loss; 
therefore the severity of consequences of hydrogen fire has been ranked as 
‘Catastrophic’.  
It is expected that hydrogen fire can be detected in flight through audible or 
visual warnings. 
The resulting criticality level of this failure mode is ‘High’ (Table 64) 
according to the estimated value of probability of occurrence level.   
 
The LiPo batteries failure modes analysis is the same as for rotor wing RPAS 
power subsystem (Table 63). 
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The DC power bus failure modes can be electrical failure due to overvoltage 
or under voltage (Table 63): 
• The probability of occurrence level has been estimated as C 
(Occasional) (Table 79) 
The DC power Bus failure potentially leads to the lack of supplied power to 
the RPA electrical loads, therefore the severity of consequences of this failure 
mode has been classified as ‘Catastrophic’ potentially leading to the loss of the 
(hybrid RPA) system.  
No means of detection of the above mentioned failure mode when the aircraft 
is in flight have been identified in literature. Therefore, the detection method has 
been classified as ‘None’. 
The resulting criticality level associated to these failure modes is ‘High’ 
(Table 64) according to the estimated value of probability of occurrence level.   
 
The DC to DC converter failure modes can be due to the failure of its internal 
components like capacitors or transistors (Table 63): 
• The probability of occurrence level of DC to DC converter internal 
components failure has been estimated as C (Occasional) (Table 79) 
The failure of the DC to DC converter leads to the lack of proper management 
of electrical current voltage to be provided to the RPA electrical loads. This fault 
scenario can potentially lead to the degradation of functionality of all other hybrid 
RPA electrical powered equipment and to the system (hybrid RPA) loss. 
Therefore, the severity of the consequences of these failure modes has been 
classified as ‘Catastrophic’.  
No means of detection of the above mentioned failure mode when the aircraft 
is in flight have been identified in literature. Therefore, the detection method has 
been classified as ‘None’. 
The resulting criticality level associated to these failure modes is ‘High’ 
(Table 64) according to the estimated value of probability of occurrence level.   
The Command and Control (C2) link  
The Command and Control (C2) link is the radio link that allows the remote 
pilot to command and control/manage the RPA from ground (Figure 37).  
 
The failure modes are signal degradation and signal loss (Table 65): 
• The probability of occurrence level of the radio link signal degradation 
has been estimated as D (Remote) (Table 79) 
The severity of this failure mode consequences has been estimated as 
‘Catastrophic’ potentially leading to the loss of the (RPA) system.  
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Visual or audible warning devices are expected to be used as detection 
methods. The resulting criticality level is ‘Medium’ according to the estimated 
value of probability of occurrence level (Table 65). 
• The probability of occurrence level of the radio link signal loss has 
been estimated as D (Remote) (Table 79) 
The severity of this failure mode consequences has been estimated as 
‘Catastrophic’ potentially leading to the loss of the (RPA) system.  
Visual or audible warning devices are expected to be used as detection 
methods. The resulting criticality level is ‘Medium’ according to the estimated 
value of probability of occurrence level (Table 65). 
The ground segment  
The RPAS ground segment is composed of the following subsystems (Figure 
38): 
• The GCS Power Generation Subsystem 
• The GCS Start-Up subsystem 
• The GCS HMI Subsystem 
• The GCS Flight Termination HMI Subsystem 
• The GCS Payload Sensors HMI Subsystem 
• The GCS Communication Subsystem 
The Ground Control Station Power Generation Subsystem 
For a more complex RPAS, the GCS Power Generation Subsystem mainly 
consists of a generator and ground emergency battery (Figure 38); for simpler 
RPAS it mainly consists of the battery which supplies the hand-held portable 
radio controller. For a more comprehensive analysis (applicable for civil RPAS 
capable of certified operations, for example), the more complex case is hereinafter 
debated. 
 
The generator failure modes are missed start and sudden stop (Table 67): 
• The probability of occurrence level of the missed start failure mode 
has been estimated as D (Remote) (Table 79) 
• The probability of occurrence level of the sudden stop failure mode 
has been estimated as D (Remote) (Table 79) 
The severity of consequences of these failure modes has been estimated as 
‘Catastrophic’ because they can lead to the loss of GCS functionality, the loss of 
control of the airborne segment and ultimately to the loss of the airborne segment 
(RPA). 
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It is expected that audible or visual warnings can be used as failure detection 
methods.  
The resulting criticality level is ‘Low’ (Table 68). 
 
The ground emergency battery failure modes are low charge and lack of 
charge (Table 67); considering the emergency battery as a backup system, the 
following is expected: 
• The probability of occurrence level of low charge failure mode has 
been estimated as E (Extremely unlikely) (Table 79) 
• The probability of occurrence level of lack of charge failure mode has 
been estimated as E (Extremely unlikely) (Table 79) 
The severity of consequences of these failure modes has been estimated as 
‘Catastrophic’ because they can lead to the loss of GCS functionality, the loss of 
control of the airborne segment and ultimately to the loss of the airborne segment 
(RPA). 
It is expected that audible or visual warnings can be used as failure detection 
methods.  
The resulting criticality level is ‘Low’ (Table 68). 
The Ground Control Station Start Up Subsystem 
The GCS Start Up Subsystem mainly consists of the master switch (Figure 
38) to power on the ground control segment (both for more complex and simpler 
RPAS). 
 
The GCS Start Up Subsystem failure mode is missed start (Table 67): 
• The probability of occurrence level of this failure mode has been 
estimated as E (Extremely unlikely) (Table 79) 
The severity of consequences of these failure modes has been estimated as 
‘Minor’ due to the impossibility to start and perform the aerial mission if this 
failure occurs. 
No means of detection of the above mentioned failure have been identified in 
literature. Therefore, the detection method has been classified as ‘None’. 
The resulting criticality level associated to these failure modes is ‘Low’ Table 
70.   
The Ground Control Station Human Machine Interface 
Subsystem 
The GCS Human Machine Interface (Figure 38) consists (both for more 
complex and simpler RPAS) of: the control (usually a joystick) to command the 
RPA attitude variation along the longitudinal and directional axes, the control 
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(pedals for more complex RPAS or level switches for simpler RPAS) to command 
the RPA attitude variations on the lateral direction and the throttle to manage the 
thrust regime on board the RPA; the autopilot modes selection switch to choose 
the most proper RPA autopilot for each stage of flight; the GCS management 
software that receives the command signals generated by the remote pilot every 
time he/she operates an HMI control, converts them into electromagnetic signals 
according to given protocols and convey them towards the GCS communication 
subsystem to send them to the RPA via the radio uplink channel; the displays fed 
by telemetry data to monitor the status of on board RPA functional subsystems 
(Table 71).  
 
The GCS joystick failure modes are (Table 71): lack of calibration, software 
error, missed start and sudden stop: 
• The probability of occurrence level of the joystick hardware failure 
has been estimated as D (Remote) (Table 79) 
• The probability of occurrence level of the joystick software error has 
been estimated as D (Remote) (Table 79) 
• The probability of occurrence level of the joystick missed start has 
been estimated as D (Remote) (Table 79) 
• The probability of occurrence level of the joystick sudden stop has 
been estimated as D (Remote) (Table 79) 
The severity of consequences of these failure modes has been estimated as 
‘Catastrophic’ because they can lead to the loss of longitudinal and lateral control 
of the airborne segment and ultimately to the loss of the airborne segment (RPA). 
No means of detection of the above mentioned failure mode when the RPA is 
in flight have been identified in literature. Therefore, the detection method has 
been classified as ‘None’. 
The resulting criticality level is ‘Medium’ (Table 72). 
 
The GCS pedals failure modes are (Table 71): lack of calibration, software 
error, missed start and sudden stop: 
• The probability of occurrence level of the pedals hardware failure has 
been estimated as D (Remote) (Table 79) 
• The probability of occurrence level of the pedals software error has 
been estimated as D (Remote)  (Table 79) 
• The probability of occurrence level of the pedals missed start has 
been estimated as D (Remote)  (Table 79) 
• The probability of occurrence level of the pedals sudden stop has 
been estimated as D (Remote) (Table 79) 
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The severity of consequences of these failure modes has been estimated as 
‘Catastrophic’ because they can lead to the loss of directional control of the 
airborne segment and ultimately to the loss of the airborne segment (RPA). 
No means of detection of the above mentioned failure mode when the RPA is 
in flight have been identified in literature. Therefore, the detection method has 
been classified as ‘None’. 
The resulting criticality level is ‘Medium’ (Table 72). 
 
The GCS throttle failure modes are (Table 71): lack of calibration, software 
error, missed start and sudden stop:  
• The probability of occurrence level of the throttle hardware failure has 
been estimated as D (Remote) (Table 79) 
• The probability of occurrence level of the throttle software error has 
been estimated as D (Remote) (Table 79) 
• The probability of occurrence level of the throttle missed start has 
been estimated as has been estimated as D (Remote) (Table 79) 
• The probability of occurrence level of the throttle sudden stop has 
been estimated as D (Remote) (Table 79) 
The severity of consequences of these failure modes has been estimated as 
‘Catastrophic’ because they can lead to the loss of trust control of the airborne 
segment and ultimately to the loss of the airborne segment (RPA). 
No means of detection of the above mentioned failure mode when the RPA is 
in flight have been identified in literature. Therefore, the detection method has 
been classified as ‘None’. 
The resulting criticality level is ‘Medium’ (Table 72). 
 
The Autopilot switch failure modes are (Table 71): mechanical failure, 
electrical failure and software error: 
• The probability of occurrence level of the mechanical failure has been 
estimated as D (Remote) (Table 79) 
• The probability of occurrence level of the electrical failure has been 
estimated as D (Remote)  (Table 79) 
• The probability of occurrence level of the autopilot switch signal error 
has been estimated as D (Remote) (Table 79) 
The severity of consequences of these failure modes has been estimated as 
‘Catastrophic’ because they can lead to the loss of control of the airborne segment 
(RPA) and ultimately to the loss of the airborne segment (RPA) 
No means of detection of the above mentioned failure mode when the RPA is 
in flight have been identified in literature. Therefore, the detection method has 
been classified as ‘None’. 
The resulting criticality level is ‘Medium’ (Table 72). 
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The GCS management software failure mode is software error (Table 71): 
• The probability of occurrence level has been estimated as E 
(Extremely Unlikely) (Table 79) 
The severity of consequences of these failure modes has been estimated as 
‘Catastrophic’ because they can lead to the loss of control of the airborne segment 
(RPA) and ultimately to the loss of the airborne segment (RPA) 
No means of detection of the above mentioned failure mode when the RPA is 
in flight have been identified in literature. Therefore, the detection method has 
been classified as ‘None’. 
The resulting criticality level is ‘Medium’ (Table 72). 
 
The GCS displays failure modes are (Table 71): electrical failure and software 
error: 
• The probability of occurrence level of lack of power supply has been 
estimated as D (Remote) (Table 79) 
• The probability of occurrence level of the GCS displays software error 
has been estimated as D (Remote) (Table 79) 
The severity of consequences of these failure modes has been estimated as 
‘Catastrophic’ because they can lead to the loss of GCS monitoring capability of 
the RPA, the loss of control of the RPA and ultimately to the loss of the airborne 
segment (RPA). 
No means of detection of the above mentioned failure mode when the aircraft 
is in flight have been identified in literature. Therefore, the detection method has 
been classified as ‘None’. 
The resulting criticality level is ‘Medium (Table 72). 
The Ground Control Station Emergency Flight Termination HMI 
Subsystem 
The GCS Flight Termination HMI Subsystem consists of the FTS command 
switch and the Recovery Parachute deployment command switch (Figure 38).  
 
The FTS command switch failure modes is the mechanical failure (Table 73): 
• The probability of occurrence level of FTS command switch mechanical 
failure has been estimated as E (Extremely Unlikely) (Table 79) 
The severity of consequences of this failure mode has been estimated as 
‘Catastrophic’ because it leads to the loss of the airborne segment due to 
emergency on board failures. 
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No means of detection of the above mentioned failure mode when the aircraft 
is in flight have been identified in literature. Therefore, the detection method has 
been classified as ‘None’. 
The resulting criticality level is ‘Low’ (Table 74). 
 
The Emergency Parachute command switch failure modes is the mechanical 
failure (Table 73): 
• The probability of occurrence level of Emergency Parachute switch 
mechanical failure has been estimated as E (Extremely Unlikely) (Table 
79) 
The severity of consequences of this failure mode has been estimated as 
‘Catastrophic’ because it leads to the loss of the airborne segment due to 
emergency on board failures. 
No means of detection of the above mentioned failure mode when the aircraft 
is in flight have been identified in literature. Therefore, the detection method has 
been classified as ‘None’. 
The resulting criticality level is ‘Low’ (Table 74). 
The Ground Control Station Payload Sensors HMI Switch 
Subsystem 
The Ground Control Station Payload Sensors HMI Subsystem is the whole of 
the controls to manage the RPA on board payload sensors from ground. The 
payload sensors can be: photo/video cameras and/or other kinds of sensors 
according to the commercial mission aim (Figure 38Figure 38 – Ground Control 
Station [80]). 
 
The photo/video cameras command switch failure mode is mechanical failure 
(Table 75):  
• The probability of occurrence level of mechanical failure has been 
estimated as D (Remote) (Table 79) 
The severity of consequences of this failure mode has been estimated as 
‘Minor’ because it does not imply any safety related consequence on the RPAS. 
No means of detection of the above mentioned failure mode when the aircraft 
is in flight have been identified in literature. Therefore, the detection method has 
been classified as ‘None’. 
The resulting criticality level is ‘Low’ (Table 76). 
 
The other payload command switch failure mode is mechanical failure (Table 
75):  
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• The probability of occurrence level of mechanical failure has been 
estimated as D (Remote) (Table 79) 
The severity of consequences of this failure mode has been estimated as 
‘Minor’ because it does not imply any safety related consequence on the RPAS. 
No means of detection of the above mentioned failure mode when the aircraft 
is in flight have been identified in literature. Therefore, the detection method has 
been classified as ‘None’. 
The resulting criticality level is ‘Low’ (Table 76). 
The Ground Control Station Communication Subsystem 
The GCS Communication Subsystem consists of the Transmitting Antenna, 
the Receiving Antenna and the ATC channel (Figure 38). 
 The GCS Communication Transmitting Subsystem failure modes are: 
transmitting antenna lack of signal processing and antenna fade (Table 77) [57]: 
• The probability of occurrence level of transmitting lack of signal 
processing has been estimated as D (Remote) (Table 79) 
• The probability of occurrence level of transmitting antenna fade has been 
estimated as C (Occasional ([57], with reference to item D.7-d for which 
the probability of occurrence has been estimated as 
‘Medium’/’Occasional’ (Table 79) 
The severity of consequences of RPAS transmitting antenna failure modes 
can potentially lead to the loss of the RPA control and ultimately to the loss of the 
RPA system; therefore it has been ranked as ‘Catastrophic’.  
No means of detection of the above mentioned failure modes when the 
aircraft is in flight have been identified in literature. Therefore, the detection 
method has been classified as ‘None’.  
The criticality of this failure mode is ‘Medium’ and ‘Low’ in accordance with 
the estimated probability of occurrence levels (Table 78).  
 
The GCS Communication Receiving Subsystem failure modes are: receiving 
antenna lack of signal processing and antenna fade (Table 77) [57]: 
• The probability of occurrence level of receiving lack of signal 
processing has been estimated as D (Remote) (Table 79) 
• The probability of occurrence level of receiving antenna fade has been 
estimated as C (Occasional ([57], with reference to item D.7-d for 
which the probability of occurrence has been estimated as 
‘Medium’/’Occasional’ (Table 79) 
The severity of consequences of RPAS transmitting antenna failure modes 
can potentially lead to the loss of the RPA control and ultimately to the loss of the 
RPA system; therefore it has been ranked as ‘Catastrophic’.  
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No means of detection of the above mentioned failure modes when the 
aircraft is in flight have been identified in literature. Therefore, the detection 
method has been classified as ‘None’.  
The criticality of this failure mode is ‘Medium’ and ‘Low’ in accordance with 
the estimated probability of occurrence levels (Table 78).  
 
The failure mode of the ATC channel is the lack of communication with the 
ATC (Table 77): 
• The probability of occurrence level of this failure mode has been 
estimated as C (Occasional) (Table 79) 
The severity of the consequences has been ranked as ‘Catastrophic’ due to the 
possible loss of the aircraft (Table 79) 
This failure mode is expected to be detected through visual or audible 
warning devices. 
The criticality level of this failure mode is ‘High’ (Table 78). 
FMECA analysis: pros and cons  
The FMECA analysis has been performed to systematically investigate the 
possible single failure modes (that is simple events of failure not furtherly 
decomposable in other simpler events) of the components of each main segments 
of RPAS (the airborne segment, the radio link and the ground segment), that could 
abruptly occur during flight operations in the civil airspace; each failure can have  
impact on the RPAS itself and/or on third parties according to the operative 
scenario. This aspect is further investigated forward in this work in the safety 
hazards analysis.    
The performed analysis has provided a wide basis to identify direct or indirect 
events that can cause the RPAS practical/operating drift from its baseline towards 
an incident/accident. The analysis results allow to confirm the benefit of the 
FMECA methodology for RPAS too as for manned aircraft as guideline for better 
addressed design choices. 
The limitations of the performed analysis are summed up hereinafter: 
• A qualitative analysis has been intentionally rather than a quantitative 
one because of the consistent lack of reliability data on RPAS due to 
the relatively recency of this technology  
• The analysis has been intentionally performed on a generic theoretical 
RPAS functional architecture to lay down the basis for a more 
comprehensive analysis and because the RPAS technology is a quickly 
changing disruptive technology 
• The analysis purpose has not been the evaluation of reliability of 
current given RPAS commercial equipment but looking forward the  
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safety hazard risk analysis on the system ‘RPAS integrated in the 
controlled airspace’ focus of this research work  
• In general, the reliability of an RPAS equipment is not expected to be 
equal to the reliability of the same type of equipment designed to be 
installed on a civil aircraft mainly for the different level of 
environmental stress caused by strongly different airframe 
configurations, weight and sizes (much lower than manned aircraft) 
and altitudes of operation (until operating within urban environment): 
as initial expectations, a more stressing effect due to vibrations, 
temperature, humidity, wind gust, dust and debris are expected to 
more negatively affect RPAS equipment reliability. Proper technical 
documentation ([52], [53] and [54]) has been consulted to find out 
indications on corrective factors to be applied. In any case, in 
accordance with [51], quantitative values of RPAS equipment failure 
rate can be determined only running dedicated tests on the equipment 
reproducing the real operative conditions on board the RPAS  
• Proper requirements and guidelines on RPAS equipment reliability are 
needed to be issued by Aviation Authorities for incoming specific 
category operations 
• Proper requirements and guidelines on RPAS safety critical software 
functionalities are needed to be issued by Aviation Authorities for 
incoming specific category operations to avoid errors/bugs in the 
software modules embedded in the following equipment/subsystems:  
‘Detect and Avoid’ (DAA), ‘Flight Control Computer’ (FCC), ‘Flight 
Termination System’ (FTS) 
• Proper requirements and guidelines on the systematic performance of 
reliability tests for collection of RPAS historical reliability data are 
needed to be issued by Aviation Authorities  
Fault Tree Analysis  
The Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a top-down graphical deductive analysis 
methodology structured in terms of events. It is used to model faults in terms of 
failures, anomalies, malfunctions, and human errors. In this work, it has been 
applied to find out combinantions of FMECA sngle fault events (thus maintaining 
the direct correlation between the two analyses) potentially leading to a given 
equipment failure and, from there onwards, untill the complete loss of 
functionality of the associated RPAS subsystem. Going through the FTA, possbile 
fault paths can be identfied from initiating events; for any functionality, the 
initiating events have been chosen among failure modes causes. For each 
subsystem functionality a fault tree has been implemented; the descending truth 
tables have been solved combining the ‘OR’, ‘AND’ and ‘XOR’ Boolean 
operators assigned as deemed necessary to logically represent the expected real 
functional links among equipment. The failure modes qualitative probability of 
occurrence levels assigned in the FMECA analysis and combined in the truth 
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tables have been changed into numerical values (Table 80) (Table 81) following 
the assumptions of Table 10 and rearranged according to criticality level from 
those characterized by high criticality to those characterized by low criticality 
(Table 81). Once solved the truth tables related to intermediate multiple failures, 
an average value of their probability of occurrence level has been calculated (at 
the bottom of the related truth table) to give the same weight (without other 
available information) to each combination of failures that can lead to the partial 
or total loss of the overall subsystem functionality under analysis. The resulting 
estimated probability of occurrence level of loss of a given RPAS subsystem 
functionality has been calculated as a single value (A, B, C, D or E) or a range 
between two extreme values of an interval (‘B  C’, for example). Finally, these 
data have been used as an indication to assess the probability of occurrence the 
hazards due to a given RPAS subsystem loss of functionality.  
Considering the current early stage of definition of RPAS operations in the 
not segregated airspace and related regulations, the above described approach has 
been deemed the most proper to be used at the moment. For the same reasons, 
during the FTA performance, the combinations up to six input variables to the 
truth tables have been extensively solved only; proper considerations have been 
introduced to simplify more complex cases (for instance: flight control subsystem 
FTA for fixed wing aerial segment).    
The analysis has been carried on the following the aerial and ground segments 
subsystem functionalities as already defined for the FMECA analysis; again the 
fault trees of duplicated aerial segment subsystems (for example passing from 
rotor wing to fixed wing RPAS) has been avoided.  
The FTA analysis has been carried out on the following RPAS subsystems:  
• Rotor wing RPAS: 
o Propulsion Subsystem functionality (Figure 40, Table 82, 
Table 83, Table 84 and Table 85)  
o Power Subsystem functionality (Figure 41, Table 86) 
o Electrical Subsystem functionality (Figure 42, Table 87, Table 
88 and Table 89) 
o Navigation Subsystem functionality (Figure 43, Table 90, 
Table 91, Table 92, Table 93 and Table 94) 
o Air Data Subsystem functionality (Figure 44, Table 95) 
o Flight Control Subsystem functionality (Figure 45, Table 96, 
Table 97 and Table 98) 
o Emergency Flight Termination Subsystem functionality 
(Figure 46, Table 99, Table 100 and Table 101) 
o Mission Control Subsystem functionality (Figure 47, Table 
102) 
o Payload Sensors Subsystem functionality 
o On Board Communication Subsystem functionality (Figure 48, 
Table 103, Table 104 and Table 105) 
• Fixed wing RPAS: 
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o Propulsion with Combustion Engine Subsystem functionality 
(Figure 49, Table 106, Table 107 and Table 108) 
o Propulsion with Combustion Engine with Propellers 
Subsystem functionality (Figure 50, Table 110, Table 111, and 
Table 112) 
o Fuel Subsystem functionality (Figure 51, Table 113) 
o Power Generation Subsystem functionality (Figure 52, Table 
117) 
o Air Data Subsystem functionality (Figure 53, Table 118 and 
Table 119) 
o Flight Control Subsystem functionality (Figure 54, Table 120) 
• Hybrid RPAS: 
o Propulsion Subsystem functionality  (Figure 55, Table 121, 
Table 122, Table 123, Table 124 and Table 125) 
• Command and Control (C2) Radio Link: 
o Command and Control (C2) Radio Link Subsystem 
functionality  ( 
o  
o  
 
o Figure 56, Table 126) 
• Ground Segment: 
o Ground Control Station Start-Up Subsystem functionality 
(Figure 57, Table 127 and Table 128) 
o Ground Control Station Power Generation Subsystem 
functionality (Figure 57, Table 129) 
o Ground Control Station HMI Subsystem functionality (Figure 
58, Table 130, Table 131, Table 132, Table 133 and Table 134) 
o Ground Control Station Payload Sensors HMI Subsystem 
functionality  
o Ground Control Station Flight Termination HMI Subsystem 
functionalityv (Figure 59, Table 135) 
o Ground Control Station Communication Subsystem 
functionality (Figure 60, Table 136, Table 137 and Table 138) 
The FTA analysis has been developed according to the ‘Military Handbook 
338 Revision B’ [84]; the final results have been reported in Appendix B (Table 
139). 
The human factor model  
The hazards caused by human factor in RPAS operations into civil non 
segregated airspace has been investigated using the SHELL and HFACS models. 
The mismatches precursors to hazards due to human behaviour with respect to the 
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surrounding operational environment have been identified using the SHELL 
model (Table 140). The mismatches have been defined considering as ‘liveware’ 
in turn each one of three categories of human actors potentially involved into 
RPAS operations in the not segregated airspace: the remote pilot, the pilot on 
board manned aircraft and the ATC controllers. The most comprehensive case has 
been considered where all of the three above mentioned human roles are involved. 
The analysis has been performed referring to a typical operational event where 
this condition can occur: the mid-air conflict between a remotely piloted aircraft 
and a manned intruder in the airspace under the overview of competent ATC. 
With reference to the concept of operations described in Figure 6, this can be a 
typical scenario for a certified category flight operation; without the involvement 
of the ATC it becomes a possible scenario for specific category RPAS operations. 
In addition, the performance of the three above mentioned actors has been 
analysed according to the HFACS model to find other sources of hazards of 
interest (Table 141).  
The human factor analysis and the results have been reported in Appendix C 
(Table 142) where a list of selected hazards related to human factor in RPAS 
operations in the not segregated have been collected with an associated qualitative 
assessment of the probability of occurrence, as hereinafter reported: 
Hazard: ATC Communication error: according to [85], the measured rate of 
ATC communication error that can cause an accident is equal to 1.10E-07 per 
ATC communication; the assigned qualitative probability of occurrence of this 
hazard according to Table 5 [3] is Improbable (D) [85]. 
Hazard: Collision with natural/man made obstacle when the RPA is flown in 
manual mode: the collision could be caused by an error due to remote pilot low 
flight planning or his/her poor practice; the assigned probability of occurrence 
according to Table 5 [3] is Occasional (B). 
Hazard: Confusing, misleading or cluttering of operational documentation, 
and checklists, etc.: this issue is particularly expected to be more frequent at the 
beginning of integration of RPAS into the not segregated airspace when a 
transitory period of adaptation of civil RPAS remote pilot to these well 
consolidated practices of manned aeronautics can occur; the assigned probability 
of occurrence according to Table 5 [3] is Frequent (A). 
Hazard: Error to manage separations: this issue could be expected to be more 
frequent at the beginning of integration of RPAS into the not segregated airspace 
due to ATC adaptation to the new operational scenarios involving RPAS; the 
assigned probability of occurrence to Table 5 [3] is Occasional (B). 
Hazard: Human senses limitation: the assigned probability of occurrence 
according to Table 5 [3] is Frequent (A) due to the location of the remote pilot not 
on board he RPA and receiving data from sensors not from his senses [86]. 
Hazard: Loss of remote pilot situational awareness; the assigned probability 
of occurrence according to Table 5 [3] is Frequent (A) particularly in complex 
operations in congested scenario due to the location of the remote pilot not on 
board he RPA and receiving data from sensors not from his senses [86]. 
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Hazard: Insufficient or inappropriate operational procedure; this issue is 
expected to more frequent at the beginning of integration of RPAS into the not 
segregated airspace; the assigned probability of occurrence to Table 5 [3] is 
Occasional (B). 
Hazard: Intentional violation of standard procedures; this issue is expected to 
be due to malicious act; the assigned probability of occurrence to Table 5 [3] is 
Remote (C). 
Hazard: Lack of specific checklists, operational procedures; this issue is 
expected to more frequent at the beginning of integration of RPAS into the not 
segregated airspace when a transitory period of adaptation of civil RPAS 
(commercial) operators to these well consolidated practices of manned 
aeronautics can occur; the assigned probability of occurrence to Table 5 [3] is 
Frequent (A). 
Hazard: Low manned aircraft crew resource management in case of mid-air 
conflict with an RPA; this hazard is expected to more frequent at the beginning of 
integration of RPAS into the not segregated airspace; the assigned probability of 
occurrence to Table 5 [3] is Occasional (B). 
Hazard: Low remote pilot training; this hazard is expected to more frequent at 
the beginning of daily routine RPAS commercial operations RPAS into the not 
segregated airspace; the assigned probability of occurrence to Table 5 [3] is 
Occasional (B). 
Hazard: Performance of no compliant procedures; this hazard is expected to 
more frequent at the beginning of daily routine RPAS commercial operations 
RPAS into the not segregated airspace; the assigned probability of occurrence to 
Table 5 is Occasional (B). 
Hazard: Excessive workload due to the presence of RPAS in the airspace; this 
hazard can occur both to ATC personnel, to RPAS remote pilot and to the pilot of 
manned aircraft; the assigned probability of occurrence to Table 5 [3] is 
Occasional (B). 
Hazard: Remote pilot reduced physical performance; the assigned probability 
of occurrence to Table 5  [3] is Remote (C). 
Hazard: Remote pilot perceptual errors; the assigned probability of occurrence 
to Table 5 [3] is Frequent (A) due to the location of the remote pilot not on board 
he RPA and receiving data from sensors not from his senses [86]. 
Hazard: RPA flight through adverse weather conditions: the assigned 
probability of occurrence to Table 5 [3] is Occasional (B) due to the lack of 
weather RADARs on board the RPA [86]. 
Hazard: Unintentional violation of operational procedures: the assigned 
probability of occurrence to Table 5 [3] is Remote (C) due to eventual poor or 
lack of adequate training. 
Hazard: Intentional violation of operational procedures: the assigned 
probability of occurrence to Table 5 [3] is Occasional (B) due to malicious acts. 
Hazard: Unintentional violation of separations: the assigned probability of 
occurrence to Table 5 [3] is Remote (C) due to eventual poor or lack of adequate 
training. 
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Hazard: Intentional violation of separations: the assigned probability of 
occurrence to Table 5 [3] is Occasional (B) due to malicious acts. 
3.2.8 The U-space hazard log  
The U-Space hazard log (Table 11) has been draft according to the 
categorization of RPAS functionalities described in Paragraph 3.2 for the 
successive safety risk analysis. It reports the hazards expected to occur for 
specific category RPAS operations performed in the VLL subspace served by the 
U-Space according to EUROCONTROL/EASA definitions ([25], [26], [27]). The 
considered RPAS weight is between 25 and 150 kg (light RPAS). 
 
Table 11 – Hazard analysis: U-Space hazard log 
Hazard log 
Hazard # Definition 
Service: U-Space 
RPAS Aviate functionality related hazards 
H01 Loss of abort launch capability 
H02 Loss of flight controls  
H03 Loss of propulsion 
H04 Loss of GCS HMI 
H05 
Deviation from steady-state  
(not-accelerating) flight condition 
H06 Loss of Emergency Flight Termination System 
H07 Loss of ‘Return to home function’ 
RPAS Navigate functionality related hazards 
H08 Loss of mission plan 
H09 Loss of GPS signal 
H10 Loss of EGNOS signal 
H11 Drift with respect to mission plan 
RPAS Communicate functionality related hazards 
H12 Loss of uplink channel of the RPAS radio link 
H13 Loss of downlink channel of the RPAS radio link 
H14 Loss of ADS_B  
RPAS hazards avoidance functionality related hazards 
H15 Presence of natural obstacles  
H16 Presence of man-made manufactures 
H17 Mid-air collision with other aircraft 
H18 Loss of DAA capability 
H19 No detectability from other airspace users 
H20 Cooperative traffic intrusion 
H21 Not cooperative traffic intrusion 
H22 Missed cooperative traffic tracking 
H23 Missed not cooperative traffic tracking 
H24 Collision avoidance with cooperative traffic 
H25 Collision avoidance with not cooperative traffic 
H26 Missed performance of collision avoidance manoeuvre  
H27 
Missed monitoring of performance  
of collision avoidance manoeuvring  
Hazard log 
Hazard # Definition 
Service: U-Space 
H28 Missed weather awareness capability 
H29 Missed gathering of contingent weather information  
H30 Missed avoidance of adverse weather  
Cross-cutting functionalities related hazards 
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H31 Loss of RPAS subsystems health and status monitoring  
H32 
Loss of communication while transiting  
from LOS to BRLOS and vice versa  
H33 Unintentional radio link interference 
 
Table 11 – Hazard analysis: U-Space hazard log (Cont’d) 
H34 Malicious radio link jamming 
H35 Malicious radio link spoofing 
Contingencies  Failures related hazards 
H36 Fire 
H37 Loss of RPAS autopilot 
H38 Loss of electrical power 
H39 Loss of inertial platform 
H40 Loss of heading indication 
H41 Loss of altitude indication 
H42 Pressure sensor failure 
H43 Misleading altitude indication 
H44 Misleading airspeed indication 
H45 Misleading indication of the angle of incidence 
H46 Stall 
Contingencies  Human factor related hazards 
H47 Loss of fuel cell 
H48 Remote pilot low training 
H49 Non-compliant operational procedures 
H50 Remote pilot loss of situational awareness 
H51 Human senses limitations 
H52 Remote pilot excessive workload 
Contingencies  Weather related hazards 
H53 Cloud cover 
H54 Fog 
H55 Freezing rain 
H56 Glare 
H57 Haze 
H58 Humidity 
H59 Ice 
H60 Rain 
H61 Snow 
H62 Solar storms 
H63 Temperature 
H64 Turbulence 
H66 Wind 
H66 Lightning strike 
H67 Hail 
H68 Hurricanes 
H69 Volcanic ash 
The U-space risk assessment matrix  
The risk matrix has been developed on the basis of the hazard log reported 
Table 11.  
Each hazard has been characterized in terms of probability of occurrence and 
severity of consequences and safety assessment (tolerance, risk range description), 
mitigation actions and residual risk.  
For each hazard: 
• The probability of hazard consequence occurrence has been assigned 
in accordance with the ICAO guidance (ICAO ranking) reported in 
Table 5 [3] using the following sources of data: 
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o The probability of occurrence levels estimated for the FMECA 
analysis (Appendix A) 
o The probability of occurrence levels estimated for the FTA 
analysis (Appendix B) 
o The probability of occurrence levels estimated for the human 
factor analysis (Appendix C) 
o Available literature 
o Arbitrary assessment if no other matching references were 
available 
Note: as precized in [3] (Paragraphs 2.13.5 and 2.13.6), hazards 
shall not be confused with their consequences. In fact they are two 
distinct items, where the consequence is physically the outcome 
triggered by the hazard existence. In addition, more and different 
levels of consequences can be caused by the same hazardous event 
ranging from an immediate consequence to an ultimate 
consequence identifiable with an accident. In this work, due to the 
simplicity of RPAS for civil use and the uncertainty of data 
available at the moment of the research, a single consequence has 
been conjectured to be caused by each given hazard and the 
probability of hazard consequence occurrence  has been defined in 
a qualitative way heavily basing on the above mentioned sources 
of probability of occurrence level of the related hazard event itself. 
In other words, due to the above remembered high simplicity of 
RPAS for civil use, it has been assumed that, as a first 
approximation, if the hazard occurs, the consequent/accident will 
occur, so the probability of occurrence of these two events can be 
assumed to be equal. The same assumption has been used to 
perform both the safety assessment reported in the U-space risk 
matrix (Table 143) and the safety assessment reported in the ATM 
risk matrix (Table 144) 
• The severity of consequences and the safety assessment parameters, 
have been ranked or defined according to the content of Table 6 and  
Table 7 and Table 8/Table 9 [3], respectively  
• The mitigation actions have been selected and assigned to downgrade 
the residual risk from initial high level to medium/low level risks and 
from initial medium level to low level 
The analysis carried out to develop the U-Space safety matrix content  is  
0063hereinafter reported; the resulting matrix has been reported in Appendix D 
(Table 143).  
 
H01 – ‘Loss of abort launch capability’: the probability of occurrence of 
hazard H01 consequences has been estimated as ‘Remote’ (3); the severity of H01 
hazard consequences, potentially leading to RPA destruction, has been assessed as 
‘Catastrophic’; the risk associated to hazard H01 has been assessed as ‘High’ and 
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unacceptable; the proposed mitigation action is to immediately terminate the flight 
using FTS/Emergency parachute; the mitigation action shall reduce the 
probability of H01 hazard consequences occurrence from C to D (Improbable) 
and the residual risk from ‘High’ to ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. 
H02 – ‘Loss of flight controls’: the probability of occurrence of hazard H02 
consequences has been estimated as ‘Occasional’ (4): from the FTA analysis 
(Table 139), the probability of occurrence level of loss of RPA control hazard has 
been estimated included in the range D ÷ B for rotor wing RPA and equal to A for 
fixed wing RPA. Performing a precautionary evaluation, the probability of 
occurrence of hazard H02 consequences has been ranked as ‘Occasional’ (4) 
(from probability of occurrence level ‘A’). The severity of H02 hazard 
consequences, potentially leading to RPA destruction, has been assessed as 
‘Catastrophic’. The risk associated to hazard H02 has been assessed as ‘High’ and 
unacceptable. The proposed mitigation action is to terminate the flight using the 
FTS if far from congested areas or using the parachute for smoother landing if 
not. The mitigation action shall reduce the entity of the hazard consequences 
severity from ‘Catastrophic’ to ‘Minor’, due to use of emergency procedures, and 
the residual risk from ‘High’ to ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. 
H03 – ‘Loss of propulsion’: the probability of occurrence of hazard H03 
consequences has been estimated as ‘Occasional’ (4): from the FTA analysis 
(Table 139), the probability of occurrence level of loss of RPA propulsion hazard 
has been estimated included in the range D ÷ B both for rotor wing and fixed wing 
RPA. Performing a precautionary evaluation, the probability of occurrence of 
hazard number H02 has been ranked as ‘Occasional’ (4). The severity of hazard 
H03 consequences, potentially leading to RPA destruction, has been assessed as 
‘Catastrophic’. The risk associated to hazard H03 has been assessed as ‘High’ and 
unacceptable. The proposed mitigation action is to terminate the flight using the 
FTS if far from congested areas or using the parachute for smoother landing if 
not. The mitigation action shall reduce the entity of the hazard consequences 
severity from ‘Catastrophic’ to ‘Minor’, due to use of emergency procedures, and 
the residual risk from ‘High’ to ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. 
H04 – ‘Loss of GCS HMI’: the probability of occurrence of hazard H04 
consequences has been estimated as ‘Remote’ (3): the probability of occurrence 
level of GCS HMI loss has been estimated as D in the FMECA analysis with 
reference to GCS HMI single failure modes (Table 71) and as B in the FTA 
analysis, with reference to loss of longitudinal, lateral, direction and trust control 
hazards (Table 139); an intermediate value has been chosen, ‘Remote’ (3). The 
severity of hazard H04 consequences, potentially leading to RPA destruction, has 
been assessed as ‘Catastrophic’. The risk associated to hazard H04 has been 
assessed as ‘High’ and unacceptable. The proposed mitigation action is to 
terminate the flight using the FTS if far from congested areas or using the 
parachute for smoother landing if not. The FTS HMI is intended to be 
implemented as a separate control from other GCS HMIs (Figure 38). The 
mitigation action shall reduce the entity of the hazard consequences severity from 
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‘Catastrophic’ to ‘Minor’, due to use of emergency procedures, and the residual 
risk from ‘High’ to ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. 
H05 – ‘Deviation from steady-state (not-accelerating) flight condition’: the 
probability of occurrence of hazard H05 consequences has been assessed as 
‘Remote’ (3). The severity of hazard H05 consequences has been assessed as 
‘Catastrophic’ assimilating this hazard to a loss of RPAS control hazard. The 
proposed mitigation action is to terminate the flight using the FTS if far from 
congested areas or using the parachute for smoother landing if not. The mitigation 
action shall reduce the hazard consequences severity from ‘Catastrophic’ to 
‘Minor’, due to use of emergency procedures, and the residual risk from ‘High’ to 
‘Moderate’ and acceptable. 
H06 – ‘Loss of Emergency Flight Termination System’: the probability of 
occurrence of hazard H06 consequences has been estimated as ‘Remote’ (3): the 
probability of occurrence level of FTS/Emergency Parachute loss has been 
estimated as C/D in the FMECA analysis (Table 37) and included within B and A 
in the FTA analysis (Table 139); an intermediate value has been chosen, ‘Remote’ 
(3), both considering the above mentioned data and also expecting a general 
higher reliability from these RPA subsystems being emergency subsystems. The 
severity of H06 hazard consequences, potentially leading to RPA destruction, has 
been assessed as ‘Catastrophic’. The risk associated to hazard H06 has been 
assessed as ‘High’ and unacceptable. The proposed mitigation action is an 
operational procedure to immediately interrupt the sortie setting the autopilot to 
‘landing’ flight mode. The mitigation action shall reduce the consequences 
severity of the hazard from ‘Catastrophic’ to ‘Minor’, due to use of emergency 
procedures, and the residual risk from ‘High’ to ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. 
H07 – ‘Loss of “Return to Home” function’: the probability of occurrence of 
hazard H07 consequences has been estimated as ‘Improbable’ (2) with reference 
to Autopilot software error probability of occurrence level estimated as D 
(Remote) (Table 35, item FCSS1c of the FMECA analysis). The severity of 
hazard H07 consequences, potentially leading to RPA destruction (for example in 
case of loss of link within urban environment without the possibility to use the 
“Return to Home” function), has been assessed as ‘Catastrophic’. The risk 
associated to hazard H07 has been assessed as ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. The 
proposed mitigation action is to terminate the flight using the FTS if far from 
congested areas or using the parachute for smoother landing if not. The mitigation 
action shall reduce the entity of the hazard consequences severity from 
‘Catastrophic’ to ‘Minor’, due to use of emergency procedures, and the residual 
risk from ‘Moderate’ to ‘Low’ and fully acceptable. 
H08 – ‘Loss of mission plan functionality’: the probability of occurrence of 
hazard H08 consequences has been estimated as ‘Remote’ (3) with reference to 
‘Loss of mission software’ (item MCSS1a of the FMECA analysis) which 
probability of occurrence level has been estimated as C (Occasional) (Table 39) 
and ‘Loss of RPAS Mission Control subsystem functionality’ with probability of 
occurrence level estimated between C and B. The severity of hazard H08 
consequences, has been assessed as ‘Minor’ potentially involving operating 
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limitations and/or use of emergency procedures. The risk associated to hazard 
H08 has been assessed as ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. The proposed mitigation 
action is to use the ‘Return to Home’ autopilot software functionality. The 
mitigation action shall reduce the hazard consequences probability of occurrence 
from ‘Remote’ to ‘Improbable’ (2), the hazard consequences severity from 
‘Minor’ to ‘Negligible’, and the residual risk from ‘Moderate’ to ‘Low’ and fully 
acceptable. 
H09 – ‘Loss of GPS signal’: the probability of occurrence of hazard H09 
consequences has been estimated as ‘Occasional’ (4). The severity of hazard H09 
consequences, has been assessed as ‘Minor’ potentially involving operational 
limitations and/or use of emergency procedures. The risk associated to hazard 
H09 has been assessed as ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. The proposed mitigation 
action is to switch on EGNOS service, to use inertial navigation or to activate the 
“Return to Home” function. The mitigation action shall reduce the hazard 
consequences severity from ‘Minor’ to ‘Negligible’, and the residual risk from 
‘Moderate’ to ‘Low’ and fully acceptable. 
H10: ‘Loss of EGNOS signal’: the probability of occurrence of hazard H10 
consequences has been estimated as ‘Remote’ (3) from item NSS3b of the 
FMECA analysis (Table 31) which probability of occurrence level has been 
estimated as ‘D’ (Remote); further more robustness/reliability is expected from 
EGNOS service if compared to current GPS service. The severity of hazard H10 
consequences, has been assessed as ‘Catastrophic’ potentially leading to RPA 
destruction if the case of RPA flying within urban or congested environment is 
considered with the occurrence of loss of EGNOS signal. The risk associated to 
hazard H10 has been assessed as ‘High’ and unacceptable. The proposed 
mitigation action is to switch on GPS service, to use inertial navigation or to 
activate the “Return to Home” function. The mitigation action shall reduce the 
hazard consequences severity from ‘Catastrophic’ to ‘Minor’, due to use of 
emergency procedures, and residual the risk from ‘High’ to ‘Moderate’ and 
acceptable. 
H11 – ‘Drift from the mission plan’:  the probability of occurrence of hazard 
H11 consequences has been estimated as ‘Remote’ (3). The severity of hazard 
H11 consequences, has been assessed as ‘Hazardous’ with reference to a potential 
large reduction in safety margin potentially. The risk associated to hazard H11 has 
been assessed as ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. The proposed mitigation action to 
further decrease the risk is to use the “Return to Home” function or to terminate 
the flight using the FTS if far from congested areas or using the parachute for 
smoother landing if not. The mitigation action shall reduce the hazard 
consequences severity from ‘Hazardous’ to ‘Minor’, due to use of emergency 
procedures, and the residual risk from ‘Moderate’ to ‘Low’ and fully acceptable. 
H12 – ‘Loss of uplink channel of the RPAS radio link’: the probability of 
occurrence of hazard H12 consequences has been estimated as ‘Occasional’ (4) as 
intermediate evaluation between items C2LSS1a and C2LSS1b probability of 
occurrence level estimated as ‘D’ (Remote) from the FMECA analysis (Table 65) 
and hazard ‘Degradation or loss of uplink command link with the RPA’ 
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probability of occurrence level estimated as included within B and A from the 
FTA analysis (Table 139). The severity of hazard H12 consequences, has been 
assessed as ‘Catastrophic’ potentially leading to RPA destruction due to the 
complete loss of RPA remote control in case of loss of uplink channel. The risk 
associated to hazard H12 has been assessed as ‘High’ and unacceptable. The 
proposed mitigation action is to provide a redundant uplink channel, to use the 
“Return to Home” function or to terminate the flight using the FTS if far from 
congested areas or using the parachute for smoother landing if not. The mitigation 
action shall reduce the hazard consequences severity from ‘Catastrophic’ to 
‘Minor’ due to use of emergency procedures, and the residual risk from ‘High’ to 
‘Moderate’ and acceptable. 
H13 – ‘Loss of downlink channel of the RPAS radio link’: the probability of 
occurrence of hazard H13 consequences has been estimated as ‘Occasional’ (4) as 
intermediate evaluation between items C2LSS1a and C2LSS1b probability of 
occurrence level estimated as ‘D’ (Remote) from the FMECA analysis (Table 31) 
and hazard ‘Degradation or loss of downlink telemetry link from the RPA’ 
probability of occurrence level estimated as included within B and A from the 
FTA analysis (Table 139). The severity of hazard H13 consequences, has been 
assessed as ‘Catastrophic’ potentially leading to RPA destruction due to the 
complete loss of RPA remote control in case of loss of uplink channel. The risk 
associated to hazard H13 has been assessed as ‘High’ and unacceptable. The 
proposed mitigation action is to provide a redundant uplink channel, to use the 
“Return to Home” function or to terminate the flight using the FTS if far from 
congested areas or using the parachute for smoother landing if not. The mitigation 
action shall reduce the hazard consequences severity from ‘Catastrophic’ to 
‘Minor’ due to use of emergency procedures, and the residual risk from ‘High’ to 
‘Moderate’ and acceptable. 
H14 – ‘Loss of ADS-B’: the probability of occurrence of hazard H14 
consequences has been estimated as ‘Occasional’ (4) as intermediate evaluation 
between items NSS4o probability of occurrence level estimated as ‘C’ 
(Occasional) from the FMECA analysis (Table 31) and hazard ‘Degradation or 
loss of ADS-B functionality on board the RPAS’ probability of occurrence level 
estimated as ‘A’ from the FTA analysis (Table 139). The severity of hazard H14 
consequences, has been assessed as ‘Catastrophic’ potentially leading to RPA 
destruction: in fact the loss of ADS-B causes lack of RPA surveillance from other 
airspace users, hence enhancing the probability of mid-air conflict/collision 
occurrence for the given RPA. The risk associated to hazard H14 has been 
assessed as ‘High’ and unacceptable. The proposed mitigation action is to 
immediately terminate the flight using the FTS if far from congested areas or 
using the parachute for smoother landing if not. The mitigation action shall reduce 
the hazard consequences severity from ‘Catastrophic’ to ‘Minor’, due to use of 
emergency procedures, and the residual risk from ‘High’ to ‘Moderate’ and 
acceptable. 
H15 – ‘Presence of natural obstacles’: the probability of occurrence of hazard 
H15 consequences has been estimated as ‘Frequent’ (5). The severity of hazard 
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H15 consequences, has been assessed as ‘Catastrophic’ potentially leading to 
RPA destruction if mid-air collision of an RPA against a natural obstacle occurs. 
The risk associated to hazard H15 has been assessed as ‘High’ and unacceptable. 
The proposed mitigation action is to provide the RPA with on board collision 
avoidance systems based on the use of downward LIDAR/SONAR sensor and/or 
to provide the RPA mission planner software with terrain profile data from 
mapping services (like Google Map). The mitigation action shall reduce the 
hazard consequences severity from ‘Catastrophic’ to ‘Negligible’ (few 
consequences) and the residual risk from ‘High’ to ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. 
H16 – ‘Presence of man-made manufactures’: the probability of occurrence of 
hazard H16 consequences has been estimated as ‘Frequent’ (5). The severity of 
hazard H16 consequences, has been assessed as ‘Catastrophic’ potentially leading 
to RPA destruction if mid-air collision of an RPA against a natural obstacle 
occurs. The risk associated to hazard H16 has been assessed as ‘High’ and 
unacceptable. The proposed mitigation action is to provide the RPA with on board 
collision avoidance systems based on the use of downward LIDAR/SONAR 
sensor and/or to provide the RPA mission planner software with terrain profile 
data from mapping services (like Google Map); in addition geofence software 
functionality is suggested to completely avoid RPA to fly nearby sensitive 
buildings, airport infrastructures forbidden areas, etc. The mitigation action shall 
reduce the hazard consequences severity from ‘Catastrophic’ to ‘Negligible’ (few 
consequences) and the residual risk from ‘High’ to ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. 
H17 – ‘Mid-air collision with other aircraft’: the probability of occurrence of 
hazard H17 consequences has been estimated as ‘Occasional’ (4). The severity of 
hazard H17 consequences has been assessed as ‘Catastrophic’ leading to RPA 
destruction if mid-air collision of an RPA against another RPA or manned aircraft 
occurs; further human beings severe injury or death can potentially in case of mid-
air collision with manned aircraft. The risk associated to hazard H17 has been 
assessed as ‘High’ and unacceptable. The proposed mitigation action is to provide 
the RPA with on board ‘Detect and Avoid’ systems against mid-air conflict with 
cooperative traffic and to provide the RPA with LIDAR/SONAR sensor against 
mid-air conflict with not cooperative traffic. The mitigation action shall reduce the 
hazard consequences severity from ‘Catastrophic’ to ‘Negligible’ (few 
consequences) and the residual risk from ‘High’ to ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. 
H18 – ‘Loss of DAA capability’: the probability of occurrence of hazard H18 
consequences has been estimated as ‘Remote’ (3) starting from the calculated 
probability of occurrence level of DAA multiple failures of Table 97. The severity 
of hazard H18 consequences, has been assessed as ‘Catastrophic’ leading to RPA 
destruction if mid-air collision of an RPA against another RPA or manned aircraft 
occurs; further human beings severe injury or death can potentially occur if an 
RPA collides with a manned aircraft. The risk associated to hazard H18 has been 
assessed as ‘High’ and unacceptable. The proposed mitigation action is to 
terminate the flight using the FTS if far from congested areas or using the 
parachute for smoother landing if not. The mitigation action shall reduce the 
hazard consequences severity from ‘Catastrophic’ to ‘Minor’ (due to use of 
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emergency procedures), and the residual risk from ‘High’ to ‘Moderate’ and 
acceptable. 
H19 – ‘No detectability from other airspace users’: the probability of 
occurrence of hazard H19 consequences has been estimated as ‘Frequent’ (5) due 
to the reduced size of RPA with respect to manned aviation. The severity of 
hazard H19 consequences, has been assessed as ‘Catastrophic’ leading to RPA 
destruction if mid-air collision of an RPA against another RPA or manned aircraft 
occurs; further human beings severe injury or death can potentially occur if an 
RPA collides with a manned aircraft. The risk associated to hazard H19 has been 
assessed as ‘High’ and unacceptable. The proposed mitigation action is to provide 
the RPA with on board ADS-B to be detectable by other U-Space users equipped 
with DAA functionalities. The mitigation action shall reduce the hazard 
consequences severity from ‘Catastrophic’ to ‘Minor’ (due to use of emergency 
procedures), and the residual risk from ‘High’ to ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. 
H20 – ‘Cooperative traffic intrusion’: the probability of occurrence of hazard 
H20 consequences has been estimated as ‘Occasional’ (4). The severity of hazard 
H20 consequences, has been assessed as ‘Catastrophic’ leading to RPA 
destruction if mid-air collision of an RPA against another RPA or manned aircraft 
occurs; further human beings severe injury or death can potentially occur if an 
RPA collides with a manned aircraft. The risk associated to hazard H20 has been 
assessed as ‘High’ and unacceptable. The proposed mitigation action is to provide 
the RPA with on board ADS-B and DAA equipment against cooperative traffic 
intrusion in the VLL subspace. The mitigation action shall reduce the hazard 
consequences severity from ‘Catastrophic’ to ‘Minor’ (due to use of emergency 
procedures), and the residual risk from ‘High’ to ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. 
H21 – ‘Not cooperative traffic intrusion’: the probability of occurrence of 
hazard H21 consequences has been estimated as ‘Occasional’ (4). The severity of 
hazard H21 consequences, has been assessed as ‘Catastrophic’ leading to RPA 
destruction if mid-air collision of an RPA against another RPA or manned aircraft 
occurs; further human beings severe injury or death can potentially occur if an 
RPA collides with a manned aircraft. The risk associated to hazard H21 has been 
assessed as ‘High’ and unacceptable. The proposed mitigation action is to provide 
the RPA with LIDAR/SONAR sensors as secondary (with respect to DAA 
subsystem) collision avoidance system against not cooperative traffic intrusion in 
the VLL subspace. The mitigation action shall reduce the hazard consequences 
severity from ‘Catastrophic’ to ‘Minor’ (due to use of emergency procedures), and 
the residual risk from ‘High’ to ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. 
H22 – ‘Missed cooperative traffic tracking’: the probability of occurrence of 
hazard H22 consequences has been estimated as ‘Occasional’ (4). The severity of 
hazard H22 consequences, has been assessed as ‘Catastrophic’ leading to RPA 
destruction if mid-air collision of an RPA against another RPA or manned aircraft 
occurs; further human beings severe injury or death can potentially occur if an 
RPA collides with a manned aircraft. The risk associated to hazard H22 has been 
assessed as ‘High’ and unacceptable. The proposed mitigation action is to provide 
the RPA with on board ADS-B and DAA equipment. The mitigation action shall 
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reduce the hazard consequences severity from ‘Catastrophic’ to ‘Minor’, and the 
residual risk from ‘High’ to ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. 
H23 – ‘Missed not cooperative traffic tracking’: the probability of occurrence 
of hazard H23 consequences has been estimated as ‘Occasional’ (4). The severity 
of hazard H23 consequences, has been assessed as ‘Catastrophic’ leading to RPA 
destruction if mid-air collision of an RPA against another RPA or manned aircraft 
occurs; further human beings severe injury or death can potentially occur if an 
RPA collides with a manned aircraft. The risk associated to hazard H23 has been 
assessed as ‘High’ and unacceptable. The proposed mitigation action is to provide 
the RPA with on board LIDAR/SONAR sensors (also as secondary, with respect 
to DAA, surveillance and anti-collision systems). The mitigation action shall 
reduce the hazard consequences severity from ‘Catastrophic’ to ‘Minor’, and the 
residual risk from ‘High’ to ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. 
H24 – ‘Collision with cooperative traffic’: the probability of occurrence of 
hazard H24 consequences has been estimated as ‘Occasional’ (4). The severity of 
hazard H24 consequences, has been assessed as ‘Catastrophic’ leading to RPA 
destruction if mid-air collision of an RPA against another RPA or manned aircraft 
occurs; further human beings severe injury or death can potentially occur if an 
RPA collides with a manned aircraft. The risk associated to hazard H24 has been 
assessed as ‘High’ and unacceptable. The proposed mitigation action is to provide 
the RPA with DAA equipment to detect cooperative traffic in the VLL subspace. 
The mitigation action shall reduce the hazard consequences severity from 
‘Catastrophic’ to ‘Minor’ (due to use of emergency procedures), and the residual 
risk from ‘High’ to ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. 
H25 – ‘Collision with not cooperative traffic’: the probability of occurrence of 
hazard H25 consequences has been estimated as ‘Occasional’ (4). The severity of 
hazard H25 consequences, has been assessed as ‘Catastrophic’ leading to RPA 
destruction if mid-air collision of an RPA against another RPA or manned aircraft 
occurs; further human beings severe injury or death can potentially occur if an 
RPA collides with a manned aircraft. The risk associated to hazard H25 has been 
assessed as ‘High’ and unacceptable. The proposed mitigation action is to provide 
the RPA with LIDAR/SONAR sensors as secondary (with respect to DAA 
subsystem) collision avoidance system to detect not cooperative traffic in the VLL 
subspace. The mitigation action shall reduce the hazard consequences severity 
from ‘Catastrophic’ to ‘Minor’ (due to use of emergency procedures), and the 
residual risk from ‘High’ to ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. 
H26 – ‘Missed performance of avoidance collision manoeuvre’: the 
probability of occurrence of hazard H26 consequences has been estimated as 
‘Occasional’ (4). The severity of hazard H26 consequences, has been assessed as 
‘Catastrophic’ leading to RPA destruction when avoidance mid-air collision of an 
RPA against another RPA or manned aircraft occurs due to missed performance 
of avoidance manoeuvre; further human beings severe injury or death can 
potentially occur if an RPA collides with a manned aircraft. The risk associated to 
hazard H26 has been assessed as ‘High’ and unacceptable. Assuming that hazard 
H26 occurs for DAA failure, the proposed mitigation action is to provide the RPA 
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with a secondary collision avoidance system based on LIDAR/SONAR sensors 
capable as DAA to provide the Flight Control Subsystem with proper data to 
make the RPA perform anti-collision evasive manoeuvre. The mitigation action 
shall reduce the hazard consequences probability of occurrence from ‘Occasional’ 
to ‘Remote’, hazard consequences severity from ‘Catastrophic’ to ‘Minor’ (due to 
use of emergency procedures), and the residual risk from ‘High’ to ‘Moderate’ 
and acceptable. 
H27 – ‘Missed monitoring of performance of collision avoidance manoeuvre’: 
the probability of occurrence of hazard H27 consequences has been estimated as 
‘Occasional’ (4). The severity of hazard H27 consequences, has been assessed as 
‘Hazardous’ leading to large reduction in RPA safety margins. The risk associated 
to hazard H27 has been assessed as ‘High’ and unacceptable. The proposed 
mitigation action is to increase the remote pilot training in monitoring collision 
avoidance manoeuvring. The mitigation action shall reduce the hazard 
consequences probability of occurrence from ‘Occasional’ to ‘Remote’, and the 
residual risk from ‘High’ to ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. 
H28 – ‘Missed weather awareness capability’: the probability of occurrence 
of hazard H28 consequences has been estimated as ‘Remote’ (3). The severity of 
hazard H28 consequences, has been assessed as ‘Hazardous’ potentially leading to 
large reduction in RPA safety margins. The risk associated to hazard H28 has 
been assessed as ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. The proposed mitigation action to 
further decrease the risk is to immediately terminate the flight using the FTS if far 
from congested areas or using the parachute for smoother landing if not. The 
mitigation action shall reduce the hazard consequences severity from ‘Hazardous’ 
to ‘Minor’ (due to use of emergency procedures), and the residual risk from 
‘Moderate’ to ‘Low’ and fully acceptable. 
H29 – ‘Missed gathering of contingent weather information’: the probability 
of occurrence of hazard H29 consequences has been estimated as ‘Remote’ (3). 
The severity of hazard H29 consequences, has been assessed as ‘Hazardous’ 
potentially leading to large reduction in RPA safety margins. The risk associated 
to hazard H29 has been assessed as ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. The proposed 
mitigation action to further decrease risk is to increase on ground routine 
maintenance/checks for weather information gathering HMI. The mitigation 
action shall reduce the hazard consequences probability of occurrence from 
‘Remote’ to ‘Improbable’ and the risk from ‘Moderate’ to ‘Low’ and fully 
acceptable. 
H30 – ‘Missed avoidance of adverse weather’: the probability of occurrence 
of hazard H30 consequences has been estimated as ‘Occasional’ (4). The severity 
of hazard H30 consequences, has been assessed as ‘Catastrophic’ potentially 
leading to RPA destruction. The risk associated to hazard H30 has been assessed 
as ‘High’ and unacceptable. The proposed mitigation action to provide support to 
the remote pilot through the installation of an on board miniaturized weather 
Doppler RADAR. The mitigation action shall reduce the hazard consequences 
severity from ‘Catastrophic’ to ‘Negligible’, and the risk from ‘High’ to 
‘Moderate’ and acceptable. 
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H31 – ‘Loss of RPAS subsystems health and status monitoring’: the 
probability of occurrence of hazard H31 consequences has been estimated as 
‘Occasional’ (4). The severity of hazard H31 consequences, has been assessed as 
‘Hazardous’ potentially leading to large reduction in RPA safety margins. The 
risk associated to hazard H31 has been assessed as ‘High’ and unacceptable. The 
proposed mitigation action is to use the “Return to Home” function or to terminate 
the flight using the FTS if far from congested areas or using the parachute for 
smoother landing if not. The mitigation action shall reduce the hazard 
consequences severity from ‘Hazardous’ to ‘Minor’, due to use of emergency 
procedures, and the risk from ‘High’ to ‘Low’ and fully acceptable. 
H32 – ‘Loss of communication while transiting from LOS to BRLOS and 
vice versa’: the probability of occurrence of hazard H32 consequences has been 
estimated as ‘Frequent’ (5) on the basis of probability of occurrence levels 
estimated between B and A for the hazards ‘Degradation or loss of uplink 
command link with the RPA’/‘Degradation or loss of downlink telemetry link 
from the RPA’ (Table 139). The severity of hazard H32 consequences, has been 
assessed as ‘Catastrophic’ potentially leading to RPA destruction. The risk 
associated to hazard H32 has been assessed as ‘High’ and unacceptable. The 
proposed mitigation action is to perform an accurate pre-flight mission planning 
in accordance with the RPAS radio link range capability. The mitigation action 
shall reduce hazard H32 probability of consequences occurrence from 
‘Occasional’ to ‘Remote’, hazard H32 consequences severity from ‘Hazardous’ to 
‘Minor’, due to use of emergency procedures, and the residual risk from ‘High’ to 
‘Moderate’ and acceptable. 
H33 – ‘Unintentional radio link interference’: the probability of occurrence of 
hazard H33 consequences has been estimated as ‘Remote’ (3) with reference to 
items C2LSS1a and C2LSS1b which probability of occurrence level has been 
estimated equal to ‘D’ (Remote) in the FMECA analysis (Table 65). The severity 
of hazard H33 consequences, has been assessed as ‘Catastrophic’ potentially 
leading to RPA destruction. The risk associated to hazard H33 has been assessed 
as ‘High’ and unacceptable. The proposed mitigation action is to provide a 
redundant radio link on another radio frequency band. The mitigation action shall 
reduce the hazard consequences probability of occurrence from ‘Remote’ to 
‘Improbable’, and the residual risk from ‘High’ to ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. 
H34 – ‘Malicious radio link jamming’: the probability of occurrence of hazard 
H34 consequences has been estimated as ‘Occasional’ (4). The severity of hazard 
H34 consequences, has been assessed as ‘Catastrophic’ potentially leading to 
RPA destruction. The risk associated to hazard H34 has been assessed as ‘High’ 
and unacceptable. The proposed mitigation action is to provide a redundant radio 
link on another radio frequency band or to immediately terminate the flight using 
the FTS if far from congested areas or using the parachute for smoother landing if 
not. The mitigation action shall reduce hazard H34 consequences probability of 
occurrence from ‘Occasional’ to ‘Remote’, hazard H34 consequences severity 
from ‘Catastrophic’ to ‘Minor’ (due to use of emergency procedures) and the 
residual risk from ‘High’ to ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. 
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H35 – ‘Malicious radio link jamming’: the probability of occurrence of hazard 
H35 consequences has been estimated as ‘Occasional’ (4). The severity of hazard 
H35 consequences, has been assessed as ‘Catastrophic’ potentially leading to 
RPA destruction. The risk associated to hazard H35 has been assessed as ‘High’ 
and unacceptable. The proposed mitigation action is to provide a redundant radio 
link on another radio frequency band or to immediately terminate the flight using 
the FTS if far from congested areas or using the parachute for smoother landing if 
not. The mitigation action shall reduce hazard H35 probability of occurrence from 
‘Occasional’ to ‘Remote’, hazard H35 consequences severity from ‘Catastrophic’ 
to ‘Minor’ (due to use of emergency procedures) and the residual risk from ‘High’ 
to ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. 
H36 – ‘Fire’: the probability of occurrence of hazard H36 consequences has 
been estimated as ‘Occasional’ (4) on the basis of the evaluations performed on 
different RPAS subsystems: fire caused by LiPo batteries short circuit with 
probability of occurrence level estimated as ‘B’; fire due to electrical cables short 
circuit with probability of occurrence level estimated as ‘A’, fire on board fixed 
wing RPAS with probability of occurrence level estimated between ‘B’ and ‘A’, 
fire on board hybrid RPAS with probability of occurrence level estimated between 
‘C’ and ‘B’ (from the FTA analysis, Table 139). The severity of hazard H36 
consequences, has been assessed as ‘Catastrophic’ leading to RPA destruction. 
The risk associated to hazard H36 has been assessed as ‘High’ and unacceptable. 
The proposed mitigation action is to perform proper routine maintenance actions 
on LiPo batteries, electrical, fuel and hydrogen fuel cells subsystems to prevent 
hazard H36 from occurring; the suggested mitigation action is to immediately 
terminate the flight using the FTS. The mitigation action shall reduce the hazard 
consequences severity from ‘Catastrophic’ to ‘Hazardous’ (due large reduction of 
safety margins) and the residual risk from ‘High’ to ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. 
H37 – ‘Loss of RPAS autopilot’: the probability of occurrence of hazard H37 
consequences has been estimated as ‘Remote’ (3) on the basis of the evaluations 
performed in for items FCSS1a, FCSS1b, FCSS1c in the FMECA analysis (Table 
35). The severity of hazard H37 consequences, has been assessed as 
‘Catastrophic’ potentially leading to RPA destruction. The risk associated to 
hazard H37 has been assessed as ‘High’ and unacceptable. The proposed 
mitigation action is to switch on a redundant autopilot and/or to immediately 
terminate the flight using the FTS if far from congested areas or using the 
parachute for smoother landing if not. The mitigation action shall reduce hazard 
H37 probability of occurrence from ‘Remote’ to ‘Improbable’ (switching on 
redundant autopilot), hazard H37 consequences severity from ‘Catastrophic’ to 
‘Minor’ (due to use of the flight termination emergency procedures) and the 
residual risk from ‘High’ to ‘Low’ and fully acceptable. 
H38 – ‘Loss of electrical power’: the probability of occurrence of hazard H38 
consequences has been estimated as ‘Frequent (5) on the basis of the evaluations 
performed for the following hazards ‘Degradation or loss of rotor wing RPAS 
power functionality’ with probability of occurrence level estimated as ‘B’ and/or 
‘Degradation or loss of fixed wing RPAS power functionality’ with probability of 
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occurrence level included between ‘B’ and ‘A’ in the FTA analysis (Table 139). 
The severity of hazard H38 consequences, has been assessed as ‘Catastrophic’ 
potentially leading to RPA destruction. The risk associated to hazard H38 has 
been assessed as ‘High’ and unacceptable. The proposed mitigation action is to 
immediately terminate the flight using the FTS if far from congested areas or 
using the parachute for smoother landing if not. The mitigation action shall reduce 
the hazard consequences severity from ‘Catastrophic’ to ‘Minor’ (due to the use 
of emergency procedures) and the residual risk from ‘High’ to ‘Moderate’ and 
acceptable. 
H39 – ‘Loss of inertial platform’: the probability of occurrence of hazard H39 
consequences as ‘Occasional’ (4) on the basis of items NSS1a and NSS1b 
probability of occurrence levels estimated as ‘D’ and ‘C’ respectively in the 
FMECA analysis (Table 31). The severity of hazard H39 consequences, has been 
assessed as ‘Catastrophic’ potentially leading to RPA destruction. The risk 
associated to hazard H39 has been assessed as ‘High’ and unacceptable. The 
proposed mitigation action is to switch on a redundant inertial platform or to 
immediately terminate the flight using the FTS if far from congested areas or 
using the parachute for smoother landing if not. The mitigation action  shall 
reduce hazard H39 consequences probability of occurrence from ‘Occasional’ to 
‘Remote’ (switching on the redundant inertial platform), hazard H39 
consequences severity from ‘Catastrophic’ to ‘Minor’ (due to the use of flight 
termination emergency procedures) and the residual risk from ‘High’ to 
‘Moderate’ and acceptable. 
H40 – ‘Loss of heading indication’: the probability of occurrence of hazard 
H40 consequences has been estimated as ‘Occasional’ (4) on the basis of items 
NSS1a and NSS1b probability of occurrence levels estimated as ‘D’ and ‘C’ 
respectively in the FMECA analysis (Table 31). The severity of hazard H40 
consequences, has been assessed as ‘Catastrophic’ potentially leading to RPA 
destruction. The risk associated to hazard H40 has been assessed as ‘High’ and 
unacceptable. The proposed mitigation action is to switch on a redundant inertial 
platform or to immediately terminate the flight using the FTS if far from 
congested areas or using the parachute for smoother landing if not. The mitigation 
action  shall reduce hazard H40 consequences probability of occurrence from 
‘Occasional’ to ‘Remote’ (switching on the redundant inertial platform), hazard 
H40 consequences severity from ‘Catastrophic’ to ‘Minor’ (due to the use of 
flight termination emergency procedures) and the residual risk from ‘High’ to 
‘Moderate’ and acceptable. 
H41 – ‘Loss of altitude indication’: the probability of occurrence of hazard 
H41 consequences has been estimated as ‘Improbable’ (2) on the basis of the 
evaluations of item NSS4g probability of occurrence level estimated as ‘E’ in the 
FMECA analysis (Table 31) performed in the FMECA analysis. The severity of 
hazard H41 consequences, has been assessed as ‘Catastrophic’ potentially leading 
to RPA destruction. The risk associated to hazard H41 has been assessed as 
‘Moderate’ and acceptable. The proposed mitigation action is to provide a 
redundant altimeter or to immediately terminate the flight using the FTS if far 
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from congested areas or using the parachute for smoother landing if not. The 
mitigation action shall reduce hazard H41 consequences probability of occurrence 
from ‘Improbable’ to ‘Extremely improbable’ (switching on the redundant 
altimeter), hazard H41 consequences severity from ‘Catastrophic’ to ‘Minor’ (due 
to the use of flight termination emergency procedures) and the residual risk from 
‘Moderate’ to ‘Low’ and fully acceptable. 
H42 – ‘Pressure sensor failure: the probability of occurrence of hazard H42 
consequences has been estimated as ‘Frequent’ (5) on the basis of the hazard 
‘Pressure sensor failure’ probability of occurrence level estimated as A in the FTA 
analysis (Table 139). The severity of hazard H42 consequences, has been assessed 
as ‘Catastrophic’ potentially leading to RPA destruction. The risk associated to 
hazard H42 has been assessed as ‘High’ and unacceptable. The proposed 
mitigation action is to provide a redundant pressure sensor or to immediately 
terminate the flight using the FTS if far from congested areas or using the 
parachute for smoother landing if not. The mitigation action shall reduce hazard 
H42 consequences probability of occurrence from ‘Frequent’ to ‘Occasional’ 
(switching on the redundant pressure sensor), hazard H42 consequences severity 
from ‘Catastrophic’ to ‘Minor’ (due to the use of flight termination emergency 
procedures) and the residual risk from ‘High’ to ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. 
H43 – ‘Misleading altitude indication’: the probability of occurrence of 
hazard H43 consequences has been estimated as ‘Frequent’ (5) on the basis of the 
hazard ‘Misleading altitude indication’ probability of occurrence level estimated 
as A in the FTA analysis (Table 139). The severity of hazard H43 consequences, 
has been assessed as ‘Catastrophic’ potentially leading to RPA destruction. The 
risk associated to hazard H43 has been assessed as ‘High’ and unacceptable. The 
proposed mitigation action is to provide a redundant pressure sensor or to 
immediately terminate the flight using the FTS if far from congested areas or 
using the parachute for smoother landing if not. The mitigation action shall reduce 
hazard H43 consequences probability of occurrence from ‘Frequent’ to 
‘Occasional’ (switching on the redundant altimeter), hazard H43 consequences 
severity from ‘Catastrophic’ to ‘Minor’ (due to the use of flight termination 
emergency procedures) and the residual risk from ‘High’ to ‘Moderate’ and 
acceptable. 
H44 – ‘Misleading airspeed indication’: the probability of occurrence of 
hazard H44 consequences has been estimated as ‘Frequent’ (5) on the basis of the 
hazard ‘Misleading airspeed indication’ probability of occurrence level estimated 
as A in the FTA analysis (Table 139). The severity of hazard H44 consequences, 
has been assessed as ‘Catastrophic’ potentially leading to RPA destruction. The 
risk associated to hazard H44 has been assessed as ‘High’ and unacceptable. The 
proposed mitigation action is to provide a redundant pressure sensor or to 
immediately terminate the flight using the FTS if far from congested areas or 
using the parachute for smoother landing if not. The mitigation action shall reduce 
hazard H44 consequences probability of occurrence from ‘Frequent’ to 
‘Occasional’ (switching on the redundant pressure sensor), hazard H44 
consequences severity from ‘Catastrophic’ to ‘Minor’ (due to the use of flight 
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termination emergency procedures) and the residual risk from ‘High’ to 
‘Moderate’ and acceptable. 
H45 – ‘Misleading indication of the angle of incidence’: the probability of 
occurrence of hazard H45 consequences has been estimated as ‘Frequent’ (5) on 
the basis of the hazard ‘Fixed wing RPAS misleading angle of attack indication’ 
probability of occurrence level estimated as included between B and A in the FTA 
analysis (Table 139). The severity of hazard H45 consequences, has been assessed 
as ‘Catastrophic’ potentially leading to RPA destruction. The risk associated to 
hazard H45 has been assessed as ‘High’ and unacceptable. The proposed 
mitigation action is to provide a redundant pressure sensor or to immediately 
terminate the flight using the FTS if far from congested areas or using the 
parachute for smoother landing if not. The mitigation action shall reduce hazard 
H45 consequences probability of occurrence from ‘Frequent’ to ‘Occasional’ 
(switching on the redundant pressure sensor), hazard consequences severity from 
‘Catastrophic’ to ‘Minor’ (due to the use of flight termination emergency 
procedures) and the residual risk from ‘High’ to ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. 
H46 – ‘Stall’: the probability of occurrence of hazard H46 consequences has 
been estimated as ‘Frequent’ (5) on the basis of the hazard ‘Fixed wing RPAS 
stall’ probability of occurrence level estimated as included between B and A in 
the FTA analysis (Table 139). The severity of hazard H46 consequences, has been 
assessed as ‘Catastrophic’ potentially leading to RPA destruction. The risk 
associated to hazard H46 has been assessed as ‘High’ and unacceptable. The 
proposed mitigation action is to promptly execute a diving manoeuvre or to 
immediately terminate the flight using the FTS if far from congested areas or 
using the parachute for smoother landing if not. The mitigation action shall reduce 
hazard H46 consequences severity from ‘Catastrophic’ to ‘Minor’ (due to the use 
of emergency procedures) and the residual risk from ‘High’ to ‘Moderate’ and 
acceptable. 
H47 – ‘Loss of fuel cell’: the probability of occurrence of hazard H47 
consequences has been estimated as ‘Remote’ (3) on the basis of items HPSS2a 
and HPSS2b probability of occurrence levels estimated equal to ‘D’ in the 
FMECA analysis (Table 63). The severity of hazard H47 consequences, has been 
assessed as ‘Catastrophic’ potentially leading to RPA destruction. The risk 
associated to hazard H47 has been assessed as ‘High’ and unacceptable. The 
proposed mitigation action is to switch on redundant LiPo batteries. The 
mitigation action shall reduce the hazard consequences severity from 
‘Catastrophic’ to ‘Minor’ (due to use of emergency procedures) and the residual 
risk from ‘High’ to ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. 
H48 – ‘Lack or not appropriate remote pilot training’: the probability of 
occurrence of hazard H48 consequences has been estimated as ‘Occasional’ (4) on 
the basis of the human factor related hazard ‘Low remote pilot training’ with 
probability of occurrence estimated as ‘Occasional’ (Table 142). The severity of 
hazard H48 consequences, has been assessed as ‘Hazardous’, potentially leading 
to a large reduction in safety margins. The risk associated to hazard H48 has been 
assessed as ‘High’ and unacceptable. The proposed mitigation action is to increase 
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and improve the remote pilot training. The mitigation action shall reduce hazard 
H48 probability of occurrence from ‘Occasional’ to ‘Remote’, hazard H48 
consequences severity from ‘Hazardous’ to ‘Minor’ (nuisance) and the residual 
risk from ‘High’ to ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. 
H49 – ‘Lack of compliant operational procedures, checklist, etc.’: the 
probability of occurrence of hazard H49 consequences has been estimated as 
‘Frequent’ (5) on the basis of the ‘Lack of specific checklists, operational 
procedures’ human factor related hazard with probability of occurrence estimated 
as ‘Frequent’ (Table 142). The severity of hazard H49 consequences, has been 
assessed as ‘Hazardous’, potentially leading to a large reduction in safety margins. 
The risk associated to hazard H49 has been assessed as ‘High’ and unacceptable. 
The proposed mitigation action is the provision of proper operational procedures 
and checklists. The mitigation action shall reduce hazard H49 consequences 
probability of occurrence from ‘Frequent’ to ‘Remote’, hazard H49 consequences 
severity from ‘Hazardous’ to ‘Minor’ (nuisance) and the residual risk from ‘High’ 
to ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. 
H50 – ‘Loss of remote pilot situational awareness’: the probability of 
occurrence of hazard H50 consequences has been estimated as ‘Frequent’ (5) on 
the basis of the ‘Loss of remote pilot situational awareness’ human factor related 
hazard with probability of occurrence estimated as ‘Frequent’ (Table 142). The 
severity of hazard H50 consequences, has been assessed as ‘Hazardous’, 
potentially leading to a large reduction in safety margins. The risk associated to 
hazard H50 has been assessed as ‘High’ and unacceptable. The proposed 
mitigation action is the increase the remote pilot training. The mitigation action 
shall reduce hazard H50 consequences probability of occurrence from ‘Frequent’ 
to ‘Remote’, hazard H50 consequences severity from ‘Hazardous’ to ‘Minor’ 
(nuisance) and the residual risk from ‘High’ to ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. 
H51 – ‘Human senses limitation’: the probability of occurrence of hazard H51 
consequences has been estimated as ‘Frequent’ (5) on the basis of the ‘Human 
senses limitation’ human factor related hazard with probability of occurrence 
estimated as ‘Frequent’ (Table 142). The severity of hazard H51 consequences, 
has been assessed as ‘Catastrophic’, potentially leading to RPA destruction. The 
risk associated to hazard H51 has been assessed as ‘High’ and unacceptable. The 
proposed mitigation action is the increase the remote pilot training. The mitigation 
action shall reduce hazard H51 consequences probability of occurrence from 
‘Frequent’ to ‘Remote’, hazard H51 consequences severity from ‘Catastrophic’ to 
‘Minor’ (nuisance) and the residual risk from ‘High’ to ‘Moderate’ and 
acceptable. 
H52 – ‘Remote pilot excessive workload’: the probability of occurrence of 
hazard H52 consequences has been estimated as ‘Occasional’ (4) on the basis of 
the ‘Human senses limitation’ human factor related hazard with probability of 
occurrence estimated as ‘Occasional’ (Table 142). The severity of hazard H52 
consequences, has been assessed as ‘Major’, potentially leading to a significant 
reduction in safety margins. The risk associated to hazard H52 has been assessed 
as ‘High’ and unacceptable. The proposed mitigation action is the increase the 
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remote pilot training. The mitigation action shall reduce hazard H52 consequences 
probability of occurrence from ‘Occasional’ to ‘Remote’, hazard H52 
consequences severity from ‘Major’ to ‘Minor’ (nuisance) and the residual risk 
from ‘High’ to ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. 
H53 – ‘Cloud cover’: the probability of occurrence of hazard H53 
consequences has been estimated as ‘Frequent’ (5). The severity of hazard H53 
consequences, has been assessed as ‘Major’ [87]. The risk associated to hazard 
H53 has been assessed as ‘High’ and unacceptable. The proposed mitigation 
action is to interrupt the flight mission and to apply the “Return to Home” 
function. The mitigation actions shall reduce the hazard consequences severity 
from ‘Major’ to ‘Minor’ (with reference to nuisance/use of emergency 
procedures) and the residual risk from ‘High’ to ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. 
H54 – ‘Fog’: the probability of occurrence of hazard H54 consequences has 
been estimated as ‘Occasional’ (4). The severity of hazard H54 consequences, has 
been assessed as ‘Major’ [87]. The risk associated to hazard H54 has been 
assessed as ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. Nevertheless, the proposed mitigation 
action to further decrease the risk associated to this hazard is to interrupt the flight 
mission and to apply the “Return to Home” function. The mitigation actions shall 
reduce the hazard consequences severity from ‘Major’ to ‘Negligible’ (few 
consequences); the residual risk remains ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. 
H55 – ‘Freezing rain’: the probability of occurrence of hazard H55 
consequences has been estimated as ‘Remote’ (3). The severity of hazard H55 
consequences, has been assessed as ‘Hazardous’ leading to a large reduction in 
safety margins. The risk associated to hazard H55 has been assessed as 
‘Moderate’ and acceptable. Nevertheless, the proposed mitigation action to further 
decrease the risk associated to this hazard is to interrupt the flight mission and to 
apply the “Return to Home” function. The mitigation actions shall reduce the 
hazard consequences severity from ‘Hazardous’ to ‘Negligible’ (few 
consequences) and the residual risk from ‘Moderate’ to ‘Low’ and fully 
acceptable. 
H56 – ‘Glare’: the probability of occurrence of hazard H56 consequences has 
been estimated as ‘Occasional’ (4). The severity of hazard H56 consequences, has 
been assessed as ‘None’ due to the absence of the pilot on board the RPAS. The 
risk associated to hazard H56 has been assessed as ‘Moderate’ and acceptable 
without the necessity for further mitigation actions required. 
H57 – ‘Haze’: the probability of occurrence of hazard H57 consequences has 
been estimated as ‘Occasional’ (4). The severity of hazard H57 consequences, has 
been assessed as ‘Major’ [87]. The risk associated to hazard H57 has been 
assessed as ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. Nevertheless, the proposed mitigation 
action to further decrease the risk associated to this hazard is to interrupt the flight 
mission and to apply the “Return to Home” function. The mitigation actions shall 
reduce the hazard consequences severity from ‘Hazardous’ to ‘Negligible’ (few 
consequences) and the residual risk from ‘Moderate’ to ‘Low’ and fully 
acceptable. 
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H58 – ‘Humidity’: the probability of occurrence of hazard H58 consequences 
has been estimated as ‘Frequent’ (5). The severity of hazard H58 consequences, 
has been assessed as ‘Hazardous’ [87]. The risk associated to hazard H58 has 
been assessed as ‘High’ and unacceptable. Nevertheless, the proposed mitigation 
action is to forbid the flight mission until the air humidity values are above the 
RPAS limits indicated in the operational manual. The mitigation action shall 
reduce the hazard consequences severity from ‘Hazardous’ to ‘Negligible’ (few 
consequences) and the residual risk from ‘High’ to ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. 
H59 – ‘Ice’: the probability of occurrence of hazard H59 consequences has 
been estimated as ‘Occasional’ (4). The severity of hazard H59 consequences, has 
been assessed as ‘Hazardous’ [87]. The risk associated to hazard H59 has been 
assessed as ‘High’ and unacceptable. The proposed mitigation action is to forbid 
the flight mission until when optimal weather conditions are restored. The 
mitigation action shall reduce the hazard consequences severity from ‘Hazardous’ 
to ‘Negligible’ (few consequences) and the residual risk from ‘High’ to ‘Low’ and 
fully acceptable. 
H60 – ‘Rain’: the probability of occurrence of hazard H60 consequences has 
been estimated as ‘Frequent’ (5). The severity of hazard H60 consequences, has 
been assessed as ‘Hazardous’ [87]. The risk associated to hazard H60 has been 
assessed as ‘High’ and unacceptable. The proposed mitigation action is the 
provision of an on board miniaturized weather Doppler RADAR to identify the 
rain and the successive application of the “Return to Home” function to save the 
RPA. The mitigation action shall reduce the hazard consequences severity from 
‘Hazardous’ to ‘Negligible’ (few consequences) and the residual risk from ‘High’ 
to ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. 
H61 – ‘Snow’: the probability of occurrence of hazard H61 consequences has 
been estimated as ‘Frequent’ (5). The severity of hazard H61 consequences, has 
been assessed as ‘Hazardous’ [87]. The risk associated to hazard H61 has been 
assessed as ‘High’ and unacceptable. The proposed mitigation action is the 
provision of an on board miniaturized weather Doppler RADAR to identify the 
rain and the successive application of the “Return to Home” function to save the 
RPA. The mitigation action shall reduce the hazard consequences severity from 
‘Hazardous’ to ‘Negligible’ (few consequences) and the residual risk from ‘High’ 
to ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. 
H62 – ‘Solar storm’: the probability of occurrence of hazard H62 
consequences has been estimated as ‘Remote’ (3). The severity of hazard H62 
consequences, has been assessed as ‘Hazardous’ [87]. The risk associated to 
hazard H62 has been assessed as ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. Nevertheless, due to 
the potential occurrence of loss or degradation of the radio link caused by 
excessive solar activity, the proposed mitigation action is to apply the “Return to 
Home” function and save he RPA. The mitigation action shall reduce the hazard 
consequences severity from ‘Hazardous’ to ‘Negligible’ (few consequences) and 
the risk from ‘Moderate’ to ‘Low’ and fully acceptable. 
H63 – ‘Temperature’: the probability of occurrence of hazard H63 
consequences has been estimated as ‘Frequent’ (5). The severity of hazard H63 
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consequences, has been assessed as ‘Hazardous’ [87]. The risk associated to 
hazard H63 has been assessed as ‘High’ and unacceptable. The proposed 
mitigation action is to forbid the flight mission until the temperature values are 
above the RPAS limits indicated in the operational manual. The mitigation action 
shall reduce the hazard consequences severity from ‘Hazardous’ to ‘Negligible’ 
(few consequences) and the residual risk from ‘High’ to ‘Moderate’ and 
acceptable. 
H64 – ‘Turbulence’: the probability of occurrence of hazard H64 
consequences has been estimated as ‘Occasional’ (4). The severity of hazard H64 
consequences, has been assessed as ‘Hazardous’ [87]. The risk associated to 
hazard H64 has been assessed as ‘High’ and unacceptable. The proposed 
mitigation action is to forbid the flight mission until that optimal operational 
conditions are restored. The mitigation action shall reduce the hazard 
consequences severity from ‘Hazardous’ to ‘Negligible’ (few consequences) and 
the residual risk from ‘High’ to ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. 
H65 – ‘Wind’: the probability of occurrence of hazard H65 consequences has 
been estimated as ‘Frequent’ (5). The severity of hazard H65 consequences, has 
been assessed as ‘Hazardous’ [87]. The risk associated to hazard H65 has been 
assessed as ‘High’ and unacceptable. The proposed mitigation action is to forbid 
the flight mission until that optimal operational conditions are restored. The 
mitigation action shall reduce the hazard consequences severity from ‘Hazardous’ 
to ‘Negligible’ (few consequences) and the residual risk from ‘High’ to 
‘Moderate’ and acceptable. 
H66 – ‘Lightning strike’: the probability of occurrence of hazard H66 
consequences has been estimated as ‘Occasional’ (4). The severity of hazard H65 
consequences, has been assessed as ‘Catastrophic’ [87]. The risk associated to 
hazard H66 has been assessed as ‘High’ and unacceptable. The proposed 
mitigation action is to forbid the flight mission until that optimal operational 
conditions are restored. The mitigation action shall reduce the hazard 
consequences severity from ‘Hazardous’ to ‘Negligible’ (few consequences) and 
the residual risk from ‘High’ to ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. 
H67 – ‘Hail’: the probability of occurrence of hazard H67 consequences has 
been estimated as ‘Occasional’ (4). The severity of hazard H67 consequences, has 
been assessed as ‘Catastrophic’ [87]. The risk associated to hazard H67 has been 
assessed as ‘High’ and unacceptable. The proposed mitigation action is to forbid 
the flight mission until when optimal weather conditions are restored. The 
mitigation action shall reduce the hazard consequences severity from 
‘Catastrophic’ to ‘Negligible’ (few consequences) and the risk from ‘High’ to 
‘Moderate’ and fully acceptable. 
H68 – ‘Hurricane’: the probability of occurrence of hazard H68 consequences 
has been estimated as ‘Remote’ (3). The severity of hazard H68 consequences, 
has been assessed as ‘Catastrophic’ [87]. The risk associated to hazard H68 has 
been assessed as ‘High’ and unacceptable. The proposed mitigation action is to 
forbid the flight mission until when optimal weather conditions are restored. The 
mitigation action shall reduce the hazard consequences severity from 
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‘Catastrophic’ to ‘Negligible’ (few consequences) and the risk from ‘High’ to 
‘Low’ and fully acceptable. 
H69 – ‘Volcanic ash’: the probability of occurrence of hazard H69 
consequences has been estimated as ‘Remote’ (3) ([88], Appendix 4). The 
severity of hazard H69 consequences, has been assessed as ‘Catastrophic’. The 
risk associated to hazard H69 has been assessed as ‘High’ and unacceptable. The 
proposed mitigation action is to forbid the flight mission until when optimal 
weather conditions are restored. The mitigation action shall reduce the hazard 
consequences severity from ‘Catastrophic’ to ‘Negligible’ (few consequences) 
and the risk from ‘High’ to ‘Low’ and fully acceptable. 
3.2.9 The ATM hazard log  
The ATM hazard log (Table 12) has been draft according to the categorization 
of RPAS functionalities described in Paragraph 3.2 for the successive safety risk 
analysis. It reports the hazards expected to occur in the subspace above 500 Feet 
of altitude until FL600 and beyond under ATM service where the certified 
category operations involving RPAS with maximum take-off weight between 150 
and 600 kg (HALE RPAS) are expected to be host ([18], [27], [28] and [29]). 
 
Table 12 – Hazard analysis: ATM hazard log 
Hazard log 
Hazard # Definition 
Service: ATM 
RPAS Aviate functionality related hazards 
H01 Impossibility to perform manoeuvres on ground 
H02 Loss of abort launch capability 
H03 Loss of flight controls 
H04 Loss of propulsion 
H05 Loss of GCS HMI 
H06 Loss of GCS monitoring displays  
H07 
Deviation from steady-state  
(not-accelerating) flight condition 
H08 Loss of Emergency Flight Termination System 
H09 Loss of ‘Return to home function’ 
H10 Impossibility to perform a ‘go around’ manoeuvre 
RPAS Navigate functionality related hazards 
H11 Loss of mission plan 
H12 Loss of GPS signal 
H13 Loss of EGNOS signal 
H14 Drift from the mission plan 
H15 Loss of mission plan updating software functionality 
H16 Lack of communication of mission plan updating to ATC 
RPAS Communicate functionality related hazards 
Hazard log 
Hazard # Definition 
Service: ATM 
H17 Loss of uplink channel of the RPAS radio link 
H18 Loss of downlink channel of the RPAS radio link 
H19 Loss of ADS_B 
H20 Loss of communication with ATC 
RPAS hazards avoidance functionality related hazards 
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Table 12 – Hazard analysis: ATM hazard log (Cont’d) 
H21 Presence of natural obstacles  
H22 Presence of man-made manufactures  
H23 Mid-air collision with other aircraft 
H24 Loss of DAA functionality 
H25 No detectability from other airspace users 
H26 Cooperative traffic intrusion 
H27 Not cooperative traffic intrusion 
H28 Missed cooperative traffic tracking 
H29 Missed not cooperative traffic tracking 
H30 Collision with cooperative traffic 
H31 Collision with not cooperative traffic 
H32 Missed performance of collision avoidance manoeuvre  
H33 
Missed monitoring of performance  
of collision avoidance manoeuvring 
H34 Missed weather awareness capability 
H35 Missed gathering of contingent weather information  
H36 Missed avoidance of adverse weather 
Cross-cutting functionalities related hazard 
H37 Loss of RPAS subsystems health and status monitoring  
H38 
Loss of communication while transiting  
from LOS to BRLOS and vice versa  
H39 Unintentional radio link interference 
H40 Malicious radio link jamming 
H41 Malicious radio link spoofing 
Contingencies  Failures related hazards 
H42 Fire 
H43 Loss of RPAS autopilot 
H44 Loss of electrical power  
H45 Loss of inertial platform 
H46 Loss of heading indication 
H47 Loss of altitude indication 
H48 Loss of airspeed indication 
H49 Pressure sensors failure 
H50 Misleading altitude indication 
H51 Misleading airspeed indication 
H52 Misleading indication of the angle of incidence 
H53 Stall 
H54 Loss of fuel cell 
H55 Loss of fuel 
Contingencies  Human factor related hazards 
H56 Remote pilot low training 
H57 Non-compliant operational procedures 
H58 Remote pilot loss of situational awareness 
H59 Human senses limitations 
H60 Remote pilot excessive workload 
H61 Loss of separation provision from the ATC 
H62 Loss of separation provision from the remote pilot 
H63 Erroneous separation instruction provision from the ATC 
H64 
Erroneous execution of the separation  
provision instruction from the remote pilot 
H65 
The RPAS does not comply or incorrectly  
responds to separation provision instruction issued by ATC 
H66 
Remote pilot delayed response to  
separation instruction provision from ATC 
Hazard log 
Hazard # Definition 
Service: ATM 
H67 
Excessive number of intentional deviations  
from separation provision instruction 
H68 Missed submission of flight plan to ATC 
Contingencies  Weather related hazards 
H69 Cloud cover 
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Table 12 – Hazard analysis: ATM hazard log (Cont’d) 
H70 Fog 
H71 Freezing rain 
H72 Glare 
H73 Haze 
H74 Humidity 
H75 Ice 
H76 Rain 
H77 Snow 
H78 Solar storms 
H79 Temperature 
H80 Turbulence 
H81 Wind 
H82 Lightning strike 
H83 Hail 
H84 Hurricanes 
H85 Volcanic ash 
The ATM risk assessment matrix  
The ATM risk matrix has been developed following the same criteria as for 
the U-Space risk matrix. 
The analysis carried out to develop the ATM safety matrix content is 
hereinafter reported; the differences only in the analysis of the ATM hazard log 
and implementation of the descending risk matrix with respect to the above 
described U-space hazard log and risk matrix analysis are hereinafter reported and 
described.  
The resulting ATM safety risk matrix has been reported in Appendix D (Table 
144).  
 
H01 – ‘Impossibility to perform manoeuvers on ground’: the probability of 
occurrence of hazard H01 consequences has been estimated as ‘Remote’ (3); the 
severity of H01 hazard consequences, has been assessed as ‘Hazardous’ leading to 
a large reduction in safety margins on ground; the risk associated to hazard H01 
has been assessed as ‘High’ and unacceptable; the proposed mitigation action is to 
increase RPA maintenance; the mitigation action shall reduce the probability of 
hazard H01 consequences occurrence from ‘Remote’ to ‘Improbable’ and the 
residual risk from ‘High’ to ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. 
H02 – ‘Loss of abort launch capability’: as for hazard H01 in the U-space 
matrix. 
H03 – ‘Loss of flight controls’: as for hazard H02 in the U-space matrix, but 
the probability of hazard H03 consequences occurrence has been assessed as 
‘Remote’ (3) due to the operation of RPAS expected to be technically more 
advanced. The proposed mitigation actions shall reduce the residual risk from 
‘High’ to ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. 
H04 – ‘Loss of propulsion’: as for hazard H03 in the U-space matrix, but the 
probability of hazard H04 consequences occurrence has been assessed as 
‘Remote’ (3) due to the operation of RPAS expected to be technically more 
advanced. The proposed mitigation actions shall reduce the residual risk from 
‘High’ to ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. 
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H05 – ‘Loss of GCS HMI’: as for hazard H04 in the U-space matrix, but the 
probability of hazard H05 consequences occurrence has been assessed as 
‘Improbable’ (2) and the risk as ‘Moderate’ due to the operation of RPAS 
expected to be technically more advanced. The proposed mitigation actions shall 
reduce the residual risk from ‘Moderate’ to ‘Low’ and fully acceptable. 
H06 – ‘Loss of GCS monitoring displays’: the probability of occurrence of 
hazard H06 consequences has been estimated as ‘Remote’ (3) on the basis of 
items GCSHMISS6a and GCSHMISS6b with estimated probability of occurrence 
level estimated as D (Remote) in the FMECA analysis (Table 71) and on the basis 
of the hazard ‘Loss of RPA on board systems monitoring/telemetry due to GCS 
displays failure’ with probability of occurrence estimated as ‘B’. The severity of 
hazard H06 consequences, has been assessed as ‘Catastrophic’ potentially leading 
to RPA destruction; the risk associated to hazard H06 has been assessed as 
‘Moderate’ and acceptable; to further decrease the risk, the proposed mitigation 
action is to immediately terminate the flight using the FTS if far from congested 
areas or using the parachute for smoother landing if not; the mitigation action 
shall reduce the hazard H06 consequences severity from ‘Catastrophic’ to ‘Minor’ 
(with reference to the use of emergency procedures) and the residual risk from 
‘Moderate’ to ‘Low’ and fully acceptable.  
H07 – ‘Deviation from steady-state (not-accelerating) flight condition’: as for 
hazard H05 in the U-space matrix, but the probability of hazard H07 
consequences occurrence has been assessed as ‘Improbable’ (2) and the risk as 
‘Moderate’ due to the operation of RPAS expected to be technically more 
advanced. The proposed mitigation actions shall reduce the residual risk from 
‘Moderate’ to ‘Low’ and fully acceptable. 
H08 – ‘Loss of Emergency Flight Termination System’: as for hazard H06 in 
the U-space matrix, but the probability of hazard H08 consequences occurrence 
has been assessed as ‘Improbable’ (2) and the risk as ‘Moderate’ due to the 
operation of RPAS expected to be technically more advanced. The proposed 
mitigation actions shall reduce the residual risk from ‘Moderate’ to ‘Low’ and 
fully acceptable. 
H09 – ‘Loss of “Return to Home” function’: as for hazard H07 in the U-space 
matrix. 
H10 – ‘Impossibility to perform a go-around manoeuver’: the probability of 
occurrence of this hazard consequences has been estimated as ‘Occasional’ (4). 
The severity of hazard H10 consequences, has been assessed as ‘Catastrophic’ 
potentially leading to RPA destruction; the risk associated to hazard H10 has been 
assessed as ‘High’ and unacceptable; the proposed mitigation action is to 
immediately terminate the flight using the parachute for smoother landing; the 
mitigation action shall reduce hazard H10 consequences severity from 
‘Catastrophic’ to ‘Minor’ (with reference to the use of emergency procedures) and 
the residual risk from ‘High’ to ‘Moderate’ and acceptable.  
H11 – ‘Loss of Mission plan’: as for hazard H08 in the U-space matrix, but 
the probability of hazard H11 consequences occurrence has been assessed as 
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‘Improbable’ (2) and the risk as ‘Low’ due to the operation of RPAS mission 
software expected to be more advanced and reliable. 
H12 – ‘Loss of GPS signal’: as for hazard H09 in the U-space matrix. 
H13 – ‘Loss of EGNOS signal’: as for hazard H10 in the U-space matrix. 
H14 – ‘Drift from the mission plan’: as for hazard H11 in the U-space matrix, 
but the probability of hazard H14 consequence occurrence has been assessed as 
‘Improbable’ (2) and the risk as ‘Moderate’ due to the operation of RPAS 
expected to be technically more advanced. The proposed mitigation actions shall 
reduce the residual risk from ‘Moderate’ to ‘Low’ and fully acceptable. 
H15 – ‘Loss of mission plan updating software functionality’: the probability 
of occurrence hazard H15 consequences occurrence has been estimated as 
‘Remote’ (3). The severity of hazard H15 consequences, has been assessed as 
‘Hazardous’ potentially leading to a large reduction in safety margins; the risk 
associated to hazard H15 has been assessed as ‘Moderate’ and acceptable; the 
proposed mitigation action is to immediately terminate the flight using the 
parachute for smoother landing; the mitigation action shall reduce the probability 
of H15 hazard consequences from ‘Hazardous’ to ‘Minor’ (with reference to the 
use of emergency procedures) and the residual risk from ‘Moderate’ to ‘Low’ and 
fully acceptable.  
H16 – ‘Lack of communication of mission plan updating to ATC’: the 
probability of occurrence of hazard H16 consequences has been estimated as 
‘Remote’ (3). The severity of hazard H16 consequences, has been assessed as 
‘Hazardous’ potentially leading to a large reduction in safety margins; the risk 
associated to hazard H16 has been assessed as ‘Moderate’ and acceptable; the 
proposed mitigation action is to increase the remote pilot training; the mitigation 
action shall reduce the probability of occurrence of H16 hazard probability of 
occurrence from ‘Remote’ to ‘Improbable’ and the residual risk from ‘Moderate’ 
to ‘Low’ and fully acceptable. 
H17 – ‘Loss of uplink channel of the RPAS radio link’: as for hazard H12 in 
the U-space matrix, but the probability of occurrence of hazard H17 consequences 
has been assessed as ‘Remote’ (3) due to the operation of RPAS expected to be 
technically more advanced and, with reference to hazard H17 with a more robust 
radio link. The proposed mitigation actions shall reduce the residual risk from 
‘High’ to ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. 
H18 – ‘Loss of downlink channel of the RPAS radio link’: as for hazard H13 
in the U-space matrix, but the probability of occurrence of hazard H18 
consequences has been assessed as ‘Remote’ (3) due to the operation of RPAS 
expected to be technically more advanced and, with reference to hazard H18 with 
a more robust radio link. The proposed mitigation actions shall reduce the residual 
risk from ‘High’ to ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. 
H19 – ‘Loss of ADS-B’: as for hazard H14 in the U-space matrix, but the 
probability of occurrence of hazard H19 consequences has been assessed as 
‘Improbable’ (2) and the risk as ‘Moderate’ due to the operation of RPAS 
expected to be technically more advanced. The proposed mitigation actions is to 
provide a redundant ADS-B on board the RPA; the proposed mitigation actions 
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shall reduce the hazard H19 consequences probability of occurrence from 
‘Improbable’ to ‘Extremely improbable’; the residual risk remains ‘Moderate’ and 
acceptable. 
H20 – ‘Loss of communication with ATC’: the probability of occurrence of 
this hazard consequences has been estimated as ‘Remote’ (3). The severity of H20 
hazard consequences, has been assessed as ‘Catastrophic’ potentially leading to 
RPA destruction; the risk associated to hazard H20 has been assessed as ‘High’ 
and unacceptable; the proposed mitigation action is to switch and immediately 
and rely on controller-pilot data link communication channel; the mitigation 
action shall reduce hazard H20 consequences probability of occurrence from 
‘Remote’ to ‘Improbable’ and the residual risk from ‘High’ to ‘Moderate’ and 
acceptable. 
H21 – ‘Presence of natural obstacle’: as for hazard H15 in the U-space matrix. 
H22 – ‘Presence of man-made manufactures’: as for hazard H16 in the U-
space matrix. 
H23 – ‘Mid-air collision with other aircraft’: as for hazard H17 in the U-space 
matrix. 
H24 – ‘Loss of DAA functionality’: the probability of occurrence of this 
hazard consequences has been estimated as ‘Improbable’ (2). The severity of H20 
hazard consequences, has been assessed as ‘Catastrophic’ potentially leading to 
RPA destruction; the risk associated to hazard H20 has been assessed as ‘High’ 
and unacceptable; the proposed mitigation action is to switch on redundant DAA 
subsystem; the mitigation action shall reduce the probability of occurrence of 
hazard H20 consequences from ‘Improbable’ to ‘Extremely improbable’; the 
residual risk remains ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. 
H25 – ‘No detectability from other airspace users’: the probability of 
occurrence of this hazard consequences has been estimated as ‘Remote’ (3). The 
severity of H20 hazard consequences, has been assessed as ‘Catastrophic’ 
potentially leading to RPA destruction; the risk associated to hazard H20 has been 
assessed as ‘High’ and unacceptable; the proposed mitigation action is to equip 
RPA with ADS-B equipment; the mitigation action shall reduce the consequences 
severity of hazard H20 from ‘Catastrophic’ to ‘Minor’ (nuisance) and the residual 
risk from ‘High’ to ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. 
H26 – ‘Cooperative traffic intrusion’: as for hazard H20 in the U-space 
matrix, but the probability of hazard H26 consequences occurrence has been 
assessed as ‘Remote’ (3) and the risk as ‘Moderate’ and acceptable due to the 
expected operation of more skilled crews. The proposed mitigation actions shall 
reduce the residual risk from ‘High’ to ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. 
H27 – ‘Not cooperative traffic intrusion’: as for hazard H21 in the U-space 
matrix, but the probability of hazard H27 consequences occurrence has been 
assessed as ‘Remote’ (3) and the risk as ‘Moderate’ and acceptable due to the 
expected operation of more skilled crews. The proposed mitigation actions shall 
reduce the residual risk from ‘High’ to ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. 
H28 – ‘Missed cooperative traffic tracking’: as for hazard H22 in the U-space 
matrix, but the probability of hazard H28 consequences occurrence has been 
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assessed as ‘Improbable’ (2) and the risk as ‘Moderate’ and acceptable due to the 
operation of RPAS expected to be technically more advanced. The proposed 
mitigation actions shall reduce the residual risk from ‘Moderate’ to ‘Low’ and 
fully acceptable. 
H29 – ‘Missed not cooperative traffic tracking’: as for hazard H23 in the U-
space matrix, but the probability of hazard H29 consequences occurrence has been 
assessed as ‘Improbable’ (2) and the risk as ‘Moderate’ and acceptable due to the 
operation of RPAS expected to be technically more advanced. The proposed 
mitigation actions shall reduce the residual risk from ‘Moderate’ to ‘Low’ and 
fully acceptable. 
H30 – ‘Collision with cooperative traffic’: as for hazard H24 in the U-space 
matrix, but the probability of hazard H30 consequences occurrence has been 
assessed as ‘Improbable’ (2) and the risk as ‘Moderate’ due to the operation of 
RPAS expected to be technically more advanced. The proposed mitigation actions 
shall reduce the residual risk from ‘Moderate’ to ‘Low’ and fully acceptable. 
H31 – ‘Collision with not cooperative traffic’: as for hazard H24 in the U-
space matrix, but the probability of hazard H31 consequences occurrence has been 
assessed as ‘Improbable’ (2) and the risk as ‘Moderate’ and acceptable due to the 
operation of RPAS expected to be technically more advanced. The proposed 
mitigation actions shall reduce the residual risk from ‘Moderate’ to ‘Low’ and 
fully acceptable. 
H32 – ‘Missed performance of collision avoidance manoeuvre’: as for hazard 
H26 in the U-space matrix, but the probability of hazard H32 consequences 
occurrence has been assessed as ‘Remote’ (3) due to the operation of RPAS 
expected to be technically more advanced and the risk as ‘High’. The proposed 
mitigation actions shall reduce the residual risk from ‘High’ to ‘Moderate’ and 
acceptable. 
H33 – Missed monitoring of performance of collision avoidance 
manoeuvring: as for hazard H27 in the U-space matrix, but the probability of 
occurrence of hazard H33 consequences occurrence has been assessed as 
‘Remote’ (3) due to the operation of RPAS expected to be technically more 
advanced and the risk as ‘Moderate’and acceptable. The proposed mitigation 
actions shall reduce the residual risk from ‘Moderate’ to ‘Low’ and fully 
acceptable. 
H34 – ‘Missed weather awareness capability’: as for hazard H28 in the U-
space matrix, but the probability of occurrence of hazard H34 consequences has 
been assessed as ‘Improbable’ (2) due to the operation of RPAS expected to be 
technically more advanced and the risk as ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. The 
proposed mitigation actions shall reduce the residual risk from ‘Moderate’ to 
‘Low’ and fully acceptable. 
H35 – ‘Missed gathering of contingent weather information’: as for hazard 
H28 in the U-space matrix, but the probability of occurrence of hazard H35 
consequences has been assessed as ‘Improbable’ (2) due to the operation of RPAS 
expected to be technically more advanced and the risk as ‘Moderate’. The 
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proposed mitigation actions shall reduce the residual risk from ‘Moderate’ to 
‘Low’ and fully acceptable. 
H36 – ‘Missed avoidance of adverse weather’: as for hazard H30 in the U-
space matrix, but the probability of occurrence of hazard H36 consequences has 
been assessed as ‘Improbable’ (2) due to the operation of RPAS expected to be 
technically more advanced as ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. The proposed mitigation 
actions shall reduce the residual risk from ‘Moderate’ to ‘Low’ and fully 
acceptable. 
H37 – ‘Loss of RPAS subsystems health and status monitoring’: as for hazard 
H31 in the U-space matrix, but the probability of occurrence of hazard H37 
consequences has been assessed as ‘Improbable’ (2) due to the operation of RPAS 
expected to be technically more advanced and the risk as ‘Moderate’ and 
acceptable. The proposed mitigation actions is to increase RPAS health subsystem 
maintenance on ground; the proposed mitigation action shall reduce the residual 
risk from ‘Moderate’ to ‘Low’ and fully acceptable. 
H38 – ‘Loss of communication while transiting from LOS to BRLOS and 
vice versa’: the probability of occurrence of this hazard consequences has been 
estimated as ‘Extremely improbable’ (1) due to the operation of RPAS expected 
to be technically more advanced. The severity of hazard H38 consequences, has 
been assessed as ‘Catastrophic’ potentially leading to RPA destruction. The risk 
associated to hazard H38 has been assessed as ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. No 
further mitigation actions has been provided due to assigned probability of 
occurrence.  
H39 – ‘Unintentional radio link interference’: as for hazard H33 in the U-
space matrix, but the probability of occurrence of hazard H39 consequences has 
been assessed as ‘Improbable’ (2) due to the operation of RPAS expected to be 
technically more advanced and the risk as ‘Moderate’. The proposed mitigation 
actions is to increase RPAS health subsystem maintenance on ground; the 
proposed mitigation action shall reduce the residual risk from ‘Moderate’ to 
‘Low’ and fully acceptable. 
H40 – ‘Malicious radio link jamming’: as for hazard H34 in the U-space 
matrix, but the probability of occurrence of hazard H40 consequences has been 
assessed as ‘Remote’ (3) due to the operation of RPAS expected to be technically 
more advanced and the risk as ‘High’. The proposed mitigation actions is to 
increase RPAS health subsystem maintenance on ground; the proposed mitigation 
action shall reduce the residual risk from ‘High’ to ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. 
H41 – ‘Malicious radio link spoofing’: as for hazard H35 in the U-space 
matrix, but the probability of occurrence of hazard H41 consequences has been 
assessed as ‘Remote’ (3) due to the operation of RPAS expected to be technically 
more advanced and the risk as ‘High’. The proposed mitigation actions is to 
increase RPAS health subsystem maintenance on ground; the proposed mitigation 
action shall reduce the residual risk from ‘High’ to ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. 
H42 – ‘Fire’: as for hazard H36 in the U-space matrix, but the probability of 
occurrence of hazard H42 consequences has been assessed as ‘Extremely 
improbable’ (1) due to the operation of RPAS expected to be technically more 
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advanced and the risk as ‘Moderate’. The proposed mitigation shall reduce the 
residual risk from ‘High’ to ‘Low’ and fully acceptable. 
H43 – ‘Loss of RPAS autopilot’: as for hazard H37 in the U-space matrix, but 
the probability of occurrence of hazard H43 consequences has been assessed as 
‘Extremely improbable’ (1) due to the operation of RPAS expected to be 
technically more advanced and the risk as ‘Moderate’. The proposed mitigation 
shall reduce the residual risk from ‘High’ to ‘Low’ and fully acceptable. 
H44 – ‘Loss of electrical power’: as for hazard H38 in the U-space matrix, but 
the probability of occurrence of hazard H44 consequences has been assessed as 
‘Extremely improbable’ (1) due to the operation of RPAS expected to be 
technically more advanced and the risk as ‘Moderate’. The proposed mitigation 
shall reduce the residual risk from ‘High’ to ‘Low’ and fully acceptable. 
H45 – ‘Loss of inertial platform’: as for hazard H39 in the U-space matrix, 
but the probability of occurrence of hazard H45 consequences has been assessed 
as ‘Extremely improbable’ (1) due to the operation of RPAS expected to be 
technically more advanced and the risk as ‘Low’. No further mitigation actions 
are requested. 
H46 – ‘Loss of heading indication’: as for hazard H40 in the U-space matrix, 
but the probability of occurrence of hazard H46 consequences has been assessed 
as ‘Extremely improbable’ (1) due to the operation of RPAS expected to be 
technically more advanced and the risk as ‘Low’. No further mitigation actions 
are requested. 
H47 – ‘Loss of altitude indication’: as for hazard H41 in the U-space matrix, 
but the probability of occurrence of hazard H47 consequences has been assessed 
as ‘Extremely improbable’ (1) due to the operation of RPAS expected to be 
technically more advanced and the risk as ‘Moderate’. The proposed mitigation 
action is to switch on redundant altimeter; the proposed mitigation action shall 
reduce the residual risk from ‘Moderate’ to ‘Low’ and fully acceptable. 
H48 – ‘Loss of airspeed indication: the probability of occurrence of hazard 
H48 consequences has been assessed as ‘Extremely improbable’ (1) due to the 
operation of RPAS expected to be technically more advanced and the risk as 
‘Low’. No further mitigation actions are requested. 
H49 – ‘Loss of pressure sensor failure’: as for hazard H42 in the U-space 
matrix, but the probability of occurrence of hazard H49 consequences has been 
assessed as ‘Extremely improbable’ (1) due to the operation of RPAS expected to 
be technically more advanced and the risk as ‘Moderate’. The proposed mitigation 
action is to switch on redundant pressure sensor; the proposed mitigation action 
shall reduce the residual risk from ‘Moderate’ to ‘Low’ and fully acceptable. 
H50 – ‘Misleading altitude indication’: as for hazard H43 in the U-space 
matrix, but the probability of occurrence of hazard H50 consequences has been 
assessed as ‘Remote’ (3) due to the operation of RPAS expected to be technically 
more advanced and the risk as ‘High’. The proposed mitigation action is to switch 
on redundant alitmeter; the proposed mitigation action shall reduce the residual 
risk from ‘High’ to ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. 
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H51 – ‘Misleading airspeed indication’: as for hazard H44 in the U-space 
matrix, but the probability of occurrence of hazard H51 consequences has been 
assessed as ‘Remote’ (3) due to the operation of RPAS expected to be technically 
more advanced and the risk as ‘High’. The proposed mitigation action is to switch 
on redundant altimeter; the proposed mitigation action shall reduce the residual 
risk from ‘High’ to ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. 
H52 – ‘Misleading indication of the angle of incidence’: as for hazard H45 in 
the U-space matrix, but the probability of occurrence of hazard H52 consequences 
has been assessed as ‘Improbable’ (2) due to the operation of RPAS expected to 
be technically more advanced and the risk as ‘Moderate’. The proposed mitigation 
action is to switch on redundant pressure sensors or to immediately terminate the 
flight; the proposed mitigation action shall reduce the residual risk from 
‘Moderate’ to ‘Low’ and fully acceptable. 
H52 – ‘Stall’: as for hazard H46 in the U-space matrix, but the probability of 
occurrence of hazard H52 consequences has been assessed as ‘Improbable’ (2) 
due to the operation of RPAS expected to be technically more advanced and the 
risk as ‘Moderate’. The proposed mitigation action is to perform a proper diving 
corrective manoeuvre or to immediately terminate the flight; the proposed 
mitigation action shall reduce the residual risk from ‘High’ to ‘Moderate’ and 
acceptable. 
H54 – ‘Loss of fuel cell’: as for hazard H47 in the U-space matrix, but the 
probability of occurrence of hazard H54 has been assessed as ‘Improbable’ (2) 
due to the operation of RPAS expected to be technically more advanced and the 
risk as ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. The proposed mitigation action is to switch on 
LiPo batteries; the proposed mitigation action shall reduce the residual risk from 
‘Moderate’ to ‘Low’ and fully acceptable. 
H55 – ‘Loss of fuel’: the probability of occurrence of this hazard 
consequences has been estimated as ‘Remote’ (3) with reference to item FSS1 of 
the FMECA analysis, ‘Structural damage’ of the fuel tank, that causes loss of fuel 
(Table 52). The severity of hazard H55 consequences, has been assessed as 
‘Catastrophic’ potentially leading to RPA destruction. The risk associated to 
hazard H55 has been assessed as ‘High’ and unacceptable. The proposed 
mitigation action is to immediately terminate the flight using the FTS. The 
mitigation action shall reduce the hazard consequences from ‘Catastrophic’ to 
‘Minor’ (due to the use of emergency procedures) and the residual risk from 
‘High’ to ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. 
H56 – ‘Remote pilot low training’: as for hazard H48 in the U-space matrix, 
but the probability of occurrence of hazard H56 consequences has been assessed 
as ‘Remote’ (3) due to the expected operation of more skilled crews and the risk 
as ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. The proposed shall reduce the residual risk from 
‘Moderate’ to ‘Low’ and fully acceptable. 
H57 – ‘Non-compliant operational procedures’: as for hazard H49 in the U-
space matrix, but the probability of occurrence of hazard H57 consequences has 
been assessed as ‘Remote’ (3) due to the expected operation of more skilled crews 
 157 
 
and the risk as ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. The proposed shall reduce the residual 
risk from ‘Moderate’ to ‘Low’ and fully acceptable. 
H58 – ‘Remote pilot loss of situational awareness’: as for hazard H50 in the 
U-space matrix, but the probability of occurrence of hazard H58 consequences has 
been assessed as ‘Remote’ (3) due to the expected operation of more skilled crews 
and the risk as ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. The proposed shall reduce the residual 
risk from ‘Moderate’ to ‘Low’ and fully acceptable. 
H59 – ‘Human senses limitations’: as for hazard H51 in the U-space matrix. 
H60 – ‘Remote pilot excessive workload’: as for hazard H52 in the U-space 
matrix. 
H61 – ‘Loss of separation provision from the ATC’: the probability of 
occurrence of this hazard consequences has been estimated as ‘Remote’ (3): the 
severity of H61 hazard consequences, potentially leading to a large reduction in 
safety margins, has been assessed as ‘Hazardous’. The risk associated to hazard 
H61 has been assessed as ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. The proposed mitigation 
action is to provide DAA/LIDAR sensor on board the RPA against mid-air 
conflict/collision risks. The mitigation action shall reduce the entity of the hazard 
consequences from ‘Catastrophic’ to ‘None’, and the residual risk from 
‘Moderate’ to ‘Low’ and fully acceptable. 
H62 – ‘Loss of separation provision from the remote pilot’: the probability of 
occurrence of this hazard consequences has been estimated as ‘Occsional’ (4): the 
severity of H62 hazard consequences, potentially leading to a large reduction in 
safety margins, has been assessed as ‘Hazardous’. The risk associated to hazard 
H62 has been assessed as ‘High’ and unacceptable. The proposed mitigation 
action is to provide DAA/LIDAR sensor on board the RPA against mid-air 
conflict/collision risks. The mitigation action shall reduce the entity of the hazard 
consequences from ‘Catastrophic’ to ‘Negligible’, and the residual risk from 
‘High’ to ‘Moderate’ and fully acceptable. 
H63 – ‘Loss of separation provision from the remote pilot’: the probability of 
occurrence of this hazard consequences has been estimated as ‘Extremely 
improbable’ (1) with reference to hazard ‘ATC communication errors’ from 
human factor analysis (Table 141): the severity of H63 hazard consequences, 
potentially leading to a large reduction in safety margins, has been assessed as 
‘Hazardous’. The risk associated to hazard H63 has been assessed as ‘Low’ and 
fully acceptable. No further mitigation actions are required. 
H64 – ‘Erroneous execution of the separation provision instruction from the 
remote pilot’: the probability of occurrence of this hazard consequences has been 
estimated as ‘Occasional’ (4): the severity of H64 hazard consequences, 
potentially leading to a large reduction in safety margins, has been assessed as 
‘Hazardous’. The risk associated to hazard H64 has been assessed as ‘High’ and 
unacceptable. The proposed mitigation action is to provide DAA/LIDAR sensor 
on board the RPA against mid-air conflict/collision risks and to increase the 
remote pilot training. The mitigation action shall reduce the probabilty of hazard 
H64 occurrence (increase of remote pilot training) and hazard H64 severity of 
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consequences from ‘Catastrophic’ to ‘Minor’ (due to the use of emergency 
procedures), and the residual risk from ‘High’ to ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. 
H65 – ‘The RPAS does not comply or incorrectly responds to separation 
provision instruction issued by ATC’: the probability of occurrence of this hazard 
consequences has been estimated as ‘Remote’ (3): the severity of H65 hazard 
consequences, potentially leading to RPA destruction, has been assessed as 
‘Catastrophic’. The risk associated to hazard H65 has been assessed as ‘High’ and 
unacceptable. The proposed mitigation action is to terminate the flight using the 
FTS if far from congested areas or using the parachute for smoother landing if 
not. The mitigation action shall reduce the hazard consequences from 
‘Catastrophic’ to ‘Minor’ (due to the use of emergency procedures), and the 
residual risk from ‘High’ to ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. 
H66 – ‘Remote pilot delayed response to separation provision instruction 
from ATC’: the probability of occurrence of this hazard consequences has been 
estimated as ‘Occasional’ (4): the severity of H66 hazard consequences, a 
significant reduction in safety margins, has been assessed as ‘Major’. The risk 
associated to hazard H66 has been assessed as ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. The 
proposed mitigation action is to increase the remote pilot training. The mitigation 
action shall reduce the hazard consequences severity from ‘Major’ to ‘Negligible’ 
(due to the use of emergency procedures), and the residual risk from ‘Moderate’ 
to ‘Low’ and fully acceptable. 
H67 – ‘Excessive number of intentional deviations from separation provision 
instructions’: the probability of occurrence of this hazard consequences has been 
estimated as ‘Frequent’ (5): the severity of H65 hazard consequences, has been 
assessed as ‘Major’ with reference to a significant reduction in safety margins. 
The risk associated to hazard H67 has been assessed as ‘High’ and unacceptable. 
The proposed mitigation action is to increase the remote pilot training. The 
mitigation action shall reduce the hazard consequences probability of occurrence  
from ‘Frequent’ to ‘Remote’, and the residual risk from ‘High’ to ‘Moderate’ and 
acceptable. 
H68 – ‘Missed submissionof flight plan to ATC’: the probability of 
occurrence of this hazard consequences has been estimated as ‘Occasional’ (4): 
the severity of H68 hazard consequences, has been assessed as ‘Hazardous’ with 
reference to a large reduction in safety margins. The risk associated to hazard H68 
has been assessed as ‘High’ and unacceptable. The proposed mitigation action is 
to increase the remote pilot training. The mitigation action shall reduce the hazard 
consequences probability of occurrence from ‘Occasional’ to ‘Remote’, and the 
residual risk from ‘High’ to ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. 
H69 – ‘Cloud’: the probability of occurrence of this hazard consequences has 
been estimated as ‘Frequent’ (5): the severity of H69 hazard consequences, has 
been assessed as ‘Negligible’ for IFR flights and ‘Minor’ (nuisance) for VFR 
flights. The risk associated to hazard H69 has been assessed as ‘Moderate’ and 
acceptable both for IFR and for VFR flights. The proposed mitigation action is to 
use the autopilot “Return to Home” function. The mitigation action shall reduce 
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the hazard consequences severity from ‘Minor’ to ‘Negligible’ for VFR flights; 
the residual risk remains ‘Moderate’ and acceptable both for IFR and VFR flights. 
H70 – ‘Fog’: the probability of occurrence of this hazard consequences has 
been estimated as ‘Occasional’ (4): the severity of H70 hazard consequences, has 
been assessed as ‘Negligible’ for IFR flights and ‘Minor’ (nuisance) for VFR 
flights. The risk associated to hazard H70 has been assessed as ‘Moderate’ and 
acceptable both for IFR and for VFR flights. The proposed mitigation action is to 
use the autopilot “Return to Home” function. The mitigation action shall reduce 
the hazard consequences severity from ‘Minor’ to ‘Negligible’ for VFR flights; 
the residual risk remains ‘Moderate’ and acceptable both for IFR and VFR flights. 
H71 – ‘Freezing rain’: the probability of occurrence of this hazard 
consequences has been estimated as ‘Remote’ (5): the severity of H71 hazard 
consequences, has been assessed as ‘Catastrophic’ both for IFR and VFR flights. 
The risk associated to hazard H71 has been assessed as ‘High’ and unacceptable 
both for IFR and for VFR flights. The proposed mitigation action is to use the 
autopilot “Return to Home” function. The mitigation action shall reduce the 
hazard consequences severity from ‘Catatrophic’ to ‘Negligible’ and the residual 
risk from ‘High’ to ‘Low’ and fully acceptable both for IFR and VFR flights. 
H72 – ‘Glare’: the probability of occurrence of this hazard consequences has 
been estimated as ‘Occasional’ (4): the severity of H72 hazard consequences, has 
been assessed as ‘Negligible’ both for IFR and VFR flights due to the absence of 
the remote pilot onboard. The risk associated to hazard H72 has been assessed as 
‘Moderate’ and unacceptable both for IFR and for VFR flights. The proposed 
mitigation action is to use the autopilot “Return to Home” function. The 
mitigation action shall reduce the hazard consequences severity from 
‘Catatrophic’ to ‘Negligible’ and the residual risk from ‘High’ to ‘Low’ and fully 
acceptable both for IFR and VFR flights. 
H73 – ‘Haze’: the probability of occurrence of this hazard consequences has 
been estimated as ‘Occasional’ (4): the severity of H73 hazard consequences, has 
been assessed as ‘Negligible’ for IFR flights and ‘Minor’ (nuisance) for VFR 
flights. The risk associated to hazard H73 has been assessed as ‘Moderate’ and 
acceptable both for IFR and for VFR flights. The proposed mitigation action is to 
use the autopilot “Return to Home” function. The mitigation action shall reduce 
the hazard consequences severity from ‘Minor’ to ‘Negligible’ for VFR flights; 
the residual risk remains ‘Moderate’ and acceptable both for IFR and VFR flights. 
H74 – ‘Humidity’: the probability of occurrence of this hazard consequences 
has been estimated as ‘Frequent’ (5): the severity of H73 hazard consequences, 
has been assessed as ‘Negligible’ for the RPA expected to fly certified operations. 
The risk associated to hazard H73 has been assessed as ‘Moderate’ and 
acceptable. No further mitigation actions have been foreseen. 
H75 – ‘Ice’: the probability of occurrence of this hazard consequences has 
been estimated as ‘Occasional’ (4): the severity of H73 hazard consequences, has 
been assessed as ‘Catastrophic’ both for IFR and VFR flights. The risk associated 
to hazard H73 has been assessed as ‘High’ and unacceptable. For both IFR and 
VFR flights, the proposed mitigation action is to forbid the flight mission until 
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when optimal weather conditions are restored. The mitigation action shall reduce 
the hazard consequences severity from ‘Catastrophic’ to ‘Negligible’ (few 
consequences) and the residual risk from ‘High’ to ‘Moderate’ and acceptable. 
H76 – ‘Rain’: as for Hazard H60 of the U-space matrix with reference to both 
IFR and VFR flights. 
H77 – ‘Snow’: as for Hazard H61 of the U-space matrix with reference to 
both IFR and VFR flights. 
H78 – ‘Solar storm’: as for Hazard H62 of the U-space matrix with reference 
to both IFR and VFR flights. 
H79 – ‘Temperature’: as for Hazard H63 of the U-space matrix with reference 
to both IFR and VFR flights; but the severity of consequences of hazard H79 have 
been considered negligible the RPA expected to fly certified operations. The risk 
associated to hazard H79 has been ranked as ‘Moderate’; no futher mitigation 
provision has been foreseen. 
H80 – ‘Turbulence’: as for Hazard H64 of the U-space matrix with reference 
to both IFR and VFR flights.  
H81 – ‘Wind’: as for Hazard H65 of the U-space matrix with reference to 
both IFR and VFR flights. 
H82 – ‘Lightning strike’: as for Hazard H66 of the U-space matrix with 
reference to both IFR and VFR flights. 
H83 – ‘Hail’: as for Hazard H67 of the U-space matrix with reference to both 
IFR and VFR flights. 
H84 – ‘Hurricanes’: as for Hazard H68 of the U-space matrix with reference 
to both IFR and VFR flights. 
H85 – ‘Volcanic ash’: as for Hazard H69 of the U-space matrix with reference 
to both IFR and VFR flights. 
3.3 RPAS risk mitigation strategies 
The general indications for mitigation strategies are reported in the U-Space 
and ATM risk matrices (Table 143 and Table 144). Further evaluations better 
specifying threats and escalation factors have been carried out using the Bow Tie 
Methodology.  
3.3.1 Residual risk  
With reference to both the U-Space and the ATM risk matrices, the mitigation 
provisions have been determined in such a way that the residual risk was 
ultimately downgraded to an acceptable level (low or moderate, Table 143 and 
Table 144).  
3.3.2 The Bow Tie methodology 
The whole of the U-Space and ATM risk matrices accomplishes the 
identification of hazard risks for operations of RPAS integrated in the civil not 
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segregated airspace from ground to flight level FL600 and beyond covering both 
uncontrolled and controlled airspace. From this point onwards, starting from the 
Bow Tie analysis, the research has been focused on RPAS capable of specific 
category operations in the VLL subspace under U-Space service only. In fact, this 
scenario involving light RPAS will be the most representative one in the nearest 
future: following EASA work intentions, the specific category RPAS operations 
will immediately cover routine commercial flights; the certified category 
operations are defined theoretically only at the moment and, by definition, for 
they high complexity, they need more advanced regulations and operational 
infrastructures to be performed maintain hazards at or below an acceptable level.    
The Bow Tie Analysis has been performed considering for each main group 
of hazards of Table 143 the most significant one identifying the top event related 
to the given hazard and the associable treats/barriers and escalation 
factors/barriers.  
The analysis has been carried out following the conceptual scheme reported in 
Figure 12; the results have been reported in Appendix E (Figure 61 ÷ Figure 74).   
3.4 Conclusions 
In accordance with the definition of Safety Management System in aviation 
[3] and in accordance with the ICAO regulations for which every aeronautical 
operator shall manage the safety of its assets and operations according to a Safety 
Management System ([1] and [2]), the risk analysis described in this chapter has 
identified safety hazards and mitigation provisions to maintain risks generated by  
the integration of RPAS into the civil not segregated airspaces at or below an 
acceptable level.   
The analysis has been further developed focusing on the concern of mitigating 
safety hazards. From this stage on, the work has been focused on the specific 
category RPAS operations scenario only, as the first one that will be deployed n 
the next future. 
This second part of the research work starts considering the ‘Expert Systems’, 
as described in Chapter 4. 
 162 
 
Chapter 4 
‘Expert Systems’ 
4.1 Introduction 
The U-Space risk matrix content has been exploited to implement the 
knowledge basis for a rule-based ‘Expert System’. It has been deemed that an 
‘Expert System’ can provide the basis for an effective active mitigation provision 
to be integrated with autopilot software functionalities to support the remote pilot 
decision making process in case of in-flight hazard occurrence during specific 
category RPAS flight operations or to act autonomously in case of certified 
category RPAS flight operations.  
An ‘Expert System’ is a software programmed to emulate the human experts 
judgment in a field of knowledge. An ‘Expert System’ initial stage (basis of 
knowledge) has been developed starting from the U-space risk matrix to provide 
the remote pilot with a dynamic and flexible tool to support his/her decision 
making process about the solution of RPAS in-flight safety hazards in case of 
their occurrence. 
4.2 ‘Expert Systems’ 
The ‘Expert Systems’ are a sub-set of computer systems programmed with 
‘Artificial Intelligence’ software capable of emulating the human experts: in fact 
they are designed and implemented to provide the user with support in decision-
making thanks to the experience gained in a field (or domain) of knowledge. 
Further, similarly to experienced human beings, the ‘Expert Systems’ can find the 
solution of complex problems operating on the acquired body of knowledge [89].   
The architecture of an ‘Expert System’ is mainly composed of (Figure 22 
[90]): 
• The knowledge basis  
• The inference engine 
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• The user, who cannot be expert of the considered domain of 
knowledge 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 22 – ‘Expert System’ concept [90] 
An ‘Expert System’ is high performant, understandable, reliable and high 
responsive. In general they are programmed to be capable of emulating human 
processes like advising, assisting human persons in decision making against very 
complex problems, deriving solutions, performing diagnoses, providing 
explanations, interpreting inputs, predicting results, justifying conclusions or 
suggesting alternative conclusion for a given problem. On the contrary, the 
‘Expert Systems’ are not able to substitute the human being in taking decision, to 
possess human capabilities, to autonomously take decision or to autonomously 
refine their knowledge on issues related to a domain they have not been properly 
taught about [89].  
The knowledge basis comprehends facts, data, as collection of facts, and 
information based on data and facts. The knowledge based on information is 
classified as factual; the knowledge based on practice, judgment, one’s ability to 
evaluate and guessing is classified as heuristic [91]. The process of instructing the 
‘Expert System’ through the acquisition of knowledge is actuated using simple 
‘rules’ formally expressed according to the logical sequence ‘IF  - THEN’. This 
statement subtends ‘IF a given condition occurs’, ‘THEN this action will follow’. 
The knowledge database made up as above described are defined ‘rule-based’ 
‘Expert Systems’ class and they are of interest for this work. Other ‘Expert 
Systems’ implemented according to different criteria are out of the scope of this 
work. 
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The ‘Expert System’ deduces new facts from previous ones through the 
deduction processes implemented in the inference engine. The inference engine 
can be assimilate to the reasoning part of the ‘Expert System’ [92]: in fact the  
‘inference’ refers to the logical process of explicitly ‘drawing a consequence’; 
conceptually, it is a logical process opposite to the ‘implication’ which implicitly 
attains to a consequence. Two typologies of inference processes can be applied 
while implementing an ‘Expert System’: forward chaining and backward chaining 
(Figure 23) [91]. In the first case the inference engine leads the user from the facts 
to the conclusion through the rules; in the latter the facts are deduced from the 
conclusion though the rules. 
 
 
Figure 23 – ‘Expert System’ inference engine forward/backword chaining [91] 
In general, opportunistic strategies consisting of mixing some forward 
chaining with some other backward chaining in an adaptable way are 
recommended to get more flexibility of the ‘Expert System’ associated to the 
designed inference engine [92]. Further, the inference engine can reiterate the 
inference process to obtain facts generating new facts and thus increasing the level 
of knowledge of the ‘Expert System’ [91]. In case of conflicts caused by multiple 
rules applied to the same case, the inference engine is able to solve them. On a 
secondary level, the ‘Expert Systems’ include the ‘explanation’ sub-system 
responsible of providing the explanation for a given inference rule [92]. 
The user, usually a person who is not expert of the given domain of 
knowledge, approaches the ‘Expert System’ to solve a problem by mean of a user 
interface towards the machine. The user interface shall be friendly and simple to 
be operated like for instance an interactive dialogue system which asks questions 
to the ‘Expert System’ and this one forwards the answers as ‘information’ or 
‘facts’ to the inference engine for further processing [92] outputting a conclusion 
for the user decisional process. The inference rules are previously stored in the 
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knowledge database by the knowledge engineer who determines the architecture 
of the database, identifies the rules and implements the knowledge database [92]. 
The following main ‘Expert Systems’ operational limitations are presented 
and discussed because of interest for this research work. There are limitations on 
the level of knowledge in a given domain: the knowledge can be incomplete or 
affected by uncertainty for which mitigation measures like weight age factors or 
statistical approaches are used to compensate knowledge incompleteness and 
uncertainty. With reference to the level of knowledge, the implementation of an 
‘Expert System’ for each possible task within a domain is impossible; the ‘Expert 
Systems’ are not able to identify erroneous facts or information introduced in the 
knowledge database; the ‘Expert Systems are not able to know and be aware 
about their own state, scope and limitations. The unit of measure of ‘Expert 
Systems’ size is the ‘rule’; the highest is the database size, the highest is the 
number of rules that compose it and the highest will be the time to attain a 
conclusion and to take a decision from the user perspective [93] and the more 
complex will be the maintenance as well as development costs [92]. The ‘Expert 
System’ maintenance consists of the existing source code updating/debugging and 
of knowledge basis upgrading according to the eventual latest development 
occurred in the domain of knowledge the ‘Expert System’ refers to. The updating 
of knowledge can further include new interfaces addition with other information 
systems if any [92]. 
The advantages in the ‘Expert Systems’ are that they work in a similar way to 
the human reasoning, but, with time, they do not become old and make mistakes 
and, in general, the probability of risk occurring in evaluations is lower than 
relying on human beings mind; further, they operate without getting motional, 
tensed or fatigued [93]. Finally, the ‘Expert Systems’ can be used in dangerous 
environment (as RPAS, Paragraph 1.2.2) thus avoiding human beings exposure; 
on the other hand, their adaptability depends upon the knowledge basis 
architecture design.  
The rule-based ‘Expert Systems’ based on ‘IF – THEN’ statements are 
usually programmed with the ‘CLIPS’ tool developed by NASA [94].  
4.3 Why ‘Expert Systems’ for RPAS 
It has been conceived to draft the knowledge basis of a rule-based ‘Expert 
System’ as basis for the future implementation of affordable mitigation provisions 
based on artificial intelligence to support the RPAS remote pilot decision making 
process when a hazard occurs within the scenario of specific category flight 
operations into the VLL uncontrolled subspace under the U-Space service.  
4.4 Architecture of the proposed ‘Expert Systems’  
The rule-based ‘Expert System’ proposed in this work is directly correlated 
with the U-Space risk matrix: the content of each hazard of the matrix (Table 143) 
has been developed into one or more ‘IF – THEN’ statements allowing to develop 
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a set of rules to be activated or de-activated according to the indications and 
warnings issued by the RPAS about occurring in flight hazards.  
The high level architecture of the ‘Expert System’ merged with the RPAS is 
showed in Figure 24.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 24 – RPAS ‘Expert System’ high level architecture 
4.4.1 The knowledge basis 
The knowledge basis of the considered ‘Expert System’ has been 
implemented with rules derived from the U-Space risk matrix content (Table 143). 
Each assessed hazard has been transposed into a ‘IF – THEN’ statement with the 
following meaning: ‘IF <condition> THEN <statement>’. The ‘condition’ is the 
hazard content expressed with other conditions; the ‘statement’ or ‘conclusion’ 
corresponds to the mitigation action proposed by the risk matrix even integrated 
with further suggestions derived from the Bow Tie analysis (Table 143 and 
Appendix E contents, respectively). The ‘conclusion’ also reports the warn about 
the resulting initial and residual hazard classification. 
All the U-Space hazards have been transposed into a rule or a set of rules 
except the following ones: hazards related to electromagnetic interference (Hazard 
H33), hazards related to cybersecurity (Hazards H34 and H35), hazards related to 
human factor (Hazards number H27, H28, and Hazards H48 ÷ H52),  hazards not 
applicable to the hybrid rotor wing RPAS model conjectured to implement the 
rules and finally some hazards related to adverse weather conditions (Hazards 
H53 ÷ H59 and Hazards H63 ÷ H69).  
In these cases, other solutions rather than an ‘Expert System’ rule have been 
judged as more proper to be implemented to mitigate risks for the mentioned 
hazards:  
• Unintentional electromagnetic interference: geofence or proper 
operational procedures can be foreseen to avoid altogether RPAS 
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operations nearby VORs, airports (as already requested by current 
RPAS national regulations), television broadcasting stations and 
similar infrastructures 
• Jamming and spoofing attacks: proper cybersecurity strategies at 
electronic, information and telecommunication level shall be designed 
to avoid random malicious control of the RPAS; the scientific and 
technical community is actively working on this concern 
• Human factor: wearable sensors to measure and monitor physiological 
parameters related to fatigue and emotional stress can be used to warn 
the remote pilot on potential hazardous conductance and management 
of the flight operation; an ‘Expert System’ tailored on human 
physiology and human factor correlated with unmanned flight 
operations is an example of future works on issues generated by the 
incoming intensive use of RPAS for aerial work. Another possible 
solution for mitigation of hazards related to human factor, often 
suggested in this work (FMECA analysis, Appendix A), is the 
provision of proper training for remote pilot/crew to become more and 
more familiar with remote aircraft piloting techniques and hidden 
pitfalls   
An index has been defined and used in Appendix F (Table 145) to take into 
consideration the ground risk component of RPAS specific category operations. 
This index is derived from the ground risk assessment elaborated by JARUS 
within the ‘Specific Operations Risk Assessment’ (SORA) documentation 
package ([95], Paragraph 3.2.3, Figure 2). Such index considers both the 
combination of the following flight modalities:  
• RLOS operations: operations conducted in Visual Line of Sight of the 
remote pilot with respect to the RPA 
• BRLOS operations: operations conducted with the RPA flying Beyond 
Visual Line of Sight with respect to the remote pilot 
and the characteristics of the overflown area, in terms of controlled/not controlled 
areas and population density, foreseeing and distinguishing the following cases: 
• Controlled area, located inside a sparsely populated environment 
• Sparsely populated environment (overflown areas uniformly 
inhabited) 
• Controlled area, located inside a populated environment 
• Populated environment 
• Areas with gathering of people 
Further, depending the ground risk depends on the characteristic size of the 
flying RPA, four ranges of types of RPA representative characteristic sizes have 
been defined; then the intrinsic ground risk has been described accordingly. These 
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conditions have been combined according to an increasing risk-based criterion 
and mixed with the safety related content of the draft rules (Appendix F). 
All the variables used to write the rules have been defined and reported in 
Appendix F before the list of rules. 
All the draft rules have been collected in Appendix F. 
4.4.2 The inference engine 
In the present case a simple forward chaining approach has been used for the 
inference engine: each rule starts with a series of conditions explicitly including 
the hazard content and ends with the final conclusion that notifies the gravity of 
the hazard to the remote pilot and suggests him/her the proper recommended 
mitigation to reduce the consequences of the hazard occurrence.  
4.4.3 The integration of the ‘Expert System’ with the RPAS 
A proposal for the integration of an ‘Expert System’ with the RPAS autopilot 
software capable of performing specific operations is shown in Figure 25.  
According to the external inputs, the ‘Expert System’ activates or deactivates 
the rule(s) related to a given hazard predefined and stored in the knowledge basis 
and suggests the remote pilot the best conclusion/mitigation action to solve the 
contingent risk situation on the basis of proper assigned control variables. The 
control variables physically can be signals generated by monitoring or failure 
sensors properly arranged in advance on board the RPAS (Figure 25). 
 
Figure 25 – Integration of the ‘Expert system’ with the RPAS autopilot software 
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An on board monitoring unit interfaces with safety critical 
equipment/subsystems sensors. The signals generated by the monitoring sensors 
indicated in Figure 25 replicate the input variables used into the rules (Appendix 
F). 
Each variable is monitored during flights and sent to the interface module 
which plays the role of the user querying the ‘Expert System’. According to the 
combination of values of the monitored variables, navigating through the 
knowledge basis, the inference engine generates a warning message and a 
conclusion. Both these information are sent to the remote pilot on ground to warn 
him on what is happening to the platform, the related risk range description (as 
assessed in Table 143) and the proposed conclusion/hazard mitigation provision 
(as assessed in Table 143). From the perspective of the remote pilot the 
conclusion identified by the ‘Expert System’ is the suggested mitigation action to 
solve the hazard and preserve the RPA from an accident occurrence.  
Two levels of integration of ‘Expert Systems’ with RPAS autopilots software 
have been conceived:  
• A basic level of integration, where the remote pilot holds the full 
remote manual control of the flying RPA. The ‘Expert System’ 
supports as above described the remote pilot in solving the in-flight 
hazards, but the remote pilot and not the autopilot remains in 
command of the aerial platform  
• An advanced level of integration, where the RPA automatically solves 
the in-flight hazards: the autopilot dialogues with the ‘Expert Systems’ 
and directly acts on the aerial platform; this solution has been deemed 
more suitable for very complex flight missions where a more promptly 
and quick solution of the hazards than human capability could save the 
RPA from hazards consequences effects 
4.4.3 The verification of the knowledge basis of the ‘Expert 
System’ 
From the perspective of the system engineering, the knowledge basis is the 
most critical component of the ‘Expert System’ for which a good design is 
necessary. The operation of the ‘Expert System’ relies on the truth, completeness, 
correctness and consistency of the knowledge basis.  
At this very early stage of RPAS operations, a coverage/consistency 
verification of the rules content with respect to the hazard conditions identified as 
main core of the performed safety analysis on RPAS has been carried out. The 
FMECA, FTA and human factor analyses results have been used in support of the 
verification in object.  
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4.4.4 Rules coverage verification: results and discussion 
Table 13 sums up the results of rules consistency and coverage verification. 
 
Table 13 – ‘Expert System’ rules coverage/consistency 
verification against U-space matrix content 
Hazard # Definition Rule Control variables Coverage/Consistency 
RPAS Aviate functionality related hazards 
H01 
Loss of abort  
launch capability 
Hazard 01  
Rules 1, 2 
RPAS_ALT  
RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGA  
RPAS_RATE_OF_CLIMB  
RPAS_LIDAR_SENSOR_OUTPUT  
RPAS_AUTOPILOT_ABORT_LAUNCH_MODE  
IRGRC  
RPAS_RECOVERY_PARACHUTE_CMD  
The loss of abort launch 
capability during take-
off/launch in presence of 
a sudden obstacle has 
been considered  OK 
H02 Loss of flight controls  
Hazard 02  
Rules 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 
PITCH_CMD_LONGITUDINAL_SHIFT  
PITCH_CMD_ELECTRICAL_SIGNAL  
ROLL_CMD_LONGITUDINAL_SHIFT  
ROLL_CMD_ELECTRICAL_SIGNAL  
YWA_CMD_LONGITUDINAL_SHIFT  
YAW_CMD_ELECTRICAL_SIGNAL  
RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGA 
RPAS_ALT  
IRGRC 
RPAS_RECOVERY_PARACHUTE_CMD  
RPAS_FTS_CMD 
Pitch, roll and yaw 
commands have been 
considered  Ok 
H03 Loss of propulsion 
Hazard 03 
Rules 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 
RPAS_ALT  
RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGA  
RPAS_LIPO_BATTERY_CURRENT  
RPAS_ESC_FAILURE_SENSOR 
IRGRC 
RPAS_RECOVERY_PARACHUTE_CMD  
RPAS_FTS_CMD 
Loss of LiPo battery and 
ESC failure in case of LiPo 
battery correct operations 
have been considered  
Ok 
H04 Loss of GCS HMI 
Hazard 04 
Rules 1,2,3,4,5,6 
PITCH_CMD_LONGITUDINAL_SHIFT  
PITCH_CMD_ELECTRICAL_SIGNAL  
ROLL_CMD_LONGITUDINAL_SHIFT  
ROLL_CMD_ELECTRICAL_SIGNAL  
YWA_CMD_LONGITUDINAL_SHIFT  
YAW_CMD_ELECTRICAL_SIGNAL  
RPAS_ALT  
RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGA 
IRGRC  
RPAS_RECOVERY_PARACHUTE_CMD  
RPAS_FTS_CMD 
The loss of Pitch, Roll and 
Yaw commands have been 
considered while the RPA 
is flying  Ok 
H05 
Deviation from steady-
state (not-accelerating) 
flight condition 
Hazard 05 
Rules 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 
WP_ALT 
RPAS_IAS 
RPAS_ALT 
IRGRC  
RPAS_RECOVERY_PARACHUTE_CMD  
RPAS_FTS_CMD  
The cases of constant 
altitude with not constant 
airspeed and vice versa 
have been considered  
Ok 
H06 
Loss of Emergency Flight 
Termination System 
Hazard 06 
Rules 1, 2 
RPAS_FTS_BIT 
RPAS_RECOVERY_PARACHUTE_BIT 
IRGRC  
RPAS_AUTOPILOT_LANDING_MODE 
The cases of recovery 
parachute and FTS failures 
have been considered  
Ok 
H07 
Loss of “Return  
to home function” 
Hazard 07 
Rules 1, 2 
RPAS_AUTOPILOT_RETURN_TO_HOME_MODE 
IRGRC  
RPAS_RECOVERY_PARACHUTE_CMD  
RPAS_FTS_CMD 
The error of autopilot 
“Return to Home” mode 
has been considered  
Ok 
RPAS Navigate functionality related hazards 
H08 Loss of mission plan 
Hazard 08 
Rules 1, 2 
RPAS_MISSION_PLAN 
IRGRC  
RPAS_RECOVERY_PARACHUTE_CMD  
RPAS_FTS_CMD 
The loss of the mission 
plan functionality has 
been considered  Ok 
H09 Loss of GPS signal 
Hazard 09 
Rules 1, 2, 3 
GPS_LAT 
GPS_LONG 
GPS_ALT 
IRGRC  
RPAS_AUTOPILOT_RETURN TO HOME_MODE 
RPAS_RECOVERY_PARACHUTE_CMD  
RPAS_FTS_CMD 
The freezing of GPS data 
has been considered  
Ok 
H10 Loss of EGNOS signal 
Hazard 10 
Rules 1, 2, 3 
EGNOS_LAT 
EGNOS_LONG 
EGNOS_ALT 
IRGRC  
RPAS_AUTOPILOT_RETURN TO HOME_MODE 
RPAS_RECOVERY_PARACHUTE_CMD  
RPAS_FTS_CMD 
The freezing of EGNOS 
data has been considered 
 Ok 
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Table 13  – ‘Expert System’ rules coverage/consistency  
verification against U-space matrix content (Cont’d) 
Hazard # Definition Rule Control variables Coverage/Consistency 
H11 
Drift with respect  
to mission plan 
Hazard 10 
Rules 1, 2 
RPAS_LAT  
PLANNED_WP_LAT 
RPAS_LONG  
PLANNED_WP_LONG 
RPAS_ALT  
PLANNED_WP_ALT  
IRGRC  
RPAS_AUTOPILOT_RETURN TO HOME_MODE 
RPAS_RECOVERY_PARACHUTE_CMD  
RPAS_FTS_CMD  
The difference between 
the RPAS current position 
and the planned one has 
been considered  Ok 
RPAS Communicate functionality related hazards 
H12 
Loss of uplink channel  
of the RPAS radio link 
Hazard H12 
Rule 1 
RPAS_UPLINK_PATH_LOSS 
RPAS_AUTOPILOT_RETURN TO HOME_MODE  
The loss of uplink channel 
has been considered  
Ok 
H13 
Loss of downlink channel  
of the RPAS radio link 
Hazard H12 
Rule 1 
RPAS_DOWNLINK_PATH_LOSS 
RPAS_AUTOPILOT_RETURN TO HOME_MODE  
The loss of uplink channel 
has been considered  
Ok 
H14 Loss of ADS_B  
Hazard H13 
Rule 1, 2 
RPAS_ADS-B_BIT 
IRGRC  
RPAS_RECOVERY_PARACHUTE_CMD  
RPAS_FTS_CMD 
The falure diagnosis of 
ADS-B has been 
considered  Ok 
RPAS hazards avoidance functionality related hazards 
H15 
Presence of  
natural obstacles  
Hazard H14 
Rule 1 
RPAS_LIDAR_SENSOR_OUTPUT  
RPAS_DISTANCE_FROM_OBSTACLE  
The ue of LIDAR has been 
considered  Ok 
H16 
Presence of  
man-made manufactures 
Hazard H15 
Rule 1 
RPAS_LIDAR_SENSOR_OUTPUT  
RPAS_DISTANCE_FROM_OBSTACLE  
The ue of LIDAR has been 
considered  Ok 
H17 
Mid-air collision  
with other aircraft 
Hazard H17 
Rule 1 
RPAS_DAA_OUTPUT 
RPAS_LIDAR_SENSOR_OUTPUT  
RPAS_DISTANCE_FROM_OBSTACLE  
The ue of DAA and LIDAR 
has been considered  
Ok 
H18 Loss of DAA capability 
Hazard H8 
Rule 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 
RPAS_ADS-B_BIT 
RPAS_ALTIMETER_BIT 
RPAS_EGNOS_BIT 
IRGRC  
RPAS_RECOVERY_PARACHUTE_CMD  
RPAS_FTS_CMD 
The cases of at least aech 
DAA component failure 
has been considered  
Ok 
H19 
No detectability  
from other airspace users 
Hazard H18 
Rule 1, 2 
RPAS_DAA_OUTPUT 
RPAS_LIDAR_SENSOR_OUTPUT  
RPAS_DISTANCE_FROM_OBSTACLE  
The ue of DAA and LIDAR 
has been considered  
Ok 
H20 
Cooperative  
traffic intrusion 
Hazard H19 
Rule 1 
RPAS_DAA_OUTPUT 
RPAS_DISTANCE_FROM_OBSTACLE  
The ue of DAA has been 
considered  Ok 
H21 
Not cooperative  
traffic intrusion 
Hazard H21 
Rule 1 
RPAS_LIDAR_SENSOR_OUTPUT  
RPAS_DISTANCE_FROM_OBSTACLE  
The ue of LIDAR has been 
considered  Ok 
H22 
Missed cooperative  
traffic tracking 
Hazard H22 
Rule 1 
RPAS_DAA_OUTPUT 
RPAS_DISTANCE_FROM_OBSTACLE  
The ue of DAA has been 
considered  Ok 
H23 
Missed not cooperative  
traffic tracking 
Hazard H23 
Rule 1 
RPAS_LIDAR_SENSOR_OUTPUT  
RPAS_DISTANCE_FROM_OBSTACLE  
The ue of LIDAR has been 
considered  Ok 
H24 
Collision avoidance  
with cooperative traffic 
Hazard H24 
Rule 1 
RPAS_DAA_OUTPUT 
RPAS_DISTANCE_FROM_OBSTACLE  
The ue of DAA has been 
considered  Ok 
H25 
Collision avoidance  
with not cooperative traffic 
Hazard H25 
Rule 1 
RPAS_LIDAR_SENSOR_OUTPUT  
RPAS_DISTANCE_FROM_OBSTACLE  
The ue of LIDAR has been 
considered  Ok 
H26 
Missed performance  
of collision avoidance 
manoeuvre  
Hazard H26 
Rules 1, 2 
RPAS_DAA_OUTPUT 
RPAS_LIDAR_SENSOR_OUTPUT  
RPAS_DISTANCE_FROM_OBSTACLE  
RPAS_FTS_CMD 
The ue of DAA and LIDAR 
has been considered  
Ok 
 
Missed monitoring of performance  
of collision avoidance manoeuvring  
H27 
Missed performance  
of collision avoidance 
manoeuvre monitoring 
This is an hazard condition related to human factor performance; no Expert System rules are deemed 
applicable in this case 
H28 
Missed weather  
awareness capability 
Hazard condition related to human factor performance: no Expert System rules are deemed applicable in this 
case 
H29 
Missed gathering of  
contingent weather 
information  
Hazard H29 
Rules 1, 2 
WEATHER_DOPPLER_RADAR_BIT 
RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGA  
RPAS_ALT  
IRGRC  
RPAS_RECOVERY_PARACHUTE_CMD  
RPAS_FTS_CMD  
The diagnosis of weather 
Doppler RADAR has been 
considered  Ok 
H30 
Missed avoidance  
of adverse weather  
Hazard condition that can be verified on ground performing pre-flight briefing, 
checklists, etc.; no ‘Expert System’ rules are deemed to be applicable in this 
case 
Ok 
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Table 13  – ‘Expert System’ rules coverage/consistency  
verification against U-space matrix content (Cont’d) 
Hazard # Definition Rule Control variables Coverage/Consistency 
Cross-cutting functionalities related hazards 
H31 
Loss of RPAS subsystems  
health and status 
monitoring  
Hazard H30 
Rules 1, 2 
HEALTH_AND_STATUS_MONITORING_BIT 
RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGA  
RPAS_ALT  
IRGRC  
RPAS_RECOVERY_PARACHUTE_CMD  
RPAS_FTS_CMD 
The diagnosi of RPA health 
and status monitoring 
subsystem has been 
considered  Ok 
H32 
Loss of communication 
while transiting from LOS 
to BRLOS and vice versa 
Hazard H31 
Rules 1, 2 
RPAS_RANGE  
RPAS_RANGE_RLOS 
RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGA  
RPAS_ALT  
RPAS_UPLINK_PATH_LOSS  
RPAS_DOWNLINK_PATH_LOSS  
RPAS_AUTOPILOT_RETURN TO HOME_MODE 
The loss of up/downlink 
with RPAS variation with 
time  has been considered 
 Ok 
H33 
Unintentional radio  
link interference 
Hazard condition that can be solved using operational procedures; no ‘Expert 
System’ rules are deemed to be applicable in this case 
Ok 
H34 
Malicious radio  
link jamming 
Hazard condition that can be solved using operational procedures: switching on 
secondary redundant radio frequency band or immediately terminate the flight; 
no ‘Expert System’ rules are deemed to be applicable in this case 
Ok 
H35 
Malicious radio  
link spoofing 
Hazard condition that can be solved using operational procedures: switching on 
secondary redundant radio frequency band or immediately terminate the flight; 
no ‘Expert System’ rules are deemed to be applicable in this case 
Ok 
Contingencies  Failures related hazards 
H36 Fire 
Hazard H36 
Rule 1 
RPAS_FIRE_WARNING  
RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGA  
RPAS_ALT  
IRGRC 
RPAS_FTS_CMD  
The on board RPAS fire 
when the RPA is in flight 
has been considered  
Ok 
H37 Loss of RPAS autopilot 
Hazard H37 
Rule 1, 2 
RPAS_AUTOPILOT_FAILURE_WARNING  
RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGA  
RPAS_ALT  
IRGRC  
RPAS_RECOVERY_PARACHUTE_CMD  
RPAS_FTS_CMD 
The falure of on board 
RPAS autopilot when the 
RPA is in flight has been 
considered  Ok 
H38 Loss of electrical power 
Hazard H38 
Rules 1, 2 
LIPO_BATTERY_CURRENT 
RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGA 
RPAS_ALT  
IRGRC  
RPAS_RECOVERY_PARACHUTE_CMD  
RPAS_FTS_CMD  
The loss of RPAS electrical 
power when the RPA is in 
flight has been considered 
 Ok 
H39 Loss of inertial platform 
Hazard H39 
Rules 1, 2 
RPAS_IMU_BIT 
RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGA  
RPAS_ALT IS GREATER THAN ZERO feet  
IRGRC  
RPAS_RECOVERY_PARACHUTE_CMD  
RPAS_FTS_CMD  
The loss of RPAS IMU 
when the RPA is in flight 
has been considered  
Ok 
H40 Loss of heading indication 
Hazard H40 
Rules 1, 2 
RPAS_HDG1 
RPAS_HDG2 
RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGA 
RPAS_ALT  
IRGRC  
RPAS_RECOVERY_PARACHUTE_CMD  
RPAS_FTS_CMD  
The loss of RPAS heading 
when the RPA is in flight 
has been considered  
Ok 
H41 Loss of altitude indication 
Hazard H41 
Rules 1, 2 
RPAS_ALT1 
RPAS_ALT2 
RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGA -  
RPAS_ALT  
IRGRC  
RPAS_RECOVERY_PARACHUTE_CMD  
RPAS_FTS_CMD  
The loss of RPAS altitude 
when the RPA is in flight 
has been considered  
Ok 
H42 Pressure sensor failure 
Hazard H42 
Rules 1, 2 
RPAS_PRSR1 
RPAS_PRSR2 
RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGA -  
RPAS_ALT IS  
IRGRC  
RPAS_RECOVERY_PARACHUTE_CMD  
RPAS_FTS_CMD  
The loss of RPAS pressuer 
sensor when the RPA is in 
flight has been considered 
 Ok 
H43 
Misleading  
altitude indication 
Hazard H43 
Rules 1, 2 
RPAS_ALT1 
RPAS_ALT2 
RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGA 
RPAS_ALT  
IRGRC  
RPAS_RECOVERY_PARACHUTE_CMD  
RPAS_FTS_CMD  
The loss of RPAS altitude 
when the RPA is in flight 
has been considered  
Ok 
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Table 13  – ‘Expert System’ rules coverage/consistency  
verification against U-space matrix content (Cont’d) 
Hazard # Definition Rule Control variables Coverage/Consistency 
H44 
Misleading  
airspeed indication 
Hazard H44 
Rules 1, 2 
RPAS_IAS1 
RPAS_IAS2 
RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGA  
RPAS_ALT  
IRGRC  
RPAS_RECOVERY_PARACHUTE_CMD  
RPAS_FTS_CMD  
The loss of RPAS altitude 
when the RPA is in flight 
has been considered  
Ok 
H45 
Misleading indication  
of the angle of incidence 
Hazard not applicable to the hybrid rotor wing RPAS model used to implement 
the rules 
Ok 
H46 Stall 
Hazard not applicable to the hybrid rotor wing RPAS model used to implement 
the rules 
Ok 
Contingencies  Human factor related hazards 
H47 Loss of fuel cell 
Hazard H44 
Rules 1, 2 
RPAS_FUEL_CELL_CURRENT 
RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGA  
RPAS_ALT  
IRGRC  
RPAS_RECOVERY_PARACHUTE_CMD  
RPAS_FTS_CMD  
The loss of RPAS altitude 
when the RPA is in flight 
has been considered  
Ok 
H48 Remote pilot low training 
Hazard condition due to human factor issues: ‘Expert System’ rules are deemed 
not applicable 
 
H49 
Non-compliant  
operational procedures 
Hazard condition due to human factor issues: ‘Expert System’ rules are deemed 
not applicable 
Ok 
H50 
Loss of remote  
pilot situational awareness 
Hazard condition due to human factor issues: ‘Expert System’ rules are deemed 
not applicable 
Ok 
H51 Human senses limitations 
Hazard condition due to human factor issues: ‘Expert System’ rules are deemed 
not applicable 
Ok 
H52 
Remote pilot  
excessive workload 
Hazard condition due to human factor issues: ‘Expert System’ rules are deemed 
not applicable 
Ok 
Contingencies  Weather related hazards 
H53 Cloud cover 
Hazard condition that can be managed with on ground operational procedures 
foreseeing that the flight operations cannot be performed if weather conditions 
are less than optimal or they shall be interrupted if less than optimal conditions 
occur during the flight mission 
Ok 
H54 Fog 
Hazard condition that can be managed with on ground operational procedures 
foreseeing that the flight operations cannot be performed if weather conditions 
are less than optimal or they shall be interrupted if less than optimal conditions 
occur during the flight mission 
Ok 
H55 Freezing rain 
Hazard condition that can be managed with on ground operational procedures 
foreseeing that the flight operations cannot be performed if weather conditions 
are less than optimal or they shall be interrupted if less than optimal conditions 
occur during the flight mission 
Ok 
H56 Glare 
Hazard condiion deemed to cause moderate acceptable risk due to the fact that 
the remote pilot is not on board the RPA 
Ok 
H57 Haze 
Hazard condition that can be managed with on ground operational procedures 
foreseeing that the flight operations cannot be performed if weather conditions 
are less than optimal or they shall be interrupted if less than optimal conditions 
occur during the flight mission 
Ok 
H58 Humidity 
Hazard condition that can be managed with on ground operational procedures 
foreseeing that the flight operations cannot be performed if weather conditions 
are less than optimal or they shall be interrupted if less than optimal conditions 
occur during the flight mission 
Ok 
H59 Ice 
Hazard condition that can be managed with on ground operational procedures 
foreseeing that the flight operations cannot be performed if weather conditions 
are less than optimal or they shall be interrupted if less than optimal conditions 
occur during the flight mission 
Ok 
H60 Rain 
Hazard H60 
Rule 1 
WEATHER_DOPPLER_RADAR_IMAGE  
RPAS_ENGINE  
RPAS_ALT  
RPAS_AUTOPILOT_RETURN TO HOME_MODE 
When the weather 
Doppler RADAR identifies 
‘rain’ during a mission 
flight, the RPAS shll return 
home  Ok 
H61 Snow 
Hazard H60 
Rule 1 
WEATHER_DOPPLER_RADAR_IMAGE  
RPAS_ENGINE  
RPAS_ALT  
RPAS_AUTOPILOT_RETURN TO HOME_MODE 
When the weather 
Doppler RADAR identifies 
‘snow’ during a mission 
flight, the RPAS shll return 
home  Ok 
H62 Solar storms 
Hazard H62 
Rule 1 
GPS_LAT 
GPS_LONG 
GPS_ALT 
EGNOS_LAT 
EGNOS_LONG 
EGNOS_ALT 
RPAS_AUTOPILOT_RETURN TO HOME_MODE 
When the weather 
Doppler RADAR identifies 
‘snow’ during a mission 
flight, the RPAS shll return 
home  Ok 
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verification against U-space matrix content (Cont’d) 
Hazard # Definition Rule Control variables Coverage/Consistency 
H63 Temperature 
Hazard condition that can be managed with on ground operational procedures 
foreseeing that the flight operations cannot be performed if weather conditions 
are less than optimal or they shall be interrupted if less than optimal conditions 
occur during the flight mission 
Ok 
H64 Turbulence 
Hazard condition that can be managed with on ground operational procedures 
foreseeing that the flight operations cannot be performed if weather conditions 
are less than optimal or they shall be interrupted if less than optimal conditions 
occur during the flight mission 
Ok 
H66 Wind 
Hazard condition that can be managed with on ground operational procedures 
foreseeing that the flight operations cannot be performed if weather conditions 
are less than optimal or they shall be interrupted if less than optimal conditions 
occur during the flight mission 
Ok 
H66 Lightning strike 
Hazard condition that can be managed with on ground operational procedures 
foreseeing that the flight operations cannot be performed if weather conditions 
are less than optimal or they shall be interrupted if less than optimal conditions 
occur during the flight mission 
Ok 
H67 Hail 
Hazard condition that can be managed with on ground operational procedures 
foreseeing that the flight operations cannot be performed if weather conditions 
are less than optimal or they shall be interrupted if less than optimal conditions 
occur during the flight mission 
Ok 
H68 Hurricanes 
Hazard condition that can be managed with on ground operational procedures 
foreseeing that the flight operations cannot be performed if weather conditions 
are less than optimal or they shall be interrupted if less than optimal conditions 
occur during the flight mission 
Ok 
H69 Volcanic ash 
Hazard condition that can be managed with on ground operational procedures 
foreseeing that the flight operations cannot be performed if weather conditions 
are less than optimal or they shall be interrupted if less than optimal conditions 
occur during the flight mission 
Ok 
 
  With reference to performed verifications, the following issues are 
considered:  
• The consistency of the knowledge basis relies on the safety analysis 
correctness 
• The coverage of the knowledge basis rules relies on how much the 
safety analysis has been deepen and articulated and correct; its 
correctness leans on FMECA and FTA as consolidated reliability and 
safety analyses methodologies and on the confidence on the derived 
results: 
• The  confidence on the FMECA results is as much high as the 
failure rates are correct and as the analyst has a clear and 
deepen knowledge of the equipment characteristics, way of 
operation, and how it is connected and interface with adjacent 
equipment  
• The  confidence on the FTA results is correlated with the 
FMECA quality of execution: for a given system, the initiating 
events and single failure events identify with failure mode 
causes and failure modes themselves listed in the analysis.  
• In terms of risk ranking (‘High risk’, ‘Moderate risk’ and ‘Low 
risk’), the safety assessment leans on the correctness of the 
evaluation of the failure modes probability of occurrence when 
the hazards derives from a failure occurrence and rely on the 
evaluation of the hazards probability of occurrence in the other 
cases. Similarly, the evaluation of the consequences of the 
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hazards shall be correct, that is the heaviest one among the 
possible ones.  
• The reference parameters for the evaluation are supposed to be 
correct by definition: they are issued by ICAO (Table 5, Table 
6, Table 7 and Table 8/Table 9 [3]) and accepted by the 
scientific and technical community after continuous 
application for aerospace 
For any hazard occurrence, Table 13 shows the rules that are activated and 
triggered by control variables (highlighted in bold) which can be monitored by 
dedicated sensors (Figure 25). 
According to safety management general principles [3], the defence of the 
system from all possible hazards is impossible: every change in the RPAS mission 
or every variation in its physical configuration will introduce new hazards. This 
issue strengthens the nature of safety management activities that are a continuous 
and dynamic process (SMS safety assurance pillar) to fit with new system 
conditions; from the ‘Expert Systems’ perspective this fact brings back to the 
problem of their maintenance/upgrade and to the size of the associated knowledge 
basis that can be increased but searching for the best compromise between the 
numer of rules, the performance of the ‘Expert System’ and its regular 
maintenance/debug.    
4.4 Conclusions  
The ‘Expert Systems’ have been proposed as a dynamic and flexible support 
to remote pilot decision making process in case of RPAS in-flight safety hazards 
occurrence.  
The knowledge basis of a rule-based ‘Expert Systems’ has been draft 
exploiting the content of the U-space safety risks matrix. 
A proposal for an ‘Expert System’ integrated with RPAS autopilot software 
has been proposed for more advanced real time solution of in-flight hazards for 
RPAS involved in specific category operations.   
A coverage/consistency verification of the knowledge basis rules content with 
respect to the hazards collected in the U-space matrix has been performed. 
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Chapter 5 
RPAS safety oriented architectures 
and review of U-space 
infrastructures 
5.1 Introduction 
The performed safety analysis and the introduction of the ‘Expert System’ 
have been used to define a proposal of a high level RPAS architecture oriented 
towards safe specific category operations in the VLL. 
Beside this topic, a critical review of technical proposals for U-Space service 
deployment available in literature and on the web has been performed from a 
safety perspective and reported in this Chapter.  
5.2 Safety oriented RPAS functional architectures: a 
proposal 
As anticipated in Chapter 1, a typical specific category RPAS flight mission 
can be the following one: the operator sends the request for authorization to 
perform the mission and receive the acknowledge from the authority; the RPAS 
takes-off from outside a town and flies until arriving over the urban area; there it 
has to modify its route due to a NOTAM warning on the temporary presence of a 
police helicopter to monitor the area on a car accident; the RPAS avoids the mid-
air conflict with the manned aircraft, arrive to destination and land to deliver the  
payload. Among the relevant elements, during the above mentioned example of 
mission the RPAS flies over at least two different scenarios: a rural one and a 
more congested one and it has to manage a contingent mid-air conflict. These 
issues highlights the need for RPAS architectures capable of dynamically adapting 
to changing scenarios but preserving  operational safety.  
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Considering these premises, the performed safety analysis and the concept of 
‘Expert Systems’ integrated with RPAS, a proposal for a functional high level 
architecture for an RPAS capable of safety risks mitigation is hereinafter 
presented and discussed.  
5.2.1 External airframe and size  
As already stated, light RPAS until 150 kilograms (payload included) have 
been considered for operations in the VLL subspace. With reference to the RPAS 
external airframe and size, the most challenging scenario is the urban/congested 
one. In literature, Authors suggest contained sizes up to 1.80 meters for fixed 
wing RPAS, and 1 meter for rotary wing RPAS [96].  
5.2.1 Internal functional architecture  
The VLL upper limit of 500 feet assures separation from operations of 
manned aircraft acting as a first line of risk mitigation. Nevertheless, the mid-air 
conflicts can occur and therefore, the mid-air collision risk shall be 
prevented/mitigated due to the presence in the VLL of sports and recreational air 
traffic, air ambulances, police ‘Buster Air Traffic’ (BAT) or helicopters/aircrafts 
involved in fire extinguishing/rescue operations, etc. In addition all other hazards 
capable of causing the RPAS operation going out of control shall be considered 
and mitigated in the VLL subspace as well. 
Starting from these premises, the following RPAS high level functional 
architecture is proposed (Figure 26) as applications of the results of the performed 
safety analysis: it is an hybrid/electric powered RPAS with rotor engines (four 
ones for example) composed of the following subsystems: the airframe structures, 
the Propulsion Subsystem, the Power Subsystem, the Flight Management 
Subsystem, the Payload Sensors Subsystem, the Communication Subsystem; at its 
turn, the Flight Management Subsystem includes the Navigation Subsystem, the 
Air Data Subsystem, the Flight Control Subsystem and the Flight Termination 
Subsystem; the aerial segment communicates with the Ground Segment through a 
redundant Data Link Subsystem.  
The above mentioned subsystems are hereinafter described highlighting the 
provisions derived from the performed safety analysis. 
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Figure 26 – Light RPAS high level safety oriented architecture 
The Power and the Propulsion Subsystem 
The electrical engines are supposed to be powered by hydrogen fuel cells to 
enhance the RPA endurance and range. The fuel cell is the main source of energy. 
The LiPo batteries are provided as a redundancy in case of fuel cells system 
failure (Hazard H47, FMECA items HPSS1a, HPSS1b, HPSS2a, HPSS2b and 
FTA Table 121, Table 122, Table 123, Table 124 and Table 125) and to promptly 
provide energy in case of high demanding manoeuvers (a sudden evasive 
manoeuvre to avoid mid-air collision, for example). 
The Flight Management Subsystem/Navigation Subsystem 
The Flight Management Subsystem/Navigation Subsystem is supposed to be 
provided with the EGNOS SoL (Safety of Life Service) receiver as primary 
navigation aid coupled with the GPS receiver as backup solution (Hazard H10, 
FMECA items NSS3a, NSS3b, NSS3c, NSS3d and FTA Table 94). The EGNOS 
is proposed as main navigation aid due to its higher accuracy and continuity of 
service with respect to GPS. This provision is fundamental for RPAS to safely 
operate within urban and congested environments as they will routinely requested 
to do in civilian applications; this idea is supported by Authors in literature too as 
reported, for instance, in [65].  
Two redundant Inertial Measurement Units are foreseen in accordance with 
the reliability and safety analyses indications (Hazard H39, FMECA items NSS1a 
and NSS1b, and FTA Table 90).  
The ADS-B transponder and a LIDAR sensor are proposed as fundamental 
equipment for subsystems to avoid mid-air collisions with other aircraft (Hazards 
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from H15 to H25). The ‘Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcasting’ 
(ADS-B) is a transponder that relies on the Mode S  at 1090 MHz (according to 
EASA ETSO-2C112b), on ‘Global Navigation Satellite Systems’ (GNSS) service 
(according to EASA ETSO C-129 and ETSO C-145/C-146) and on the 
deployment of ground-based surveillance systems capable of broadcasting 
enhanced sets of aircraft surveillance data to the ATM service and other airspace 
users [66]. These surveillance data (for example: position, track and speed) are 
much more accurate than those provided by ground based RADAR systems 
currently in use. The ADS-B introduction will allow manned aviation to perform 
more accurate navigation thus optimizing the allocation in the airspace available 
volume, saving more fuel and allowing to host the expected traffic increase in the 
next yeas ([1], [66]). According to the European Commission Regulation 
No 1207/2011 (22th November 2011), from the 7th June 2020, all aircraft with 
maximum take-off weight beyond 5.700 kilograms or capable of a maximum 
cruise speed greater than 250 knots, shall be equipped with ADS-B devices to be 
authorized to operate in the European airspace [66]. No similar regulations 
currently apply for RPAS, but when it will happen, the RPAS traffic will benefit 
the same flexibility and safety in navigation as manned aviation.  
Further, the ADS-B is the focal equipment around which the RPAS ‘Detect 
and Avoid’ (DAA) systems are built. The provision of DAA subsystems ([36], 
[37], [38]) provides effective mitigations against mid-air collision risk with other 
cooperative traffic; ‘cooperative traffic’ means that the intruder on the RPAS 
route is equipped with the ADS-B equipment too; the RPAS DAA receives the 
signal broadcasted by the intruder ADS-B, elaborates it and use it to command the 
evasive manoeuvre to the given RPAS and make it execute o effectively avoid the 
collision. If the intruder is ‘not cooperative’, that is without the ADS-B installed 
on board, the DAA function is performed using sensors like the LIDAR. In order 
to protect the RPAS from the risk of mid-air collision with other both cooperative 
and not cooperative traffic, DAA subsystem and LIDAR sensors have been 
foreseen in the architecture under discussion (Figure 26).   
The weather Doppler RADAR is provided (Figure 26) as mitigation provision 
to monitor weather changes in real time during flight operations specifically in 
case of long endurance operations; a weather Doppler RADAR can be useful in 
particular against the contingent occurrence of rain and snow (Hazards H30, H60 
and H61) .  
A final observation on navigation equipment applies: as foreseen by literature 
(Figure 9 [3]), the best compromise shall be reached between the need for 
enhanced safety, RPAS size, weight constraints and power availability and costs 
of advanced avionics: in fact, the RPAS shall accomplish safety of operations and 
competitive global costs with respect to manned fixed wing/rotor wing aviation. 
Given these elements, valid solutions will be probably provided by 
miniaturization techniques and nanotechnology as shown, for example, by  
Figure 27 [97].  
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Figure 27 – ADS-B for Light RPAS [97] 
The Air Data Subsystem 
The Air Data Subsystem is composed of redundant pressure sensors and 
altimeters according to the safety and reliability analyses results (Hazards H41, 
H42, H43, H44, FMECA items from ADSS1 to ADSS6 and FTA Table 95). 
The Flight Control Subsystem 
The Flight Control Subsystem mainly includes a redundant autopilot in 
accordance with the safety and reliability analyses results  (Hazard H37, FMECA, 
items FCSS1a, FCSS1b, FCSS1c and FTA Table 98), the ESCs (having supposed 
to consider a hybrid/electric powered RPAS with electrical motors) and the anti-
collision subsystems based on DAA subsystem and LIDAR sensor previously 
described. As anticipated in Chapter 4, the autopilot has been supposed to be 
supported by a very simple rule-based ‘Expert System’ for real time  management 
of in-flight hazard risks; the ‘Expert System’ triggered by the following signals 
(Table 13): Autopilot ‘Abort Launch Mode’, Pitch Command, Pitch Command 
HMI Longitudinal Shift, Pitch Command HMI Electrical Signal, Roll Command, 
Roll Command HMI Lateral Shift, Roll Command HMI Electrical Signal, Yaw 
Command, Yaw Command HMI Directional Shift, Yaw Command HMI 
Electrical Signal, LiPo Battery Current, ESC Failure Sensor, Waypoint Altitude, 
RPAS Indicated Airspeed (IAS), RPAS Altitude, FTS Built in Test (BIT), 
Recovery Parachute Built In Test (BIT), Autopilot “Return to Home” mode 
monitor, RPAS Mission Plan, GPS Latitude, GPS Longitude, GPS Altitude, 
EGNOS Latitude, EGNOS Longitude, EGNOS Altitude, RPAS Latitude, Planned 
Waypoint Latitude, RPAS Longitude, Planned Waypoint Longitude, Planned 
Waypoint Altitude, RPAS Uplink Path Loss, RPAS Downlink Path Loss, RPAS 
ADS-B BIT, RPAS LIDAR Sensor Output, RPAS Distance from obstacle, RPAS 
DAA output, RPAS Altimeter BIT (Built In Test), RPAS EGNOS BIT (Built In 
Test), Weather Doppler RADAR BIT (Built In Test), Health and Status 
Monitoring BIT (Built In Test), RPAS Range, RPAS Range RLOS, RPAS Fire 
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Warning, RPAS Autopilot Failure Warning, LiPo Battery Current, RPAS IMU 
BIT (Built In Test), RPAS Heading Indication 1, RPAS Heading Indication 2, 
RPAS Altitude Indication 1, RPAS Altitude Indication 2, RPAS Pressure Sensor 
Indication 1, RPAS Pressure Sensor Indication 2, RPAS Indicated Airspeed 1, 
RPAS Airspeed Indication 2, RPAS Fuel Cell Current, Weather Doppler RADAR 
Image. 
The Flight Termination Subsystem 
The Flight Termination System is composed of both the functionality to cut-
off all the RPAS engines and to deploy the emergency parachute for smooth 
landing over congested/populated environments (Hazard H06, FMECA items 
EFSS1a, EFSS1b, EFSS1c and items EFSS2a, EFSS2b, EFSS2c and  FTA Table 
99, Table 100 and Table 101). 
The radio link 
The radio link allows to: 
• Command and control the RPA in uplink 
• Monitor the RPA telemetry data in downlink  
• Command and control the payload in uplink 
• Monitor the payload telemetry data sent in downlink including images, 
videos and the ‘First Person View’ (FPV) data 
From a safety perspective, two redundant bands are proposed to be used for 
uplink and downlink channels (Hazards H12, H13, FMECA items C2LSS1a, 
C2LSS1b and FTA Table 126). One non redundant band is proposed for the 
payload management because the loss of payload is expected to affect the scope 
of the flight mission (FMECA items MPYSS1 and MPYSS2) but not the safety of 
the RPA or of third parties on ground.  
The Ground Segment 
The Ground segments includes the human machine interface to generate the 
flight command signals to be sent to the RPA in uplink, the monitoring displays 
mechanized by the signals sent from the RPA in downlink, the Flight Termination 
System HMI, the Payload HMI and the communication subsystem. 
From a safety perspective the provision for monitoring sensors is indicated in 
Figure 26 to alert the remote pilot if failures on HMI controls occur.  
In addition, a whole of systematic and well-structured safety alerts in terms of 
cautions and warnings fed by the RPA on board safety monitoring sensors is 
suggested to be implemented in the ground control station or on hand-held 
portable radio controller to enhance the remote pilot situational awareness on 
precursors of RPAS in-flight hazards. 
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5.3 U-space service infrastructures for implementation in 
Europe: a critical review from a safety perspective  
Besides the above reported description of a light RPAS safety oriented high 
level architecture for the performance of routinely specific category operations in 
the VLL subspace, the main features of U-space service infrastructures 
implementation in Europe found in literature/on the web (in most of cases) are 
hereinafter reported (Table 14 [98]) and reviewed from a safety perspective; in 
particular the following items are detailed:  
• The name of the considered infrastructure/platform  
• The European state/company where it has been developed 
• A brief description of its technical features/provided functionalities 
• The main category of technological solution it can be ascribed to 
• An evaluation from safety of RPAS operations perspective in terms of 
added value and possible limitations 
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Table 14 – Infrastructures/platforms developed in Europe to operatively deploy the U-Space service [98] 
Infrastructure/ 
platform name 
Origin Description/Provided functionalities 
Technological 
category  
Considerations about safety 
Added value Limitations 
Guardian UTM 
Altitude Angel 
(United Kingdom) 
Provision of traffic  
management capabilities 
Need for preliminary flight plan filing 
Use of open standards and protocols 
Customisable and modular 
Capable of manned traffic, and unmanned cooperative and not 
cooperative traffic tracking 
Cloud-based platform 
Manned and unmanned cooperative/not cooperative 
traffic management capability 
Preliminary flight planning filing 
ATC situational awareness 
Modularity 
Scalability 
Potential lack of use of certified cartography  
approved for aeronautical use 
Potential lack of provisions and real time upgrade  
of further service information like weather 
Potential remote pilot situational  
awareness enhancement 
Potential low cyber security  
(due to the use of open protocols) 
Drone-Flight-Check 
Colibrex  
(Germany) 
RPAS information 
RPAS traffic management database  
App for enhanced safety and regulation  
Solution based on the 
use of 
telecommunication 
networks 
Better RPAS monitoring into volume of airspaces not 
covered by ground-based RADAR systems 
Possibility of capillary monitoring of RPAS traffic due to 
the use of telecommunication infrastructures  
Potential poor technical  
solution with lack of modularity 
Potential lack of mid-air collision risk mitigations 
Potential low cyber security 
Potential low radio link robustness against unintentional or 
malicious radio frequencies interferences  
UTM 
DFS 
(Germany) 
Location of RPAS flying BRLOS 
using the mobile telecommunications network  
Incorporation of the traffic located into an air situation display 
Transmission of RPAS position to the controller  using the mobile 
network 
RPAS equipped with an LTE modem,  
a GPS module and a mobile transmitter  
Generation of an air situation display  from these position data 
Surrounding traffic, warning of conflicts, prohibited areas etc.  
are shown to the controller operator  
Detection of in-flight RPAS up to 100 meters of altitude 
can detect unmanned aircraft systems  
up to a height of 100 metres.  
Traffic monitoring through the use of  
multi sensor RADAR systems  
Adaptation of visualization on the controller  
displays of the monitored RPAS traffic  
Link to existing air traffic control systems 
Integration of chart material, prohibited areas  
and meteorological information 
Addition of data from detection systems to identify intrusive RPAS 
Solution based on the 
use of 
telecommunication 
networks 
Better RPAS monitoring into volume of airspaces not 
covered by ground-based RADAR systems 
Possibility of capillary monitoring of RPAS traffic due to 
the use of telecommunication infrastructures 
RPAS remote pilot situational awareness 
ATC situational awareness 
Possibility of capillary monitoring of RPAS traffic due to 
the use  
of telecommunication infrastructures 
Detection of RPAS between  
ground and 100 meter of altitude 
Use of cartography approved  
for aeronautical use 
Identification of intrusive RPAS traffic. 
Potential low cyber security 
Potential low radio link robustness against unintentional or 
malicious radio frequencies interferences 
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Table 14 – Infrastructures/platforms developed in Europe to operatively deploy the U-Space service [98] (Cont’d) 
Infrastructure/ 
platform name 
Origin Description/Provided functionalities 
Technological 
category  
Considerations about safety 
Added value Limitations 
Blueprint Concept 
for Urban Airspace 
Integration  
DLR 
(Germany) 
Allowance to fly according to the technical sophistication of the 
considered RPAS; such degree of sophistication is visually represented 
with a small or large polygon (less of more sophistication) 
Assignment of a full simulated and risk-minimised flight path which 
takes into account airspace users that are already airborne, avoids 
critical areas on the ground, and results in a flight route with the less 
number of deviations as possible from the ideal path  
Other  
technical  
solution 
RPAS remote pilot situational awareness 
ATC situational awareness 
 
Potentially complicated system,  
potential low scalability 
Potentially low manned and unmanned cooperative/ 
not cooperative traffic management capability 
Potential lack of use of certified cartography  
approved for aeronautical use 
Potential lack of provisions and real time upgrade  
of further service information like weather 
 
DAMS 
Drone Radar 
(Polish) 
DAMS: Drones Aware and Monitoring System  
Fully integrated with the  
Polish Air Navigation Services Agency (PANSA) 
Analysis of the airspace using information  
and data shared with the PANSA 
Two ways not verbal communication between  
the ATC operators and the RPAS operator 
Bi-directional emergency communication with the RPAS operator to 
immediately land the unmanned aircraft when necessary 
Other  
technical  
solution 
Use of data shared with the national ATC 
Communication of the RPAS operator with the ATC 
during ordinary flight activity and during emergency, 
with immediate land of the RPAS if necessary 
Potentially low manned and unmanned cooperative/not 
cooperative traffic management capability/strategies 
DroNav 
Dronsystems 
(United Kingdom) 
Self-learning platform based on the use of  
software and hardware elements 
Capability of offering redundancy,  
fail-safe algorithms for conflict  
prevention/resolution and management. 
Scalable and easily deployable system capable of allowing the safe 
management of concurrent operations of a large number of RPAS in 
the same airspace 
Other  
technical  
solution 
Conflict prevention/resolution/management 
Scalability 
Potential low ATC situational awareness 
Potential low RPAS remote pilot situational awareness 
Potential lack of use of certified cartography  
approved for aeronautical use 
Potential lack of provisions and real time upgrade  
of further service information like weather 
Potential low cyber security  
UTM portal 
Exponent Technology 
Services 
(United Kingdom)  
Portal coupled with the  
Exponent’s SkyCommander Tracker,  
Allowance to manage a host of UAV/RPAS flight operation functions 
from a single operational console 
Overlay with dedicated ADS-B civil air traffic data 
Near real time monitoring of RPAS separation, with automated alerts 
generated based upon customizable metrics as defined by the 
regulator.  
Storage of flight data: data can be made available for successive 
audits; data can be exported and integrated with third party tools; 
report generation 
Extendibility to allow new applications via API to enable payload data 
visualization and analytics   
Cloud-based platform 
Use of a single operational console 
ATC situational awareness 
Monitoring of ADS-B civil air data 
Provision of near real time monitoring of RPAS 
separation 
Storage of data for successive possible safety 
analysis/Collection of RPAS safety/reliability  related 
data  
Potential low remote pilot situational awareness 
Potential risk to have to manage too much data on a single console 
and for one of few ATC operators 
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Table 14 – Infrastructures/platforms developed in Europe to operatively deploy the U-Space service [98] (Cont’d) 
Infrastructure/ 
platform name 
Origin Description/Provided functionalities 
Technological 
category  
Considerations about safety 
Added value Limitations 
Urban ATM 
GLVI 
(Germany) 
Modular, redundant and expandable system 
Designed for urban environments and areas without clear lines-of-
sight, and with  
atmospheric disturbances (fog, rain, or dust) 
Designed to work with high traffic densities 
The system does not distinguish between remotely piloted and 
software-in-control unmanned aircraft  
The system is able to consider both airspace users able to cooperate 
with the system and others which are not able to like pedestrians, 
leisure drones, or birds.  
Other  
technical  
solution 
Modularity and scalability of the system 
Design for urban environments (one of the most 
challenging for RPAS due to the presence of a variety of 
obstacles) 
System designed to manage  
high traffic densities 
Capability to manage both cooperative  
and not cooperative traffic 
Potential lack of care for ATC situational awareness 
Potential lack of care for RPAS remote  
pilot situational awareness 
Potential lack of use of certified cartography  
approved for aeronautical use 
Potential lack of provisions and real time upgrade  
of further service information like weather 
Potential low cyber security 
DREAMS 
IDS  
(Italy) 
Web-based system for airspace  
management and information  
Provision for e-registration, identification and tracking 
Single point of entry for all RPAS stakeholders 
Provision of tailored services and interfaces 
No-fly zone, airspace and flight planning 
management and reservation  
Flight validation and scheduling  
Flight awareness, RPAS tracking  
and notification to ATC for potential conflicts 
Recording and playback for safety investigation  
Cloud-based platform 
Modularity and scalability of the system 
Potential use of cartography approved for aeronautical 
use 
ATC and remote pilot  
flight situational awareness 
Data recording for successive possible safety analysis 
and safety and reliability historical data collection 
Potential low cyber security 
Involi.live 
Involi  
(Switzerland) 
Collection of real time data from low altitude traffic equipped with 
ADS-B and aircraft transponders 
The system is able to process these data and to transmit them to the 
UTM system to share in real time information with all the airspace 
users 
Implementation of automated micro-control tower capable of 
operating without the intervention of the human operator 
Other  
technical  
solution 
High automation in RPAS  
traffic management 
Potential low care for ATC and  
remote pilot situational awareness 
Potential low cyber security 
Potential low radio link robustness against unintentional or 
malicious radio frequencies interferences 
Automated  
UTM system 
Leonardo Company 
S.p.A. (Italy) 
Automated UTM system 
Provision of public register of RPAS, communication, route and 
mission planning, dynamic geo fencing 
Provision of a scalable cloud platform according to the architecture 
‘Platform as service’ 
Fusion of information from the UTM and the ATM and sharing with 
the remote users 
Provision of a mission safety processor capable of warning operators 
on safety related events 
Cloud-based platform 
Automation 
Scalability 
Mission planning 
Fusion of information between the ATM and the RPAS 
traffic management system 
Sharing of information with remote users 
Use of the safety processor to warn the operators on 
safety related events 
Potential lack of provisions for cyber security  
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Table 14 – Infrastructures/platforms developed in Europe to operatively deploy the U-Space service [98] (Cont’d) 
Infrastructure/ 
platform name 
Origin Description/Provided functionalities 
Technological 
category  
Considerations about safety 
Added value Limitations 
Drones Solutions 
Lufthansa Systems  
(Germany) 
Use of APPs based on Lufthansa  
aeronautical certified data shared among RPAS users to warn them in 
case of safety related events 
Cloud-based platform 
Use and sharing of aeronautical certified data among 
the airspace users 
 
Potential lack of measures to prevent mid-air collisions events with 
both cooperative  
and not cooperative traffic  
Potential low care for ATC and  
remote pilot situational awareness 
Potential low cyber security 
 
Drone Assist 
NATS  
(United Kingdom) 
Interactive map of areas used by commercial aircraft 
Use of the ‘Fly now’ feature to share RPAS locations and reduce the 
risk of RPAS related incidents  
Other  
technical  
solution 
Use and sharing of  
data among the airspace users 
 
Potential lack of the use of certified aeronautical data 
Potential lack of measures to prevent mid-air collisions events with 
both cooperative  
and not cooperative traffic  
Potential low care for ATC and  
remote pilot situational awareness 
Potential low cyber security 
 
AlphaOne,  
One Sky Connect 
OneSky  
(Involi, Switzerland) 
Provision of a system of micro control towers  
Provision of an internet platform to manage RPAS separations, 
conflicts and geo fencing 
Other  
technical  
solution 
See ‘Involi.live’ See ‘Involi.live’ 
Low Level  
RPAS Traffic 
Management 
(LLRTM)  
ONERA 
(France) 
Provision of the LLRTM (Low Level RPAS Traffic Management). 
Platform to manage RPAS traffic in uncontrolled airspace and to 
interface  
with traffic within controlled airspaces 
Coordination of traffic monitoring with the  
ATC within controlled airspaces 
Ground-based system to manage RPAS sorties 
within VLL subspace (airspace classes E and G), 
though the use of a combination airborne collaborative alerting 
sensors and ground sensor  
Other  
technical  
solution 
Interface with ATC and coordination with them within 
controlled airspaces  
Use of airborne and ground-based monitoring sensors 
 
Potential lack of the use of certified aeronautical data 
Potential low cyber security 
 
ECOSystem 
 
THALES 
(France) 
Software application capable of real-time  
validation of RPAS flight plans 
Provision of a decision support platform  
for advanced aviation operations 
Other 
technical 
solution 
 
Provision for flights plan validation Provision for cyber 
security 
ATC situational awareness 
Probable provision and sharing of  
certified aeronautical data and real time updated 
weather information 
 
Not tailored for RPAS only 
Not sensitive to specific operational  
environments like the urban scenarios 
Possible lack of specific measures for the  
mitigation of mid-air risk collision avoidance  
Possible lack of the remote pilot situational awareness 
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Table 14 – Infrastructures/platforms developed in Europe to operatively deploy the U-Space service [98] (Cont’d) 
Infrastructure/ 
platform name 
Origin Description/Provided functionalities 
Technological 
category  
Considerations about safety 
Added value Limitations 
 
RPAS  
VLLOC 
VITO, Luciad  
and FlightPlus 
(Belgium)  
RPAS ‘Very Low Level Operation Coordination’ (RPAS VLLOC) platform 
suitable for safe planning  
of RPAS VLL operations 
The platform has been designed to provide control over operations 
and the possibility to cancel them if necessary 
Compliant with the EUROCONTROL SWIM service 
Other  
technical  
solution 
RPAS mission planning 
ATC situational awareness 
Possible lack of specific measures for the  
mitigation of mid-air risk collision avoidance  
Possible lack of the remote pilot situational awareness 
Possible lack of use of certified aeronautical data 
Possible lack of real time update of weather information 
Possible lack of cyber security 
 
Swiss wide  
U-Space 
FOCA  
(Switzerland) [99] 
High digitalization solution for RPAS electronic registration, 
identification and geo fence 
Other  
technical  
solution 
High automation in RPAS  
traffic management 
RPAS mission planning 
ATC situational awareness 
Possible lack of specific measures for the  
mitigation of mid-air risk collision avoidance  
Possible lack of the remote pilot situational awareness 
Possible lack of use of certified aeronautical data 
Possible lack of real time update of weather information 
Possible lack of cyber security 
 
Use of sim cards on 
RPAS and of 4G/LTE 
networks 
VODAFONE UK 
(United Kingdom) 
[100] 
RPAS monitoring and control solutions based on the use of sim cards 
like those equipping mobile phones and the 4G/LTE network 
Solution based on the 
use of 
telecommunication 
networks 
 
Better RPAS monitoring into volume of airspaces not 
covered by ground-based RADAR systems 
Possibility of capillary monitoring of RPAS traffic due to 
the use of telecommunication infrastructures 
 
Potential low care for ATC and  
remote pilot situational awareness 
Potential low cyber security 
Potential low radio link robustness against unintentional or 
malicious radio frequencies interferences 
 
Web-based cloud 
system for RPAS 
collision and  
Avoidance [101] 
Example from 
literature 
RPAS monitoring and control and collision avoidance solutions relying 
on web-based cloud systems 
Cloud-based platform 
Scalability 
Provision of mid-air collision risk mitigation  
Use of certified aeronautical data 
Potential low cyber security 
Potential low care for ATC and  
remote pilot situational awareness 
Potential low care for the remote pilot  
situational awareness 
Potential lack for real time updated  
weather information 
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Some basic requirements for the operational deployment of the U-Space 
service in the VLL subspace have been derived from the review reported in Table 
14 (Table 15): 
 
Table 15 – Basic requirements for the U-Space service in the VLL subspace 
Requirement Motivation/Notes 
RPAS electronic registration 
He need for the electronic registration (e-registration)  
to allow the identification of the operating RPAS 
RPAS electronic identification 
The need for the electronic identification (e-identification) to know 
who is flying through the knowledge of the remote pilot contacts, 
his/her identity verification capability and through the knowledge 
of the RPAS data 
RPAS geo fence 
The need  for The whole of digital boundaries on air maps with 
associated rules for access with real time status upgrade and 
sharing among the VLL users 
RPAS mission planning Necessary for awareness on the number of flying RPAS in the VLL 
One common source/database for mission plan filing 
Necessary for better control of the  
number of the VLL subspace users 
RPAS mission plan visualization 
Necessary for ATC/remote pilot  
situational awareness enhancement 
RPAS mission plan cancellation 
Necessary for ATC situational  
awareness enhancement 
Modularity 
Necessary for an easier and  
dynamic management of the VLL 
Scalability 
Necessary to easily add new users to 
 the VLL subspace monitoring 
Cyber security 
Necessary to avoid intentional malicious interference with RPAS 
operations to catch the remote control of the flying RPAS  
Prevention of intentional RPAS loss of link (spoofing, jamming) 
Necessary to avoid intentional malicious interference with RPAS 
operations to catch the remote control of the flying RPAS like, 
more specifically, performing spoofing, jamming, etc. 
Prevention of unintentional RPAS loss of link (for instance  
caused by flight over radio transmitting stations, VORs, etc.) 
Necessary to avoid electromagnetic interference if the RPAS 
operates near powerful sources of radio waves like 
telecommunication antennas, VORs, etc. 
Interface of the U-Space service with the ATM service 
Necessary for manned traffic  
identification of RPAS traffic 
Sharing of RPAS flight data between the  
U-Space service with the ATM service in the VLL subspace 
Necessary for ATC situational  
awareness with respect to RPAS traffic 
Availability of real time updated weather information 
Necessary to prevent weather  
related hazards from occurring 
Use for RPAS of certified aeronautical data/charts/map Necessary to properly implement geo fence 
Geofence implemented on the basis of  
certified aeronautical data/charts/map 
Necessary to properly prevent RPAS traffic from entering 
prohibited areas like aerodromes or sensitive areas, etc. 
Prevention of mid-air conflict risk with cooperative RPAS traffic 
Necessary for prevention of mid-air collision  
hazard with cooperative RPAS traffic 
Prevention of mid-air conflict risk with not cooperative RPAS 
Necessary for prevention of mid-air collision  
hazard with not cooperative RPAS traffic 
Avoidance collision in case of  
mid-air conflict risk with cooperative RPAS 
Necessary for avoidance of mid-air collision  
hazard with cooperative RPAS traffic 
Avoidance collision in case of  
mid-air conflict risk with not cooperative RPAS 
Necessary for avoidance of mid-air collision  
hazard with not cooperative RPAS traffic 
Aerial traffic resolution 
Necessary for resolution of conflicts among  
RPAS traffic or between unmanned and manned traffic  
Aerial traffic management Necessary for management of ordinary RPAS operations 
Facilitation of RPAS remote pilot  
situational awareness in the VLL subspace 
Necessary to enhance general safety of RPAS operations 
Facilitation of ATC controllers situational awareness  
towards RPAS traffic merged with manned traffic 
Necessary to enhance a safer management  
of RPAS traffic from the perspective of he ATC personnel 
Two ways voice communication with ATC Necessary to communicate with the ATC for ordinary reasons 
Two ways voice emergency  
communication with ATC 
Necessary to communicate with  
the ATC in case of emergency on board the RPAS 
Monitoring of RPAS flight not  
identifiable by ground RADAR 
Necessary for monitoring of RPAS at altitudes at which ground 
RADAR are not capable of identifying/controlling the RPAS  
Capillary monitoring of high volumes of RPAS traffic 
Necessary for precise monitoring of  
a high number of concurrently operating RPAS  
Use of ADS-B on small RPAS Necessary for cooperative RPAS traffic identification 
Use of LIDAR/SONAR on small RPAS Necessary for not cooperative RPAS traffic identification 
Use of weather RADAR on small RPAS Necessary for real time updating of weather information 
RPAS flight data recording for safety analyses 
Necessary to collect safety related data for safety 
analysis/evaluation of compliance with key safety targets 
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Table 15 – Basic requirements for the U-Space service in the VLL subspace (Cont’d) 
Requirement Motivation/Notes 
RPAS data recording for reliability  
analyses/identification and collection of historical data 
Necessary to collect reliability related data for historical databases 
Automation for RPAS traffic management 
Necessary to alleviate ATC personnel workload  
and enhance RPAS flight operations management 
Use of distributed micro control towers 
Necessary to alleviate ATC personnel workload  
and enhance RPAS flight operations management 
Use of airborne and ground-based monitoring sensors 
Necessary to alleviate ATC personnel workload  
and enhance RPAS flight operations management 
5.4 Conclusions 
A proposal for a light RPAS high level functional architecture oriented 
towards operational risk mitigation in the VLL airspace has been presented and 
discussed in this chapter. 
In addition, the first available proposals of technical solutions to deploy the 
U-space service have been presented and review from a safety of RPAS 
operations perspective, identifying possible useful requirements to manage light 
remotely piloted aircraft systems flight operations in the VLL subspace. 
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Chapter 6 
Complex systems safety analysis 
6.1 Introduction 
The FMECA, FTA and Bow Tie used as basis to derive hazards for the safety 
analysis of the system ‘RPAS integrated in the civil airspace’ are event based 
models. 
From safety perspective, the operating scenario of RPAS integrated in the not 
segregated airspaces can be assimilated to a complex system where the 
identification of systemic accidents precursors is capable of providing additional 
data for a more effective Safety Management System.  
The complex systems are object of study of the ‘System Theory’: the 
‘System-Theoretic Process Analysis’ (STPA) hazard analysis derived from the 
‘System-Theoretic Accidents Model Process’ (STAMP) methodology is 
hereinafter described and applied to a selected accident scenario to show its 
potentialities to integrate traditional safety analysis methodologies.   
6.2 Complex systems and the systems theory 
The FMECA and FTA are probabilistic event based analysis techniques based 
on the probability of occurrence of single components failure that can trigger an 
accident occurrence. For this reason, according to more recent trends in safety 
analysis, they do not completely match with the reality: the paradox can occur that 
all of the system components are confirmed to be reliable but an accident occur to 
the system, that is the system has not resulted to be safe in reality. 
The ‘Complex Systems’ theory proposes extended causality models that allow 
the investigation of interactions among the system components and found out 
system hazards; the system hazards cannot be identified by traditional event based 
safety analysis methodologies [42] thus revealing an important limitation. These 
issues are overcome by ‘Complex Systems’ derived methodologies thus helping 
the analyst to get complementary data and positively supporting the 
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implementation of more effective safety management systems. Using complex 
systems techniques, the safety problem is reformulated in terms of a control 
problem rather than in terms of a reliability issue. The theoretical foundation of 
this approach is the ‘Systems Theory’. The expression ‘System Theory’ deals with 
approaching the system under study as a whole, rather than considering its 
components singularly. Further, the ‘System Theory’ operates not only on the 
system components but also on their mutual interactions according to proper 
control laws [42]. 
6.2.1 STAMP methodology 
Within the ‘System Theory’, the ‘System-Theoretic Process Analysis’ (STPA) 
hazard analysis methodology derived from the ‘System-Theoretic Accidents 
Model Process’ (STAMP) is hereinafter proposed and discussed.   
6.2.2 The STPA safety hazard analysis 
The ‘System Theoretic Process Analysis’ is a hazard analysis technique based 
on the STAMP methodology; therefore it describes the system in terms of control 
loops foreseeing a controller who observes the behaviour of the controlled process 
through measured variables and manipulates it through the injection in the loops 
of controlled variables (Figure 28 [42]). 
 
 
Figure 28 – Complex systems control loop [42] 
Passing through a control problem strategy rather than single components 
failure, the STPA identifies hazards due to unsafe and unintended interactions 
occurring among the system components even if none of them is affected by 
failures and lead to identify the process causing the accident scenario. To reach 
this aim, the STPA methodology uses further causal factors like behaviour, 
omissions, decisions, etc. [42] to include hazards of other nature caused by sub-
system interactions, design errors, software errors, human beings behaviour and 
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decision making process errors, and social, management and organizational 
related factors. The accident is conceived as the result of the violation of system 
constraints in one or more control loops [102]. 
The STPA methodology is applied following these steps ([42], [102], [103]); 
Figure 29 ([42], [103]) shows a standard control loop associated to the above 
reported steps: 
a) Safety constraints definition: the hazards are transposed into safety 
constraints 
b) Safety control loops definition: the system structure is transposed into 
tailored safety control loops 
c) Potentially inadequate control actions identification: it is the 
identification of the whole of the ways according to which the system 
can get into safety hazards conditions; the inadequate control actions 
can  belongs to one of the following four categories: 
o A control action required to maintain safety is not provided 
o An incorrect or unsafe control action is provided thus 
inducing a loss in the system 
o Potentially correct or adequate control actions are provided 
too early, too late, or out of sequence 
o A correct control action is stopped too early 
d) Identification of causes of inadequate controls: it is the determination 
of how each potential identified hazardous action can occur with 
reference to: management of change procedures, verification if safety 
constraints are changing accordingly; audits performance; detection of 
unplanned changes that can violate the constraints; accident and 
incident analysis to trace anomalies to the hazards and to the system 
design 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 29 – A standard control loop and associated factors ([42], [103]) 
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6.2.3 The STPA safety analysis of the system ‘RPAS integrated in 
the civil airspace’ 
The safety analysis of the system ‘RPAS integrated in the civil airspace’ 
applying the STPA method has been performed with reference to a specific 
accident scenario to show the essence of this methodology and, on this basis, to 
evaluate its potentiality/differences with the traditional safety analysis techniques 
used in this research. 
Three main risks shall be properly managed when during and RPAS sortie:  
• Mid-air collision with manned aircraft 
• Fatal injury to persons on ground 
• Damage to third parts on ground  
The ‘mid-air collision with manned aircraft’ is chosen in this case to show 
how the STPA method works.  
According to the above mentioned methodology steps the following is set up: 
a) Safety constraints definition: the high level hazards and high level 
safety requirements (SR) necessary to apply the STPA methodology 
are reported in Table 16 [103] 
b) Figure 30 ([102], [103]) shows the standard control loops tailored to 
this case 
c) Potentially inadequate control actions are identified in Table 16 [103] 
d) The results of the application of the STPA technique with the 
identification of the hazards have been reported in Appendix G ([103] 
Table 147 [103] and Table 148 [103]) 
 
Table 16 – STPA methodology: set up of the investigated scenario and analysis parameters [103] 
Investigated scenario: Mid-air collision of an RPAS in the VLL with a cooperative manned aircraft 
High level safety hazards High level safety requirements (SR): 
H01: unsafe separation from a cooperative manned aircraft SR01: the RPAS shall maintain safe separation from manned aircraft 
H02: loss of RPAS control 
SR02: the remote pilot shall maintain  
safe separation from manned aircraft 
H03: Detect and Avoid subsystem failure 
SR03: the Detect and Avoid subsystem shall prevent the  
RPAS from collision occurrence with other airspace users 
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Figure 30 – Light RPAS operations in VLL airspace: STPA control loop [103] 
6.2.4 Discussion 
The operational accident scenario used in Appendix G is that of the mid-air 
collision risk between the operated RPA and a cooperative (ADS-B equipped) 
manned intruder in the VLL airspace.  
The possible control actions (CA) related to the given accident scenario are: 
climb/descend, left/right turn, move backward/forward, increase/decrease 
airspeed, deactivate/reactivated. The controlled actions can be performed by the 
RPA commanded by the remote pilot or through automated flight modes acting on 
the RPA control algorithm.  
The control actions trigger hazardous/unsafe control actions (UCA) 
effectively causing hazards or not. If they cause an hazardous state, this is 
explicitly indicated recalling one or more of the high level hazards of interest 
(Table 16 [103]) capable to lead to the accident scenario under examination 
(Table 148 [103]). 
The identified control actions of interest (Table 147 [103]) are reconsidered 
and classified according to possible causal factors (Table 148 [103]); the 
following case is described more in detail for example: starting from control 
action 1 ‘Climb’, if it is performed according to DAA proposed manoeuvre to 
resolve the mid-air conflict, the RPA will avoid the collision with the intruder; if 
not, the accident scenario with the intruder will occur; the CA1 ‘Climb’ cannot be 
performed because the RPA does not correctly execute the DAA commanded 
evasive manoeuvre ([UCA2]) or because the remote pilot, bypassing the DAA, 
commands an inappropriate/wrong manoeuvre to the RPA ([UCA3]). Going 
through the unsafe control actions causal factors (Table 148 [103]): the RPA 
cannot correctly execute the DAA manoeuvre due to inadequate command signals 
generated by the control algorithm or due to inadequate communication link 
between the remote controller and the RPA or due to misleading information 
shown by on ground displays. Therefore, using the STPA technique, safety 
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hazards related to the following topics can be argued more easily and directly than 
using only FMECA/FTA methodologies [42]: 
• Design errors (including software flaws): they can apply to ground 
control displays content; if the requirements for their mechanization 
are poor, the displays will provide misleading information to the 
remote pilot affecting his/her situational awareness, decisions and 
consequent recovery actions  
• Cognitively complex human decision-making errors: the RPAS 
operator can decide to perform an action on the basis of an 
unexpected external input; but the actions reveals to be detrimental 
for the RPAS 
• Social, management or organizational factors contributing to cause 
accidents: it could be the case of inadequate regulation issued by the 
authority; it can be the case of a regulation that is intrinsically 
affected by error or which is not clearly formulated; the same could 
be said about wrong or improper procedure contained in the 
operational manual of the RPAS operator and still not having been 
properly amended 
The above described example of application of the STPA method shows how 
it allows to identifies more hazard events than traditional reliability based 
methods including those caused by lack of system components reliability as well 
([42], [102]). The integration of traditional and STPA safety hazards analyses can 
provide a more extended spectrum of safety risks allowing the implementation of 
more effective safety management systems for RPAS. Further, according to the 
basic definition of safety management system for which the search for new 
hazards never stops but dynamically fits with the system to be managed, it can be 
stated that such advanced methodologies like the STPA hazard analysis can 
adequately support this activity and as the system becomes more and more 
complex it helps the analyst to easily going through it and identifying the deepest 
and most hidden causes of incidents/accidents. Nevertheless, the safety analysis 
reported in this dissertation has been based on traditional analysis methodologies 
like FMECA and FTA due to their consolidated recognized reliability against the 
high level of novelties brought by the RPAS technology and their incoming 
integration into the civil not segregated airspace. Further, the investigation on 
RPAS equipment reliability has been judged fundamental because no systematic 
and extended reliability and safety analysis have been found in literature. 
Among the causal factors not related to simple lack of system components 
reliability, the system components interaction and the use of software [42] to 
manage the RPAS operations can be separately discussed. The system 
components interaction is still early to be considered in depth due to the current 
early stage of integration of RPAS and developments of related regulation. With 
reference to software modules largely used on board RPAS, the STPA 
 196 
 
methodology can provide significant more support in the analysis of software  
functionalities than traditional event based techniques.  
Finally, if the STPA is appreciated because it provides great support to the 
safety analyses during the initial phases of design when the system neither exists, 
FMECA and FTA gain usefulness with the increase of RPA operative life, when 
failures due to the physiological decrease of components reliability start to more 
and more affect the system safety of operation.  
In conclusion, the above reported considerations highlight the utility of both 
event based and system based hazards analysis techniques.  
6.3 Conclusions 
The safety analysis methodology STPA (‘System-Theoretic Process 
Analysis’) derived from the ‘Systems Theory’ has been introduced in this Chapter 
because it is as a powerful technique to integrate hazards identified applying 
traditional safety analysis techniques.   
The STPA, focusing on system components interactions rather than on single 
components reliability, provides the possibility to identify systemic hazards.  
A practical case based on a selected accident scenario has been presented and 
discussed as an example of the results obtainable using the STPA methodology. 
The application of both traditional and STPA techniques on the system 
‘RPAS integrated in the civil airspace’, can lead to a more comprehensive, better 
structured and effective Safety Management System for RPAS. 
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Chapter 7 
Evaluation of impacts of the safety 
analysis on RPAS Italian 
regulation  
7.1 Introduction 
The Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems are regulated in Italy by the ‘Ente 
Nazionale Aviazione Civile’, ENAC. The state of art of Italian applicable 
regulation for RPAS operations is mainly composed of the following 
documentation: 
• Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems, Second Edition, issued on the  16th 
July 2015; amendment 4 (21st May 2018) [104] 
• Standard scenarios prescriptions in accordance with EASA Opinion 
01/2018 but defined for open category RPAS operations only for the 
moment [105], as it can be argued by the weight category of involved 
RPAS (MTOW less than 2 kilograms, MTOW included between 2 and 
4 kilograms, MTOW included between 4 and 25 kilograms) and the 
indicated operational limitations; for this reason this document is not 
hereinafter further analysed 
Hence, the above mentioned main RPAS Italian regulation [104] is considered 
against the performed research activity on RPAS safety and reviewed to evaluate 
the impacts of the analysis on them.   
7.2 RPAS Italian regulation 
The main contents of the Italian RPAS regulations are hereinafter recalled. 
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The Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems regulation [104] rules the operations 
of RPAS until 150 kilograms maximum take-off weight. Indoor operations of 
RPAS or free balloons are excluded. The Italian regulation is focused on safety 
requirements to operate the RPAS outdoor within the Italian boundaries. The 
possible kinds of operations are the commercial ones and those performed for 
scientific/research purposes under RLOS, ERLOS (extended RLOS with the 
support of technological devices) and BRLOS conditions. 
Three categories are identified according to the RPAS maximum take-off 
weight: 
• RPAS with maximum take-off weight until 25 kilograms: the 
operations are further classified as critical or not critical according to 
the correlated risk level (low or medium/high, respectively)  
• RPAS with maximum take-off weight between 25 and 150 kilograms: 
they shall be identifiable through the assignment registration marks 
and they undergo the issuance of a permit to fly to operate within the 
national airspace  
• RPAS with maximum take-off weight below 2 kilograms; the sorties 
performed with these RPAS are always considered as low risk 
operations 
The survey of crowds of people during sport events or similar are always 
forbidden in Italy.  
A design certification document is foreseen if a manufacturer wants to make 
industrial production of an RPAS model. 
The standard scenario prescriptions [105] identify the safety prescriptions to 
mitigate the risks for each one of the proposed scenario in accordance with the 
roadmap foreseen by EASA [28]: the aim at the basis of this process is to simplify 
the formal procedures for the operators to get the flight authorizations and to 
alleviate burden of Authorities in evaluating requests to fly. 
7.2.1 Evaluation of safety analyses impacts on ENAC 
RPAS regulation 
The evaluation on the basis of the performed safety analysis of the above 
mentioned Italian regulation is hereinafter reported; the evaluation is performed 
specifically indicating each article and comma of interest of the considered 
regulation and related comments. 
The following items of the ENAC RPAS regulation [104] have been 
considered evaluations on the basis of the safety analysis performed during the 
research: 
Article 7, comma 4, with reference to ‘Extended Visual Line of Sight’ 
(EVLOS) operations (that is operations beyond VLOS conditions and for which 
the remote pilot uses supporting technical devices and operators (other remote 
pilot) to maintain the visual contact and the control of the RPAS): this also means 
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that the radio link shall be effectively maintained when the aerial platform control 
is passed from one remote pilot to another one. It is deemed that hazard H32 from 
the U-space risk matrix (Table 143) is applicable even if more precisely it deals 
with BRLOS condition (that is beyond ERLOS condition); as shown in Table 143, 
the lack of capability to maintain the radio link leads to a high risk; an accurate 
pre-flight planning is suggested as mitigation action during which the ground and 
aerial segments communication equipment (on ground/on board 
transmitting/receiving antennas and devices) are properly verified with reference 
to range performances; in case of lost link hazard condition, the emergency flight 
termination can be recommended as further recovery action. 
Article 8, comma 5, with reference to altimeter for altitude holding: the use of 
the altimeter shall be highlighted in the RPAS operational manual as safety 
prescription. 
Article 8, comma 6, with reference to the installation and use of lights or other 
devices to facilitate the recognition of the operating RPAS from other airspace 
users in not-segregated airspaces: the not recognition of RPAS from other 
airspace users involves a high risk (U-space matrix, hazard H19, Table 143); the 
implementation and correct use of the above mentioned devices shall be 
highlighted in the RPAS operational manual as a safety prescription; a redundant 
power supply line for lights shall be implemented in the RPAS. 
Article 10, comma 5, with reference to the activation of the Flight 
Termination System: the use of parachute systems rather than the cut off of 
motors/engines is suggested to better control the RPAS fall particularly within 
urban/congested environments. The loss of the Emergency Termination 
Subsystem or of the HMI to manage the its activation involves high risk (U-space 
matrix, hazard H06 and H04 respectively, Table 143); sensors for on board 
automatic activation can be foreseen both as redundancy of manual activation 
from ground and as redundancy in case of loss of ground Emergency Termination 
Subsystem HMI (FMECA Table 75 and FTA Table 135) or loss of overall ground 
segment functionality (FMECA Table 54 and FTA Table 129, Table 130, Table 
131, Table 132, Table 133, Table 134 and Table 135); the provision of an 
independent emergency battery to power the Emergency Flight Termination 
System is recommended in case of loss of on board main power supply or in case 
of on board fire. 
Article 10, comma 6, letter b: with reference to mitigation provisions in case 
of loss link occurrence during RLOS operations over urban scenarios: the loss of 
link involves a high risk (U-space matrix, hazard H12 for loss of uplink channel 
and H13 for loss of downlink channel respectively, Table 143); the use of 
redundant channels on two different radio frequency bands; the provision for 
‘Return to home function’ among autopilot automatic flight modes; the 
termination of flight using FTS or parachute systems. 
Article 24, comma 4, with reference to avoidance for SAPR to perform flight 
operations nearby airports and ATZ/CTR (‘Aerodrome Traffic Zone/Control 
Traffic Region) areas: the implementation of geofence software functionality can 
help RPAS accomplishing this requirement (U-space matrix hazard H16, Table 
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143); the implementation of geofence systems based on aeronautical official and 
up-to-date cartography is recommended. 
Article 26, comma 1: with reference to BRLOS operations. The separation 
from other airspace users shall be assured/maintained; mid-air conflicts scenarios 
are always high risk scenarios (U-space matrix hazards H15 ÷ H25, Table 143)  
and collision avoidance software functionality shall be implemented on board the 
RPAS using DAA subsystems based on ADS-B surveillance transponder against 
cooperative traffic and RADAR, LIDAR or SONAR based subsystems against not 
cooperative traffic (natural or man-made infrastructures are intended to be 
included in this statement); such functionalities are also expected to provide 
support to maintain separations in flight 
7.3 Discussion 
Within the integration of RPAS into not segregated airspaces, regulation plays 
a basic role: as clearly shown by EASA documentation ([27] and [28]) and as it is 
confirmed by Authors ([46] and [47], for example), future RPAS regulations will 
follow a risk-based approach to identify airworthiness requirements for RPAS. A 
proper unambiguous link shall be established between the requirement indicated 
by the regulation and the assessed risk of reference [46] to further proceed with a 
solid basis for RPAS airworthiness certification and legal authorization to enter 
the airspace. 
The effectiveness of the this approach depends on how much the risk analysis 
is comprehensive and accurate. The following elements are almost consolidated 
among Authors [46]: the risks posed by RPAS are different in nature from those 
posed by manned aircraft due to the absence of the pilot on board and the high 
variety of configurations of RPAS with respect to manned aircraft: fixed wing 
RPAS, rotor wing RPAS, the possibility to be launched by hand or by a catapult 
rather than the possibility to take-off and landing like an helicopter or like a 
manned fixed wing aircraft; the possibility that the RPAS is manually piloted 
from ground or it is flown in automatic modes, etc. A systematic regulation-based 
approach to the safety analysis like the one performed in this research work 
(based on general functional requirements [39], [47] and then gradually detailed 
using FMECA, FTA and human factor models) is hence confirmed in its 
correctness.  
7.4 Conclusions 
Current RPAS Italian regulation has been critically evaluated according to the 
content of the performed safety assessment of RPAS operations in the civil not 
segregated airspace.  
The basic importance of a regulation-based approached focused on risk 
assessment is confirmed in its correctness due to the high variety of RPAS 
technology configurations. 
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Conclusions 
 
The research work object of this Dissertation consists of the following main 
parts and contribuitions: 
• In 2013 ICAO issued the Annex 19 on safety management thus 
stressing the necessity for a new global and integrated approach to 
safety in aviation. This has been due to the expectation for a 
duplication of volume of civil air traffic. With the Annex 19, the 
safety in aviation is officially elevated to a State responsibility and the 
obligation to implement a Safety Management System is extended to 
all aeronautical operators both of manned and remotely piloted aircraft 
systems to be allowed to enter the airspace 
• Starting from the first experimental test flights on remotely piloted 
aircraft operating beside manned traffic performed under the SESAR1 
RAID research demo project (under CIRA responsibility), a 
preliminary risk matrix on hazards identified during the cited activity 
has been draft. Successively, the idea arose to study safety 
management systems for RPAS focusing on safety risk analysis and 
extending the concept of risk matrix to more comprehensive cases. 
Hence, following the guidelines provided by EASA on the risk based 
categorization of RPAS operations (open, specific and certified 
category operations according to a growing risk) and merging it with 
the concept of operations issued by EUROCONTROL (open and 
specific category operations to be performed until 500 feet of altitude 
from ground, within an uncontrolled subspace served by U-space 
infrastructures and certified operations allowed beyond 500 feet of 
altitude from ground within controlled subspaces served by ATM 
infrastructures) two extended risk matrices have been implemented 
• After having investigated which hazards can be generated from the 
operation of both manned and unmanned aircraft in the same 
controlled/uncontrolled airspace, the attention has been focused on the 
provision of solutions to mitigate the effects of the identified hazards. 
The concept of ‘Expert System’ and the proposal for a high level 
functional RPAS architecture oriented towards safety of specific 
operations have been carried out 
• Finally evaluations on more recent safety analysis techniques, impacts 
on the performed safety analysis on current Italian RPAS regulation, 
and on hybrid RPAS have been performed 
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In the following Table 17 we finally summarize the main engineering results 
gained during the research work, the main novelties introduced by these results 
against the current state of art of knowledge about RPAS, the main limits of the 
methodology adopted to perform this research work and the main possible future 
developments of the engineering results described in this Dissertation.  
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Engineering results Novelties vs. RPAS state of art Limits Future works 
Functional categorization of safety hazards introduced by RPAS 
operations within not segregated airspace 
Performance of an extensive reliability and 
safety analysis on RPAS functional architecture 
and operations  
The lack of reliability data deriving from the 
absence of consistent historical databases and 
due to the fact that currently no extensive 
reliability tests have never been performed and 
results systematically collected (too much 
recent technology) has been recognised and 
highlighted 
The reliability and safety analyses have been 
performed using qualitative methodologies 
due to the lack of RPAS reliability data 
The safety analysis has been performed using 
traditional methodologies based on system 
components single failure events as causal 
factors 
Integration of the performed safety analysis 
with more recent system based hazards 
analysis methodologies like the STPA 
technique from ‘Complex Systems’ theory 
 
Development of a software based on artificial 
intelligence (with respect to which the ‘Expert 
Systems’ are precursors) integrating the 
designed ‘Expert System’ with an inference 
engine 
 
Functional integration  of the artificial 
intelligence  with the RPAS autopilot/Flight 
Management System and the RPAS failure 
sensor monitoring system for a real time 
effective mitigation of safety risk even during 
complex RPAS flight operations in the not 
segregated airspace 
 
Identification of valuable criteria to manage 
uncertainty of strategies to assess safety risk 
Allocation of hazards according to the EASA risk-based 
categorization of RPAS operations of interest (specific and 
certified) 
Allocation of hazards according to the EUROCONTROL CONOPS 
(risks related to specific category operations in the VLL 
subspace; risks related to the certified category operations in 
the subspace between 500 feet of altitude from ground and 
FL600 and beyond) 
Performance of the FMECA analysis on a complete RPAS 
functional architecture 
Performance of the FTA analysis on a complete RPAS functional 
architecture 
Performance of the analysis of some examples of hazards 
related to the human factor involved in the RPAS operations 
into the not segregated airspace 
Full implementation of the risk matrices for RPAS operations 
both into uncontrolled and controlled airspaces 
Evaluation of barriers/defences to prevent/mitigate the effects 
of safety hazards though the Bow Tie Method 
Identification of mitigation strategies according 
to the basic definition of ‘Safety Management 
System’ 
(The continuous identification of safety 
hazards and application of mitigation strategies 
to maintain the risk level of the given system at 
or below an acceptable level) 
The effectiveness of the ‘Expert System’ 
depends on the size hat is the number of rules 
composing the knowledge basis; this item, at 
its turn, depend on the level of detail of the 
correlated risk model 
Design of the knowledge basis of an ‘Expert System’ to support 
the decision making process of the remote pilot on ground 
during RPAS specific category operations 
Identification of a high level RPAS functional architecture 
oriented towards the mitigation of safety hazards during 
specific category operations 
Evaluations of solutions for the operational deployment  
of the U-Space service from a safety perspective  Evaluation of U-space infrastructure  
in the light of the performed safety analysis Identification of safety requirements for the deployment of the 
U-space service  
Evaluation from a safety perspective of current RPAS Italian 
regulation 
Evaluation of Italian RPAS regulation in the light 
of the performed safety analysis 
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Appendix A – Failure Modes and 
Effects and Criticality Analysis 
(FMECA) – Results 
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System definition: see the following sections of FMECA analysis 
System mission phases definition: see the following sections of FMECA analysis 
 
 
FMECA analysis: performed according to Military Standard 1629 Revision A [51] 
Classification of occurrences according to the following severity ranking: 
 
 
Table 18 – Severity ranking [51] 
Description Classification Mishap definition Severity number (SN) 
Catastrophic I Death or system loss 4 
Critical II 
Severe injury/Major property damage/Major 
system damage resulting in system loss 
3 
Marginal III 
Minor injury/Minor property damage/Minor 
system damage with delay or loss of system 
availability or mission degradation 
2 
Minor IV 
Failure not serious enough 
to cause injury, property damage or system 
damage, 
but which will result in unscheduled 
maintenance or repair 
1 
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Classification of occurrences according to the following occurrence probability ranking: 
 
Table 19 – Probability of occurrence [51] 
Level Occurrence Description Occurrence number Probability number (PN) 
A Frequent High probability of occurrence 
> 0,20 of the overall probability of failure 
during the item operating time interval 
5 
B Reasonably probable Moderate probability of occurrence 
> 0,10 and < 0,20 of the overall probability 
of failure during the item operating time 
interval 
4 
C Occasional Occasional probability of occurrence 
> 0,01 and < 0,10 of the overall probability 
of failure during the item operating time 
interval 
3 
D Remote Unlikely probability of occurrence 
> 0,001 and < 0,01 of the overall 
probability of failure during the item 
operating time interval 
2 
E Extremely unlikely Essentially zero 
< 0,001 of the overall probability of failure 
during the item operating time interval 
1 
 
 
Detectability ranking: 
 
Table 20 – Detectability ranking [51] 
Detection method Ranking 
Visual or audible warning devices 1 
Automatic sensing devices 2 
Sensing instrumentation 3 
Other methods 4 
None  5 
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Compensating provisions: 
 
 
Table 21 – Compensating provisions [51] 
Compensating provision Design solutions: 
 
Provision of a design that foresees redundant items  
that allow continued and safe operation 
 
Provision of safety or relief devices such as monitoring or alarm 
provisions which permit effective operation or limit damage 
 
Provision of alternative modes of operation such as  
backup or standby items or systems 
 Operator actions: 
 
Compensating provisions which require 
operator action to circumvent or mitigate the effect of the postulated 
failure. The compensating provision that best satisfies 
the indication(s) observed by an operator when the failure occurs shall 
be determined. This may require the investigation of an interface 
system to determine the most correct operator action(s) . The consequences of any probable incorrect action(s) 
by the operator in response to an abnormal indication should be considered and recorded 
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Criticality matrix (from Military Standard 1629 Revision A [51]):  
 
 
Table 22 – Criticality level [51] 
LEVEL A – 
FREQUENT 
    
LEVEL B – 
REASONABLY 
PROBABLE 
    
LEVEL C – 
OCCASIONAL 
    
LEVEL D – 
REMOTE 
    
LEVEL E – 
EXTREMELY 
UNLIKELY 
    
Probability of occurrence 
                   
                  Severity level 
CATEGORY IV  
-  
MINOR 
CATEGORY III  
-  
MARGINAL 
CATEGORY II  
- 
CRITICAL  
CATEGORY I  
- 
 CATASTROPHIC 
 
Criticality increase 
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System definition: rotor wing  RPAS: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 31 – Rotor wing RPAS 
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Mission phases: rotor wing RPAS: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 32 – Rotor wing RPAS mission phases [80] 
 
 
Table 23 – RPAS mission phases [80] 
Mission phase number Mission phase name 
1 Taxi – Engines power on 
2 Take-off 
3 Climb 
4 Cruise 
5 Loiter – Use of payload in the mission area 
6 Cruise 
7 Descent 
8 Landing 
9 Taxi – Engines shutdown 
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Table 24 – Mission phases [80] 
RPAS Flight functionality 
potentially involved 
Mission phases (Rotor wing RPAS) 
1, 2 3 4 5 6 7 8, 9 
Start-up subsystem X X X X X X X 
Structures X X X X X X X 
Propulsion subsystem X X X X X X X 
Power subsystem X X X X X X X 
Electrical subsystem X X X X X X X 
Flight Navigation subsystem - X X X X X - 
Flight Information subsystem - X X X X X - 
Flight control subsystem - X X X X X - 
Emergency 
flight subsystem 
- X X X X X - 
Mission data subsystem X X X X X X X 
Payload data subsystem - - - X - - - 
Communication Command and 
Control subsystem 
X X X X X X X 
Ground Control 
Station subsystem 
X X X X X X X 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Aerial segment 
Type of aerial segment:  
rotor wing aircraft  
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
150 kg < Weight < 600 kg EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 25 – Subsystem: Propulsion Subsystem 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Aerial segment 
Type of aerial segment:  
rotor wing aircraft  
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
150 kg < Weight < 600 kg EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 25 – Subsystem: Propulsion Subsystem (Cont’d) 
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Design solution 
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Loss of thrust System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 D 2 None 5 16 80 
Operator 
actions 
(Performance 
of proper 
maintenance 
on ground [59]) 
- 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Aerial segment 
Type of aerial segment:  
rotor wing aircraft  
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
150 kg < Weight < 600 kg EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 25 – Subsystem: Propulsion Subsystem (Con’t) 
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b
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r
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i
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p
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Electrical 
brushless 
motor 
Thrust 
generation 
PSS2b Worn bearings 
Poor 
lubrication/ 
Contamination/ 
Overloading/ 
High 
temperature 
2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
Loss of 
engine 
Loss of thrust System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 C 3 None 5 12 60 
Operator 
actions 
(Performance 
of proper 
maintenance 
on ground [59]) 
- 
Electrical 
brushless 
motor 
Thrust 
generation 
PSS2c 
Windings  
open circuit 
Excessively  
high 
temperature 
2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
Loss of 
engine 
Loss of thrust System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 D 2 None 5 8 40 
Operator 
actions 
(Performance 
of proper 
maintenance 
on ground [59]) 
- 
Electrical 
brushless 
motor 
Thrust 
generation 
PSS2d 
Armature shaft 
structural 
damage 
Fatigue/ 
Misalignment/ 
Bearing failure 
2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
Loss of 
engine 
Loss of thrust System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 D 2 None 5 8 40 
Operator 
actions 
(Performance 
of proper 
maintenance 
on ground [59]) 
- 
  
 223 
 
Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Aerial segment 
Type of aerial segment:  
rotor wing aircraft  
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
150 kg < Weight < 600 kg EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 25 – Subsystem: Propulsion Subsystem (Con’t) 
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b
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r
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i
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Propeller 
Lift 
generation 
PSS3a 
Propeller 
structural 
failure 
Fatigue/ 
Vibration/ 
Collision with 
an obstacle 
2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
Loss of 
propeller 
Loss of thrust System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 E 1 None 5 4 20 
Design 
solutions 
(Provision of 
redundant 
equipment) 
- 
Propeller 
Lift 
generation 
PSS3b 
Propeller 
connection 
failure 
Fatigue/ 
Vibration 
2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
Loss of 
propeller 
Loss of thrust System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 D 2 None 5 8 40 
Design 
solutions 
(Provision of 
redundant 
equipment) 
- 
Propeller 
Lift 
generation 
PSS3c 
Abrupt stop of 
the propeller 
Friction/ 
Wear/Lack of 
lubrication/ 
Low or 
improper 
lubrication 
2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
Loss of 
propeller 
Loss of thrust System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 E 1 None 5 4 20 
Operator 
actions  
(Performance 
of proper 
maintenance 
on ground) 
- 
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Table 26 – Propulsion Subsystem failure modes criticality matrix 
LEVEL A – 
FREQUENT     
LEVEL B – 
REASONABLY 
PROBABLE 
    
LEVEL C – 
OCCASIONAL 
   
ESC seizing (PSS1a) 
ESC degradation (PSS1b) 
ESC overheating (PSS1c) 
ESC burn out (PSS1d) 
Worn bearings (PSS2b) 
LEVEL D – 
REMOTE 
   
Cranked stator housing (PSS2a) 
Windings open circuit (PSS2c) 
Armature shaft structural 
failure (PSS2d) 
Propeller connection  
failure (PSS3b) 
LEVEL E – 
EXTREMELY 
UNLIKELY 
   
Propeller structural  
failure (PSS3a) 
Abrupt stop  
of the propeller (PSS3c) 
 CATEGORY IV – MINOR CATEGORY III – MARGINAL CATEGORY II – CRITICAL  CATEGORY I – CATASTROPHIC 
  
Criticality increase 
 225 
 
Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Aerial segment 
Type of aerial segment:  
rotor wing aircraft  
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
150 kg < Weight < 600 kg EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 27 – Subsystem: Power Subsystem 
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p
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b
e
r
 
F
a
i
l
u
r
e
 
m
o
d
e
s
 
F
a
i
l
u
r
e
 
c
a
u
s
e
s
 
M
i
s
s
i
o
n
 
p
h
a
s
e
 Failure effects 
S
e
v
e
r
i
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LiPo battery 
Electrical 
power 
generation 
PWSS1a Short circuit  
Heat/ 
External 
overheating/
High rate 
operation 
(causing 
overheat)/   
Internal short 
circuit (hot 
spot)/ 
External short 
circuit/Over 
charge/Over 
discharge 
2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
Loss of 
battery 
Loss or 
decrease of 
electrical 
power/ 
Loss of thrust 
System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 C 3 
Visual or audible  
warning devices [61] 
1 12 12 
Design 
solutions 
(Provision of 
redundant 
equipment) 
- 
LiPo battery 
Electrical 
power 
generation 
PWSS1b 
Mechanical 
damage 
Crush/Nail 
Penetration/ 
Drop/ 
Mechanical 
Shock/ 
Vibration 
/Water 
Immersion 
2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
Loss of 
battery 
Loss or 
decrease of 
electrical 
power/Loss 
of thrust 
System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 C 3 None 5 12 60 
Design 
solutions 
(Provision of 
redundant 
equipment) 
- 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Aerial segment 
Type of aerial segment:  
rotor wing aircraft  
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
150 kg < Weight < 600 kg EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 27 – Subsystem: Power Subsystem (Cont’d) 
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LiPo battery 
Electrical 
power 
generation 
PWSS1c Fire 
Overheat/ 
Thermal 
ramp/Fire 
2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
Loss of 
battery 
Loss or 
decrease of 
electrical 
power/Loss 
of thrust 
System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 C 3 None 5 12 60 
Design 
solutions 
(Provision of 
redundant 
equipment) 
- 
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Table 28 – Power Subsystem failure modes criticality matrix 
LEVEL A – 
FREQUENT 
    
LEVEL B – 
REASONABLY 
PROBABLE 
    
LEVEL C – 
OCCASIONAL 
   
Short circuit (PWSS1a) 
Mechanical damage(PWSS1b) 
Fire (PWSS1c) 
LEVEL D – 
REMOTE 
    
LEVEL E – 
EXTREMELY 
UNLIKELY 
    
 CATEGORY IV – MINOR CATEGORY III – MARGINAL CATEGORY II – CRITICAL  CATEGORY I – CATASTROPHIC 
 
 
Criticality increase 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Aerial segment 
Type of aerial segment:  
rotor wing aircraft  
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
150 kg < Weight < 600 kg EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 29 – Subsystem: Electrical Subsystem 
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p
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i
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JST/XH balance 
cables  
Electrical 
power  
distribution 
ESS1a Short circuit 
Insulation 
breakdown/ 
Fatigue 
2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
- 
Loss or 
decrease of 
electrical 
power 
System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 C 3 None 5 12 60 
Operator 
actions 
(Performance 
of proper 
maintenance 
on ground) 
- 
JST/XH balance 
cables  
Electrical 
power  
distribution 
ESS1b Open circuit 
Fatigue/ 
Vibrations/ 
Mechanical 
shock 
2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
- 
Loss or 
decrease of 
electrical 
power 
System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 A 5 None 5 20 100 
Operator 
actions 
(Performance 
of proper 
maintenance 
on ground) 
- 
Distribution 
cables 
Electrical 
power  
distribution 
ESS2a Short circuit 
Insulation 
breakdown/ 
Fatigue 
2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
- 
Loss or 
decrease of 
electrical 
power 
System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 C 3 None 5 12 60 
Operator 
actions 
(Performance 
of proper 
maintenance 
on ground) 
- 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Aerial segment 
Type of aerial segment:  
rotor wing aircraft  
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
150 kg < Weight < 600 kg EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 29 – Subsystem: Electrical Subsystem (Cont’d) 
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Distribution 
cables 
Electrical 
power  
distribution 
ESS2b Open circuit 
Fatigue/ 
Vibrations/ 
Mechanical 
shock 
2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
- 
Loss or 
decrease of 
electrical 
power 
System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 A 5 None 5 20 100 
Operator 
actions 
(Performance 
of proper 
maintenance 
on ground) 
- 
Connectors 
Electrical 
power  
distribution 
ESS3 Electric arc 
Mechanical 
disconnection
/Fatigue/ 
Vibrations/ 
Shock 
2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
- 
Loss or 
decrease of 
electrical 
power 
System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 C 3 None 5 12 60 
Operator 
actions 
(Performance 
of proper 
maintenance 
on ground) 
- 
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Table 30 – Electrical Subsystem failure modes criticality matrix 
LEVEL A – 
FREQUENT 
   
Open circuit (ESS1b) 
Open circuit (ESS2b) 
LEVEL B – 
REASONABLY 
PROBABLE 
    
LEVEL C – 
OCCASIONAL 
   
Short circuit (ESS1a) 
Short circuit (ESS2a) 
Electric arc (ESS3) 
LEVEL D – 
REMOTE 
    
LEVEL E – 
EXTREMELY 
UNLIKELY 
    
 CATEGORY IV – MINOR CATEGORY III – MARGINAL CATEGORY II – CRITICAL  CATEGORY I – CATASTROPHIC 
  
Criticality increase 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Aerial segment 
Type of aerial segment:  
rotor wing aircraft  
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
150 kg < Weight < 600 kg EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 31 – Subsystem: Flight Subsystem/Navigation Subsystem 
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c
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l
 
E
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d
 
e
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t
s
 
Inertial 
Measurement 
Unit 
Measurement 
of angular 
rates and of 
translation 
accelerations 
NSS1a 
Circuitry 
overload 
Power surge/ 
Electric static 
discharge 
 2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
Inaccurate 
inertial 
measurem
ents 
Incorrect 
data 
reported to 
the flight 
computer 
Inaccurate 
flight data/ 
Mission 
degradation 
M
a
r
g
i
n
a
l
 
2 D 2 None 5 4 20 
Design 
solutions 
(Provision of 
redundant 
equipment, use 
of surge 
protection, use 
of proper 
ground circuit) 
- 
Inertial 
Measurement 
Unit 
Measurement 
of angular 
rates and of 
translation 
accelerations 
NSS1b Calibration loss 
Reset to 
factory 
default/ 
Vibrations  
on equipment 
connections/ 
Cables 
damage/ 
Disconnection 
from power 
surge 
 2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
Inaccurate 
inertial 
measurem
ents 
Incorrect 
data 
reported to 
the flight 
computer 
Inaccurate 
flight data/ 
Mission 
degradation 
M
a
r
g
i
n
a
l
 
2 C 3 None 5 6 30 
Design 
solutions 
(Provision of 
redundant 
equipment)/ 
Operator 
actions 
(Performance 
of proper 
maintenance 
on ground) 
- 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Aerial segment 
Type of aerial segment:  
rotor wing aircraft  
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
150 kg < Weight < 600 kg EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 31 – Subsystem: Flight Subsystem/Navigation Subsystem (Cont’d) 
E
q
u
i
p
m
e
n
t
 
F
u
n
c
t
i
o
n
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d
e
n
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i
f
i
c
a
t
i
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n
 
n
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e
r
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l
u
r
e
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o
d
e
s
 
F
a
i
l
u
r
e
 
c
a
u
s
e
s
 
M
i
s
s
i
o
n
 
p
h
a
s
e
 Failure effects 
S
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v
e
r
i
t
y
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i
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i
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a
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o
n
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r
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t
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N
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c
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p
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c
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p
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c
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i
t
y
 
n
u
m
b
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c
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e
r
 
 
l
e
v
e
l
 
E
n
d
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
 
GPS  
System 
navigation in 
3D space 
NSS2a 
GPS   
antenna  
failure 
Amplifier 
oscillation 
 2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
- - 
Mission 
degradation 
M
a
r
g
i
n
a
l
 
2 E 1 
Visual or audible  
warning devices 
1 4 4 
Design 
solutions 
(Provision of 
redundant 
equipment) 
- 
GPS 
System 
navigation in 
3D space 
NSS2b 
GPS signal 
jamming 
External 
malicious 
interference 
 2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
- - System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 E 1 None 5 4 20 
Design 
solutions 
(Design against 
cyber threats) 
- 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Aerial segment 
Type of aerial segment:  
rotor wing aircraft  
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
150 kg < Weight < 600 kg EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 31 – Subsystem: Flight Subsystem/Navigation Subsystem (Cont’d) 
E
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u
i
p
m
e
n
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u
n
c
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i
o
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r
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e
 Failure effects 
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c
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c
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c
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p
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c
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c
t
 
N
e
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t
 
 
h
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h
e
r
 
 
l
e
v
e
l
 
E
n
d
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
 
GPS 
System 
navigation in 
3D space 
NSS2c 
GPS signal 
spoofing 
External 
malicious 
interference 
 2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
- - System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 B 4 Other methods 4 16 64 
Design 
solutions 
(Design against 
cyber threats)/ 
Operator 
actions 
(Operator 
actions: training 
on manual 
 RPAS flight 
parameters 
monitoring; 
switching from 
automatic to 
manual flight 
mode) 
- 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Aerial segment 
Type of aerial segment:  
rotor wing aircraft  
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
150 kg < Weight < 600 kg EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 31 – Subsystem: Flight Subsystem/Navigation Subsystem (Cont’d) 
E
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i
p
m
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b
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e
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o
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r
e
 
c
a
u
s
e
s
 
M
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n
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s
e
 Failure effects 
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i
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p
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c
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e
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t
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e
r
 
 
l
e
v
e
l
 
E
n
d
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
 
European 
Geostationary 
Navigation 
Overlay System 
(EGNOS)  
System 
navigation in 
3D space 
NSS3a 
EGNOS  
receiver 
failure 
Receiver 
cables 
disconnected 
or damaged/ 
Damaged RX 
ports/ 
Wrong 
antenna 
polarization 
settings 
 2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
EGNOS 
receiver 
functionality 
degradation 
ADS-B 
functionality  
degradation  
Mission 
degradation 
M
a
r
g
i
n
a
l
 
2 A 5 
Visual or audible  
warning devices 
1 10 10 
Design 
solutions 
(Provision of 
redundant 
equipment)/ 
Operator 
actions 
(Performance 
of proper 
maintenance 
on ground) 
- 
European 
Geostationary 
Navigation 
Overlay System 
(EGNOS)  
System 
navigation in 
3D space 
NSS3b 
Loss of  
EGNOS signal 
continuity  
Environmental 
conditions 
(ionosphere 
effects)/ 
Unscheduled 
satellite outages 
 2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
EGNOS 
receiver 
functionality 
degradation 
ADS-B 
functionality  
degradation  
Mission 
degradation 
M
a
r
g
i
n
a
l
 
2 D 2 
Visual or audible  
warning devices 
1 4 4 
Design 
solutions 
(Provision of 
redundant 
equipment) 
- 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Aerial segment 
Type of aerial segment:  
rotor wing aircraft  
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
150 kg < Weight < 600 kg EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 31 – Subsystem: Flight Subsystem/Navigation Subsystem (Cont’d) 
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r
e
 
c
a
u
s
e
s
 
M
i
s
s
i
o
n
 
p
h
a
s
e
 Failure effects 
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i
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c
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l
 
E
n
d
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
 
European 
Geostationary 
Navigation 
Overlay System 
(EGNOS)  
System 
navigation in 
3D space 
NSS3c 
Loss of EGNOS 
signal integrity 
The error 
associated to 
the position is 
larger than 
the alert 
limits defined 
for the 
intended 
operation 
 2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
EGNOS 
receiver 
functionality 
degradation 
ADS-B 
functionality  
degradation  
Mission 
degradation 
M
a
r
g
i
n
a
l
 
2 E 1 
Visual or audible  
warning devices 
1 2 2 
Design 
solutions 
(Provision of 
redundant 
equipment) 
- 
European 
Geostationary 
Navigation 
Overlay System 
(EGNOS)  
System 
navigation in 
3D space 
NSS3d 
EGNOS  
signal  
delay 
Ionosphere 
dispersion 
effect 
 2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
EGNOS 
receiver 
functionality 
degradation 
ADS-B 
functionality  
degradation  
Mission 
degradation 
M
a
r
g
i
n
a
l
 
2 D 2 
Visual or audible  
warning devices 
1 4 4 
Design 
solutions 
(Provision of 
redundant 
equipment) 
- 
ADS-B 
In flight 
surveillance 
NSS4a 
Loss of  
EGNOS  
position 
accuracy 
Equipment 
aging 
 2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
- - System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 A 5 None [67] 5 20 100 
Operator 
actions 
(Performance 
of proper 
maintenance 
on ground 
[67]]) 
- 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Aerial segment 
Type of aerial segment:  
rotor wing aircraft  
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
150 kg < Weight < 600 kg EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 31 – Subsystem: Flight Subsystem/Navigation Subsystem (Cont’d) 
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r
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 Failure effects 
S
e
v
e
r
i
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c
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E
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d
 
e
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e
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s
 
ADS-B 
In flight 
surveillance 
NSS4b 
EGNOS receiver 
unit failure 
Lack of 
calibration/ 
Maintenance 
 2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
- - System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 B 2 
Visual or audible  
warning devices [67] 
1 8 8 
Design 
solutions 
(Provision of 
redundant GPS 
receiver [67]) 
- 
ADS-B 
In flight 
surveillance 
NSS4c 
ADS-B OUT 
antenna failure 
Equipment 
aging 
 2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
Incorrect 
data 
broadcast 
- System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 C 3 None [67] 5 12 60 
Operator 
actions  
(Check for ADS-
B data integrity 
validation [67]) 
- 
ADS-B 
In flight 
surveillance 
NSS4d 
ADS-B OUT 
antenna 
deterioration 
Lak of 
maintenance/ 
Lack of 
calibration 
 2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
Incorrect 
data 
broadcast 
- System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 A 5 None [67] 5 20 100 
Operator 
actions  
(Check for ADS-
B data integrity 
validation [67]) 
 
- 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Aerial segment 
Type of aerial segment:  
rotor wing aircraft  
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
150 kg < Weight < 600 kg EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 31 – Subsystem: Flight Subsystem/Navigation Subsystem (Cont’d) 
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r
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e
 Failure effects 
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i
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R
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c
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E
n
d
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
 
ADS-B 
In flight 
surveillance 
NSS4e 
Signal 
interruption 
Intentional/ 
unintentional 
RF 
interference 
 2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
- - System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 A 5 None [67] 5 20 100 
Operator 
actions  
(Check for ADS-
B data integrity 
validation [67]) 
- 
ADS-B 
In flight 
surveillance 
NSS4f 
Emitter/ 
transponder 
failure 
Lak of 
maintenance/ 
Lack of 
calibration 
 2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
- - System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 A 5 None [67] 5 20 100 
Operator 
actions  
(Check for ADS-
B data integrity 
validation [67]) 
- 
ADS-B 
In flight 
surveillance 
NSS4g 
Erroneous 
altitude  
data  
Altimeter 
failure/ 
Altitude 
encoder 
failure/Pitot 
tube failure 
 2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
Erroneous 
data 
transmission 
to the ADS-B 
emitter 
- System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 E 1 None [67] 5 4 20 
Operator 
actions  
(Performance 
of proper 
maintenance 
on ground [67]) 
- 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Aerial segment 
Type of aerial segment:  
rotor wing aircraft  
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
150 kg < Weight < 600 kg EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 31 – Subsystem: Flight Subsystem/Navigation Subsystem (Cont’d) 
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 Failure effects 
S
e
v
e
r
i
t
y
 
c
l
a
s
s
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
S
e
v
e
r
i
t
y
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
(
S
N
)
 
O
c
c
u
r
r
e
n
c
e
 
p
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
P
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
(
P
N
)
 
F
a
i
l
u
r
e
 
d
e
t
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
m
e
t
h
o
d
/
 
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
b
l
e
 
s
y
m
p
t
o
m
s
 
D
e
t
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
r
a
n
k
i
n
g
 
(
D
R
)
 
C
r
i
t
i
c
a
l
i
t
y
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
R
P
N
 
M
i
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
R
e
m
a
r
k
s
 
L
o
c
a
l
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
 
N
e
x
t
 
 
h
i
g
h
e
r
 
 
l
e
v
e
l
 
E
n
d
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
 
ADS-B 
In flight 
surveillance 
NSS4h 
Data  
encoding  
error 
Software 
error/ 
Encoder error 
 2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
Incorrect 
altitude data 
transmitted 
to the  
ADS-B 
emitter 
- System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 E 1 None [67] 5 4 20 
Operator 
actions  
(Performance 
of proper 
maintenance 
on ground [67]) 
- 
ADS-B 
In flight 
surveillance 
NSS4i 
Intentional/ 
unintentional 
jamming of 
ADS-B signal 
Loss of 
position data 
to be sent to 
the emitter 
 2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
Loss of 
position 
data to be 
transmitted 
to the ADS-B 
emitter 
- System loss 
C
a
t
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t
r
o
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i
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4 E 1 
Visual or audible  
warning devices [67] 
1 4 4 
Design 
solutions 
(Provision of 
other backup 
on board 
navigation 
system like, for 
example – 
Inertial 
Navigation 
System (INS) 
[67]) 
- 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Aerial segment 
Type of aerial segment:  
rotor wing aircraft  
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
150 kg < Weight < 600 kg EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
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ADS-B 
In flight 
surveillance 
NSS4l 
Lack of  
ADS-B service 
Satellite 
failure 
 2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
Loss of 
ADS-B 
service 
- System loss 
C
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p
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i
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4 E 1 
Visual or audible  
warning devices [67] 
1 4 4 
Design 
solutions 
(Provision of 
other backup 
on board 
navigation 
system like, for 
example – 
Inertial 
Navigation 
System (INS) 
[67]) 
- 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Aerial segment 
Type of aerial segment:  
rotor wing aircraft  
EASA Weight class A1 
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and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
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EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
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ADS-B 
In flight 
surveillance 
NSS4m 
Inaccurate 
position datum 
sent to the 
ADS-B emitter 
EGNOS 
receiver 
malfunction/ 
EGNOS loss of 
accuracy 
 2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
- - System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 A 5 
Visual or audible 
 warning devices [67] 
1 20 20 
Design 
solutions 
(Provision of 
other backup 
on board 
navigation 
system like, for 
example – 
Inertial 
Navigation 
System (INS) 
[67]) 
- 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Aerial segment 
Type of aerial segment:  
rotor wing aircraft  
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
150 kg < Weight < 600 kg EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
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ADS-B 
In flight 
surveillance 
NSS4n 
Degradation of 
accuracy and 
integrity of data 
sent by the 
satellite to the 
ADS-B 
EGNOS failure 
 2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
- - System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 E 1 
Visual or audible  
warning devices [67] 
1 4 4 
Design 
solutions  
(The ADS-B 
emitter shall 
reject 
corrupted 
position data 
relying on 
position 
accuracy 
indicator 
(HFOM) from 
EGNOS [67]) 
- 
ADS-B 
In flight 
surveillance 
NSS4o 
Failure of ADS-B 
transponder/ 
emitter on 
the RPA 
Short circuit 
 2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
- - System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 C 3 
Visual or audible  
warning devices [67] 
1 12 12 
Design 
solutions 
(Provision of 
redundant 
emitter/ 
transponder 
[67]) 
- 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Aerial segment 
Type of aerial segment:  
rotor wing aircraft  
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
150 kg < Weight < 600 kg EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
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ADS-B 
In flight 
surveillance 
NSS4p 
Failure in 
detection of 
maneuvering 
aircraft/RPA 
EGNOS 
antenna loss 
of sensitivity 
 2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
- - System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 A 5 
Visual or audible  
warning devices [67] 
1 20 20 
Design 
solutions 
(Provision of 
redundant INS 
or EGNOS  
receiver [67]) 
- 
ADS-B 
In flight 
surveillance 
NSS4q 
Sudden loss of 
ADS-B data to 
ATC  
controllers 
without any 
notification 
Ground 
equipment 
failure/ 
Loss of power 
supply 
 2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
- - System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 D 2 
Visual or audible  
warning devices [67] 
1 8 8 
Design 
solutions 
(Provision of 
redundant 
power supply 
source for the 
ADS-B station 
[67]) 
- 
ADS-B 
In flight 
surveillance 
NSS4r 
ADS-B IN 
receiving 
antenna 
deterioration 
Poor 
maintenance/ 
Lack of 
antenna 
calibration 
 2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
- - System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 C 3 
Visual or audible  
warning devices [67] 
1 12 12 
Operator action 
(Performance 
of proper 
maintenance 
and calibration 
on ground [67]) 
- 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Aerial segment 
Type of aerial segment:  
rotor wing aircraft  
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
150 kg < Weight < 600 kg EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
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ADS-B 
In flight 
surveillance 
NSS4s 
ADS-B ground 
station failure 
Poor 
maintenance 
 2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
Incorrect 
data 
displayed 
to the ATC 
controller 
- System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 D 2 None [67] 5 8 40 
Operator 
actions 
(Performance 
of proper 
maintenance 
on ground of 
ADS-B ground 
segment [67]) 
- 
ADS-B 
In flight 
surveillance 
NSS4t 
Performance of 
wrong preflight 
procedures on 
ADS-B 
Remote pilot 
human 
error/Lack of 
preflight 
checks 
 2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
- - System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 D 3 None [67]  5 12 60 
Operator 
actions 
(Performance 
of more 
training) 
- 
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Table 32– Flight Subsystem/Navigation Subsystem failure modes criticality matrix 
LEVEL A – 
FREQUENT 
   
EGNOS receiver failure (NSS3a) 
Loss of EGNOS position accuracy (NSS4a) 
Inaccurate position datum sent to the ADS-B 
emitter (NSS4m) 
Failure in detection of manoeuvring 
aircraft/RPA (NSS4p) 
LEVEL B – 
REASONABLY 
PROBABLE 
   
EGNOS receiver unit failure (NSS4b) 
ADS-B OUT antenna deterioration (NSS4d) 
Signal interruption (NSS4e) 
LEVEL C – 
OCCASIONAL 
   
Calibration loss (NSS1b) 
ADS-B OUT antenna failure (NSS4c) 
Emitter/transponder failure (NSS4f) 
Failure of ADS-B transponder/ 
emitter on the RPA (NSS4o) 
ADS-B IN receiving antenna  
deterioration (NSS4r) 
LEVEL D – 
REMOTE 
   
Circuitry overload (NSS1a) 
Loss of EGNOS signal continuity (NSS3b) 
EGNOS signal delay (NSSd) 
Sudden loss of ADS-B data to ATC  
controllers without any notification (NSS4q) 
ADS-B ground station failure (NSS4s) 
Performance of wrong preflight procedures 
on ADS-B (NSS4t) 
LEVEL E – 
EXTREMELY 
UNLIKELY 
   
GPS antenna failure (NSS2a) 
GPS signal jamming (NSS2b) 
GPS signal spoofing (NSS2c) 
Loss of EGNOS signal integrity (NSS3c) 
Erroneous altitude data (NSS4g) 
Data encoding error (NSS4h) 
Intentional/unintentional jamming  
of ADS-B signal (NSS4i) 
Lack of ADS-B service (NSS4l) 
Degradation of accuracy and integrity of 
data sent by the satellite to the ADS-B 
(NSS4n) 
 CATEGORY IV – MINOR CATEGORY III – MARGINAL CATEGORY II – CRITICAL  CATEGORY I – CATASTROPHIC 
  
Criticality increase 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Aerial segment 
Type of aerial segment:  
rotor wing aircraft  
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
150 kg < Weight < 600 kg EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
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Air Data 
Unit 
Measurement 
and provision 
of airspeed and 
barometric 
altitude 
ADSS1a 
Incorrect 
signal 
Reduction of signal 
level/Impedance 
mismatch/Analogue 
to digital 
conversion failure 
2, 3, 4, 5, 
6, 7, 8 
Inaccurate  
air data 
measurement 
Incorrect 
air data 
reported to 
computer 
System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 A 5 None 5 20 100 
Design solutions 
(Provision of redundant 
GPS for altitude 
measurement)/ 
Operator action 
(Performance of proper 
maintenance on 
ground) 
- 
Air Data 
Unit 
Measurement 
and provision 
of airspeed and 
barometric 
altitude 
ADSS1b Loss of signal 
Chip failure/ 
Corrosion 
2, 3, 4, 5, 
6, 7, 8 
Inaccurate  
air data 
measurement 
Incorrect 
air data 
reported to 
computer 
System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 A 5 None 5 20 100 
Design solutions 
(Provision of redundant 
GPS for altitude 
measurement)/ 
Operator action 
(Performance of proper 
maintenance on 
ground) 
- 
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EASA Weight class A1 
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or < 900 g 
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Air Data 
Unit 
Measurement 
and provision 
of airspeed and 
barometric 
altitude 
ADSS1c 
Signal error 
along the 
transmission 
line 
Interference  
on the line 
2, 3, 4, 5, 
6, 7, 8 
Inaccurate  
air data 
measurement 
Incorrect 
air data 
reported to 
computer 
System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 C 3 None 5 12 60 
Design solutions 
(Provision of redundant 
GPS for altitude 
measurement)/ 
Operator action 
(Performance of proper 
maintenance on 
ground) 
- 
Air Data 
Unit 
Measurement 
and provision 
of airspeed and 
barometric 
altitude 
ADSS1d 
Error on 
output signal  
Error in the  
sensor algorithm 
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air data 
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Incorrect 
air data 
reported to 
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System loss 
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4 C 3 None 5 12 60 
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GPS for altitude 
measurement)/ 
Operator action 
(Performance of proper 
maintenance on 
ground) 
- 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Aerial segment 
Type of aerial segment:  
rotor wing aircraft  
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
150 kg < Weight < 600 kg EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 33 – Subsystem: Flight Subsystem/Air Data Subsystem (Cont’d) 
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Air Data 
Unit 
Measurement 
and provision 
of airspeed and 
barometric 
altitude 
ADSS1e 
Loss of  
power supply  
Failure in power 
supply/Mechanical 
disconnection from 
power supply 
2, 3, 4, 5, 
6, 7, 8 
Inaccurate  
air data 
measurement 
Incorrect 
air data 
reported to 
computer 
System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 A 5 None 5 20 100 
Design solutions 
(Provision of redundant 
GPS for altitude 
measurement)/ 
Operator action 
(Performance of proper 
maintenance on 
ground) 
- 
Air Data 
Unit 
Measurement 
and provision 
of airspeed and 
barometric 
altitude 
ADSS1f 
Calibration 
error  
Error in the  
sensor algorithm 
2, 3, 4, 5, 
6, 7, 8 
Inaccurate  
air data 
measurement 
Incorrect 
air data 
reported to 
computer 
System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 C 3 None 5 12 60 
Design solutions 
(Provision of redundant 
GPS for altitude 
measurement)/ 
Operator action 
(Performance of proper 
maintenance on 
ground) 
- 
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Table 34 – Subsystem/Air Data Subsystem failure modes criticality matrix 
LEVEL A – 
FREQUENT 
   
Incorrect signal (ADSS1a) 
Loss of signal (ADSS1b) 
Loss of power supply (ADSS1e) 
LEVEL B – 
REASONABLY 
PROBABLE 
    
LEVEL C – 
OCCASIONAL 
   
Signal error along the transmission line (ADSS1c) 
Error on output signal (ADSS1d) 
Calibration error (ADSS1f) 
LEVEL D – 
REMOTE 
    
LEVEL E – 
EXTREMELY 
UNLIKELY 
    
 CATEGORY IV – MINOR CATEGORY III – MARGINAL CATEGORY II – CRITICAL  CATEGORY I – CATASTROPHIC 
  
Criticality increase 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Aerial segment 
Type of aerial segment:  
rotor wing aircraft  
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
150 kg < Weight < 600 kg EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 35 – Subsystem: Flight Subsystem/Flight Control Subsystem 
E
q
u
i
p
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Autopilot Unit 
Vehicle flight 
control and 
management 
FCSS1a 
Failure of  
weak joints 
Over-
temperature 
2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
- - System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 D 2 
Visual or audible  
warning devices  
1 8 8 
Design 
solutions 
(Provision of a 
redundant 
item) 
- 
Autopilot Unit 
Vehicle flight 
control and 
management 
FCSS1b 
Lack of  
power supply 
Vibrations/ 
Damaged 
wiring 
2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
- - System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 D 2 
Visual or audible  
warning devices  
1 8 8 
Design 
solutions 
(Provision of a 
redundant 
item) 
- 
Autopilot Unit 
Vehicle flight 
control and 
management 
FCSS1c Software error 
Lack of 
pass/fail 
signal 
2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
- - System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 D 2 
Visual or audible  
warning devices  
1 8 8 
Design 
solutions 
(Provision of a 
redundant 
item) 
- 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Aerial segment 
Type of aerial segment:  
rotor wing aircraft  
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
150 kg < Weight < 600 kg EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 35 – Subsystem: Flight Subsystem/Flight Control Subsystem (Cont’d) 
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Detect  
and Avoid  
Mid-air 
collision 
avoidance 
FCSS2a 
ADS-B IN 
receiving 
antenna 
deterioration 
Poor 
maintenance/ 
Lack of 
antenna 
calibration 
 2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
- - System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 C 3 
Visual or audible  
warning devices [67] 
1 12 12 
Operator action 
(Performance 
of proper 
maintenance 
and calibration 
on ground [67]) 
- 
Detect  
and Avoid  
Mid-air 
collision 
avoidance 
FCSS2b 
EGNOS  
receiver 
failure 
Receiver 
cables 
disconnected 
or damaged/ 
Damaged RX 
ports/ 
Wrong 
antenna 
polarization 
settings 
 2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
EGNOS 
receiver 
functionality 
degradation 
ADS-B 
functionality  
degradation  
Mission 
degradation 
M
a
r
g
i
n
a
l
 
2 A 5 
Visual or audible  
warning devices 
1 10 10 
Design 
solutions 
(Provision of 
redundant 
equipment)/ 
Operator 
actions 
(Performance 
of proper 
maintenance 
on ground) 
- 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Aerial segment 
Type of aerial segment:  
rotor wing aircraft  
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
150 kg < Weight < 600 kg EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 35 – Subsystem: Flight Subsystem/Flight Control Subsystem (Cont’d) 
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Detect  
and Avoid  
Mid-air 
collision 
avoidance 
FCSS2c 
Erroneous 
altitude  
data  
Altimeter 
failure/ 
Altitude 
encoder 
failure/Pitot 
tube failure 
 2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
Erroneous 
data 
transmission 
to the ADS-B 
emitter 
- System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 E 1 None [67] 5 4 20 
Operator 
actions  
(Performance 
of proper 
maintenance 
on ground [67) 
- 
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Table 36 – Flight Subsystem/Flight Control Subsystem failure modes criticality matrix 
LEVEL A – 
FREQUENT 
   EGNOS receiver failure  (FCSS2b) 
LEVEL B – 
REASONABLY 
PROBABLE 
    
LEVEL C – 
OCCASIONAL 
   ADS-B IN receiving antenna deterioration (FCSS2a) 
LEVEL D – 
REMOTE 
   
Failure of weak joints (FCSS1a) 
Lack of power supply (FCSS1b)  
Software error (FCSS1c) 
LEVEL E – 
EXTREMELY 
UNLIKELY 
   Erroneous altitude data (FCSS2c) 
 CATEGORY IV – MINOR CATEGORY III – MARGINAL CATEGORY II – CRITICAL  CATEGORY I – CATASTROPHIC 
  
Criticality increase 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Aerial segment 
Type of aerial segment:  
rotor wing aircraft  
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
150 kg < Weight < 600 kg EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 37 – Subsystem: Flight Subsystem/Emergency Flight Termination Subsystem 
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Flight 
Termination 
System 
To allow 
minimization of 
risks for 
people/ 
infrastructures 
on ground 
during 
emergency 
flight mission 
plan 
termination 
EFSS1a 
Loss of 
dedicated  
radio link 
Electro-
magnetic 
interference 
2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
- - System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 C 3 
Visual or audible  
warning devices 
1 12 12 
Design 
solutions 
(Provision of 
redundant 
radio link) 
- 
Flight 
Termination 
System 
To allow 
minimization of 
risks for 
people/ 
infrastructures 
on ground 
during 
emergency 
flight mission 
plan 
termination 
EFSS1b 
Lack of 
functionality 
Loss of  
power supply 
2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
- 
 
- 
System loss 
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a
t
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t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 D 2 
Visual or audible  
warning devices 
1 8 8 
Design 
solutions 
(Provision of 
redundant 
item) 
- 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Aerial segment 
Type of aerial segment:  
rotor wing aircraft  
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
150 kg < Weight < 600 kg EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 37 – Subsystem: Flight Subsystem/Emergency Flight Termination Subsystem (Cont’d) 
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Flight 
Termination 
System 
To allow 
minimization of 
risks for 
people/ 
infrastructures 
on ground 
during 
emergency 
flight mission 
plan 
termination 
EFSS1c 
Unlawful 
interference on 
dedicated radio 
link (jamming) 
Intentional 
malicious 
interference 
 
2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
- - System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 B 4 
Visual or audible  
warning devices 
1 16 16 
Design solutions 
(Provision of 
protections 
against 
electromagnetic 
interference) 
- 
Emergency 
recovery 
parachute 
To allow 
minimization of 
risks for 
people/ 
infrastructures 
on ground 
during 
emergency 
flight mission 
plan 
termination 
EFSS2a 
Loss of 
dedicated  
radio link 
Electro-
magnetic 
interference 
2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
- - System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 C 3 
Visual or audible  
warning devices 
1 12 12 
Design 
solutions 
(Provision of 
redundant 
radio link) 
- 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Aerial segment 
Type of aerial segment:  
rotor wing aircraft  
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
150 kg < Weight < 600 kg EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 37 – Subsystem: Flight Subsystem/Emergency Flight Termination Subsystem (Cont’d) 
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Emergency 
recovery 
parachute 
To allow 
minimization of 
risks for 
people/ 
infrastructures 
on ground 
during 
emergency 
flight mission 
plan 
termination 
EFSS2b 
Lack of 
functionality 
Loss of  
power supply 
2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
- - System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 D 2 
Visual or audible  
warning devices 
1 8 8 
Design 
solutions  
(Provision of  
redundant 
item) 
- 
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recovery 
parachute 
To allow 
minimization of 
risks for 
people/ 
infrastructures 
on ground 
during 
emergency 
flight mission 
plan 
termination 
EFSS2c 
Unlawful 
interference on 
dedicated radio 
link (jamming) 
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5, 6, 7, 8 
- - System loss 
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p
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4 B 4 
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1 16 16 
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electromagnetic 
interference) 
- 
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Table 38 – Flight Subsystem/Emergency Flight Termination Subsystem failure modes criticality matrix 
LEVEL A – 
FREQUENT 
    
LEVEL B – 
REASONABLY 
PROBABLE 
   
Unlawful interference  
on dedicated radio link  
(jamming) (EFSS1c) 
Unlawful interference  
on dedicated radio link  
(jamming) (EFSS2c) 
LEVEL C – 
OCCASIONAL 
   
Loss of dedicated radio link (EFSS1a) 
Loss of dedicated radio link (EFSS2a) 
LEVEL D – 
REMOTE 
   
Lack of functionality (EFSS1b) 
Lack of functionality (EFSS2b) 
LEVEL E – 
EXTREMELY 
UNLIKELY 
    
 CATEGORY IV – MINOR CATEGORY III – MARGINAL CATEGORY II – CRITICAL  CATEGORY I – CATASTROPHIC 
 
 
  
Criticality increase 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Aerial segment 
Type of aerial segment:  
rotor wing aircraft  
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
150 kg < Weight < 600 kg EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 39 – Subsystem: Mission Control Subsystem 
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Data  
Storage Unit 
Storage of 
mission 
data 
MCSS1a 
Loss of 
mission 
software 
Electromagnetic 
interference 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 
Loss of 
mission 
data 
- 
Mission 
degradation 
M
a
r
g
i
n
a
l
 
2 C 3 Other methods 4 6 24 
Operator action 
(Performance 
of preflight 
checks) 
- 
Data  
Storage Unit 
Storage of 
mission 
data 
MCSS1b 
Physical unit 
degradation 
Vibrations/ 
Mechanical 
shock/ 
Electric shock 
3, 4, 5, 6, 7 
Loss of 
mission 
data 
- 
Mission 
degradation 
M
a
r
g
i
n
a
l
 
2 C 3 Other methods 4 6 24 
Operator action 
(Performance 
of preflight 
checks) 
- 
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Table 40 – Mission Control Subsystem failure modes criticality matrix 
LEVEL A – 
FREQUENT 
    
LEVEL B – 
REASONABLY 
PROBABLE 
    
LEVEL C – 
OCCASIONAL 
 
Loss of mission data  
software (MCSS1a) 
Physical unit  
degradation 
(MCSS1b) 
  
LEVEL D – 
REMOTE 
    
LEVEL E – 
EXTREMELY 
UNLIKELY 
    
 CATEGORY IV – MINOR CATEGORY III – MARGINAL CATEGORY II – CRITICAL  CATEGORY I – CATASTROPHIC 
 
  
Criticality increase 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Aerial segment 
Type of aerial segment:  
rotor wing aircraft  
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
150 kg < Weight < 600 kg EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 41 – Subsystem: Mission Payload Sensors Subsystem 
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Payload 
Photo/video 
camera sensors 
Photo/ 
video data 
recording 
MPYSS1 
According to 
sensor type and 
technology 
According to 
sensor type 
and 
technology 
5 
Loss of 
functionality 
Loss of 
payload data 
- 
M
i
n
o
r
 
1 D 2 
Visual or audible  
warning devices 
1 2 2 
Operator 
actions 
(Performance 
of proper 
maintenance 
on ground) 
- 
Other  
payload sensors 
Other 
functions 
depending 
on the 
sensor used 
MPYSS2 
According to 
sensor type and 
technology 
According to 
sensor type 
and 
technology 
5 
Loss of 
functionality 
Loss of 
payload data 
- 
M
i
n
o
r
 
1 D 2 
Visual or audible  
warning devices 
1 2 2 
Operator 
actions 
(Performance 
of proper 
maintenance 
on ground) 
- 
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Table 42 – Mission Payload Sensors Subsystem failure modes criticality matrix 
LEVEL A – 
FREQUENT 
    
LEVEL B – 
REASONABLY 
PROBABLE 
    
LEVEL C – 
OCCASIONAL 
    
LEVEL D – 
REMOTE 
Photo/video  
camera failure (MPYSS1) 
Other payload  
sensors failure (MPYSS2) 
   
LEVEL E – 
EXTREMELY 
UNLIKELY 
    
 CATEGORY IV – MINOR CATEGORY III – MARGINAL CATEGORY II – CRITICAL  CATEGORY I – CATASTROPHIC 
 
 
Criticality increase 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Aerial segment 
Type of aerial segment:  
rotor wing aircraft  
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
150 kg < Weight < 600 kg EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 43 – Subsystem: On Board Communication Subsystem 
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transmitting 
antenna 
To send 
telemetry 
data to the 
ground 
segment  
CSS1a 
The on board 
transmitting 
antenna cannot 
process the 
control signal  
Lack of power 
supply/ 
Failure in the 
electrical 
system/ 
Antenna 
intermitted 
1,2,3,4, 
5,6,7,8,9 
- - System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 D 2 None 5 8 40 
Design Solution 
(Provision of 
redundant 
equipment) 
- 
On board 
transmitting 
antenna 
To send 
telemetry 
data to the 
ground 
segment  
CSS1b 
On board 
transmitting 
antenna fade  
RPA shape 
and flight 
attitude/RPA 
airframe 
material 
1,2,3,4, 
5,6,7,8,9 
- - System loss 
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t
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4 C 3 None 5 12 60 
Design Solution 
(Provision of 
redundant 
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- 
On board 
receiving 
antenna 
To receive 
the flight 
command 
signals from 
the aerial 
segment 
CSS2a 
The on board 
receiving 
antenna cannot 
process the 
control signals 
Lack of power 
supply/ 
Failure in the 
electrical 
system/ 
Antenna 
intermitted 
1,2,3,4, 
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- - System loss 
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i
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4 D 2 None 5 8 40 
Design Solution 
(Provision of 
redundant 
equipment) 
- 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Aerial segment 
Type of aerial segment:  
rotor wing aircraft  
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
150 kg < Weight < 600 kg EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 43 – Subsystem: On Board Communication Subsystem (Cont’d) 
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airframe 
material 
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Design Solution 
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equipment) 
- 
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Table 44 –  On Board Communication Subsystem failure modes criticality matrix 
LEVEL A – 
FREQUENT 
    
LEVEL B – 
REASONABLY 
PROBABLE 
    
LEVEL C – 
OCCASIONAL 
   
On board transmitting antenna 
fade (CSS1b) 
On board receiving antenna 
fade (CSS2b) 
LEVEL D – 
REMOTE 
   
The on board transmitting 
antenna cannot process the 
control signal (CSS1a) 
The onboard receiving antenna 
cannot process the control 
signal (CSS2a) 
LEVEL E – 
EXTREMELY 
UNLIKELY 
    
 CATEGORY IV – MINOR CATEGORY III – MARGINAL CATEGORY II – CRITICAL  CATEGORY I – CATASTROPHIC 
  
Criticality increase 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Aerial segment 
Type of aerial segment:  
rotor wing aircraft  
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
150 kg < Weight < 600 kg EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 45 –  Subsystem: Aerial segment structural frame 
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Other 
structures 
Not applicable (N/A) 
Landing 
gear 
Not applicable (N/A) 
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RPAS definition: Fixed wing RPAS: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 33 – Fixed wing RPAS 
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Mission phases: fixed wing RPAS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 34 – Fixed wing RPAS mission phases [80] 
 
 
Table 46 – RPAS mission phases [80] 
Item Mission phase name 
1 Taxi – Engines power on 
2 Take-off 
3 Climb 
4 Cruise 
5 Loiter – Use of payload in the mission area 
6 Cruise 
7 Descent 
8 Landing 
9 Taxi – Engines shutdown 
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Table 47 – RPAS mission phases [80] 
RPAS Flight functionality 
potentially involved 
Mission phases (Fixed wing RPAS) 
1, 2 3 4 5 6 7 8, 9 
Start-up  
subsystem 
X X X X X X X 
Structures X X X X X X X 
Landing gear subsystem X      X 
Fuel subsystem X X X X X X X 
Propulsion subsystem X X X X X X X 
Power subsystem X X X X X X X 
Flight Navigation subsystem - X X X X X - 
Flight Information subsystem - X X X X X - 
Flight control subsystem - X X X X X - 
Flight control subsystem - X X X X X - 
Emergency flight subsystem - X X X X X  
Mission data subsystem X X X X X X X 
Payload data subsystem - - - X - - - 
Communication Command and 
Control subsystem 
X X X X X X X 
Ground Control  
Station subsystem 
X X X X X X X 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Aerial segment 
Type of aerial segment:  
fixed wing RPAS 
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
150 kg < Weight < 600 kg EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 48 – Subsystem: Propulsion Subsystem (Combustion Engine) 
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Control Unit 
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1, 2, 3, 4, 
5, 6, 7, 8, 
9 
- 
Loss of 
engine 
functionality 
System Loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 D 2 None 5 8 40 
Design solutions 
(Provision of  
redundant equipment)/ 
Operator actions 
(Performance of proper 
maintenance on 
ground) 
- 
Engine 
Control Unit 
Engine 
management  
and control 
PSCE1b 
Mechanical 
failure 
Controller 
failure/Actuator 
failure/Sensor 
failure/Control cable 
failure 
1, 2, 3, 4, 
5, 6, 7, 8, 
9 
- 
Loss of 
engine 
functionality 
System Loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 B 4 None 5 16 80 
Design solutions 
(Provision of  
redundant equipment)/ 
Operator actions 
(Performance of proper 
maintenance on 
ground) 
- 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Aerial segment 
Type of aerial segment:  
fixed wing RPAS 
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
150 kg < Weight < 600 kg EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 48 – Subsystem: Propulsion Subsystem (Combustion Engine) (Cont’d) 
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Engine 
Control Unit 
Engine 
management  
and control 
PSCE1c 
Loss of on 
board 
computer 
Loss of  
power supply 
1, 2, 3, 4, 
5, 6, 7, 8, 
9 
- 
Loss of 
engine 
functionality 
System Loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 E 1 None 5 4 20 
Design solutions 
(Provision of  
redundant equipment)/ 
Operator actions 
(Performance of proper 
maintenance on 
ground) 
- 
Engine 
Control Unit 
Engine 
management  
and control 
PSCE1d 
Carburetor 
failure 
Vibrations/ 
Human error 
1, 2, 3, 4, 
5, 6, 7, 8, 
9 
- 
Loss of 
engine 
functionality 
System Loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 C 3 None 12 5 60 
Design solutions 
(Provision of  
redundant equipment)/ 
Operator actions 
(Performance of proper 
maintenance on 
ground) 
 
Engine 
Conversion of 
fuel chemical 
energy in 
mechanical 
energy, thrust 
generation 
PSCE2a 
Engine  
control 
system 
failure 
Carburetor failure/ 
Engine control unit 
failure 
1, 2, 3, 4, 
5, 6, 7, 8, 
9 
Loss of engine 
functionality 
Loss of 
thrust 
System Loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 A 5 
Visual or audible 
warning devices 
1 20 20 
Design solutions 
(Provision of  
redundant equipment)/ 
Operator actions 
(Performance of proper 
maintenance on 
ground) 
- 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Aerial segment 
Type of aerial segment:  
fixed wing RPAS 
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
150 kg < Weight < 600 kg EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 48 – Subsystem: Propulsion Subsystem (Combustion Engine) (Cont’d) 
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Engine 
Conversion of 
fuel chemical 
energy in 
mechanical 
energy, thrust 
generation 
PSCE2b 
Mechanical 
failure 
Wear/ 
Friction/ 
Lack of lubrication/ 
Improper lubrication/ 
Fatigue 
1, 2, 3, 4, 
5, 6, 7, 8, 
9 
Loss of engine 
functionality 
Loss of 
thrust 
System Loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 C 3 None 5 12 60 
Design solutions 
(Provision of  
redundant equipment)/ 
Operator actions 
(Performance of proper 
maintenance on 
ground) 
- 
Engine 
Conversion of 
fuel chemical 
energy in 
mechanical 
energy, thrust 
generation 
PSCE2c Engine fire 
Loss of fuel/ 
Fuel tank damage/ 
Overheating 
1, 2, 3, 4, 
5, 6, 7, 8, 
9 
Loss of engine 
functionality 
Loss of 
thrust 
System Loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 D 2 
Visual or audible 
warning devices 
1 8 8 
Design solutions 
(Provision of  
redundant equipment)/ 
Operator actions 
(Proper maintenance on 
gro Performance of 
proper maintenance on 
ground und) 
- 
Engine 
Conversion of 
fuel chemical 
energy in 
mechanical 
energy, thrust 
generation 
PSCE2d 
Use of 
improper fuel 
Human error  
1, 2, 3, 4, 
5, 6, 7, 8, 
9 
Loss of engine 
functionality 
Loss of 
thrust 
System Loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 D 2 None 5 8 40 
Operator actions 
(Performance of proper 
maintenance on 
ground) 
- 
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Table 49 – Propulsion subsystem (with Combustion Engine) failure modes criticality matrix 
LEVEL A – 
FREQUENT 
   
Engine control system  
failure (PSCE2a) 
LEVEL B – 
REASONABLY 
PROBABLE 
   Mechanical failure (PSCE1b) 
LEVEL C – 
OCCASIONAL 
   
Carburetor failure (PSCE1d) 
Mechanical failure (PCSE2b) 
LEVEL D – 
REMOTE 
   
Software error (PSCE1a) 
Engine fire (PSCE2c) 
Use of improper fuel (PSCE2d) 
LEVEL E – 
EXTREMELY 
UNLIKELY 
   
Loss of on board  
computer (PSCE1c)  
 CATEGORY IV – MINOR CATEGORY III – MARGINAL CATEGORY II – CRITICAL  CATEGORY I – CATASTROPHIC 
  
Criticality increase 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Aerial segment 
Type of aerial segment:  
fixed wing RPAS 
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
150 kg < Weight < 600 kg EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 50 –  Subsystem: Propulsion Subsystem (Combustion Engine with propeller) 
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Engine  
Control Unit 
Engine 
management  
and control 
PSCEP1a Software error 
Error during 
software/firmware 
upgrade 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6, 7, 8, 9 
- 
Loss of 
engine 
functionality 
System Loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 D 2 None 5 8 40 
Design 
solutions 
(Provision of 
redundant 
equipment)/ 
Operator 
actions 
(Performance 
of proper 
maintenance 
on ground) 
- 
Engine  
Control Unit 
Engine 
management  
and control 
PSCEP1b 
Mechanical 
failure 
Controller 
failure/Actuator 
failure/Sensor 
failure/Control cable 
failure 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6, 7, 8, 9 
- 
Loss of 
engine 
functionality 
System Loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 B 4 None 5 16 80 
Design 
solutions 
(Provision of 
redundant 
equipment)/ 
Operator 
actions 
(Performance 
of proper 
maintenance 
on ground) 
- 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Aerial segment 
Type of aerial segment:  
fixed wing RPAS 
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
150 kg < Weight < 600 kg EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 50  –  Subsystem: Propulsion Subsystem (Combustion Engine with propeller) (Cont’d) 
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Engine  
Control Unit 
Engine 
management  
and control 
PSCEP1c 
Loss of on 
board 
computer 
Loss of  
power supply 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6, 7, 8, 9 
- 
Loss of 
engine 
functionality 
System Loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 E 1 None 5 4 20 
Design 
solutions 
(Provision of 
redundant 
equipment)/ 
Operator 
actions 
(Performance 
of proper 
maintenance 
on ground) 
- 
Engine  
Control Unit 
Engine 
management  
and control 
PSCEP1d 
Carburetor 
failure 
Vibrations/ 
Human error 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6, 7, 8, 9 
- 
Loss of 
engine 
functionality 
System Loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 C 3 None 5 12 60 
Design 
solutions 
(Provision of 
redundant 
equipment)/ 
Operator 
actions 
(Performance 
of proper 
maintenance 
on ground) 
- 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Aerial segment 
Type of aerial segment:  
fixed wing RPAS 
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
150 kg < Weight < 600 kg EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 50  –  Subsystem: Propulsion Subsystem (Combustion Engine with propeller) (Cont’d) 
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Engine 
Conversion 
of fuel 
chemical 
energy in 
mechanical 
energy, 
thrust 
generation 
PSCEP2a 
Engine  
control system 
failure 
Carburetor failure/ 
Engine control unit 
failure 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6, 7, 8, 9 
Loss of 
engine 
functionality 
Loss of 
thrust 
System Loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 A 5 
Visual or audible 
warning devices 
1 20 20 
Design 
solutions 
(Provision of 
redundant 
equipment)/ 
Operator 
actions 
(Performance 
of proper 
maintenance 
on ground) 
- 
Engine 
Conversion 
of fuel 
chemical 
energy in 
mechanical 
energy, 
thrust 
generation 
PSCEP2b 
Mechanical 
failure 
Wear/ 
Friction/ 
Lack of lubrication/ 
Improper 
lubrication/ 
Fatigue 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6, 7, 8, 9 
Loss of 
engine 
functionality 
Loss of 
thrust 
System Loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 C 3 None 5 12 60 
Design 
solutions 
(Provision of 
redundant 
equipment)/ 
Operator 
actions 
(Performance 
of proper 
maintenance 
on ground) 
- 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Aerial segment 
Type of aerial segment:  
fixed wing RPAS 
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
150 kg < Weight < 600 kg EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 50  –  Subsystem: Propulsion Subsystem (Combustion Engine with propeller) (Cont’d) 
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Engine 
Conversion 
of fuel 
chemical 
energy in 
mechanical 
energy, 
thrust 
generation 
PSCEP2c Engine fire 
Loss of fuel/ 
Fuel tank damage/ 
Overheating 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6, 7, 8, 9 
Loss of 
engine 
functionality 
Loss of 
thrust 
System Loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 D 2 
Visual or audible 
warning devices 
1 8 8 
Design 
solutions 
(Provision of 
redundant 
equipment)/ 
Operator 
actions 
(Performance 
of proper 
maintenance 
on ground) 
- 
Engine 
Conversion 
of fuel 
chemical 
energy in 
mechanical 
energy, 
thrust 
generation 
PSCEP2d 
Use of 
improper fuel 
Human error  
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6, 7, 8, 9 
Loss of 
engine 
functionality 
Loss of 
thrust 
System Loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 D 2 None 5 8 40 
Operator 
actions  
(Performance 
of proper 
maintenance 
on ground)  
- 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Aerial segment 
Type of aerial segment:  
fixed wing RPAS 
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
150 kg < Weight < 600 kg EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 50  –  Subsystem: Propulsion Subsystem (Combustion Engine with propeller) (Cont’d) 
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Propeller 
Thrust 
generation 
PSCEP3a 
Propeller 
structural 
failure 
Fatigue/ 
Vibration/ 
Collision with an 
obstacle 
2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
Loss of 
propeller 
Loss of 
thrust 
System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 E 1 None 5 4 20 
Operator 
actions  
(Performance 
of proper 
maintenance 
on ground) 
- 
Propeller 
Thrust 
generation 
PSCEP3b 
Propeller 
connection 
failure 
Fatigue/ 
Vibration 
2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
Loss of 
propeller 
Loss of 
thrust 
System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
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4 D 2 None 5 8 40 
Operator 
actions  
(Performance 
of proper 
maintenance 
on ground) 
- 
Propeller 
Thrust 
generation 
PSCEP3c 
Abrupt stop of 
the propeller 
Friction/ 
Wear/Lack of 
lubrication/ 
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lubrication 
2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
Loss of 
propeller 
Loss of 
thrust 
System loss 
C
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a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 E 1 None 5 4 20 
Operator 
actions  
(Performance 
of proper 
maintenance 
on ground) 
- 
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Table 51 – Propulsion Subsystem (Combustion Engine with Propeller) failure modes criticality matrix 
LEVEL A – 
FREQUENT 
   
Engine control system  
failure (PSCEP2a) 
LEVEL B – 
REASONABLY 
PROBABLE 
   Mechanical failure (PSCEP1b) 
LEVEL C – 
OCCASIONAL 
   
Carburetor failure (PSCEP1d) 
Mechanical failure (PCSEP2b) 
LEVEL D – 
REMOTE 
   
Software error (PSCEP1a) 
Engine fire (PSCEP2c) 
Use of improper fuel (PSCEP2d) 
Propeller connection failure 
(PSCEP3b)  
LEVEL E – 
EXTREMELY 
UNLIKELY 
   
Loss of on board  
computer (PSCEP1c) 
Propeller structural  
failure (PSCEP3a) 
Abrupt stop of the  
propeller (PSCEP3c) 
 CATEGORY IV – MINOR CATEGORY III – MARGINAL CATEGORY II – CRITICAL  CATEGORY I – CATASTROPHIC 
 
 
Criticality increase 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Aerial segment 
Type of aerial segment:  
fixed wing RPAS 
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
150 kg < Weight < 600 kg EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 52 –  Subsystem: Fuel Subsystem 
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p
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Fuel tank 
Fuel 
containment 
FSS1 
Structural 
damage 
Shock/ 
Vibrations 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6, 7, 8, 9 
- 
Loss of 
engine 
functionality 
System Loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 D 2 None 5 8 40 
Design 
solutions 
(Provision of 
redundant 
equipment)/ 
Operator 
actions 
(Performance 
of proper 
maintenance 
on ground) 
- 
Fuel pump 
Fuel 
pressurization 
FSS2 
Mechanical 
failure 
Fatigue/ 
Shock/ 
Vibrations 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6, 7, 8, 9 
- 
Loss of 
engine 
functionality 
System Loss 
C
a
t
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r
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p
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i
c
 
4 D 2 
Visual or audible  
warning devices 
2 8 40 
Operator 
actions 
(Performance 
of proper 
maintenance 
on ground) 
- 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Aerial segment 
Type of aerial segment:  
fixed wing RPAS 
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
150 kg < Weight < 600 kg EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 52 –  Subsystem: Fuel Subsystem (Cont’d) 
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Fuel pipelines 
Fuel 
distribution 
FSS3 
Structural 
damage 
Shock/ 
Vibrations/ 
Fatigue/ 
External 
stress/ 
Corrosion 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6, 7, 8, 9 
- 
Loss of 
engine 
functionality 
System Loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 E 1 None 5 4 40 
Design 
solutions  
(provision of 
anti-vibration 
devices)/ 
Operator 
actions 
(Performance 
of proper 
maintenance 
on ground) 
- 
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Table 53 – Fuel Subsystem failure modes criticality matrix 
LEVEL A – 
FREQUENT 
    
LEVEL B – 
REASONABLY 
PROBABLE 
    
LEVEL C – 
OCCASIONAL 
    
LEVEL D – 
REMOTE 
   
Structural failure (FSS1) 
Mechanical failure (FSS2) 
LEVEL E – 
EXTREMELY 
UNLIKELY 
   Structural failure (FSS3) 
 CATEGORY IV – MINOR CATEGORY III – MARGINAL CATEGORY II – CRITICAL  CATEGORY I – CATASTROPHIC 
 
  
Criticality increase 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Aerial segment 
Type of aerial segment:  
fixed wing RPAS 
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
150 kg < Weight < 600 kg EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 54 – Subsystem: Power Generation Subsystem 
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c
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Alternator 
Alternate 
current 
generation 
PWGSS1 
Mechanical 
failure  
Brushes 
failure/ 
Diodes  
failure 
1, 2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8, 9 
- - System Loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 C 3 None 5 12 60 
Operator 
actions 
(Performance 
of proper 
maintenance 
on ground) 
- 
Rectifier 
Conversion 
of alternate 
current into 
direct 
current 
PWGSS2a Overheating 
Excessive  
alternate 
current 
voltage 
1, 2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8, 9 
- - System Loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 C 3 None 5 12 60 
Operator 
actions 
(Performance 
of proper 
maintenance 
on ground) 
- 
Rectifier 
Conversion 
of alternate 
current into 
direct 
current 
PWGSS2b 
Chemical 
failure 
Corrosion 
1, 2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8, 9 
- - System Loss 
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i
c
 
4 C 3 None 5 12 60 
Operator 
actions 
(Performance 
of proper 
maintenance 
on ground) 
- 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Aerial segment 
Type of aerial segment:  
fixed wing RPAS 
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
150 kg < Weight < 600 kg EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 54 – Subsystem: Power Generation Subsystem (Cont’d) 
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current 
generation 
PWGSS3a 
Mechanical 
failure 
Vibrations 
1, 2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8, 9 
- - System Loss 
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a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 D 2 None 5 8 40 
Design 
solutions 
(Provision of 
redundant 
equipment)/ 
Operator 
actions 
(Performance 
of proper 
maintenance 
on ground) 
- 
Emergency 
battery 
Direct 
current 
generation 
PWGSS3b 
Thermal 
failure 
Heat 
1, 2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8, 9 
- - System Loss 
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o
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i
c
 
4 D 2 None 5 8 40 
Design 
solutions 
(Provision of 
redundant 
equipment)/ 
Operator 
actions 
(Performance 
of proper 
maintenance 
on ground) 
- 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Aerial segment 
Type of aerial segment:  
fixed wing RPAS 
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
150 kg < Weight < 600 kg EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 54 – Subsystem: Power Generation Subsystem (Cont’d) 
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Emergency 
battery 
Direct 
current 
generation 
PWGSS3c 
Chemical 
failure 
Normal 
chemistry of 
charge/ 
discharge 
cycles 
1, 2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8, 9 
- - System Loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 D 2 None 5 8 40 
Design 
solutions 
(Provision of 
redundant 
equipment)/ 
Operator 
actions 
(Performance 
of proper 
maintenance 
on ground) 
- 
Emergency 
battery 
Direct 
current 
generation 
PWGSS3d 
Electrical 
failure 
Short  
circuit 
1, 2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8, 9 
- - System Loss 
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a
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a
s
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o
p
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i
c
 
4 D 2 None 5 8 40 
Design 
solutions 
(Provision of 
redundant 
equipment)/ 
Operator 
actions 
(Performance 
of proper 
maintenance 
on ground) 
- 
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Table 55 – Power Generation Subsystem failure modes criticality matrix 
LEVEL A – 
FREQUENT 
    
LEVEL B – 
REASONABLY 
PROBABLE 
    
LEVEL C – 
OCCASIONAL 
   
Mechanical failure (PWGSS1) 
Electrical failure (PWGSS2a) 
Chemical failure (PWGSS2b) 
LEVEL D – 
REMOTE 
   
Mechanical failure (PWGSS3a) 
Thermal failure (PWGSS3b) 
Chemical failure (PWGSS3c)  
Electrical failure (PWGSS3d) 
LEVEL E – 
EXTREMELY 
UNLIKELY 
   
 
 
 CATEGORY IV – MINOR CATEGORY III – MARGINAL CATEGORY II – CRITICAL  CATEGORY I – CATASTROPHIC 
 
 
Criticality increase 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Aerial segment 
Type of aerial segment:  
rotor wing aircraft  
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
 EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 56 – Subsystem: Flight Subsystem/Air Data Subsystem 
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Air probe 
Measurement 
of absolute and 
relative air 
pressure 
ADSS1 
Air probe 
clogging 
Ice/Dust 
2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
Inaccurate  
air data  
measurements 
Incorrect air 
data 
reported to 
computer 
System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 B 4 None 5 16 80 
Operator action 
(Performance of proper 
maintenance on 
ground) 
 
Air Data 
Unit 
Measurement 
and provision 
of airspeed and 
barometric 
altitude 
ADSS2a 
Incorrect 
signal 
Reduction of signal 
level/Impedance 
mismatch/Analogue 
to digital 
conversion failure 
2, 3, 4, 5, 
6, 7, 8 
Inaccurate  
air data 
measurement 
Incorrect 
air data 
reported to 
computer 
System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 A 5 None 5 20 100 
Design solutions 
(Provision of redundant 
GPS for altitude 
measurement)/ 
Operator action 
(Performance of proper 
maintenance on 
ground) 
- 
Air Data 
Unit 
Measurement 
and provision 
of airspeed and 
barometric 
altitude 
ADSS2b Loss of signal 
Chip failure/ 
Corrosion 
2, 3, 4, 5, 
6, 7, 8 
Inaccurate  
air data 
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Incorrect 
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reported to 
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i
c
 
4 A 5 None 5 20 100 
Design solutions 
(Provision of redundant 
GPS for altitude 
measurement)/ 
Operator action 
(Performance of proper 
maintenance on 
ground) 
- 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Aerial segment 
Type of aerial segment:  
rotor wing aircraft  
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
 EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 56 – Subsystem: Flight Subsystem/Air Data Subsystem (Cont’d) 
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Air Data 
Unit 
Measurement 
and provision 
of airspeed and 
barometric 
altitude 
ADSS2c 
Signal error 
along the 
transmission 
line 
Interference  
on the line 
2, 3, 4, 5, 
6, 7, 8 
Inaccurate  
air data 
measurement 
Incorrect 
air data 
reported to 
computer 
System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 C 3 None 5 12 60 
Design solutions 
(Provision of redundant 
GPS for altitude 
measurement)/ 
Operator action 
(Performance of proper 
maintenance on 
ground) 
- 
Air Data 
Unit 
Measurement 
and provision 
of airspeed and 
barometric 
altitude 
ADSS2d 
Error on 
output signal  
Error in the  
sensor algorithm 
2, 3, 4, 5, 
6, 7, 8 
Inaccurate  
air data 
measurement 
Incorrect 
air data 
reported to 
computer 
System loss 
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s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 C 3 None 5 12 60 
Design solutions 
(Provision of redundant 
GPS for altitude 
measurement)/ 
Operator action 
(Performance of proper 
maintenance on 
ground) 
- 
  
 287 
 
Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Aerial segment 
Type of aerial segment:  
rotor wing aircraft  
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
 EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 56 – Subsystem: Flight Subsystem/Air Data Subsystem (Cont’d) 
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Air Data 
Unit 
Measurement 
and provision 
of airspeed and 
barometric 
altitude 
ADSS2e 
Loss of  
power supply  
Failure in power 
supply/Mechanical 
disconnection from 
power supply 
2, 3, 4, 5, 
6, 7, 8 
Inaccurate  
air data 
measurement 
Incorrect 
air data 
reported to 
computer 
System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 A 5 None 5 20 100 
Design solutions 
(Provision of redundant 
GPS for altitude 
measurement)/ 
Operator action 
(Performance of proper 
maintenance on 
ground) 
- 
Air Data 
Unit 
Measurement 
and provision 
of airspeed and 
barometric 
altitude 
ADSS2f 
Calibration 
error  
Error in the  
sensor algorithm 
2, 3, 4, 5, 
6, 7, 8 
Inaccurate  
air data 
measurement 
Incorrect 
air data 
reported to 
computer 
System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 C 3 None 5 12 60 
Design solutions 
(Provision of redundant 
GPS for altitude 
measurement)/ 
Operator action 
(Performance of proper 
maintenance on 
ground) 
- 
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Table 57 – Air Data Subsystem failure modes criticality matrix 
LEVEL A – 
FREQUENT 
   
Incorrect signal (ADSS2a) 
Loss of signal (ADSS2b) 
Loss of power supply (ADSS2e) 
LEVEL B – 
REASONABLY 
PROBABLE 
   Air probe clogging (ADSS1) 
LEVEL C – 
OCCASIONAL 
   
Signal error along the 
transmission line (ADSS2c) 
Error on output signal (ADSS2d) 
Calibration error (ADSS2f) 
LEVEL D – 
REMOTE 
    
LEVEL E – 
EXTREMELY 
UNLIKELY 
    
 CATEGORY IV – MINOR CATEGORY III – MARGINAL CATEGORY II – CRITICAL  CATEGORY I – CATASTROPHIC 
  
Criticality increase 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Aerial segment 
Type of aerial segment:  
fixed wing RPAS 
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
150 kg < Weight < 600 kg EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 58 – Subsystem: Flight Subsystem/Flight Controls Subsystem 
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Control 
surface 
movement 
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FCSS1a Bias 
Poor rigging/ 
Slippage of gears/ 
Bent linkages [81] 
1, 2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8, 9 
Inaccurate 
servo unit 
positioning 
Low  
attitude 
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Mission loss 
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a
l
 
3 C 3 None 5 9 45 
Design 
solutions 
(provision of 
controller to 
compensate 
bias [81]) 
- 
Servo units 
Control 
surface 
movement 
actuation 
FCSS1b Stuck surface 
Damaged linkage/ 
Broken servo 
driveshaft/ 
Unbalanced surface 
[81] 
1, 2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8, 9 
Blocked 
surface 
No  
attitude 
control 
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4 D 2 None 5 8 40 
Operator 
actions 
(Performance 
of proper 
maintenance 
on ground) 
- 
Servo units 
Control 
surface 
movement 
actuation 
FCSS1c Hardover 
Broken linkage/ 
Broken servo 
driveshaft/ 
Unbalanced surface 
[81] 
1, 2, 3, 4, 
 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 
Blocked 
surface 
No  
attitude 
control 
System Loss 
C
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t
r
o
p
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i
c
 
4 D 2 None 5 8 40 
Operator 
actions 
(Performance 
of proper 
maintenance 
on ground) 
- 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Aerial segment 
Type of aerial segment:  
fixed wing RPAS 
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
150 kg < Weight < 600 kg EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 58 – Subsystem: Flight Subsystem/Flight Controls Subsystem (Cont’d) 
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Servo units 
Control 
surface 
movement 
actuation 
FCSS1d 
Floating 
surface 
Broken linkage/ 
Broken servo 
driveshaft [81] 
1, 2, 3, 4, 
5, 6, 7, 8, 9 
Inaccurate 
servo unit 
positioning 
Low  
attitude 
control 
System Loss 
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a
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o
p
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i
c
 
4 C 2 None 5 8 40 
Design 
solutions 
(provision of 
redundant 
equipment) 
- 
Servo units 
Control 
surface 
movement 
actuation 
FCSS1e 
Oscillatory 
modes 
Software 
bug/Faulted  
RxMux [81] 
1, 2, 3, 4, 
5, 6, 7, 8, 9 
Inaccurate 
servo unit 
positioning 
Low  
attitude 
control 
System Loss 
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4 D 2 None 5 8 40 
Design 
solutions 
(Design of a 
control robust 
against 
oscillatory 
modes [81])  
- 
Servo units 
Control 
surface 
movement 
actuation 
FCSS1f 
Increased dead 
band/stiction 
Slippage of gears/ 
Damaged servo 
driveshaft [81] 
1, 2, 3, 4, 
5, 6, 7, 8, 9 
Inaccurate 
servo unit 
positioning 
Low  
attitude 
control 
Mission 
degradation/ 
System Loss 
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o
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i
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4 D 2 None 5 8 40 
Design 
solutions 
(Design of a 
control robust 
against 
oscillatory 
modes [81])  
- 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Aerial segment 
Type of aerial segment:  
fixed wing RPAS 
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
150 kg < Weight < 600 kg EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 58 – Subsystem: Flight Subsystem/Flight Controls Subsystem (Cont’d) 
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Servo units 
Lift 
generation 
FCSS1g 
Structural 
damage 
Lack of preventive 
maintenance 
2, 3, 4, 
5, 6, 7, 8 
Blocked 
surface 
Complete 
lack of  
attitude 
control 
System Loss 
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4 E 1 None 5 4 20 
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actions 
(Performance 
of proper 
maintenance 
on ground) 
- 
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Table 59 – Flight Control Subsystem failure modes criticality matrix 
LEVEL A – 
FREQUENT 
    
LEVEL B – 
REASONABLY 
PROBABLE 
    
LEVEL C – 
OCCASIONAL 
   
Bias (FCSS1a) 
Floating surface (FCSS1d) 
LEVEL D – 
REMOTE 
   
Stuck surface (FCSS1b) 
Hardover (FCSS1c)  
Oscillatory modes (FCSS1e) 
Increased dead  
band/stiction (FCSS1f) 
LEVEL E – 
EXTREMELY 
UNLIKELY 
   Structural damage (FCSS2) 
 CATEGORY IV – MINOR CATEGORY III – MARGINAL CATEGORY II – CRITICAL  CATEGORY I – CATASTROPHIC 
 
 
Criticality increase 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Aerial segment 
Type of aerial segment:  
fixed wing RPAS 
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
150 kg < Weight < 600 kg EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 60 – Subsystem: Flight structures 
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Fuselage 
Lift 
generation 
Not applicable (N/A) 
Wings 
Lift 
generation 
Not applicable (N/A) 
Empennages 
Lift 
generation 
Not applicable (N/A) 
Landing gear 
Taxi/Take-
off/Landing 
Not applicable (N/A) 
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System definition: Hybrid RPAS (Hydrogen fuel cell + Electrical motor) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 35 – Hybrid RPAS 
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Mission phases: hybrid RPAS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 36 – Hybrid RPAS mission phases [80] 
 
 
Table 61 – RPAS mission phases [80] 
Item Mission phase name 
1 Taxi – Engines power on 
2 Take-off 
3 Climb 
4 Cruise 
5 Loiter – Use of payload in the mission area 
6 Cruise 
7 Descent 
8 Landing 
9 Taxi – Engines shutdown 
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Table 62 – Mission phases [80] 
RPAS Flight functionality 
potentially involved 
Mission phases (Hybrid RPAS (Electrical motor + Fuel cells) 
1, 2 3 4 5 6 7 8, 9 
Start-up subsystem X X X X X X X 
Structures X X X X X X X 
Landing gear subsystem X - - - - - X 
Hybrid Propulsion subsystem X X X X X X X 
Power subsystem X X X X X X X 
Flight Navigation subsystem - X X X X X - 
Flight Information subsystem - X X X X X - 
Flight control subsystem - X X X X X - 
Emergency flight subsystem - X X X X X - 
Mission data subsystem X X X X X X X 
Payload data subsystem - - - X - - - 
Communication Command and 
Control subsystem 
X X X X X X X 
Ground Control  
Station subsystem 
X X X X X X X 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Aerial segment 
Type of aerial segment:  
Hybrid fixed wing RPAS 
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
150 kg < Weight < 600 kg EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 63 – Subsystem: Hybrid Propulsion Subsystem (LiPo batteries + fuel cell) 
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Hydrogen tank 
Hydrogen 
(fuel) 
containment 
HPSS1a 
Structural 
damage 
Shock/ 
Vibrations/ 
Wrong seizing 
2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
Hydrogen 
leakage 
Loss of  
engine 
power 
System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 D 2 None 5 8 40 
Operator actions 
(Performance of proper 
maintenance on 
ground like periodical 
inspection) 
- 
Hydrogen tank 
Hydrogen 
(fuel) 
containment 
HPSS1b Leakage 
Shock/ 
Vibrations 
2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
Hydrogen 
leakage 
Loss of  
engine 
power 
System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 D 2 None 5 8 40 
Operator actions 
(Performance of proper 
maintenance on 
ground like periodical 
inspection) 
- 
Fuel cell 
Electrical 
current 
generation 
HPSS2a 
Membrane 
drying 
Wrong fuel cell 
thermal management 
(too high 
temperatures range) 
2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
Loss of  
fuel cell 
functionality 
Loss of 
engine 
functionality 
System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
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p
h
i
c
 
4 D 2 None 5 8 40 
Design solutions 
(Provision of redundant 
equipment) 
- 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Aerial segment 
Type of aerial segment:  
Hybrid fixed wing RPAS 
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
150 kg < Weight < 600 kg EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 63 – Subsystem: Hybrid Propulsion Subsystem (LiPo batteries + fuel cell) (Cont’d) 
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Fuel cell 
Electrical 
current 
generation 
HPSS2b 
Water 
condensation 
inhibition 
Wrong fuel cell 
thermal management 
(too low temperatures 
range) 
2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
Loss of  
fuel cell 
functionality 
Loss of 
engine 
functionality 
System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 D 2 None 5 8 40 
Design solutions 
(Provision of redundant 
equipment) 
- 
Hydrogen Fuel HPSS3 Fire 
Leakage/Accidental 
contact with oxidizing 
gas like oxygen or 
chlorine 
1, 2, 3, 4, 
5, 6, 7, 8, 
9 
- Fire System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 C 1 
Visual or audible 
warning devices 
1 4 4 
Operator actions 
(Performance of proper 
maintenance on 
ground like periodical 
inspection) 
- 
LiPo battery 
Electrical 
power 
generation 
HPSS4a Short circuit  
Heat/ 
External 
overheating/High rate 
operation (causing 
overheat)/   
Internal short circuit 
(hot spot)/ External 
short circuit/Over 
charge/Over discharge 
2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
Loss of 
battery 
Loss or 
decrease of 
electrical 
power/ 
Loss of thrust 
System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 C 3 
Visual or audible  
warning devices 
1 12 12 
Design solutions 
(Provision of redundant 
equipment) 
- 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Aerial segment 
Type of aerial segment:  
Hybrid fixed wing RPAS 
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
150 kg < Weight < 600 kg EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 63 – Subsystem: Hybrid Propulsion Subsystem (LiPo batteries + fuel cell) (Cont’d) 
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LiPo battery 
Electrical 
power 
generation 
HPSS4b 
Mechanical 
damage 
Crush/Nail 
Penetration/Drop/ 
Mechanical Shock/ 
Vibration /Water 
Immersion 
2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
Loss of 
battery 
Loss or 
decrease of 
electrical 
power/Loss 
of thrust 
System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 C 3 None 5 12 60 
Design solutions 
(Provision of redundant 
equipment) 
- 
LiPo battery 
Electrical 
power 
generation 
HPSS4c Fire 
Overheat/ 
Thermal ramp/Fire 
2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
Loss of 
battery 
Loss or 
decrease of 
electrical 
power/Loss 
of thrust 
System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 C 3 
Automatic  
sensing devices 
2 12 32 
Design solutions 
(Provision of redundant 
equipment) 
- 
DC  
power bus 
Selection of 
power 
source 
HPSS5 
Electrical 
failure 
Over voltage/ 
under voltage 
1, 2, 3, 4, 
5, 6, 7, 8, 
9 
- 
Loss or 
decrease of 
electrical 
power 
System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 C 3 None 2 9 18 
Design solutions 
(Provision of redundant 
equipment) 
- 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Aerial segment 
Type of aerial segment:  
Hybrid fixed wing RPAS 
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
150 kg < Weight < 600 kg EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 63 – Subsystem: Hybrid Propulsion Subsystem (LiPo batteries + fuel cell) (Cont’d) 
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DC to DC 
converter 
Voltage 
regulation 
HPSS6 
Internal  
components 
fault 
 Capacitors fault/ 
Transistors fault 
1, 2, 3, 4, 
5, 6, 7, 8, 
9 
- 
Loss or 
decrease of 
electrical 
power 
System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 C 3 None 2 9 18 
Operator actions 
(Performance of proper 
maintenance on 
ground) 
- 
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Table 64 – Hybrid Propulsion Subsystem failure modes criticality matrix 
LEVEL A – 
FREQUENT 
    
LEVEL B – 
REASONABLY 
PROBABLE 
    
LEVEL C – 
OCCASIONAL 
   
Fire (HPSS3) 
Short circuit (HPSS4a) 
Mechanical damage (HPSS4b) 
Fire (HPSS4c) 
Electrical failure (HPSS5) 
Internal components fault 
(HPSS6) 
LEVEL D – 
REMOTE 
   
Structural failure (HPSS1a) 
Leakage (HPSS1b) 
Membrane drying (HPSS2a) 
Water condensation  
inhibition (HPSS2b) 
LEVEL E – 
EXTREMELY 
UNLIKELY 
    
 CATEGORY IV – MINOR CATEGORY III – MARGINAL CATEGORY II – CRITICAL  CATEGORY I – CATASTROPHIC 
  
Criticality increase 
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System definition: Command and Control (C2) radio link. 
Mission phases: all. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 37 – Command and Control (C2) radio link [80]  
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Command and control (C2) link 
Type of aerial segment:  
Any 
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
150 kg < Weight < 600 kg EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
Table 65 – Subsystem: Command and Control Radio Link Subsystem 
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p
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Radio  
link signal 
Vehicle 
operational 
control (uplink) 
and monitoring 
(downlink) 
C2LSS1a Signal degradation 
Screening by 
terrain/ 
Weather 
interference/ 
Man-made 
unintentional 
interference 
(e.g. television 
broadcast)/ 
Malicious 
unlawful 
interference 
(jamming, 
spoofing)/ 
Vehicle out of 
range/ 
Network 
satellite 
failures/ 
Vehicle TX/RX 
equipment 
failure/ 
GCS TX/RX 
equipment 
failure/ 
Human error in 
the (frequency 
setting, 
switches) 
1, 2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8, 9 
- - System loss 
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t
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o
p
h
i
c
 
4 D 2 Visual or audible warning devices 1 8 8 
Design solutions 
(Provision of radio 
link frequency 
redundancy) 
- 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Command and control (C2) link 
Type of aerial segment:  
Any 
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
150 kg < Weight < 600 kg EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
Table 65 – Subsystem: Command and Control Radio Link Subsystem (Cont’d) 
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Radio  
link signal 
Vehicle 
operational 
control (uplink) 
and monitoring 
(downlink) 
C2LSS1b Signal loss 
Screening by 
terrain/ 
Weather 
interference/ 
Man-made 
unintentional 
interference 
(e.g. television 
broadcast)/ 
Malicious 
unlawful 
interference 
(jamming, 
spoofing)/ 
Vehicle out of 
range/ 
Network 
satellite 
failures/ 
Vehicle TX/RX 
equipment 
failure/ 
GCS TX/RX 
equipment 
failure/ 
Human error in 
the (frequency 
setting, 
switches) 
1, 2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8, 9 
- - System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 D 2 Visual or audible warning devices 1 8 8 
Design solutions 
(Provision of radio 
link frequency 
redundancy) 
- 
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Table 66 – Command and Control (C2) 
Radio Link Subsystem failure modes criticality matrix 
LEVEL A – 
FREQUENT 
    
LEVEL B – 
REASONABLY 
PROBABLE 
    
LEVEL C – 
OCCASIONAL 
    
LEVEL D – 
REMOTE 
   
C2 radio link  
signal degradation (C2LSS1a) 
C2 radio link  
signal loss (C2LSS1b) 
LEVEL E – 
EXTREMELY 
UNLIKELY 
    
 CATEGORY IV – MINOR CATEGORY III – MARGINAL CATEGORY II – CRITICAL  CATEGORY I – CATASTROPHIC 
 
Criticality increase 
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System definition: Ground Control Station 
Mission phases: all 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 38 – Ground Control Station [80] 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Ground Control Station 
Type of aerial segment:  
Any 
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
150 kg < Weight < 600 kg EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 67 – Subsystem: Ground Control Station Power Generation Subsystem 
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Ground 
generator 
Power 
generation 
GCSPWSS
1a 
Missed start 
Internal 
electrical/ 
mechanical 
failure 
1, 2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8, 9 
Loss of 
generator 
functionality 
Loss of 
Ground 
Control 
Station 
functionality 
System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 D 2 
Visual or audible  
warning devices 
1 8 8 
Design 
solutions 
(provision of an 
emergency 
redundant 
battery) 
- 
Ground 
generator 
Power 
generation 
GCSPWSS
1b 
Sudden stop 
Internal 
electrical/ 
mechanical 
failure 
1, 2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8, 9 
Loss of 
generator 
functionality 
Loss of 
Ground 
Control 
Station 
functionality 
System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 D 2 
Visual or audible  
warning devices 
1 8 8 
Design 
solutions 
(provision of an 
emergency 
redundant 
battery) 
- 
Ground 
emergency 
battery 
Power 
generation 
GCSPWSS
2a 
Low charge 
Frequent 
charge/ 
discharge 
cycles/ 
Corrosion/ 
Improper 
maintenance 
procedures 
1, 2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8, 9 
Loss of 
emergency 
battery 
functionality 
Loss of 
Ground 
Control 
Station 
functionality 
System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 E 1 
Visual or audible  
warning devices 
1 4 20 
Operator 
actions 
(emergency 
battery proper 
maintenance/ 
handling) 
- 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Ground Control Station 
Type of aerial segment:  
Any 
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
150 kg < Weight < 600 kg EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 67 – Subsystem: Ground Control Station Power Generation Subsystem (Cont’d) 
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Emergency 
battery 
Power 
generation 
GCSPWSS
2b 
Lack of charge 
Frequent 
charge/ 
discharge 
cycles/ 
Corrosion/ 
Improper 
maintenance 
procedures 
1, 2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8, 9 
Loss of 
emergency 
battery 
functionality 
Loss of 
Ground 
Control 
Station 
functionality 
System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 E 1 
Visual or audible  
warning devices 
1 4 20 
Operator 
actions 
(emergency 
battery proper 
maintenance/ 
handling) 
- 
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Table 68 – Ground Control System Power Generation Subsystem failure modes criticality matrix 
LEVEL A – 
FREQUENT 
    
LEVEL B – 
REASONABLY 
PROBABLE 
    
LEVEL C – 
OCCASIONAL 
    
LEVEL D – 
REMOTE 
   
Missed start (GCSPWSS1a) 
Sudden stop (GCSPWSS1b) 
LEVEL E – 
EXTREMELY 
UNLIKELY 
   
Emergency battery  
low charge (GCSPWSS2a) 
Emergency battery  
lack of charge (GCSPWSS2b) 
 CATEGORY IV – MINOR CATEGORY III – MARGINAL CATEGORY II – CRITICAL  CATEGORY I – CATASTROPHIC 
  
Criticality increase 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Ground Control Station 
Type of aerial segment:  
Any 
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
150 kg < Weight < 600 kg EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
Table 69 – Subsystem: Ground Control Station Start-up Subsystem 
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Power on switch 
Ground Control 
Station power 
on 
GCSSUSS1 Missed start 
Open circuit 
(oxidation non-
metallic or 
corrosive 
gaseous 
contamination 
creates open 
circuits 
by forming a 
surface film or 
oxidation)/Short 
circuits caused 
by mechanical 
failure/Loss of 
resilience of 
spring 
mechanisms 
(especially in 
momentary 
action switches) 
contamination 
or by physical 
blocks of the 
movement of 
mechanical 
elements)/ 
Mechanical 
wear of the 
switching 
elements 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5,  
6, 7, 8, 9 
Lack of 
Ground 
Control 
Station 
functionality 
- 
Impossibility to 
start and 
perform the 
mission M
i
n
o
r
 
1 E 1 None 5 1 5 
Design solutions 
(Provision of 
redundant 
equipment)/ 
Operator actions 
(Performance 
of proper 
maintenance 
on ground) 
- 
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Table 70 – Ground Control System Start-up Subsystem failure modes criticality matrix 
LEVEL A – 
FREQUENT 
    
LEVEL B – 
REASONABLY 
PROBABLE 
    
LEVEL C – 
OCCASIONAL 
    
LEVEL D – 
REMOTE 
    
LEVEL E – 
EXTREMELY 
UNLIKELY 
Power on switch  
missed start (GCSSUSS1) 
   
 CATEGORY IV – MINOR CATEGORY III – MARGINAL CATEGORY II – CRITICAL  CATEGORY I – CATASTROPHIC 
  
Criticality increase 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Ground Control Station 
Type of aerial segment:  
Any 
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
 EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 71 – Subsystem: Ground Control Station Human Machine Interface Subsystem 
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p
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Joystick 
Pitch, roll 
control of 
the aerial 
platform 
GCSHMISS1a 
Lack of 
calibration 
Human error 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5,  
6, 7, 8, 9 
Loss of 
pitch and 
roll 
attitude 
control of 
the aerial 
platform 
- System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 D 2 None 5 8 40 
Operator 
actions  
(use of FTS) 
- 
Joystick 
Pitch, roll 
control of 
the aerial 
platform 
GCSHMISS1b 
Software 
error  
Error during 
firmware/ 
software 
update 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5,  
6, 7, 8, 9 
Loss of 
pitch and 
roll 
attitude 
control of 
the aerial 
platform 
- System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 D 2 None 5 8 40 
Operator 
actions  
(use of FTS) 
- 
Joystick 
Pitch, roll 
control of 
the aerial 
platform 
GCSHMISS1c 
Missed 
start 
Physical 
disconnection/ 
Degradation of 
electrical 
power/Loss of 
electrical   
power 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5,  
6, 7, 8, 9 
Loss of 
pitch and 
roll 
attitude 
control of 
the aerial 
platform 
- System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 D 2 None 5 8 40 
Operator 
actions  
(use of FTS) 
- 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Ground Control Station 
Type of aerial segment:  
Any 
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
 EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 71 – Subsystem: Ground Control Station Human Machine Interface Subsystem (Cont’d) 
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Joystick 
Pitch, roll 
control of 
the aerial 
platform 
GCSHMISS1d 
Sudden 
stop 
Physical 
disconnection/ 
Degradation of 
electrical 
power/Loss of 
electrical power 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5,  
6, 7, 8, 9 
Loss of 
pitch and 
roll 
attitude 
control of 
the aerial 
platform 
- System loss 
C
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a
s
t
r
o
p
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i
c
 
4 D 2 None 5 8 40 
Operator 
actions  
(use of FTS) 
- 
Pedals 
Lateral 
control of 
the aerial 
platform 
(fixed wings 
air segment) 
GCSHMISS2a 
Lack of 
calibration 
Human error 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5,  
6, 7, 8, 9 
Loss of 
lateral 
attitude 
control of 
the aerial 
platform 
- System loss 
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a
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t
r
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p
h
i
c
 
4 D 2 None 5 8 40 
Operator 
actions  
(use of FTS) 
- 
Pedals 
Lateral 
control of 
the aerial 
platform 
(fixed wings 
air segment) 
GCSHMISS2b 
Software 
error  
Error during 
firmware/ 
software 
update 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5,  
6, 7, 8, 9 
Loss of 
lateral 
control of 
the aerial 
platform 
- System loss 
C
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a
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t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 D 2 None 5 8 40 
Operator 
actions  
(use of FTS) 
- 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Ground Control Station 
Type of aerial segment:  
Any 
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
 EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 71 – Subsystem: Ground Control Station Human Machine Interface Subsystem (Cont’d) 
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Pedals 
Lateral 
control of 
the aerial 
platform 
(fixed wings 
air segment) 
GCSHMISS2c 
Missed 
start 
Physical 
disconnection/ 
Degradation of 
electrical 
power/Loss of 
electrical   
power 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5,  
6, 7, 8, 9 
Loss of 
lateral 
control of 
the aerial 
platform 
- System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 D 2 None 5 8 40 
Operator 
actions  
(use of FTS) 
- 
Pedals 
Lateral 
control of 
the aerial 
platform 
(fixed wings 
air segment) 
GCSHMISS2d 
Sudden 
stop 
Physical 
disconnection/ 
Degradation of 
electrical 
power/Loss of 
electrical power 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5,  
6, 7, 8, 9 
Loss of 
lateral 
control of 
the aerial 
platform 
- System loss 
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t
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4 D 2 None 5 8 40 
Operator 
actions  
(use of FTS) 
- 
Throttle 
Thrust 
control 
GCSHMISS3a 
Lack of 
calibration 
Human error 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5,  
6, 7, 8, 9 
Loss of 
aerial 
platform 
thrust 
control 
- System loss 
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a
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t
r
o
p
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i
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4 D 2 None 5 8 40 
Operator 
actions  
(use of FTS) 
- 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Ground Control Station 
Type of aerial segment:  
Any 
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
 EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 71 – Subsystem: Ground Control Station Human Machine Interface Subsystem (Cont’d) 
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Thrust 
control 
GCSHMISS3b 
Software 
error  
Error during 
firmware/ 
software 
update 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5,  
6, 7, 8, 9 
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aerial 
platform 
thrust 
control 
- System loss 
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actions  
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Thrust 
control 
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start 
Physical 
disconnection/ 
Degradation of 
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power/Loss of 
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power 
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Loss of 
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actions  
(use of FTS) 
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Throttle 
Thrust 
control 
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Sudden 
stop 
Physical 
disconnection/ 
Degradation of 
electrical 
power/Loss of 
electrical power 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5,  
6, 7, 8, 9 
Loss of 
aerial 
platform 
thrust 
control 
- System loss 
C
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t
r
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p
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4 D 2 None 5 8 40 
Operator 
actions  
(use of FTS) 
- 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Ground Control Station 
Type of aerial segment:  
Any 
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
 EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 71 – Subsystem: Ground Control Station Human Machine Interface Subsystem (Cont’d) 
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Autopilot 
modes 
selection switch 
Selection of 
the autopilot 
flight mode 
GCSHMISS4a 
Mechanical 
failure 
Wear/ 
Improper 
installation 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5,  
6, 7, 8, 9 
Wrong or 
no 
selection 
of the 
proper 
autopilot 
flight 
mode 
- System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 D 2 None 5 8 40 
Operator 
actions  
(use of FTS) 
- 
Autopilot 
modes 
selection switch 
Selection of 
the autopilot 
flight mode 
GCSHMISS4b 
Electrical 
failure 
Open circuit/ 
Short circuit 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5,  
6, 7, 8, 9 
Wrong or 
no 
selection 
of the 
proper 
autopilot 
flight 
mode 
- System loss 
C
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t
a
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t
r
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p
h
i
c
 
4 D 2 None 5 8 40 
Operator 
actions  
(use of FTS) 
- 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Ground Control Station 
Type of aerial segment:  
Any 
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
 EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 71 – Subsystem: Ground Control Station Human Machine Interface Subsystem (Cont’d) 
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Autopilot 
modes 
selection switch 
Selection of 
the autopilot 
flight mode 
GCSHMISS4c 
Signal 
error 
Wrong  
signal input 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5,  
6, 7, 8, 9 
Wrong or 
no 
selection 
of the 
proper 
autopilot 
flight 
mode 
- System loss 
C
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t
r
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p
h
i
c
 
4 D 2 None 5 8 40 
Operator 
actions  
(use of FTS) 
- 
Ground Control 
Station 
management 
software 
GCS 
management 
GCSHMISS5 
Software 
error 
Software  
error 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5,  
6, 7, 8, 9 
- - System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
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p
h
i
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4 E 1 None 5 4 20 
Operator 
actions  
(use of FTS) 
- 
Displays 
Air segment 
subsystems 
and payload 
sensors 
monitoring 
GCSHMISS6a 
Lack of 
power 
supply  
Loss of 
electrical 
power 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5,  
6, 7, 8, 9 
Loss of 
equipment 
functionality 
- System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 D 2 None 5 8 40 
Operator 
actions  
(use of FTS) 
- 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Ground Control Station 
Type of aerial segment:  
Any 
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
 EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 71 – Subsystem: Ground Control Station Human Machine Interface Subsystem (Cont’d) 
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Displays 
Air segment 
subsystems 
and payload 
sensors 
monitoring 
GCSHMISS6b 
Software 
error 
Design 
mechanization 
error 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5,  
6, 7, 8, 9 
Loss of 
equipment 
functionality 
- System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 D 2 None 5 8 40 
Operator 
actions  
(use of FTS) 
- 
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Table 72 – Ground Control Station Human Machine Interface Subsystem failure modes criticality matrix 
LEVEL A – 
FREQUENT 
    
LEVEL B – 
REASONABLY 
PROBABLE 
    
LEVEL C – 
OCCASIONAL 
    
LEVEL D – 
REMOTE 
   
Lack of calibration (GCSHMISS1a) 
Software error (GCSHMISS1b) 
Joystick missed start (GCSHMISS1c) 
Joystick sudden stop (GCSHMISS1d) 
Lack of calibration (GCSHMISS2a) 
Software error (GCSHMISS2b) 
Missed start (GCSHMISS2c) 
Sudden stop (GCSHMISS2d) 
Lack of calibration (GCSHMISS3a) 
Software error (GCSHMISS3b) 
Throttle missed start (GCSHMISS3c) 
Throttle sudden stop (GCSHMISS3d) 
Mechanical failure (GCSHMISS4a) 
Electrical failure (GCSHMISS4b)  
Software error (GCSHMISS4c) 
Electrical failure (GCSHMISS6a)  
Software error (GCSHMISS6b) 
LEVEL E – 
EXTREMELY 
UNLIKELY 
   
Software error (GCSHMISS5) 
 
 CATEGORY IV – MINOR CATEGORY III – MARGINAL CATEGORY II – CRITICAL  CATEGORY I – CATASTROPHIC 
 
Criticality increase 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Ground Control Station 
Type of aerial segment:  
Any 
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
150 kg < Weight < 600 kg EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 73 – Subsystem: Ground Control Station Emergency Flight Termination HMI Subsystem 
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FTS 
 command 
switch 
Flight 
Termination 
System (FTS) 
activation  
GCSEFTSS1 
Mechanical 
failure 
Wear 
2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
No 
activation 
of FTS 
- System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 E 1 
Visual or audible  
warning devices 
1 4 4 
Operator actions 
(Performance 
of proper 
maintenance 
on ground) 
- 
Parachute 
deployment 
command 
switch 
Emergency 
parachute 
deployment 
activation  
GCSEFTSS2 
Mechanical 
failure 
Wear 
2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
No 
deployment 
of the safety 
parachute 
- System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 E 1 
Visual or audible  
warning devices 
1 4 4 
Operator actions 
(Performance 
of proper 
maintenance 
on ground) 
- 
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Table 74 – Ground Control Station Emergency Flight Termination HMI Subsystem failure modes criticality matrix 
LEVEL A – 
FREQUENT 
    
LEVEL B – 
REASONABLY 
PROBABLE 
    
LEVEL C – 
OCCASIONAL 
    
LEVEL D – 
REMOTE 
    
LEVEL E – 
EXTREMELY 
UNLIKELY 
   
Mechanical failure (GCSEFTSS1) 
Mechanical failure (GCSEFTSS2) 
 CATEGORY IV – MINOR CATEGORY III – MARGINAL CATEGORY II – CRITICAL  CATEGORY I – CATASTROPHIC 
 
Criticality increase 
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Type of aerial segment:  
Any 
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
150 kg < Weight < 600 kg EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 75 – Subsystem: Ground Control Station Payload Sensors HMI Subsystem 
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Photo/ 
Video cameras 
command and 
control switch 
Photo/ 
Video 
functionalities 
management  
GCSPYS
SS1 
Mechanical 
failure 
Wear 
2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
No photo/ 
Video 
camera 
activation 
- - 
M
i
n
o
r
 
1 D 2 None 5 1 5 
Operator 
actions  
(Performance 
of proper 
maintenance 
on ground) 
- 
Other sensors 
command and 
control switch 
Other sensors 
functionalities 
management  
GCSPYS
SS2 
Mechanical 
failure 
Wear 
2, 3, 4,  
5, 6, 7, 8 
No 
payload 
other 
sensors 
activation 
- - 
M
i
n
o
r
 
1 D 2 None 5 1 5 
Operator 
actions  
(Performance 
of proper 
maintenance 
on ground) 
- 
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Table 76 – Ground Control Station Payload Sensors HMI Subsystem failure modes criticality matrix 
LEVEL A – 
FREQUENT 
 
 
 
 
 
  
LEVEL B – 
REASONABLY 
PROBABLE 
    
LEVEL C – 
OCCASIONAL 
    
LEVEL D – 
REMOTE 
Mechanical failure (GCSPYSSS1a) 
Mechanical failure (GCSPYSSS2a) 
   
LEVEL E – 
EXTREMELY 
UNLIKELY 
    
 CATEGORY IV – MINOR CATEGORY III – MARGINAL CATEGORY II – CRITICAL  CATEGORY I – CATASTROPHIC 
  
Criticality increase 
 324 
 
Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Ground Control Station 
Type of aerial segment:  
Any 
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
150 kg < Weight < 600 kg EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 77 – Subsystem: Ground Control Station Communication Subsystem 
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GCS 
transmitting 
antenna 
To send 
telemetry 
data to the 
ground 
segment  
GCSCSS1a 
The 
transmitting 
antenna cannot 
process the 
control signal  
Lack of power 
supply/ 
Failure in the 
electrical 
system/ 
Antenna 
intermitted 
1,2,3,4, 
5,6,7,8,9 
- - System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 D 2 None 5 8 40 
Design Solution 
(Provision of 
redundant 
equipment) 
- 
GCS 
transmitting 
antenna 
To send 
telemetry 
data to the 
ground 
segment  
GCSCSS1b 
transmitting 
antenna fade  
RPA shape 
and flight 
attitude/RPA 
airframe 
material 
1,2,3,4, 
5,6,7,8,9 
- - System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 C 3 None 5 12 60 
Design Solution 
(Provision of 
redundant 
equipment) 
- 
GCS  
receiving 
antenna 
To receive 
the flight 
commands 
from the 
aerial 
segment 
GCSCSS2a 
The receiving 
antenna cannot 
process the 
control signals 
Lack of power 
supply/ 
Failure in the 
electrical 
system/ 
Antenna 
intermitted 
1,2,3,4, 
5,6,7,8,9 
- - System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 D 2 None 5 8 40 
Design Solution 
(Provision of 
redundant 
equipment) 
- 
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Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems FMECA 
System name: Ground Control Station 
Type of aerial segment:  
Any 
EASA Weight class A1 
 < 250 g 
and  < 80 J  
or < 900 g 
25 kg < Weight < 150 kg 
150 kg < Weight < 600 kg EASA Weight class A2 < 4 kg 
EASA Weight class A3 < 25 kg 
 
Table 77  – Subsystem: Ground Control Station Communication Subsystem (Cont’d) 
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GCS  
receiving 
antenna 
To send 
telemetry 
data to the 
ground 
segment  
GCSCSS2b 
Receiving 
antenna fade  
RPA shape 
and flight 
attitude/RPA 
airframe 
material 
1,2,3,4, 
5,6,7,8,9 
- - System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 C 3 None 5 12 60 
Design Solution 
(Provision of 
redundant 
equipment) 
- 
GCS channel 
with ATC 
To interface 
with ATC 
operators 
during flight 
sorties 
GCS 
CSS3 
Lack of 
communication 
with ATC 
Lack of power 
supply/ 
Failure in the 
electrical 
system/ 
Antenna 
intermitted 
1,2,3,4, 
5,6,7,8,9 
- - 
Mission 
degradation/ 
System loss 
C
a
t
a
s
t
r
o
p
h
i
c
 
4 C 3 
Visual or audible  
warning devices 
1 8 16 
Design 
solutions 
(Redundant 
equipment) 
- 
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Table 78 – Ground Control Station Communication Subsystem failure modes criticality matrix 
LEVEL A – 
FREQUENT 
    
LEVEL B – 
REASONABLY 
PROBABLE 
    
LEVEL C – 
OCCASIONAL 
   
Transmitting antenna  
fade (CSS1b) 
Receiving antenna  
fade (CSS2b) 
Lack of communication with 
ATC  (GCSCSS3) 
LEVEL D – 
REMOTE 
   
The transmitting antenna 
cannot process the control 
signal (CSS1a) 
The receiving antenna cannot 
process the control signal 
(CSS2a) 
LEVEL E – 
EXTREMELY 
UNLIKELY 
    
 CATEGORY IV – MINOR CATEGORY III – MARGINAL CATEGORY II – CRITICAL  CATEGORY I – CATASTROPHIC 
 
  
Criticality increase 
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Table 79 – FMECA probability of occurrence determination: data that has been used (when available) and their origin (references) 
Failure  
mode code 
Failure mode 
definition 
Estimated 
component 
specific failure 
mode rate of 
occurrence  
(from 
literature, 
when 
available) 
[failures per 
million hours] 
Estimated 
overall 
component 
basic failure 
rate  
(from 
literature, 
when 
available) 
[failures per 
million hours] 
Corrective 
factor 
applicable  
for RPAS 
technology 
level  
(from [64]) 
Corrected 
estimated 
component 
specific failure 
mode rate of 
occurrence  
[failures per 
million hours] 
Corrected 
estimated 
overall 
component 
basic failure 
rate  
[failures per 
million hours] 
Expected 
duration of a 
standard 
RPAS flight 
mission  
[hours] [64] 
Reliability with 
respect to the 
specific failure 
mode 
Reliability with 
respect to the 
overall 
component 
failure mode 
Specific  
failure mode 
probability of 
occurrence 
Overall 
component 
failure 
probability of 
occurrence 
Failure 
mode 
frequency of 
occurrence 
as for  
MIL-STD-
1629Rev.A 
Estimated 
component 
failure mode 
probability of 
occurrence 
level as for  
MIL-STD-
1629Rev.A 
AERIAL SEGMENT 
ROTOR WING RPAS 
PROPULSION SUBSYSTEM 
ESC 
PSS1a ESC seizing - - - - - - - - - - - 
C ([57],  
item B.2a) 
PSS1b 
ESC 
degradation 
0,120 [53] - 29,315 [68] 3,518 - 2 0,999 - 7,036E-06 - 0,0281 C 
PSS1c 
ESC 
overheating 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
C ([57], 
item B.2a) 
PSS1d ESC burnout - - - - 
1,25E+02 
([58], figure 6) 
2 - 0,999 - 2,50E-04 - 
C ([57], 
item B.2a, 
item B.2d) 
 ESC             
BRUSHLESS ELECTRIC MOTOR 
PSS2a 
Cranked  
stator 
housing 
0,001 [53] - 29,315 [68] 0,029 - 2 0,999 - 5,863E-08 - 0,0014 D 
PSS2b Worn bearings - - - - - - - - - - - 
C ([57],  
tem B.3a) 
PSS2c1 
Windings  
open circuit 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
D ([57],  
item B.3-c) 
PSS2c2 
Windings  
Short circuit 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
D ([57],  
item B.3-c) 
PSS2d 
Armature shaft 
structural 
damage 
- - - - - - - - - - - D 
 
Electric 
brushless 
motor 
- 2,13E+01 [58] - - - 2 0,999 - - 4,250E-05 -  
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Table 79 – FMECA probability of occurrence determination: data that has been used (when available) and their origin (references) (Cont’d) 
Failure  
mode code 
Failure mode 
definition 
Estimated 
component 
specific failure 
mode rate of 
occurrence  
(from 
literature, 
when 
available) 
[failures per 
million hours] 
Estimated 
overall 
component 
basic failure 
rate  
(from 
literature, 
when 
available) 
[failures per 
million hours] 
Corrective 
factor 
applicable  
for RPAS 
technology 
level  
(from [64]) 
Corrected 
estimated 
component 
specific failure 
mode rate of 
occurrence  
[failures per 
million hours] 
Corrected 
estimated 
overall 
component 
basic failure 
rate  
[failures per 
million hours] 
Expected 
duration of a 
standard 
RPAS flight 
mission  
[hours] [64] 
Reliability with 
respect to the 
specific failure 
mode 
Reliability with 
respect to the 
overall 
component 
failure mode 
Specific  
failure mode 
probability of 
occurrence 
Overall 
component 
failure 
probability of 
occurrence 
Failure 
mode 
frequency of 
occurrence 
as for  
MIL-STD-
1629Rev.A 
Estimated 
component 
failure mode 
probability of 
occurrence 
level as for  
MIL-STD-
1629Rev.A 
PROPELLER 
PSS3a 
Propeller 
structural 
failure 
- - - - - - - - - - - E [57] 
PSS3b 
Propeller 
connection 
failure 
- - - - - - - - - - - D[57] 
PSS3c 
Abrupt stop of 
the propeller 
- - - - - - - - - - - E [57] 
POWER SUBSYSTEM 
LIPO BATTERIES 
PWSS1a Short circuit - - - - - - - - - - - 
C ([57], 
item B.1a, 
item B.1b) 
PWSS1b 
Mechanical 
failure 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
C ([57], 
item B.1b) 
PWSS1c Fire - - - - - - - - - - - 
C ([57], 
item B.1b) 
ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM 
BALANCE CABLES 
ESS1a Open circuit 0,03 [64] -  1 0,03 - 2 0,99999994 - 6E-08 - 0,047846919 C 
ESS1b Short circuit 10 [64] - 1 10 - 2 0,99998 - 1,99998E-05 - 15,94881383 A 
 Balance cable -- 0,627 [52] 1 - 0,627 2 - 0,999998746 - 1,254E-06 -  
DISTRIBUTION CABLES 
ESS2a Open circuit 0,03 [64] - 1 0,03 - 2 0,99999994 - 6E-08 - 0,047846919 C 
ESS2b Short circuit 10 [64] - 1 10 - 2 0,99998 - 1,99998E-05 - 15,94881383 A 
 Balance cable -- 0,627 [52] 1 - 0,627 2 - 0,999998746 - 1,254E-06 -  
CONNECTORS ARC 
ESS3 - - - - - - - - - - - - C 
NAVIGATION SUBSYSTEM 
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Table 79 – FMECA probability of occurrence determination: data that has been used (when available) and their origin (references) (Cont’d) 
Failure  
mode code 
Failure mode 
definition 
Estimated 
component 
specific failure 
mode rate of 
occurrence  
(from 
literature, 
when 
available) 
[failures per 
million hours] 
Estimated 
overall 
component 
basic failure 
rate  
(from 
literature, 
when 
available) 
[failures per 
million hours] 
Corrective 
factor 
applicable  
for RPAS 
technology 
level  
(from [64]) 
Corrected 
estimated 
component 
specific failure 
mode rate of 
occurrence  
[failures per 
million hours] 
Corrected 
estimated 
overall 
component 
basic failure 
rate  
[failures per 
million hours] 
Expected 
duration of a 
standard 
RPAS flight 
mission  
[hours] [64] 
Reliability with 
respect to the 
specific failure 
mode 
Reliability with 
respect to the 
overall 
component 
failure mode 
Specific  
failure mode 
probability of 
occurrence 
Overall 
component 
failure 
probability of 
occurrence 
Failure 
mode 
frequency of 
occurrence 
as for  
MIL-STD-
1629Rev.A 
Estimated 
component 
failure mode 
probability of 
occurrence 
level as for  
MIL-STD-
1629Rev.A 
INERTIAL MEASUREMENT UNIT (IMU) 
NSS1a 
Circuitry 
overload 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
D ([57],  
item D.6-a) 
NSS1b Calibration loss            
D ([57],  
item D.6-b) 
NSS1b Calibration loss - - - - - - - - - - - 
C ([54],  
item D.6-b) 
GPS 
NSS2a 
Failure of  
GPS receiver 
- - - - - - - 1,0E-04 [68] 4,294E-04 - - E 
NSS2b 
GPS signal 
jamming 
- - - - - - - 1,0E-13 [68] 4,294E-13 - - E 
NSS2c 
GPS signal 
spoofing 
- - - - - - - - - - - B 
 GPS  6000 [69] 22,0952381  132571,4291 2  0,767  0,233   
EGNOS 
NSS2a 
EGNOS 
receiver failure 
9,04 [74] - 22,095 [58] 199,741 - 2 0,999 - 3,994E-04 - 0,361727521 A 
NSS2b 
Loss of  
EGNOS signal 
continuity 
9,04E-06 [73] - - - - - 4,0E-06 - - - 0,00362269 D 
NSS2c 
Loss of EGNOS 
signal integrity 
1,0E-09 [72] - - - - - 1,0E-09 - - - 9,05673E-07 E 
NSS2d 
EGNOS  
signal delay 
3,2E-06 [74] - - - - - 3,2E-06 - - - 0,002898152 D 
 EGNOS  25 [73] 22,095 [58]  552,381 2  0,999  1,1E-03   
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Table 79 – FMECA probability of occurrence determination: data that has been used (when available) and their origin (references) (Cont’d) 
Failure  
mode code 
Failure mode 
definition 
Estimated 
component 
specific failure 
mode rate of 
occurrence  
(from 
literature, 
when 
available) 
[failures per 
million hours] 
Estimated 
overall 
component 
basic failure 
rate  
(from 
literature, 
when 
available) 
[failures per 
million hours] 
Corrective 
factor 
applicable  
for RPAS 
technology 
level  
(from [64]) 
Corrected 
estimated 
component 
specific failure 
mode rate of 
occurrence  
[failures per 
million hours] 
Corrected 
estimated 
overall 
component 
basic failure 
rate  
[failures per 
million hours] 
Expected 
duration of a 
standard 
RPAS flight 
mission  
[hours] [64] 
Reliability with 
respect to the 
specific failure 
mode 
Reliability with 
respect to the 
overall 
component 
failure mode 
Specific  
failure mode 
probability of 
occurrence 
Overall 
component 
failure 
probability of 
occurrence 
Failure 
mode 
frequency of 
occurrence 
as for  
MIL-STD-
1629Rev.A 
Estimated 
component 
failure mode 
probability of 
occurrence 
level as for  
MIL-STD-
1629Rev.A 
ADS-B 
NSS4a 
Loss of  
EGNOS 
position 
accuracy 
- - - - - - - - 0,05 [68] - 22,65431955 A 
NSS4b 
EGNOS 
receiver  
unit failure 
9,04 [NSS4b] - 22,0952381 199,7409524 - 2 0,999600598 - 0,000399402 - 0,180963666 B 
NSS4c 
ADS_B out  
antenna failure 
- - - - - - - - 0,0001 [68] - 0,045308639 C 
NSS4d 
ADS_B out 
antenna 
deterioration 
- - - - - - - - 0,0012 [68] - 0,543703669 B 
NSS4e 
Signal 
interruption 
- - - - - - - - 0,01 [68] - 4,53086391 A 
NSS4f 
Emitter/ 
transponder 
failure 
- - - - - - - - 0,0001 [68] - 0,045308639 B 
NSS4g 
Erroneous 
altitude data 
- - - - - - - - 1E-13 [68] - 4,53086E-11 E 
NSS4h 
Data  
encoding error 
- - - - - - - - 1E-13 [68] - 4,53086E-11 E 
NSS4i 
Intentional/ 
unintentional 
jamming of 
ADS-B signal 
- - - - - - - - 1E-13 [68] - 4,53086E-11 E 
NSS4l 
Lack of  
ADS-B service 
- - - - - - - - 1E-13 [68] - 4,53086E-11 E 
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Table 79 – FMECA probability of occurrence determination: data that has been used (when available) and their origin (references) (Cont’d) 
Failure  
mode code 
Failure mode 
definition 
Estimated 
component 
specific failure 
mode rate of 
occurrence  
(from 
literature, 
when 
available) 
[failures per 
million hours] 
Estimated 
overall 
component 
basic failure 
rate  
(from 
literature, 
when 
available) 
[failures per 
million hours] 
Corrective 
factor 
applicable  
for RPAS 
technology 
level  
(from [64]) 
Corrected 
estimated 
component 
specific failure 
mode rate of 
occurrence  
[failures per 
million hours] 
Corrected 
estimated 
overall 
component 
basic failure 
rate  
[failures per 
million hours] 
Expected 
duration of a 
standard 
RPAS flight 
mission  
[hours] [64] 
Reliability with 
respect to the 
specific failure 
mode 
Reliability with 
respect to the 
overall 
component 
failure mode 
Specific  
failure mode 
probability of 
occurrence 
Overall 
component 
failure 
probability of 
occurrence 
Failure 
mode 
frequency of 
occurrence 
as for  
MIL-STD-
1629Rev.A 
Estimated 
component 
failure mode 
probability of 
occurrence 
level as for  
MIL-STD-
1629Rev.A 
NSS4m 
Inaccurate 
position datum 
sent to the 
ADS-B emitter 
- - - - - - - - 0,05 [68] - 22,65431955 A 
NSS4n 
Degradation of 
accuracy and 
integrity of 
data sent by 
the satellite to 
the ADS-B 
- - - - - - - - 
0,000000001 
[72] 
- 4,53086E-07 E 
NSS4o 
Failure of  
ADS-B 
transponder/ 
emitter on 
the RPA 
- - - - - - - - 0,0001 [68] - 0,045308639 C 
NSS4p 
Failure in 
detection of 
maneuvering 
aircraft/RPA 
- - - - - - - - 0,0012 [68] - 0,543703669 A 
NSS4q 
Sudden loss of 
ADS-B data to 
ATC controllers 
without any 
notification 
- - - - - - - - 0,00001 [68] - 0,004530864 D 
NSS4r 
ADSB-IN 
receiving 
antenna 
deterioration 
- - - - - - - - 0,0001 [68] - 0,045308639 D 
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Table 79 – FMECA probability of occurrence determination: data that has been used (when available) and their origin (references) (Cont’d) 
Failure  
mode code 
Failure mode 
definition 
Estimated 
component 
specific failure 
mode rate of 
occurrence  
(from 
literature, 
when 
available) 
[failures per 
million hours] 
Estimated 
overall 
component 
basic failure 
rate  
(from 
literature, 
when 
available) 
[failures per 
million hours] 
Corrective 
factor 
applicable  
for RPAS 
technology 
level  
(from [64]) 
Corrected 
estimated 
component 
specific failure 
mode rate of 
occurrence  
[failures per 
million hours] 
Corrected 
estimated 
overall 
component 
basic failure 
rate  
[failures per 
million hours] 
Expected 
duration of a 
standard 
RPAS flight 
mission  
[hours] [64] 
Reliability with 
respect to the 
specific failure 
mode 
Reliability with 
respect to the 
overall 
component 
failure mode 
Specific  
failure mode 
probability of 
occurrence 
Overall 
component 
failure 
probability of 
occurrence 
Failure 
mode 
frequency of 
occurrence 
as for  
MIL-STD-
1629Rev.A 
Estimated 
component 
failure mode 
probability of 
occurrence 
level as for  
MIL-STD-
1629Rev.A 
NSS4s 
ADS-B ground 
station failure 
- - - - - - - - 0,00013 [68] -- 0,058901231 D 
NSS4t 
Performance  
of wrong  
pre-flight 
procedures  
on ADS-B 
- - - - - - - - 0,0002 [68] - 0,090617278 C 
 ADS_B - 50 [76] 22,0952381 - 1104,762 - 2 0,998 - 2,2E-03 -  
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM 
AIR DATA UNIT 
ADSS1a Incorrect signal 2 [53] - 
22,0952381 
[58] 
44,19047619 - 2 0,999911623 - 8,8377E-05 - 0,800008838 A 
ADSS1b Loss of signal 2 [53] - 
22,0952381 
[58] 
44,19047619 - 2 0,999911623 - 8,8377E-05 - 0,8000038 A 
ADSS1c 
Signal error 
along the 
transmission 
line 
0,0416 [54] - 
22,0952381 
[58] 
0,919161905 - 2 0,999998162 - 1,83832E-06 - 0,016640904 C 
ADSS1d 
Error on output 
signal 
0,088 [54] - 
22,0952381 
[58] 
1,944380952 - 2 0,999996111 - 3,88875E-06 - 0,035201876 C 
ADSS1e 
Loss of  
power supply 
3,9453 [52] - 
29,32432432 
[58] 
115,6932568 - 2 0,99976864 - 0,00023136 - 2,094320277 A 
ADSS1f 
Calibration 
error 
0,088 [58] - 
22,0952381 
[58] 
1,944380952 - 2 0,999996111 - 3,88875E-06 - 0,035201876 C 
 Air Data Unit - 2,5 [77] 
22,0952381 
[58] 
- 55,23809524 2 - 0,99988953 - 0,00011047 -  
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Table 79 – FMECA probability of occurrence determination: data that has been used (when available) and their origin (references) (Cont’d) 
Failure  
mode code 
Failure mode 
definition 
Estimated 
component 
specific failure 
mode rate of 
occurrence  
(from 
literature, 
when 
available) 
[failures per 
million hours] 
Estimated 
overall 
component 
basic failure 
rate  
(from 
literature, 
when 
available) 
[failures per 
million hours] 
Corrective 
factor 
applicable  
for RPAS 
technology 
level  
(from [64]) 
Corrected 
estimated 
component 
specific failure 
mode rate of 
occurrence  
[failures per 
million hours] 
Corrected 
estimated 
overall 
component 
basic failure 
rate  
[failures per 
million hours] 
Expected 
duration of a 
standard 
RPAS flight 
mission  
[hours] [64] 
Reliability with 
respect to the 
specific failure 
mode 
Reliability with 
respect to the 
overall 
component 
failure mode 
Specific  
failure mode 
probability of 
occurrence 
Overall 
component 
failure 
probability of 
occurrence 
Failure 
mode 
frequency of 
occurrence 
as for  
MIL-STD-
1629Rev.A 
Estimated 
component 
failure mode 
probability of 
occurrence 
level as for  
MIL-STD-
1629Rev.A 
FLIGHT CONTROL SUBSYSTEM 
AUTOPILOT 
FCSS1a 
Failure of weak 
joint 
- - - - - - - - - - - D 
FCSS1a 
Lack of power 
supply 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
D ([57),  
item D.5-b) 
FCSS1a Software error - - - - - - - - - - - D 
DETECT AND AVOID 
FCSS2a 
ADS-B IN 
receiving 
antenna 
deterioration 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
C (Ref.  
item NSS4r) 
FCSS2b 
EGNOS 
receiver failure 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
A (Ref.  
item NSS3a) 
FCSS2c 
Erroneous 
altitude data 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
E (Ref.  
item NSS4g) 
EMERGENCY FLIGHT SUBSYSTEM 
FLIGHT TERMINATION SYSTEM 
EFSS1a 
Loss of 
dedicated 
radio link 
- - - - - - - - - - - C 
EFSS1b 
Lack of 
functionality 
- - - - - - - - - - - D 
EFSS1c 
Unlawful 
interference on 
dedicated 
radio link 
(jamming) 
- - - - - - - - - - - B 
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Table 79 – FMECA probability of occurrence determination: data that has been used (when available) and their origin (references) (Cont’d) 
Failure  
mode code 
Failure mode 
definition 
Estimated 
component 
specific failure 
mode rate of 
occurrence  
(from 
literature, 
when 
available) 
[failures per 
million hours] 
Estimated 
overall 
component 
basic failure 
rate  
(from 
literature, 
when 
available) 
[failures per 
million hours] 
Corrective 
factor 
applicable  
for RPAS 
technology 
level  
(from [64]) 
Corrected 
estimated 
component 
specific failure 
mode rate of 
occurrence  
[failures per 
million hours] 
Corrected 
estimated 
overall 
component 
basic failure 
rate  
[failures per 
million hours] 
Expected 
duration of a 
standard 
RPAS flight 
mission  
[hours] [64] 
Reliability with 
respect to the 
specific failure 
mode 
Reliability with 
respect to the 
overall 
component 
failure mode 
Specific  
failure mode 
probability of 
occurrence 
Overall 
component 
failure 
probability of 
occurrence 
Failure 
mode 
frequency of 
occurrence 
as for  
MIL-STD-
1629Rev.A 
Estimated 
component 
failure mode 
probability of 
occurrence 
level as for  
MIL-STD-
1629Rev.A 
EMERGENCY PARACHUTE 
EFSS2a 
Loss of 
dedicated 
radio link 
- - - - - - - - - - - C 
EFSS2b 
Lack of 
functionality 
- - - - - - - - - - - D 
EFSS2c 
Unlawful 
interference on 
dedicated 
radio link 
(jamming) 
- - - - - - - - - - - B 
MISSION CONTROL SUBSYSTEM 
MISSION DAA STORAGE UNIT 
MC1a 
Loss of mission 
software 
- - - - - - - - - - - C 
MC1b 
Physical unit 
degradation 
- - - - - - - - - - - C 
MISSION PAYLOAD SENSOR SUBSYSTEM 
PHOTO7VIDEO CAMERA SENSORS 
MC1a 
Payload 
Photo/video 
camera sensors 
failure 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
D (57,  
item D.13a, 
D13-b) 
MC1b 
Other sensors 
failure 
- - - - - - - - - - - D 
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Table 79 – FMECA probability of occurrence determination: data that has been used (when available) and their origin (references) (Cont’d) 
Failure  
mode code 
Failure mode 
definition 
Estimated 
component 
specific failure 
mode rate of 
occurrence  
(from 
literature, 
when 
available) 
[failures per 
million hours] 
Estimated 
overall 
component 
basic failure 
rate  
(from 
literature, 
when 
available) 
[failures per 
million hours] 
Corrective 
factor 
applicable  
for RPAS 
technology 
level  
(from [64]) 
Corrected 
estimated 
component 
specific failure 
mode rate of 
occurrence  
[failures per 
million hours] 
Corrected 
estimated 
overall 
component 
basic failure 
rate  
[failures per 
million hours] 
Expected 
duration of a 
standard 
RPAS flight 
mission  
[hours] [64] 
Reliability with 
respect to the 
specific failure 
mode 
Reliability with 
respect to the 
overall 
component 
failure mode 
Specific  
failure mode 
probability of 
occurrence 
Overall 
component 
failure 
probability of 
occurrence 
Failure 
mode 
frequency of 
occurrence 
as for  
MIL-STD-
1629Rev.A 
Estimated 
component 
failure mode 
probability of 
occurrence 
level as for  
MIL-STD-
1629Rev.A 
COMMUNICATION SUBSYSTEM 
ON BOARD TRANSMITTER ANTENNA 
CSS1a 
The 
transmitter 
antenna 
cannot process 
the control 
signal 
- - - - - - - - - - - D 
CSS1b 
Transmitter 
antenna fade 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
C (57],  
item D.7-d) 
ON BOARD RECEIVING ANTENNA 
CSS2a 
The receiver 
antenna 
cannot process 
the control 
signal 
- - - - - - - - - - - D 
CSS2b 
Receiver 
antenna fade 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
C (57],  
item D.7-d) 
STRUCTURES 
- 
FIXED WING RPAS 
PROPULSION SUBSYSTEM (JET TYPE) 
ENGINE CONTROL UNIT 
PSCE1a Software error - - - - - - - - - - - D [80] 
PSCE1b 
Mechanical 
failure 
- - - - - - - - - - - B [80] 
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Table 79 – FMECA probability of occurrence determination: data that has been used (when available) and their origin (references) (Cont’d) 
Failure  
mode code 
Failure mode 
definition 
Estimated 
component 
specific failure 
mode rate of 
occurrence  
(from 
literature, 
when 
available) 
[failures per 
million hours] 
Estimated 
overall 
component 
basic failure 
rate  
(from 
literature, 
when 
available) 
[failures per 
million hours] 
Corrective 
factor 
applicable  
for RPAS 
technology 
level  
(from [64]) 
Corrected 
estimated 
component 
specific failure 
mode rate of 
occurrence  
[failures per 
million hours] 
Corrected 
estimated 
overall 
component 
basic failure 
rate  
[failures per 
million hours] 
Expected 
duration of a 
standard 
RPAS flight 
mission  
[hours] [64] 
Reliability with 
respect to the 
specific failure 
mode 
Reliability with 
respect to the 
overall 
component 
failure mode 
Specific  
failure mode 
probability of 
occurrence 
Overall 
component 
failure 
probability of 
occurrence 
Failure 
mode 
frequency of 
occurrence 
as for  
MIL-STD-
1629Rev.A 
Estimated 
component 
failure mode 
probability of 
occurrence 
level as for  
MIL-STD-
1629Rev.A 
PSCE1c 
Loss of on 
board 
computer 
- - - - - - - - - - - E [80] 
PSCE1d 
Carburetor 
failure 
- - - - - - - - - - - C [80] 
(JET) ENGINE 
PSCE2a 
Engine control 
system failure 
- - - - - - - - - - - D [80] 
PSCE2b 
Mechanical 
failure 
- - - - - - - - - - - B [80] 
PSCE2c Engine fire - - - - - - - - - - - E [80] 
PSCE2d Human error - - - - - - - - - - - C [80] 
PROPELLER 
PSCEP3a 
Propeller 
structural 
failure 
- - - - - - - - - - - E [80] 
PSCEP3b 
Propeller 
connection 
failure 
- - - - - - - - - - - D [80] 
PSCEP3c 
Abrupt stop of 
the propeller 
- - - - - - - - - - - E [80] 
FUEL SUBSYSTEM 
FUEL TANK 
FSS1 
(Structural 
damage) 
- - - - - - - - - - - D 
FUEL PUMP 
FSS2 
(Mechanical 
failure) 
- - - - - - - - - - - D 
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Table 79 – FMECA probability of occurrence determination: data that has been used (when available) and their origin (references) (Cont’d) 
Failure  
mode code 
Failure mode 
definition 
Estimated 
component 
specific failure 
mode rate of 
occurrence  
(from 
literature, 
when 
available) 
[failures per 
million hours] 
Estimated 
overall 
component 
basic failure 
rate  
(from 
literature, 
when 
available) 
[failures per 
million hours] 
Corrective 
factor 
applicable  
for RPAS 
technology 
level  
(from [64]) 
Corrected 
estimated 
component 
specific failure 
mode rate of 
occurrence  
[failures per 
million hours] 
Corrected 
estimated 
overall 
component 
basic failure 
rate  
[failures per 
million hours] 
Expected 
duration of a 
standard 
RPAS flight 
mission  
[hours] [64] 
Reliability with 
respect to the 
specific failure 
mode 
Reliability with 
respect to the 
overall 
component 
failure mode 
Specific  
failure mode 
probability of 
occurrence 
Overall 
component 
failure 
probability of 
occurrence 
Failure 
mode 
frequency of 
occurrence 
as for  
MIL-STD-
1629Rev.A 
Estimated 
component 
failure mode 
probability of 
occurrence 
level as for  
MIL-STD-
1629Rev.A 
FUEL PIPELINES 
FSS3 
(Structural 
damage) 
- - - - - - - - - - - E 
POWER SUBSYSTEM 
ALTERNATOR 
PWGSS1 
Mechanical 
failure 
- - - - - - - - - - - C 
RECTIFIER 
PWGSS2a Overheating            C 
PWGSS2b 
Chemical 
failure 
- - - - - - - - - - - C 
EMERGENCY BATTERY 
PWGSS3a 
Mechanical 
failure 
- - - - - - - - - - - D 
PWGSS3b Thermal failure - - - - - - - - - - - D 
PWGSS3c 
Chemical 
failure 
- - - - - - - - - - - D 
PWGSS3d 
Electrical 
failure 
- - - - - - - - - - - D 
AIR DATA UNIT 
ADSS1 
Air probe 
clogging 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
C ([57], 
item D.8-a) 
ADSS2a Incorrect signal 2 [53] - 
22,0952381 
[58] 
44,19047619 - 2 0,999911623 - 8,8377E-05 - 0,800008838 A 
ADSS2b Loss of signal 2 [53] - 
22,0952381 
[58] 
44,19047619 - 2 0,999911623 - 8,8377E-05 - 0,8000038 A 
ADSS2c 
Signal error 
along the 
transmission 
line 
0,0416 [54] - 
22,0952381 
[58] 
0,919161905 - 2 0,999998162 - 1,83832E-06 - 0,016640904 C 
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Table 79 – FMECA probability of occurrence determination: data that has been used (when available) and their origin (references) (Cont’d) 
Failure  
mode code 
Failure mode 
definition 
Estimated 
component 
specific failure 
mode rate of 
occurrence  
(from 
literature, 
when 
available) 
[failures per 
million hours] 
Estimated 
overall 
component 
basic failure 
rate  
(from 
literature, 
when 
available) 
[failures per 
million hours] 
Corrective 
factor 
applicable  
for RPAS 
technology 
level  
(from [64]) 
Corrected 
estimated 
component 
specific failure 
mode rate of 
occurrence  
[failures per 
million hours] 
Corrected 
estimated 
overall 
component 
basic failure 
rate  
[failures per 
million hours] 
Expected 
duration of a 
standard 
RPAS flight 
mission  
[hours] [64] 
Reliability with 
respect to the 
specific failure 
mode 
Reliability with 
respect to the 
overall 
component 
failure mode 
Specific  
failure mode 
probability of 
occurrence 
Overall 
component 
failure 
probability of 
occurrence 
Failure 
mode 
frequency of 
occurrence 
as for  
MIL-STD-
1629Rev.A 
Estimated 
component 
failure mode 
probability of 
occurrence 
level as for  
MIL-STD-
1629Rev.A 
ADSS2d 
Error on output 
signal 
0,088 [54] - 
22,0952381 
[58] 
1,944380952 - 2 0,999996111 - 3,88875E-06 - 0,035201876 C 
ADSS2e 
Loss of  
power supply 
3,9453 [52] - 
29,32432432 
[58] 
115,6932568 - 2 0,99976864 - 0,00023136 - 2,094320277 A 
DSS1fA 
Calibration 
error 
0,088 [58] - 
22,0952381 
[58] 
1,944380952 - 2 0,999996111 - 3,88875E-06 - 0,035201876 C 
 Air Data Unit - 2,5 [77] 
22,0952381 
[58] 
- 55,23809524 2 - 0,99988953 - 0,00011047 -  
FLIGHT CONTROL SUBSYSTEM 
SERVOUNITS 
FCSS1a Bias - - - - - - - - - - - C [81] 
FCSS1b Stuck surface - - - - - - - - - - - D [81] 
FCSS1c Hardover - - - - - - - - - - - D [81] 
FCSS1d 
Floating 
surfaces 
- - - - - - - - - - - C [81] 
FCSS1e 
Oscillatory 
modes 
- - - - - - - - - - - D [81] 
FCSS1f 
Increased dead 
band/stiction 
- - - - - - - - - - - D [81] 
FCSS1g 
Structural 
damage 
- - - - - - - - - - - E [81] 
STRUCTURES 
- 
HYBRID RPAS 
HYDROGEN TANK 
HPSS1a 
Structural 
damage 
- - - - - - - - - - - D 
HPSS1b Leakage - - - - - - - - - - - D 
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Table 79 – FMECA probability of occurrence determination: data that has been used (when available) and their origin (references) (Cont’d) 
Failure  
mode code 
Failure mode 
definition 
Estimated 
component 
specific failure 
mode rate of 
occurrence  
(from 
literature, 
when 
available) 
[failures per 
million hours] 
Estimated 
overall 
component 
basic failure 
rate  
(from 
literature, 
when 
available) 
[failures per 
million hours] 
Corrective 
factor 
applicable  
for RPAS 
technology 
level  
(from [64]) 
Corrected 
estimated 
component 
specific failure 
mode rate of 
occurrence  
[failures per 
million hours] 
Corrected 
estimated 
overall 
component 
basic failure 
rate  
[failures per 
million hours] 
Expected 
duration of a 
standard 
RPAS flight 
mission  
[hours] [64] 
Reliability with 
respect to the 
specific failure 
mode 
Reliability with 
respect to the 
overall 
component 
failure mode 
Specific  
failure mode 
probability of 
occurrence 
Overall 
component 
failure 
probability of 
occurrence 
Failure 
mode 
frequency of 
occurrence 
as for  
MIL-STD-
1629Rev.A 
Estimated 
component 
failure mode 
probability of 
occurrence 
level as for  
MIL-STD-
1629Rev.A 
FUEL CELLS 
HPSS2a 
Membrane 
drying 
- - - - - - - - - - - D 
HPSS2b 
Water 
condensation 
- - - - - - - - - - - D 
HYDROGEN 
HPSS3 Fire            C 
BACKUP LIPO BATTERIES 
HPSS4a Short circuit - - - - - - - - - - - 
C ([57], 
item B.1a, 
item B.1b) 
HPSS4b 
Mechanical 
failure 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
C ([57], 
item B.1b) 
HPSS4c Fire - - - - - - - - - - - 
C ([57], 
item B.1b) 
DC POWER BUS 
HPSS5 
Electrical 
failure 
- - - - - - - - - - - C 
DC TO DC CONVERTER 
HPSS6 
Internal 
components 
fault 
- - - - - - - - - - - C 
COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2) SUBSYSTEM 
RADIO LINK SIGNAL 
C2LSS1a 
Signal 
degradation 
- - - - - - - - - - - D 
C2LSS1a Signal loss - - - - - - - - - - - D 
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Table 79 – FMECA probability of occurrence determination: data that has been used (when available) and their origin (references) (Cont’d) 
Failure  
mode code 
Failure mode 
definition 
Estimated 
component 
specific failure 
mode rate of 
occurrence  
(from 
literature, 
when 
available) 
[failures per 
million hours] 
Estimated 
overall 
component 
basic failure 
rate  
(from 
literature, 
when 
available) 
[failures per 
million hours] 
Corrective 
factor 
applicable  
for RPAS 
technology 
level  
(from [64]) 
Corrected 
estimated 
component 
specific failure 
mode rate of 
occurrence  
[failures per 
million hours] 
Corrected 
estimated 
overall 
component 
basic failure 
rate  
[failures per 
million hours] 
Expected 
duration of a 
standard 
RPAS flight 
mission  
[hours] [64] 
Reliability with 
respect to the 
specific failure 
mode 
Reliability with 
respect to the 
overall 
component 
failure mode 
Specific  
failure mode 
probability of 
occurrence 
Overall 
component 
failure 
probability of 
occurrence 
Failure 
mode 
frequency of 
occurrence 
as for  
MIL-STD-
1629Rev.A 
Estimated 
component 
failure mode 
probability of 
occurrence 
level as for  
MIL-STD-
1629Rev.A 
GROUND SEGMENT 
GCS POWER GENERATION SUBSYSTEM 
POWER GENERATOR 
GCSPWSS1a Missed start - - - - - - - - - - - D 
GCSPWSS1b Sudden stop - - - - - - - - - - - D 
EMERGENCY BATTERY 
GCSPWSS2a Low charge - - - - - - - - - - - D 
GCSPWSS2b Lack of charge - - - - - - - - - - - D 
GCS START-UP SUBSYSTEM 
POWER ON SWITCH 
GCSSUSS1 Missed start - - - - - - - - - - - D 
GCS HUMAN MACHINE INTERFACE SUBSYSTEM 
GCS JOYSTICK 
GCSHMI1a 
Lack of 
calibration 
- - - - - - - - - - - D 
GCSHMI1b Software error - - - - - - - - - - - D 
GCSHMI1c Missed start - - - - - - - - - - - D 
GCSHMI1d Sudden stop - - - - - - - - - - - D 
GCS PEDALS 
GCSHMI2a 
Lack of 
calibration 
           D 
GCSHMI2b Software error - - - - - - - - - - - D 
GCSHMI2c Missed start - - - - - - - - - - - D 
GCSHMI2d Sudden stop - - - - - - - - - - - D 
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Table 79 – FMECA probability of occurrence determination: data that has been used (when available) and their origin (references) (Cont’d) 
Failure  
mode code 
Failure mode 
definition 
Estimated 
component 
specific failure 
mode rate of 
occurrence  
(from 
literature, 
when 
available) 
[failures per 
million hours] 
Estimated 
overall 
component 
basic failure 
rate  
(from 
literature, 
when 
available) 
[failures per 
million hours] 
Corrective 
factor 
applicable  
for RPAS 
technology 
level  
(from [64]) 
Corrected 
estimated 
component 
specific failure 
mode rate of 
occurrence  
[failures per 
million hours] 
Corrected 
estimated 
overall 
component 
basic failure 
rate  
[failures per 
million hours] 
Expected 
duration of a 
standard 
RPAS flight 
mission  
[hours] [64] 
Reliability with 
respect to the 
specific failure 
mode 
Reliability with 
respect to the 
overall 
component 
failure mode 
Specific  
failure mode 
probability of 
occurrence 
Overall 
component 
failure 
probability of 
occurrence 
Failure 
mode 
frequency of 
occurrence 
as for  
MIL-STD-
1629Rev.A 
Estimated 
component 
failure mode 
probability of 
occurrence 
level as for  
MIL-STD-
1629Rev.A 
GCS THROTTLE 
GCSHMI3a 
Lack of 
calibration 
- - - - - - - - - - - D 
GCSHMI3b Software error - - - - - - - - - - - D 
GCSHMI3c Missed start - - - - - - - - - - - D 
GCSHMI3d Sudden stop - - - - - - - - - - - D 
AUTOPILOT FLIGHT MODES SELECTION SWITCH 
GCSHMI4a 
Mechanical 
failure 
- - - - - - - - - - - D 
GCSHMI4b 
Electrical 
failure 
- - - - - - - - - - - D 
GCSHMI4c Signal error - - - - - - - - - - - D 
GCS MANAGEMENT SOFTWARE 
GCSHMI5 Software error - - - - - - - - - - - E 
GCS DISPLAYS 
GCSHMI6a 
Lack of power 
supply 
- - - - - - - - - - - D 
GCSHMI6b Software error - - - - - - - - - - - D 
GCS FLIGHT TERMINATION COMMAND SUBSYSTEM 
GCS EMERGENCY FTS COMMAND SWITCH 
GCSFTSS1 
Mechanical 
failure 
- - - - - - - - - - - E 
GCS EMERGENCY PARACHUTE COMMAND SWITCH 
GCSFTSS2 
Mechanical 
failure 
- - - - - - - - - - - E 
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Table 79 – FMECA probability of occurrence determination: data that has been used (when available) and their origin (references) (Cont’d) 
Failure  
mode code 
Failure mode 
definition 
Estimated 
component 
specific failure 
mode rate of 
occurrence  
(from 
literature, 
when 
available) 
[failures per 
million hours] 
Estimated 
overall 
component 
basic failure 
rate  
(from 
literature, 
when 
available) 
[failures per 
million hours] 
Corrective 
factor 
applicable  
for RPAS 
technology 
level  
(from [64]) 
Corrected 
estimated 
component 
specific failure 
mode rate of 
occurrence  
[failures per 
million hours] 
Corrected 
estimated 
overall 
component 
basic failure 
rate  
[failures per 
million hours] 
Expected 
duration of a 
standard 
RPAS flight 
mission  
[hours] [64] 
Reliability with 
respect to the 
specific failure 
mode 
Reliability with 
respect to the 
overall 
component 
failure mode 
Specific  
failure mode 
probability of 
occurrence 
Overall 
component 
failure 
probability of 
occurrence 
Failure 
mode 
frequency of 
occurrence 
as for  
MIL-STD-
1629Rev.A 
Estimated 
component 
failure mode 
probability of 
occurrence 
level as for  
MIL-STD-
1629Rev.A 
GCS PAYLOAD SENSORS COMMAND SUBSYSTEM 
PHOTO/VIDEO CAMERA COMMAND SWITCH 
GCSPYSSS1 
Mechanical 
failure 
- - - - - - - - - - - E 
OTHER SENSORS COMMAND SWITCH 
GCSPYSSS2 
Mechanical 
failure 
- - - - - - - - - - - E 
GCS COMMUNICATION SUBSYSTEM 
GCS TRANSMITTING ANTENNA 
GCSCSS1a 
The 
transmitter 
antenna 
cannot process 
the control 
signal 
- - - - - - - - - - - D 
GCSCSS1b 
Transmitter 
antenna fade 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
C (57,  
item D.7-d) 
GCS RECEIVING ANTENNA 
GCSCSS2a 
The receiver 
antenna 
cannot process 
the control 
signal 
- - - - - - - - - - - D 
GCSCSS2b 
Receiver 
antenna fade 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
C (57,  
item D.7-d) 
GCS CHANNEL WITH ATC 
GCSCSS3 
Lack of 
communication 
with ATC 
- - - - - - - - - - - C 
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Table 80 – Summary of FMECA results 
Failure mode Failure typology 
Estimated qualitative  
probability of 
occurrence level 
[MIL-STD-1629A] 
[47] 
Estimated 
quantitative 
value of 
probability of 
occurrence level 
Criticality level 
Aerial segment 
Rotor wing RPAS – Propulsion Subsystem 
ESC seizing (PSS1a) Mechanical failure C 5,5E-02 HIGH 
ESC degradation PSS1b) Mechanical failure C 5,5E-02 HIGH 
ESC overheating (PSS1c) Mechanical failure C 5,5E-02 HIGH 
ESC burn out (PSS1d) Mechanical failure C 5,5E-02 HIGH 
Worn bearings (PSS2b) Mechanical failure C 5,5E-02 HIGH 
Windings open  
circuit (PSS2c1) 
Mechanical failure D 5,5E-03 MEDIUM 
Windings short  
circuit (PSS2c2) 
Mechanical failure D 5,5E-03 MEDIUM 
Cranked stator  
housing (PSS2a) 
Mechanical failure D 5,5E-03 MEDIUM 
Armature shaft 
structural failure 
(PSS2d) 
Mechanical failure D 5,5E-03 MEDIUM 
Propeller connection  
failure (PSS3b) 
Mechanical failure D 5,5E-03 MEDIUM 
Propeller structural  
failure (PSS3a) 
Mechanical failure E < 1,0E-03 LOW 
Abrupt stop  
of the propeller (PSS3c) 
Mechanical failure E < 1,0E-03 LOW 
Rotor wing RPAS – Power Subsystem 
Short circuit (PWSS1a) Electrical failure C 5,5E-02 HIGH 
Mechanical 
damage(PWSS1b) 
Mechanical failure C 5,5E-02 HIGH 
Fire (PWSS1c) Mechanical failure C 5,5E-02 HIGH 
Rotor wing RPAS  - Electrical Subsystem 
Open circuit (ESS1b) Electrical failure A > 2,0E-01 HIGH 
Open circuit (ESS2b) Electrical failure A > 2,0E-01 HIGH 
Short circuit (ESS1a) Electrical failure C 5,5E-02 HIGH 
Short circuit (ESS2a) Electrical failure C 5,5E-02 HIGH 
Electric arc (ESS3) Electrical failure C 5,5E-02 HIGH 
Rotor wing RPAS – Flight Subsystem/Navigation Subsystem 
EGNOS receiver  
failure (NSS3a) 
Software error A > 2,0E-01 HIGH 
Loss of EGNOS position 
accuracy (NSS4a) 
Software error A > 2,0E-01 HIGH 
Inaccurate position 
datum sent to the ADS-
B emitter (NSS4m) 
Software error A > 2,0E-01 HIGH 
Failure in detection of 
manoeuvring 
aircraft/RPA (NSS4p) 
Software error A > 2,0E-01 HIGH 
EGNOS receiver unit 
failure (NSS4b) 
Electrical failure B 1,5E-01 HIGH 
ADS-B OUT antenna  
deterioration (NSS4d) 
Mechanical 
failure/Electrical 
failure 
B 1,5E-01 HIGH 
Signal interruption 
(NSS4e) 
Software error B 1,5E-01 HIGH 
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Table 80 – Summary of FMECA results (Cont’d) 
Failure mode Failure typology 
Estimated qualitative  
probability of 
occurrence level 
[MIL-STD-1629A] [47] 
Estimated 
quantitative 
value of probability 
of occurrence level 
Criticality level 
Calibration loss (NSS1b) Software error D 5,5E-03 MEDIUM 
ADS-B OUT antenna 
failure (NSS4c) 
Mechanical failure/ 
Electrical failure 
D 5,5E-03 MEDIUM 
Emitter/transponder 
failure (NSS4f) 
Electrical failure D 5,5E-03 MEDIUM 
Failure of ADS-B 
transponder/ 
emitter on the RPA 
(NSS4o) 
Electrical failure D 5,5E-03 MEDIUM 
ADS-B IN receiving 
antenna deterioration 
(NSS4r) 
Mechanical failure/ 
Electrical failure 
D 5,5E-03 MEDIUM 
Circuitry overload 
(NSS1a)  
Electrical failure E < 1,0E-03 LOW 
GPS antenna  
failure (NSS2a) 
Mechanical failure/ 
Electrical failure 
E < 1,0E-03 LOW 
GPS signal  
jamming (NSS2b) 
Software error E < 1,0E-03 LOW 
GPS signal  
spoofing (NSS2c) 
Software error E < 1,0E-03 LOW 
Loss of EGNOS signal 
integrity (NSS3c) 
Software error E < 1,0E-03 LOW 
Erroneous altitude  
data (NSS4g) 
Software error E < 1,0E-03 LOW 
Data encoding  
error (NSS4h) 
Software error E < 1,0E-03 LOW 
Intentional/ 
unintentional jamming  
of ADS-B signal (NSS4i) 
Software error E < 1,0E-03 LOW 
Lack of ADS-B  
service (NSS4l) 
Software error E < 1,0E-03 LOW 
Degradation of 
accuracy and integrity 
of data sent by the 
satellite to the ADS-B 
(NSS4n) 
Software error E < 1,0E-03 LOW 
Rotor wing RPAS – Flight Subsystem/Air Data Subsystem 
Incorrect signal 
(ADSS1a) 
Software error A > 2,0E-01 HIGH 
Loss of signal (ADSS1b) Software error A > 2,0E-01 HIGH 
Loss of power  
supply (ADSS1e) 
Mechanical failure/ 
Electrical failure 
A > 2,0E-01 HIGH 
Signal error along the 
transmission line 
(ADSS1c) 
Software error C 5,5E-02 HIGH 
Error on output  
signal (ADSS1d) 
Electrical failure C 5,5E-02 HIGH 
Calibration error 
(ADSS1f) 
Mechanical failure/ 
Electrical failure 
C 5,5E-02 HIGH 
Rotor wing RPAS – Flight Subsystem/Flight Control Subsystem 
EGNOS receiver  
failure  (FCSS2b) 
Mechanical failure/ 
Electrical failure 
A > 2,0E-01 HIGH 
ADS-B IN receiving 
antenna deterioration 
(FCSS2a) 
Mechanical failure/ 
Electrical failure 
C 5,5E-02 HIGH 
Failure of weak  
joints (FCSS1a) 
Mechanical failure D 5,5E-03 MEDIUM 
Lack of power  
supply (FCSS1b)  
Mechanical failure/ 
Electrical failure 
D 5,5E-03 MEDIUM 
Software error (FCSS1c) Software error D 5,5E-03 MEDIUM 
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Table 80 – Summary of FMECA results (Cont’d) 
Failure mode Failure typology 
Estimated 
qualitative  
probability of 
occurrence level 
[MIL-STD-1629A] 
[47] 
Estimated 
quantitative 
value of probability 
of occurrence level 
Criticality level 
Erroneous altitude  
data (FCSS2c) 
Software error E < 1,0E-03 LOW 
Rotor wing RPAS – Flight Subsystem/Emergency Flight Termination Subsystem 
Unlawful interference  
on dedicated radio link  
(jamming) (EFSS1c) 
Software error B 1,5E-01 HIGH 
Unlawful interference  
on dedicated radio link  
(jamming) (EFSS2c) 
Software error B 1,5E-01 HIGH 
Loss of dedicated  
radio link (EFSS1a) 
Software error C 5,5E-02 HIGH 
Loss of dedicated  
radio link (EFSS2a) 
Software error C 5,5E-02 HIGH 
Lack of functionality 
(EFSS1b) 
Electrical failure D 5,5E-03 MEDIUM 
Lack of functionality 
(EFSS2b) 
Electrical failure D 5,5E-03 MEDIUM 
Rotor wing RPAS – Mission Control Subsystem 
Loss of mission data  
software (MCSS1a) 
Software error C 5,5E-02 LOW 
Physical unit  
degradation 
(MCSS1b) 
Mechanical failure/ 
Electrical failure 
C 5,5E-02 LOW 
Rotor wing RPAS – Mission Payload Sensors Subsystem 
Photo/video  
camera failure 
(MPYSS1) 
Electrical failure D 5,5E-03 LOW 
Other payload  
sensors failure 
(MPYSS2) 
Electrical failure D 5,5E-03 LOW 
Rotor wing RPAS – On Board Communication Subsystem 
On board transmitting 
antenna fade (CSS1b) 
Software error C 5,5E-02 HIGH 
On board receiving 
antenna fade  
(CSS2b) 
Software error C 5,5E-02 HIGH 
The on board 
transmitting antenna 
cannot process the 
control signal (CSS1a) 
Mechanical failure/ 
Electrical failure 
D 5,5E-03 MEDIUM 
The onboard receiving 
antenna cannot process 
the control signal 
(CSS2a) 
Mechanical failure/ 
Electrical failure 
D 5,5E-03 MEDIUM 
Rotor wing RPAS structural airframe 
- 
Fixed wing RPAS – Propulsion Subsystem (Combustion Engine) 
Engine control system  
failure (PSCE2a) 
Mechanical failure A > 2,0E-01 HIGH 
Mechanical failure 
(PSCE1b) 
Mechanical failure B 1,5E-01 HIGH 
Carburetor failure 
(PSCE1d) 
Mechanical failure C 5,5E-02 HIGH 
Mechanical failure 
(PCSE2b) 
Mechanical failure C 5,5E-02 MEDIUM 
Software error (PSCE1a) Software error D 5,5E-03 MEDIUM 
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Table 80 – Summary of FMECA results (Cont’d) 
Failure mode Failure typology 
Estimated 
qualitative  
probability of 
occurrence level 
[MIL-STD-1629A] 
[47] 
Estimated 
quantitative 
value of probability 
of occurrence level 
Criticality level 
Engine fire (PSCE2c) 
Mechanical failure/ 
Electrical failure 
D 5,5E-03 MEDIUM 
Use of improper fuel 
(PSCE2d) 
Human error D 5,5E-03 MEDIUM 
Loss of on board  
computer (PSCE1c) 
Electrical failure E < 1,0E-03 LOW 
Fixed wing RPAS – Propulsion Subsystem (Combustion Engine with propellers) 
Engine control system  
failure (PSCEP2a) 
Mechanical failure A > 2,0E-01 HIGH 
Mechanical failure 
(PSCEP1b) 
Mechanical failure B 1,5E-01 HIGH 
Carburetor failure 
(PSCEP1d) 
Mechanical failure C 5,5E-02 HIGH 
Mechanical failure 
(PCSEP2b) 
Mechanical failure C 5,5E-02 MEDIUM 
Software error 
(PSCEP1a) 
Software error D 5,5E-03 MEDIUM 
Engine fire (PSCEP2c) 
Mechanical failure/ 
Electrical failure 
D 5,5E-03 MEDIUM 
Use of improper fuel 
(PSCEP2d) 
Human error D 5,5E-03 MEDIUM 
Propeller connection 
failure (PSCEP3b) 
Mechanical failure D 5,5E-03 MEDIUM 
Loss of on board  
computer (PSCE1c) 
Electrical failure E < 1,0E-03 LOW 
Propeller structural  
failure (PSCEP3a) 
Mechanical failure E < 1,0E-03 LOW 
Abrupt stop of the  
propeller (PSCEP3c) 
Mechanical failure E < 1,0E-03 LOW 
Fixed wing RPAS – Fuel Subsystem 
Structural  
failure (FSS1) 
Mechanical failure D 5,5E-03 MEDIUM 
Mechanical  
failure (FSS2) 
Mechanical failure D 5,5E-03 MEDIUM 
Structural  
failure (FSS3) 
Mechanical failure E < 1,0E-03 LOW 
Fixed wing RPAS – Power Generation Subsystem 
Mechanical failure 
(PWGSS1) 
Mechanical failure C 5,5E-02 HIGH 
Electrical failure 
(PWGSS2a) 
Mechanical failure C 5,5E-02 HIGH 
Chemical failure 
(PWGSS2b) 
Chemical failure C 5,5E-02 HIGH 
Mechanical failure 
(PWGSS3a) 
Mechanical failure D 5,5E-03 MEDIUM 
Thermal failure 
(PWGSS3b) 
Mechanical failure D 5,5E-03 MEDIUM 
Chemical failure 
(PWGSS3c)  
Mechanical failure D 5,5E-03 MEDIUM 
Electrical failure 
(PWGSS3d) 
Mechanical failure D 5,5E-03 MEDIUM 
Fixed wing RPAS – Flight Subsystem/Air Data Subsystem 
Incorrect signal 
(ADSS2a) 
Software error A > 2,0E-01 HIGH 
Loss of signal (ADSS2b) Software error A > 2,0E-01 HIGH 
Loss of power  
supply (ADSS2e) 
Mechanical failure/ 
Electrical failure 
A > 2,0E-01 HIGH 
Air probe clogging 
(ADSS1) 
Mechanical failure B 1,5E-01 HIGH 
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Table 80 – Summary of FMECA results (Cont’d) 
Failure mode Failure typology 
Estimated 
qualitative  
probability of 
occurrence level 
[MIL-STD-1629A] 
[47] 
Estimated 
quantitative 
value of probability 
of occurrence level 
Criticality level 
Signal error along the 
transmission line 
(ADSS2c) 
Software error C 5,5E-02 HIGH 
Error on output 
signal (ADSS2d) 
Electrical failure C 5,5E-02 HIGH 
Calibration error 
(ADSS2f) 
Mechanical failure/ 
Electrical failure 
C 5,5E-02 HIGH 
Fixed wing RPAS – Flight subsystem/Flight Control Subsystem 
Bias (FCSS1a) Mechanical failure C 5,5E-02 HIGH 
Floating surface 
(FCSS11d) 
Mechanical failure C 5,5E-02 HIGH 
Stuck surface (FCSS1b) Mechanical failure D 5,5E-03 MEDIUM 
Hardover (FCSS1c) Mechanical failure D 5,5E-03 MEDIUM 
Oscillatory  
modes (FCSS1e) 
Mechanical failure D 5,5E-03 MEDIUM 
Increased dead  
band/stiction (FCSS1f) 
Mechanical failure D 5,5E-03 MEDIUM 
Structural  
damage (FCSS2) 
Mechanical failure E < 1,0E-03 LOW 
Rotor wing RPAS structural airframe 
- 
Rotor wing hybrid RPAS – Propulsion System 
Fire (HPSS3) Electrical failure C 5,5E-02 HIGH 
Short circuit (HPSS4a) Electrical failure C 5,5E-02 HIGH 
Mechanical  
damage (HPSS4b) 
Mechanical failure C 5,5E-02 HIGH 
Fire (HPSS4c) Electrical failure C 5,5E-02 HIGH 
Electrical  
failure (HPSS5) 
Electrical failure C 5,5E-02 HIGH 
Internal components 
fault (HPSS6) 
Electrical failure C 5,5E-02 HIGH 
Structural  
failure (HPSS1a) 
Mechanical failure D 5,5E-03 MEDIUM 
Leakage (HPSS1b) Mechanical failure D 5,5E-03 MEDIUM 
Membrane  
drying (HPSS2a) 
Mechanical failure D 5,5E-03 MEDIUM 
Water condensation  
inhibition (HPSS2b) 
Mechanical failure D 5,5E-03 MEDIUM 
Command and Control Radio Link Subsystem 
C2 radio link  
signal degradation 
(C2LSS1a) 
Software error D 5,5E-03 MEDIUM 
C2 radio link  
signal loss (C2LSS1b) 
Software error D 5,5E-03 MEDIUM 
Ground Segment 
Ground Control Station – Power Generation Subsystem 
Missed start 
(GCSPWSS1a) 
Mechanical failure D 5,5E-03 MEDIUM 
Sudden stop 
(GCSPWSS1b) 
Mechanical failure D 5,5E-03 MEDIUM 
Emergency battery low 
charge (GCSPWSS2a) 
Electrical failure E < 1,0E-03 LOW 
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Table 80 – Summary of FMECA results (Cont’d) 
Failure mode Failure typology 
Estimated 
qualitative  
probability of 
occurrence level 
[MIL-STD-1629A] 
[47] 
Estimated quantitative 
value of probability of 
occurrence level 
Criticality level 
Emergency battery lack 
of charge (GCSPWSS2b) 
Electrical failure E < 1,0E-03 LOW 
Ground Control Station – Start Up Subsystem 
Power on switch  
missed start 
(GCSSUSS1) 
Electrical failure E < 1,0E-03 LOW 
Ground Control Station – Human Machine Interface Subsystem 
Lack of calibration 
(GCSHMISS1a) 
Electrical failure D 5,5E-03 MEDIUM 
Failure mode Failure typology 
Estimated 
quantitative 
probability of 
occurrence  
Estimated qualitative  
probability of 
occurrence 
[MIL-STD-1629A] [47] 
Criticality level 
Software error 
(GCSHMISS1b) 
Software error D 5,5E-03 MEDIUM 
Joystick missed start 
(GCSHMISS1c) 
Mechanical failure/ 
Electrical failure 
D 5,5E-03 MEDIUM 
Joystick sudden stop 
(GCSHMISS1d) 
Mechanical failure/ 
Electrical failure 
D 5,5E-03 MEDIUM 
Lack of calibration 
(GCSHMISS2a) 
Electrical failure D 5,5E-03 MEDIUM 
Software error 
(GCSHMISS2b) 
Software error D 5,5E-03 MEDIUM 
Missed start 
(GCSHMISS2c) 
Mechanical failure/ 
Electrical failure 
D 5,5E-03 MEDIUM 
Sudden stop 
(GCSHMISS2d) 
Mechanical failure/ 
Electrical failure 
D 5,5E-03 MEDIUM 
Lack of calibration 
(GCSHMISS3a) 
Electrical failure D 5,5E-03 MEDIUM 
Software error 
(GCSHMISS3b) 
Software error D 5,5E-03 MEDIUM 
Throttle missed start 
(GCSHMISS3c) 
Mechanical failure/ 
Electrical failure 
D 5,5E-03 MEDIUM 
Throttle sudden stop 
(GCSHMISS3d) 
Mechanical failure/ 
Electrical failure 
D 5,5E-03 MEDIUM 
Mechanical failure 
(GCSHMISS4a) 
Mechanical failure D 5,5E-03 MEDIUM 
Electrical failure 
(GCSHMISS4b)  
Electrical failure D 5,5E-03 MEDIUM 
Software error 
(GCSHMISS4c) 
Software error D 5,5E-03 MEDIUM 
Electrical failure 
(GCSHMISS6a)  
Electrical failure D 5,5E-03 MEDIUM 
Software error 
(GCSHMISS6b) 
Software error D 5,5E-03 MEDIUM 
Software error 
(GCSHMISS5) 
Software error E < 1,0E-03 LOW 
Ground Control Station – Emergency Flight Termination HMI Subsystem 
Mechanical failure 
(GCSEFTSS1) 
Mechanical failure E < 1,0E-03 LOW 
Mechanical failure 
(GCSEFTSS2) 
Mechanical failure E < 1,0E-03 LOW 
Ground Control Station – Payload Sensors HMI Subsystem 
Mechanical failure 
(GCSPYSSS1a) 
Mechanical failure D 5,5E-03 LOW 
Mechanical failure 
(GCSPYSSS2a) 
Mechanical failure D 5,5E-03 LOW 
Ground Control Station – Communication Subsystem 
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Table 80 – Summary of FMECA results (Cont’d) 
Failure mode Failure typology 
Estimated 
qualitative  
probability of 
occurrence level 
[MIL-STD-1629A] 
[47] 
Estimated quantitative 
value of probability of 
occurrence level 
Criticality level 
Transmitter antenna  
fade (CSS1b) 
Software error C 5,5E-02 HIGH 
Receiver antenna  
fade (CSS2b) 
Software error C 5,5E-02 HIGH 
Lack of communication 
with ATC  (GCSCSS3) 
Mechanical failure/ 
Electrical failure/ 
Software error 
C 5,5E-02 HIGH 
Failure mode Failure typology 
Estimated 
quantitative 
probability of 
occurrence  
Estimated qualitative  
probability of 
occurrence 
[MIL-STD-1629A] [47] 
Criticality level 
The transmitter 
antenna cannot process 
the control signal 
(CSS1a) 
Mechanical failure/ 
Electrical failure 
D 5,5E-03 MEDIUM 
The receiver antenna 
cannot process the 
control signal (CSS2a) 
Mechanical failure/ 
Electrical failure 
D 5,5E-03 MEDIUM 
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Table 81 – Failure modes, criticality ranking, 
probability of occurrence and possible related hazards 
Single failure mode 
Estimated qualitative  
probability of occurrence 
level [MIL-STD-1629A] 
[47] 
Estimated quantitative 
value of probability of 
occurrence level 
Possible derived hazards 
ESC seizing (PSS1a) C 5,5E-02 
Low RPAS manoeuvrability (rotor wing RPA)/ 
Loss of control (rotor wing RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft 
ESC degradation PSS1b) C 5,5E-02 
Low RPAS manoeuvrability (rotor wing RPA)/ 
Loss of control (rotor wing RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft 
ESC overheating (PSS1c) C 5,5E-02 
Low RPAS manoeuvrability (rotor wing RPA)/ 
Loss of control (rotor wing RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft 
ESC burn out (PSS1d) C 5,5E-02 
Low RPAS manoeuvrability (rotor wing RPA)/ 
Loss of control (rotor wing RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft 
Worn bearings (PSS2b) C 5,5E-02 
Low RPAS manoeuvrability (rotor wing RPA)/ 
Loss of control (rotor wing RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft 
Short circuit (PWSS1a) C 5,5E-02 
Loss of electrical power 
Loss of propulsion (rotor wing RPA) 
Loss of RPAS manoeuvrability (rotor wing RPA)/ 
Loss of control (rotor wing RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft 
Mechanical damage(PWSS1b) C 5,5E-02 
Loss of electrical power 
Loss of propulsion (rotor wing RPA) 
Loss of RPAS manoeuvrability (rotor wing RPA)/ 
Loss of control (rotor wing RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft 
Fire (PWSS1c) C 5,5E-02 
Loss of electrical power 
Loss of propulsion (rotor wing RPA) 
Loss of RPAS manoeuvrability (rotor wing RPA)/ 
Loss of control (rotor wing RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft 
Fire 
Open circuit (ESS1b) A > 2,0E-01 
Loss of electrical power 
Loss of propulsion (rotor wing RPA) 
Loss of RPAS manoeuvrability (rotor wing RPA)/ 
Loss of control (rotor wing RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft 
Fire 
Open circuit (ESS2b) A > 2,0E-01 
Loss of electrical power 
Loss of propulsion (rotor wing RPA) 
Loss of RPAS manoeuvrability (rotor wing RPA)/ 
Loss of control (rotor wing RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft 
Fire 
Short circuit (ESS1a) C 5,5E-02 
Loss of electrical power 
Loss of propulsion (rotor wing RPA) 
Loss of RPAS manoeuvrability (rotor wing RPA)/ 
Loss of control (rotor wing RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft 
Fire 
Short circuit (ESS2a) C 5,5E-02 
Loss of electrical power 
Loss of propulsion (rotor wing RPA) 
Loss of RPAS manoeuvrability (rotor wing RPA)/ 
Loss of control (rotor wing RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft 
Fire 
Electric arc (ESS3) C 5,5E-02 
Loss of electrical power 
Loss of propulsion (rotor wing RPA) 
Loss of RPAS manoeuvrability (rotor wing RPA)/ 
Loss of control (rotor wing RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft 
Fire 
 
 351 
 
 
Table 81 – Failure modes, criticality ranking,  
probability of occurrence and possible related hazards (Cont’d) 
Single failure mode 
Estimated qualitative  
probability of occurrence 
level [MIL-STD-1629A] 
[47] 
Estimated quantitative 
value of probability of 
occurrence level 
Possible derived hazards 
EGNOS receiver failure (NSS3a) A > 2,0E-01 
Loss of RPA navigation functionality/ 
Loss of RPA remote control/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Loss of EGNOS position accuracy (NSS4a) A > 2,0E-01 
Loss of RPA navigation functionality/ 
Loss of RPA remote control/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Inaccurate position datum sent to the 
ADS-B emitter (NSS4m) 
A > 2,0E-01 
Loss of RPA navigation functionality/ 
Loss of RPA remote control/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Failure in detection of manoeuvring 
aircraft/RPA (NSS4p) 
A > 2,0E-01 
Loss of RPA navigation functionality/ 
Loss of RPA remote control/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
EGNOS receiver unit failure (NSS4b) B 1,5E-01 
Loss of RPA navigation functionality/ 
Loss of RPA remote control/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
ADS-B OUT antenna  
deterioration (NSS4d) 
B 1,5E-01 
Loss of RPA navigation functionality/ 
Loss of RPA remote control/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Signal interruption (NSS4e) B 1,5E-01 
Loss of RPA navigation functionality/ 
Loss of RPA remote control/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Incorrect signal (ADSS1a) A > 2,0E-01 Mid-air collision with other aircraft 
Loss of signal (ADSS1b) A > 2,0E-01 
Loss of RPAS navigation functionality/ 
Loss of RPAS remote control/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Loss of power supply (ADSS1e) A > 2,0E-01 
Loss of RPAS navigation functionality/ 
Loss of RPAS remote control/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Signal error along the  
transmission line (ADSS1c) 
C 5,5E-02 
Loss of RPAS navigation functionality/ 
Loss of RPAS remote control/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Error on output signal (ADSS1d) C 5,5E-02 
Loss of RPAS navigation functionality/ 
Loss of RPAS remote control/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
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Table 81 – Failure modes, criticality ranking,  
probability of occurrence and possible related hazards (Cont’d) 
Single failure mode 
Estimated qualitative  
probability of occurrence 
level [MIL-STD-1629A] 
[47] 
Estimated quantitative 
value of probability of 
occurrence level 
Possible derived hazards 
Calibration error (ADSS1f) C 5,5E-02 
Loss of RPAS navigation functionality/ 
Loss of RPAS remote control/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
EGNOS receiver failure  (FCSS2b) A > 2,0E-01 
Loss of RPAS navigation functionality/ 
Loss of RPAS remote control/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
ADS-B IN receiving antenna  
deterioration (FCSS2a) 
C 5,5E-02 
Loss of RPAS navigation functionality/ 
Loss of RPAS remote control/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Unlawful interference on dedicated  
radio link (jamming) (EFSS1c) 
B 1,5E-01 
Hostile takeover of RPAS/ 
Loss of RPAS navigation functionality/ 
Loss of RPAS remote control/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Unlawful interference on dedicated  
radio link (jamming) (EFSS2c) 
B 1,5E-01 
Hostile takeover of RPAS/ 
Loss of RPAS navigation functionality/ 
Loss of RPAS remote control/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Loss of dedicated radio link (EFSS1a) C 5,5E-02 
Loss of RPAS remote control/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Loss of dedicated radio link (EFSS2a) C 5,5E-02 
Loss of RPAS remote control/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
On board transmitting  
antenna fade (CSS1b) 
C 5,5E-02 
Loss of RPAS remote control/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
On board receiving  
antenna fade (CSS2b) 
C 5,5E-02 
Loss of RPAS remote control/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Engine control system failure (PSCE2a) A > 2,0E-01 
Loss of propulsion (rotor wing RPA)/ 
Loss of RPAS manoeuvrability (rotor wing RPA)/ 
Loss of control (rotor wing RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
 353 
 
 
Table 81 – Failure modes, criticality ranking,  
probability of occurrence and possible related hazards (Cont’d) 
Single failure mode 
Estimated qualitative  
probability of occurrence 
level [MIL-STD-1629A] 
[47] 
Estimated quantitative 
value of probability of 
occurrence level 
Possible derived hazards 
Mechanical failure (PSCE1b) B 1,5E-01 
Loss of propulsion (rotor wing RPA)/ 
Loss of RPAS manoeuvrability (rotor wing RPA)/ 
Loss of control (rotor wing RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Carburetor failure (PSCE1d) C 5,5E-02 
Loss of propulsion (rotor wing RPA)/ 
Loss of RPAS manoeuvrability (rotor wing RPA)/ 
Loss of control (rotor wing RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Engine control system failure (PSCEP2a) A > 2,0E-01 
Loss of propulsion (rotor wing RPA)/ 
Loss of RPAS manoeuvrability (rotor wing RPA)/ 
Loss of control (rotor wing RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Mechanical failure (PSCEP1b) B 1,5E-01 
Loss of propulsion (rotor wing RPA)/ 
Loss of RPAS manoeuvrability (rotor wing RPA)/ 
Loss of control (rotor wing RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Mechanical failure (PWGSS1) C 5,5E-02 
Loss of propulsion (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Loss of RPAS manoeuvrability (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Loss of control (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Electrical failure (PWGSS2a) C 5,5E-02 
Loss of propulsion (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Loss of RPAS manoeuvrability (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Loss of control (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Chemical failure (PWGSS2b) C 5,5E-02 
Loss of propulsion (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Loss of RPAS manoeuvrability (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Loss of control (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Incorrect signal (ADSS2a) A > 2,0E-01 
Loss of air data/ 
Loss of RPAS remote control/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Loss of signal (ADSS2b) A > 2,0E-01 
Loss of air data/ 
Loss of RPAS remote control/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Loss of power supply (ADSS2e) A > 2,0E-01 
Loss of air data/ 
Loss of RPAS remote control/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Air probe clogging (ADSS1) B 1,5E-01 
Loss of air data/ 
Loss of RPAS remote control/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
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Table 81 – Failure modes, criticality ranking,  
probability of occurrence and possible related hazards (Cont’d) 
Single failure mode 
Estimated qualitative  
probability of occurrence 
level [MIL-STD-1629A] 
[47] 
Estimated quantitative 
value of probability of 
occurrence level 
Possible derived hazards 
Signal error along the  
transmission line (ADSS2c) 
C 5,5E-02 
Loss of air data/ 
Loss of RPAS remote control/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Error on output signal (ADSS2d) C 5,5E-02 
Loss of air data/ 
Loss of RPAS remote control/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Calibration error (ADSS2f) C 5,5E-02 
Loss of air data/ 
Loss of RPAS remote control/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Bias (FCSS1a) C 5,5E-02 
Loss of RPAS manoeuvrability  
(fixed wing RPA)/ 
Loss of RPAS control (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Floating surface (FCSS11d) C 5,5E-02 
Loss of RPAS manoeuvrability  
(fixed wing RPA)/ 
Loss of RPAS control (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Fire (HPSS3) C 5,5E-02 
Loss of propulsion (hybrid RPA)/ 
Loss of RPAS manoeuvrability (hybrid RPA)/ 
Loss of control (hybrid RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain/ 
Fire 
Short circuit (HPSS4a) C 5,5E-02 
Loss of propulsion (hybrid RPA)/ 
Loss of RPAS manoeuvrability (hybrid RPA)/ 
Loss of control (hybrid RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Mechanical damage (HPSS4b) C 5,5E-02 
Loss of propulsion (hybrid RPA)/ 
Loss of RPAS manoeuvrability (hybrid RPA)/ 
Loss of control (hybrid RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Fire (HPSS4c) C 5,5E-02 
Loss of propulsion (hybrid RPA)/ 
Loss of RPAS manoeuvrability (hybrid RPA)/ 
Loss of control (hybrid RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain/ 
Fire 
Electrical failure (HPSS5) C 5,5E-02 
Loss of propulsion (hybrid RPA)/ 
Loss of RPAS manoeuvrability (hybrid RPA)/ 
Loss of control (hybrid RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
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Table 81 – Failure modes, criticality ranking,  
probability of occurrence and possible related hazards (Cont’d) 
Single failure mode 
Estimated qualitative  
probability of occurrence 
level [MIL-STD-1629A] 
[47] 
Estimated quantitative 
value of probability of 
occurrence level 
Possible derived hazards 
Internal components fault (HPSS6) C 5,5E-02 
Loss of propulsion (hybrid RPA)/ 
Loss of RPAS manoeuvrability (hybrid RPA)/ 
Loss of control (hybrid RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Transmitter antenna fade (CSS1b) C 5,5E-02 
Loss link/ 
Loss of control/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Receiver antenna fade (CSS2b) C 5,5E-02 
Loss link/ 
Loss of control/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Lack of communication  
with ATC  (GCSCSS3) 
C 5,5E-02 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Windings open circuit (PSS2c1) D 5,5E-03 
Loss of propulsion (rotor wing RPA)/ 
Loss of RPAS manoeuvrability (rotor wing RPA)/ 
Loss of control (rotor wing RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Windings short circuit (PSS2c2) D 5,5E-03 
Loss of propulsion (rotor wing RPA)/ 
Loss of RPAS manoeuvrability (rotor wing RPA)/ 
Loss of control (rotor wing RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Cranked stator housing (PSS2a) D 5,5E-03 
Loss of propulsion (rotor wing RPA)/ 
Loss of RPAS manoeuvrability (rotor wing RPA)/ 
Loss of control (rotor wing RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Armature shaft structural failure (PSS2d) D 5,5E-03 
Loss of propulsion (rotor wing RPA)/ 
Loss of RPAS manoeuvrability (rotor wing RPA)/ 
Loss of control (rotor wing RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Propeller connection failure (PSS3b) D 5,5E-03 
Loss of propulsion (rotor wing RPA)/ 
Loss of RPAS manoeuvrability (rotor wing RPA)/ 
Loss of control (rotor wing RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Calibration loss (NSS1b) D 5,5E-03 
Loss of RPAS navigation functionality/ 
Loss of RPAS remote control/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
ADS-B OUT antenna failure (NSS4c) D 5,5E-03 
Loss of RPAS navigation functionality/ 
Loss of RPAS remote control/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Emitter/transponder failure (NSS4f) D 5,5E-03 
Loss of RPAS navigation functionality/ 
Loss of RPAS remote control/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
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Table 81 – Failure modes, criticality ranking,  
probability of occurrence and possible related hazards (Cont’d) 
Single failure mode 
Estimated qualitative  
probability of occurrence 
level [MIL-STD-1629A] 
[47] 
Estimated quantitative 
value of probability of 
occurrence level 
Possible derived hazards 
Failure of ADS-B transponder/ 
emitter on the RPA (NSS4o) 
D 5,5E-03 
Loss of RPAS navigation functionality/ 
Loss of RPAS remote control/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
ADS-B IN receiving antenna  
deterioration (NSS4r) 
D 5,5E-03 
Loss of RPAS navigation functionality/ 
Loss of RPAS remote control/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Failure of weak joints (FCSS1a) D 5,5E-03 
Loss of RPAS control/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Lack of power supply (FCSS1b)  D 5,5E-03 
Loss of RPAS control/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Software error (FCSS1c) D 5,5E-03 
Loss of RPAS control/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
The on board transmitting antenna 
cannot process the control signal (CSS1a) 
D 5,5E-03 
Loss link/ 
Loss of control/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
The onboard receiving antenna cannot 
process the control signal (CSS2a) 
D 5,5E-03 
Loss link/ 
Loss of control/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Mechanical failure (PCSE2b) C 5,5E-02 
Loss of propulsion (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Loss of RPAS manoeuvrability (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Loss of control (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Software error (PSCE1a) D 5,5E-03 
Loss of propulsion (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Loss of RPAS manoeuvrability (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Loss of control (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Engine fire (PSCE2c) D 5,5E-03 
Loss of propulsion (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Loss of RPAS manoeuvrability (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Loss of control (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Use of improper fuel (PSCE2d) D 5,5E-03 
Loss of propulsion (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Loss of RPAS manoeuvrability (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Loss of control (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Carburetor failure (PSCEP1d) C 5,5E-02 
Loss of propulsion (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Loss of RPAS manoeuvrability (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Loss of control (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
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Table 81 – Failure modes, criticality ranking,  
probability of occurrence and possible related hazards (Cont’d) 
Single failure mode 
Estimated qualitative  
probability of occurrence 
level [MIL-STD-1629A] 
[47] 
Estimated quantitative 
value of probability of 
occurrence level 
Possible derived hazards 
Mechanical failure (PCSEP2b) C 5,5E-02 
Loss of propulsion (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Loss of RPAS manoeuvrability (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Loss of control (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Software error (PSCEP1a) D 5,5E-03 
Loss of propulsion (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Loss of RPAS manoeuvrability (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Loss of control (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Engine fire (PSCEP2c) D 5,5E-03 
Loss of propulsion (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Loss of RPAS manoeuvrability (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Loss of control (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Use of improper fuel (PSCEP2d) D 5,5E-03 
Loss of propulsion (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Loss of RPAS manoeuvrability (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Loss of control (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Propeller connection failure (PSCEP3b) D 5,5E-03 
Loss of propulsion (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Loss of RPAS manoeuvrability (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Loss of control (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Structural failure (FSS1) D 5,5E-03 
Loss of fuel subsystem/ 
Loss of propulsion (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Loss of RPAS manoeuvrability (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Loss of control (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain/ 
Fire 
Mechanical failure (FSS2) D 5,5E-03 
Loss of fuel subsystem/ 
Loss of propulsion (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Loss of RPAS manoeuvrability (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Loss of control (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain/ 
Fire 
Mechanical failure (PWGSS3a) D 5,5E-03 
Loss of propulsion (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Loss of RPAS manoeuvrability (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Loss of control (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain/ 
Thermal failure (PWGSS3b) D 5,5E-03 
Loss of propulsion (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Loss of RPAS manoeuvrability (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Loss of control (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain/ 
Chemical failure (PWGSS3c)  D 5,5E-03 
Loss of propulsion (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Loss of RPAS manoeuvrability (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Loss of control (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain/ 
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Table 81 – Failure modes, criticality ranking,  
probability of occurrence and possible related hazards (Cont’d) 
Single failure mode 
Estimated qualitative  
probability of occurrence 
level [MIL-STD-1629A] 
[47] 
Estimated quantitative 
value of probability of 
occurrence level 
Possible derived hazards 
Electrical failure (PWGSS3d) D 5,5E-03 
Loss of propulsion (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Loss of RPAS manoeuvrability (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Loss of control (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain/ 
Stuck surface (FCSS1b) D 5,5E-03 
Loss of control (fixed wing RPAS)/ 
Loss of manoeuvrability (fixed wing RPAS)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Hardover (FCSS1c) D 5,5E-03 
Loss of control (fixed wing RPAS)/ 
Loss of manoeuvrability (fixed wing RPAS)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Oscillatory modes (FCSS1e) D 5,5E-03 
Loss of control (fixed wing RPAS)/ 
Loss of manoeuvrability (fixed wing RPAS)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Increased dead band/stiction (FCSS1f) D 5,5E-03 
Loss of control (fixed wing RPAS)/ 
Loss of manoeuvrability (fixed wing RPAS)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Structural failure (HPSS1a) D 5,5E-03 
Loss of propulsion (hybrid RPA)/ 
Loss of RPAS manoeuvrability (hybrid RPA)/ 
Loss of control (hybrid RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain/ 
Fire 
Leakage (HPSS1b) D 5,5E-03 
Loss of propulsion (hybrid RPA)/ 
Loss of RPAS manoeuvrability (hybrid RPA)/ 
Loss of control (hybrid RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain/ 
Fire 
Membrane drying (HPSS2a) D 5,5E-03 
Loss of propulsion (hybrid RPA)/ 
Loss of RPAS manoeuvrability (hybrid RPA)/ 
Loss of control (hybrid RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain/ 
Fire 
Water condensation inhibition (HPSS2b) D 5,5E-03 
Loss of propulsion (hybrid RPA)/ 
Loss of RPAS manoeuvrability (hybrid RPA)/ 
Loss of control (hybrid RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain/ 
Fire 
C2 radio link signal  
degradation (C2LSS1a) 
D 5,5E-03 
Loss link/ 
Loss of control/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
C2 radio link signal loss (C2LSS1b) D 5,5E-03 
Loss link/ 
Loss of control/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
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Table 81 – Failure modes, criticality ranking,  
probability of occurrence and possible related hazards (Cont’d) 
Single failure mode 
Estimated qualitative  
probability of occurrence 
level [MIL-STD-1629A] 
[47] 
Estimated quantitative 
value of probability of 
occurrence level 
Possible derived hazards 
Missed start (GCSPWSS1a) D 5,5E-03 
Impossibility to start and  
perform the flight mission 
Sudden stop (GCSPWSS1b) D 5,5E-03 
Loss of RPAS remote control/ 
Loss RPAS manoeuvrability/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles 
Lack of calibration (GCSHMISS1a) D 5,5E-03 
Loss of RPAS remote control/ 
Loss RPAS manoeuvrability/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles 
Software error (GCSHMISS1b) D 5,5E-03 
Loss of RPAS remote control/ 
Loss RPAS manoeuvrability/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles 
Joystick missed start (GCSHMISS1c) D 5,5E-03 
Loss of RPAS remote control/ 
Loss RPAS manoeuvrability/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles 
Joystick sudden stop (GCSHMISS1d) D 5,5E-03 
Loss of RPAS remote control/ 
Loss RPAS manoeuvrability/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles 
Lack of calibration (GCSHMISS2a) D 5,5E-03 
Loss of RPAS remote control/ 
Loss RPAS manoeuvrability/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles 
Software error (GCSHMISS2b) D 5,5E-03 
Loss of RPAS remote control/ 
Loss RPAS manoeuvrability/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles 
Missed start (GCSHMISS2c) D 5,5E-03 
Loss of RPAS remote control/ 
Loss RPAS manoeuvrability/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles 
Sudden stop (GCSHMISS2d) D 5,5E-03 
Loss of RPAS remote control/ 
Loss RPAS manoeuvrability/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles 
Lack of calibration (GCSHMISS3a) D 5,5E-03 
Loss of RPAS remote control/ 
Loss RPAS manoeuvrability/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles 
Software error (GCSHMISS3b) D 5,5E-03 
Loss of RPAS remote control/ 
Loss RPAS manoeuvrability/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles 
Throttle missed start (GCSHMISS3c) D 5,5E-03 
Loss of RPAS remote control/ 
Loss RPAS manoeuvrability/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles 
Throttle sudden stop (GCSHMISS3d) D 5,5E-03 
Loss of RPAS remote control/ 
Loss RPAS manoeuvrability/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles 
Mechanical failure (GCSHMISS4a) D 5,5E-03 
Loss of RPAS remote control/ 
Loss RPAS manoeuvrability/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles 
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Table 81 – Failure modes, criticality ranking,  
probability of occurrence and possible related hazards (Cont’d) 
Single failure mode 
Estimated qualitative  
probability of occurrence 
level [MIL-STD-1629A] 
[47] 
Estimated quantitative 
value of probability of 
occurrence level 
Possible derived hazards 
Electrical failure (GCSHMISS4b)  D 5,5E-03 
Loss of RPAS remote control/ 
Loss RPAS manoeuvrability/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles 
Software error (GCSHMISS4c) D 5,5E-03 
Loss of RPAS remote control/ 
Loss RPAS manoeuvrability/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles 
Electrical failure (GCSHMISS6a)  D 5,5E-03 
Loss of RPAS remote control/ 
Loss RPAS manoeuvrability/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles 
Software error (GCSHMISS6b) D 5,5E-03 
Loss of RPAS remote control/ 
Loss RPAS manoeuvrability/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles 
The transmitter antenna cannot process 
the control signal (CSS1a) 
D 5,5E-03 
Loss link/ 
Loss of control/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
The receiver antenna cannot process the 
control signal (CSS2a) 
D 5,5E-03 
Loss link/ 
Loss of control/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Propeller structural failure (PSS3a) E < 1,0E-03 
Loss of propulsion (rotor wing RPA)/ 
Loss of RPAS manoeuvrability (hybrid RPA)/ 
Loss of control (hybrid RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Abrupt stop of the propeller (PSS3c) E < 1,0E-03 
Loss of propulsion (rotor wing RPA)/ 
Loss of RPAS manoeuvrability (hybrid RPA)/ 
Loss of control (hybrid RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Circuitry overload (NSS1a)  E < 1,0E-03 
Loss of RPAS navigation functionality/ 
Loss of RPAS remote control/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
GPS antenna failure (NSS2a) E < 1,0E-03 
Loss of RPAS navigation functionality/ 
Loss of RPAS remote control/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
GPS signal jamming (NSS2b) E < 1,0E-03 
Loss of RPAS remote control/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
GPS signal spoofing (NSS2c) E < 1,0E-03 
Loss of RPAS remote control/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Loss of EGNOS signal integrity (NSS3c) E < 1,0E-03 
Loss of RPAS navigation functionality/ 
Loss of RPAS remote control/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
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Table 81 – Failure modes, criticality ranking,  
probability of occurrence and possible related hazards (Cont’d) 
Single failure mode 
Estimated qualitative  
probability of occurrence 
level [MIL-STD-1629A] 
[47] 
Estimated quantitative 
value of probability of 
occurrence level 
Possible derived hazards 
Erroneous altitude data (NSS4g) E < 1,0E-03 
Loss of RPAS navigation functionality/ 
Loss of RPAS remote control/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Data encoding error (NSS4h) E < 1,0E-03 
Loss of RPAS navigation functionality/ 
Loss of RPAS remote control/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Intentional/unintentional jamming  
of ADS-B signal (NSS4i) 
E < 1,0E-03 
Loss of RPAS navigation functionality/ 
Loss of RPAS remote control/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Lack of ADS-B service (NSS4l) E < 1,0E-03 
Loss of RPAS navigation functionality/ 
Loss of RPAS remote control/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Degradation of accuracy and integrity of 
data sent by the satellite to the ADS-B 
(NSS4n) 
E < 1,0E-03 
Loss of RPAS navigation functionality/ 
Loss of RPAS remote control/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Erroneous altitude data (FCSS2c) E < 1,0E-03 
Loss of RPAS navigation functionality/ 
Loss of RPAS remote control/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Loss of mission data software (MCSS1a) C 5,5E-02 
Mission degradation/ 
Loss of mission 
Physical unit degradation (MCSS1b) C 5,5E-02 
Mission degradation/ 
Loss of mission 
Photo/video camera failure (MPYSS1) D 5,5E-03 Loss of payload mission data 
Other payload sensors failure (MPYSS2) D 5,5E-03 Loss of payload mission data 
Loss of on board computer (PSCE1c) E < 1,0E-03 
Loss of propulsion (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Loss of RPAS manoeuvrability (fixed RPA)/ 
Loss of control (fixed RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
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Table 81 – Failure modes, criticality ranking,  
probability of occurrence and possible related hazards (Cont’d) 
Single failure mode 
Estimated qualitative  
probability of occurrence 
level [MIL-STD-1629A] 
[47] 
Estimated quantitative 
value of probability of 
occurrence level 
Possible derived hazards 
Loss of on board computer (PSCE1c) E < 1,0E-03 
Loss of propulsion (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Loss of RPAS manoeuvrability (fixed RPA)/ 
Loss of control (fixed RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Propeller structural failure (PSCEP3a) E < 1,0E-03 
Loss of propulsion (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Loss of RPAS manoeuvrability (fixed RPA)/ 
Loss of control (fixed RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrainLoss  
Abrupt stop of the propeller (PSCEP3c) E < 1,0E-03 
Loss of propulsion (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Loss of RPAS manoeuvrability (fixed RPA)/ 
Loss of control (fixed RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Structural damage (FCSS2) E < 1,0E-03 
Loss of propulsion (fixed wing RPA)/ 
Loss of RPAS manoeuvrability (fixed RPA)/ 
Loss of control (fixed RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Emergency battery  
low charge (GCSPWSS2a) 
E < 1,0E-03 
Loss of control (fixed RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Emergency battery  
lack of charge (GCSPWSS2b) 
E < 1,0E-03 
Loss of control (fixed RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Power on switch  
missed start (GCSSUSS1) 
E < 1,0E-03 
No possibility to perform  
the assigned flight mission 
Software error (GCSHMISS5) E < 1,0E-03 
Loss of control (fixed RPA)/ 
Mid-air collision with other aircraft/ 
Mid-air collision with obstacles/ 
Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Mechanical failure (GCSFTSS1) E < 1,0E-03 Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Mechanical failure (GCSFTSS2) E < 1,0E-03 Uncontrolled impact into terrain 
Mechanical failure (GCSPYSSS1a) D 5,5E-03 Loss of payload data 
Mechanical failure (GCSPYSSS2a) D 5,5E-03 Loss of payload data 
  
 363 
 
 
 
Appendix B –  Fault Tree Analysis  
(FTA) – Results 
 
Figure 39 – FTA analysis legend 
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Figure 40 – Rotor wing RPAS Propulsion Subsystem functionality FTA 
ROTOR WING RPAS PROPULSION 
SUBSYSTEM FUNCTIONALITY FTA 
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Table 82 – Rotor wing RPAS – ESC multiple failures 
ESC single failure modes Possible multiple failures  
ESC seizing 
(PSS1a) 
ESC                                                                                                         
degradation 
(PSS1b) 
ESC                            
overheating 
(PSS1c) 
ESC burnout 
(PSS1d) ESC failure   
0 0 0 0 NO - - 
0 0 0 5,5E-02 YES - - 
0 0 5,5E-02 0 YES - - 
0 0 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 YES ESC  overheating/ESC burnout 1,1E-01 
0 5,5E-02 0 0 YES -  
0 5,5E-02 0 5,5E-02 YES ESC degradation/ESC burnout 1,1E-01 
0 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 0 YES ESC  degradation/ESC overheating 1,1E-01 
0 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 YES 
ESC  degradation/ 
ESC overheating/ESC burnout 
1,65E-01 
5,5E-02 0 0 0 YES - - 
5,5E-02 0 0 5,5E-02 YES ESC seizing/ESC burnout 1,1E-01 
5,5E-02 0 5,5E-02 0 YES ESC seizing/ESC overheating 1,1E-01 
5,5E-02 0 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 YES 
ESC seizing/ 
ESC overheating/ESC burnout 
1,65E-01 
5,5E-02 5,5E-02 0 0 YES ESC seizing/ESC degradation 1,1E-01 
5,5E-02 5,5E-02 0 5,5E-02 YES 
ESC seizing/ 
ESC degradation/ESC overheating 
1,65E-01 
5,5E-02 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 0 YES 
ESC seizing/ 
ESC degradation/ESC overheating 
1,65E-01 
5,5E-02 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 YES 
ESC seizing/ESC degradation/ 
ESC overheating/ESC burnout 
2,2E-01 
Estimated probability of occurrence level, average value: 1,4E-01 
 
 
Table 83 – Rotor wing RPAS – Brushless electric motor multiple failures 
Brushless electric motor single failure modes Possible multiple failures  
Cranked 
stator 
housing 
(PSS2a) 
Worn 
bearings 
(PSS2b) 
Windings 
open circuit 
(PSS2c) 
Armature 
shaft 
structural 
damage 
(PSS2d) 
Brushless 
electric 
motor 
failure 
  
0 0 0 0 NO - - 
0 0 0 5,5E-03 YES - - 
0 0 5,5E-03 0 YES - - 
0 0 5,5E-03 5,5E-03 YES 
Windings open circuit/  
Armature shaft structural damage 
1,1E-02 
0 5,5E-02 0 0 YES - - 
0 5,5E-02 0 5,5E-03 YES 
Worn bearings/ 
Armature shaft structural damage 
6,05E-02 
0 5,5E-02 5,5E-03 0 YES Worn bearings/ Windings open circuit 6,05E-02 
0 5,5E-02 5,5E-03 5,5E-03 YES 
Worn bearings/ 
Windings open circuit/ 
Armature shaft structural damage 
6,6E-02 
5,5E-03 0 0 0 YES - 5,5E-03 
5,5E-03 0 0 5,5E-03 YES 
Cranked stator housing/  
Armature shaft structural damage 
1,1E-02 
5,5E-03 0 5,5E-03 0 YES 
Cranked stator housing/  
Windings open circuit 
1,1E-02 
5,5E-03 0 5,5E-03 5,5E-03 YES 
Cranked stator housing/  
Windings open circuit/ 
Armature shaft structural damage 
1,65E-02 
5,5E-03 5,5E-02 0 0 YES 
Cranked stator housing/  
Worn bearings 
6,05E-02 
5,5E-03 5,5E-02 0 5,5E-03 YES 
Cranked stator housing/  
Worn bearings/ 
Armature shaft structural damage 
6,6E-02 
5,5E-03 5,5E-02 5,5E-03 0 YES 
Cranked stator housing/  
Worn bearings/ 
Windings open circuit/ 
6,6E-02 
5,5E-03 5,5E-02 5,5E-03 5,5E-03 YES 
Cranked stator housing/  
Worn bearings/ 
Windings open circuit/  
Armature shaft structural damage 
7,15E-02 
Estimated probability of occurrence level, average value: 4,22E-02 
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Table 84 – Rotor wing RPAS – Propeller multiple failures 
Propeller single failure modes Possible multiple failures  
Propeller 
structural  
failure (PSS3a) 
Propeller 
connection 
failure (PSS3b) 
Abrupt stop of 
the propeller 
(PSS3c) 
Propeller failure   
0 0 0 NO - - 
0 0 < 1,0E-03 YES - - 
0 5,5E-03 0 YES - - 
0 5,5E-03 < 1,0E-03 YES 
Propeller connection failure/ 
Abrupt stop of the propeller 
6,5E-03 
< 1,0E-03 0 0 YES - - 
< 1,0E-03 0 < 1,0E-03 YES 
Propeller structural failure/ 
Abrupt stop of the propeller 
2,0E-03 
< 1,0E-03 5,5E-03 0 YES 
Propeller structural failure/ 
Propeller connection failure 
6,5E-03 
< 1,0E-03 5,5E-03 < 1,0E-03 YES 
Propeller structural failure/ 
Propeller connection failure/ 
Abrupt stop of the propeller 
7,5E-03 
Estimated probability of occurrence level, average value: 5,63E-03 
 
 
Table 85 – Rotor wing RPAS – Loss of Propulsion Subsystem functionality 
Loss of RPAS Propulsion Subsystem functionality Possible multiple failures Hazards 
ESC failure 
Brushless 
electric           
motor 
failure 
Propeller 
failure 
Loss of RPAS 
Propulsion 
Subsystem 
functionality 
  
0 0 0 0 - 
Degradation or loss of  
rotor wing RPAS propulsion 
functionality 
Degradation or loss of  
rotor wing RPAS control 
Degradation or loss  
of rotor wing RPAS 
manoeuvrability 
Uncontrolled projection of 
propeller debris 
0 0 5,63E-03 5,63E-03 - 
0 4,22E-03 0 4,22E-03 - 
0 4,22E-03 5,63E-03 9,85E-03 
Electric motor failure/ 
Propeller failure 
1,4E-01 0 0 1,4E-01 - 
1,4E-01 0 5,63E-03 1,46E-01 
ESC failure/ 
Propeller failure 
1,4E-01 4,22E-03 0 1,44E-01 
ESC failure/ 
Electric motor failure 
1,4E-01 4,22E-03 5,63E-03 1,5E-01 
ESC failure/ 
Electric motor  failure/ 
Propeller failure 
Estimated probability of occurrence level, range: D  B 
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Figure 41 – Rotor wing RPAS Power Subsystem functionality FTA 
ROTOR WING RPAS POWER  
SUBSYSTEM FUNCTIONALITY FTA 
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Table 86 – Rotor wing RPAS – Loss of Power Subsystem functionality 
Loss of RPAS Power Subsystem/functionality 
Possible  
multiple failures 
Hazards 
Short circuit 
(PWSS1) 
Mechanical 
damage (PWSS2) 
Fire (PWSS3) 
Loss of RPAS Power 
Subsystem functionality 
  
0 0 0 0 - 
Degradation or 
loss of rotor 
wing RPAS  
power 
functionality 
Fire 
0 0 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 - 
0 5,5E-02 0 5,5E-02 - 
0 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 1,1E-01 Mechanical damage/Fire 
5,5E-02 0 0 5,5E-02 - 
5,5E-02 0 5,5E-02 1,1E-01 Short circuit/Fire 
5,5E-02 5,5E-02 0 1,1E-01 
Short circuit/ 
Mechanical damage 
5,5E-02 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 1,65E-01 
Short circuit/ 
Mechanical damage/ 
Fire 
Estimated probability of occurrence level: B 
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Figure 42 – Rotor wing RPAS Electrical Subsystem functionality FTA 
ROTOR WING RPAS ELECTRICAL 
SUBSYSTEM/FUNCTIONALITY FTA 
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Table 89 – Rotor wing RPAS – Loss of Electrical Subsystem functionality 
Loss of RPAS Electrical subsystem functionality Possible multiple failures Hazards 
Balance wires 
failure 
Distribution                                         
cables failure 
Electrical                                                                                   
connectors failure 
Loss of RPAS 
Electrical 
Subsystem 
functionality 
  
0 0 0 0 - 
Degradation or loss 
of rotor wing RPAS  
electrical 
functionality 
Fire 
0 0 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 - 
0 2,0E-01 0 2,0E-01 - 
0 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 2,55E-01 
Distribution                                                                                                   
cables failure/Electrical  
connectors failure 
2,0E-01 0 0 2,0E-01 - 
2,0E-01 0 5,5E-02 2,55E-01 
Balance wires failure/ 
Electrical connectors 
failure 
2,0E-01 2,0E-01 0 4,0E-01 
Balance wires 
failure/Distribution                                                 
cables failure 
2,0E-01 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 4,55E-01 
Balance wires 
failure/Distribution                                                 
cables failure/Electrical 
connectors failure 
Estimated probability of occurrence level: A 
 
Table 87 – Rotor wing RPAS – Balance cables multiple failures 
Balance cables failure modes Possible multiple failures  
Short circuit (ESS1a) Open circuit (ESS1b) Balance cables failure   
0 0 NO - - 
0 5,5E-02 YES Short circuit 5,5E-02 
2,0E-01 0 YES Open circuit 2,0E-01 
2,0E-01 5,5E-02 YES -  
Estimated probability of occurrence level, average value: - 
 
Table 88 – Rotor wing RPAS – Distribution cables multiple failures 
Distribution cables failure modes Possible multiple failures  
Short circuit (ESS2a) Open circuit (ESS2b) Balance cables failure   
0 0 NO - - 
0 5,5E-02 YES Short circuit 5,5E-02 
2,0E-01 0 YES Open circuit 2,0E-01 
2,0E-01 5,5E-02 YES - - 
Estimated probability of occurrence level, average value: - 
 371 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 43 - Rotor wing RPAS Navigation Subsystem functionality FTA 
ROTOR WING RPAS NAVIGATION 
SUBSYSTEM/FUNCTIONALITY FTA 
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Table 90 – Rotor wing RPAS – Inertial Measurement Unit multiple failures 
Inertial Measurement Unit single failure modes Possible multiple failures  
Circuitry                                  
overload (NSS1a) 
Calibration                
 loss (NSS1b) 
Inertial Measurement 
Unit failure 
  
0 0 NO - - 
0 5,5E-02 YES - - 
5,5E-03 0 YES - - 
5,5E-03 5,5E-02 YES Circuitry overload/Calibration loss 6,05E-02 
Estimated probability of occurrence level, average value: 6,05E-02 
 
 
Table 91 – Rotor wing RPAS – GPS receiver unit multiple failures 
GPS receiver unit single failure modes Possible multiple failures  
GPS   
antenna  
failure (NSS2a) 
GPS signal 
jamming 
(NSS2b) 
GPS signal 
spoofing 
(NSS2c) 
GPS unit 
receiver failure 
  
0 0 0 NO - - 
0 0 1,5E-01 YES - - 
0 < 1,0E-03 0 YES - - 
0 < 1,0E-03 1,5E-01 YES 
GPS signal jamming/ 
GPS signal spoofing 
1,51E-01 
< 1,0E-03 0 0 YES - - 
< 1,0E-03 0 1,5E-01 YES 
GPS antenna failure/ 
GPS signal spoofing 
2,0E-03 
< 1,0E-03 < 1,0E-03 0 YES 
GPS antenna failure/ 
GPS signal jamming 
1,51E-01 
< 1,0E-03 < 1,0E-03 1,5E-01 YES 
GPS antenna failure/ 
GPS signal jamming/ 
GPS signal spoofing 
1,52E-02 
Estimated probability of occurrence level, average value: 7,98E-02 
 
 
Table 92 – Rotor wing RPAS – EGNOS receiver unit multiple failures 
EGNOS receiver unit single failure modes Possible multiple failures  
EGNOS 
receiver 
failure 
(NSS3a) 
Loss of  
EGNOS signal 
continuity 
(NSS3b) 
Loss of EGNOS 
signal 
integrity 
(NSS3c) 
EGNOS  
signal  
delay (NSS3d) 
EGNOS 
receiver unit 
failure 
  
0 0 0 0 NO - - 
0 0 0 5,5E-03 YES - - 
0 0 1,0E-03 0 YES - - 
0 0 1,0E-03 5,5E-03 YES 
Loss of EGNOS signal integrity/  
EGNOS signal delay 
6,5E-03 
0 5,5E-03 0 0 YES - - 
0 5,5E-03 0 5,5E-03 YES 
Loss of EGNOS signal continuity/ 
EGNOS signal delay 
1,1E-02 
0 5,5E-03 1,0E-03 0 YES 
Loss of EGNOS signal continuity/ 
EGNOS signal d Loss of EGNOS signal integrity  
6,5E-03 
0 5,5E-03 1,0E-03 5,5E-03 YES 
Loss of EGNOS signal continuity / 
EGNOS signal d Loss of EGNOS  
signal integrity/ 
EGNOS signal delay 
1,1E-02 
2,0E-01 0 0 0 YES - - 
2,0E-01 0 0 5,5E-03 YES 
EGNOS receiver failure/  
EGNOS signal delay 
2,055E-01 
2,0E-01 0 1,0E-03 0 YES 
EGNOS receiver failure/  
Loss of EGNOS signal integrity 
2,01E-01 
2,0E-01 0 1,0E-03 5,5E-03 YES 
EGNOS receiver failure/  
Loss of EGNOS signal integrity/ 
EGNOS signal delay 
2,065E-01 
2,0E-01 5,5E-03 0 0 YES 
EGNOS receiver failure/  
Loss of EGNOS signal continuity 
2,055E-01 
2,0E-01 5,5E-03 0 5,5E-03 YES 
EGNOS receiver failure/  
Loss of EGNOS signal continuity/ 
EGNOS signal delay 
2,11E-01 
2,0E-01 5,5E-03 1,0E-03 0 YES 
EGNOS receiver failure/  
Loss of EGNOS signal continuity/ 
Loss of EGNOS signal integrity 
2,065E-01 
2,0E-01 5,5E-03 1,0E-03 5,5E-03 YES 
EGNOS receiver failure/  
Loss of EGNOS signal continuity/ 
Loss of EGNOS signal integrity Windings open circuit/  
Armature shaft structural damage/ 
EGNOS signal delay 
2,12E-01 
Estimated probability of occurrence level, average value: 1,35E-01 
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Table 93 – Rotor wing RPAS – ADS-B unit multiple failures 
ADS-B unit single failure modes Possible multiple failures  
Loss of 
EGNOS  
position 
accuracy 
(NSS4a) 
Signal 
interruption 
(NSS4e) 
Inaccurate 
position 
datum sent 
to the ADS-B 
emitter 
(NSS4m) 
Failure in 
detection of 
maneuvering 
aircraft/RPA 
(NSS4p) 
ADS-B unit 
failure 
  
0 0 0 0 NO - - 
0 0 0 2,0E-01 YES - - 
0 0 2,12E-01 0 YES - - 
0 0 2,12E-01 2,0E-01 YES 
Inaccurate position datum sent to the ADS-
B emitter/ Failure in detection of 
maneuvering aircraft/RPA 
4,0E-01 
0 1,51E-01 0 0 YES - - 
0 1,51E-01 0 2,0E-01 YES 
Signal interruption/ 
Failure in detection of maneuvering 
aircraft/RPA 
4,0E-01 
0 1,51E-01 2,12E-01 0 YES 
Signal interruption/ 
Inaccurate position datum sent to the ADS-
B emitter 
4,0E-01 
0 1,51E-01 2,12E-01 2,0E-01 YES 
Signal interruption/ 
Inaccurate position datum sent to the ADS-
B emitter/ 
Failure in detection of maneuvering 
aircraft/RPA 
6,0E-01 
2,0E-01 0 0 0 YES - - 
2,0E-01 0 0 2,0E-01 YES 
Loss of EGNOS position accuracy/ 
Failure in detection of maneuvering 
aircraft/RPA 
4,0E-01 
2,0E-01 0 2,12E-01 0 YES 
Loss of EGNOS position accuracy/ 
Inaccurate position datum sent to the ADS-
B emitter/ 
4,0E-01 
2,0E-01 0 2,12E-01 2,0E-01 YES 
Loss of EGNOS position accuracy/ 
Inaccurate position datum sent to the ADS-
B emitter/ 
Failure in detection of maneuvering 
aircraft/RPA 
6,0E-01 
2,0E-01 1,51E-01 0 0 YES 
Loss of EGNOS position accuracy/ 
Signal interruption/ 
4,0E-01 
2,0E-01 1,51E-01 0 2,0E-01 YES 
Loss of EGNOS position accuracy/ 
Signal interruption/ 
Failure in detection of maneuvering 
aircraft/RPA 
6,0E-01 
2,0E-01 1,51E-01 2,12E-01 0 YES 
Loss of EGNOS position accuracy/ 
Signal interruption/ 
Inaccurate position datum sent to the ADS-
B emitter/ 
6,0E-01 
2,0E-01 1,51E-01 2,12E-01 2,0E-01 YES 
Loss of EGNOS position accuracy/ 
Signal interruption/ 
Inaccurate position datum sent to the ADS-
B emitter/ 
Failure in detection of maneuvering 
aircraft/RPA 
8,0E-01 
Estimated probability of occurrence level, average value: 5,09E-01 
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Table 94 – Rotor wing RPAS – Loss of Navigation Subsystem functionality 
Loss of RPAS Navigation Subsystem functionality 
Possible  
multiple failures 
Hazards 
Inertial 
Measureme
nt Unit 
failure 
GPS receiver 
unit failure 
EGNOS 
receiver unit 
failure 
ADS-B unit 
failure 
Loss of 
Navigation 
Subsystem 
functionality 
  
0 0 0 0 0 - 
Degradation or loss of 
navigation 
functionality 
Degradation or loss of 
GPS functionality on 
board the RPAS 
Degradation or loss of 
EGNOS functionality 
on board the RPAS 
Degradation or loss of 
ADS-B functionality on 
board the RPAS 
0 0 0 5,09E-01 5,09E-01 - 
0 0 1,35E-01 0 1,35E-01 - 
0 0 1,35E-01 5,09E-01 6,44E-01 
EGNOS receiver unit 
failure/ADS-B unit failure 
0 7,98E-02 0 0 7,98E-02 - 
0 7,98E-02 0 5,09E-01 5,888E-01 
GPS receiver unit 
failure/EGNOS receiver unit 
failure 
0 7,98E-02 1,35E-01 0 2,148E-01 
GPS receiver unit failure/ 
EGNOS receiver unit failure 
0 7,98E-02 1,35E-01 5,09E-01 7,238E-01 
GPS receiver unit failure/ 
EGNOS receiver unit 
failure/ADS-B unit failure 
6,05E-02 0 0 0 6,05E-02 - 
6,05E-02 0 0 5,09E-01 5,695E-01 
Inertial Measurement Unit 
failure/ADS-B unit failure 
6,05E-02 0 1,35E-01 0 1,955E-01 
Inertial Measurement Unit 
failure/EGNOS receiver unit 
failure 
6,05E-02 0 1,35E-01 5,09E-01 7,045E-01 
Inertial Measurement Unit 
failure/EGNOS receiver unit 
failure/ADS-B unit failure 
6,05E-02 7,98E-02 0 0 1,403E-01 
Inertial Measurement Unit 
failure/GPS receiver unit 
failure 
6,05E-02 7,98E-02 0 5,09E-01 6,493E-01 
Inertial Measurement Unit 
failure/GPS receiver unit 
failure/ ADS-B unit failure 
6,05E-02 7,98E-02 1,35E-01 0 2,753E-01 
Inertial Measurement Unit 
failure/GPS receiver unit 
failure/ EGNOS receiver 
unit failure 
6,05E-02 7,98E-02 1,35E-01 5,09E-01 7,843E-01 
Inertial Measurement Unit 
failure/GPS receiver unit 
failure/ EGNOS receiver 
unit failure/ADS-B unit 
failure 
Estimated probability of occurrence level: A 
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Figure 44 - Rotor wing RPAS Air Data Subsystem functionality FTA 
ROTOR WING RPAS AIR DATA  
SUBSYSTEM FUNCTIONALITY FTA 
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Table 95 – Rotor wing RPAS - Loss of Air Data Subsystem functionality 
Loss of RPAS Air Data Subsystem functionality 
Possible  
multiple failures 
Hazards 
Incorrect 
signal 
(ADSS1a) 
Loss of signal 
(ADSS1b) 
Signal error along 
the transmission 
line (ADSS1c) 
Error on 
output 
signal 
(ADSS1d) 
Loss of power 
supply 
(ADSS1e) 
Calibration 
error (ADSS1f) 
Loss of RPAS 
Air Data 
Subsystem 
functionality 
  
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 
Pressure  
sensors failure 
Misleading  
altitude indication 
Misleading  
airspeed indication 
Degradation or loss of 
control of RPAS flight 
attitude 
0 0 0 0 0 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 - 
0 0 0 0 2,0E-01 0 2,0E-01 - 
0 0 0 0 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 2,55E-01 
Loss of power 
supply/Calibration error 
0 0 0 5,5E-02 0 0 5,5E-02 - 
0 0 0 5,5E-02 0 5,5E-02 1,1E-01 
Error on output signal/ 
Calibration error 
0 0 0 5,5E-02 2,0E-01 0 2,55E-01 
Error on output signal/Loss 
of power supply 
0 0 0 5,5E-02 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 3,1E-01 
Error on output signal/Loss 
of power 
supply/Calibration error 
0 0 5,5E-02 0 0 0 5,5E-02 - 
0 0 5,5E-02 0 0 5,5E-02 1,1E-01 
Signal error along the 
transmission line/ 
Calibration error 
0 0 5,5E-02 0 2,0E-01 0 2,55E-01 
Signal error along the 
transmission 
line/Calibration error 
0 0 5,5E-02 0 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 3,1E-01 
Signal error along the 
transmission line/ 
Loss of power 
supply/Calibration error 
0 0 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 0 0 1,1E-01 
Signal error along the 
transmission line/Error on 
output signal 
0 0 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 0 5,5E-02 1,65E-01 
Signal error along the 
transmission line/Error on 
output signal/Calibration 
error 
0 0 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 2,0E-01 0 3,1E-01 
Signal error along the 
transmission line/Error on 
output signal/Loss of 
power supply 
0 0 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 3,65E-01 
Signal error along the 
transmission line/Error on 
output signal/ 
Loss of power 
supply/Calibration error 
0 2,0E-01 0 0 0 0 2,0E-01 - 
0 2,0E-01 0 0 0 5,5E-02 2,55E-01 
Loss of signal/ Calibration 
error 
0 2,0E-01 0 0 2,0E-01 0 4,0E-01 
Loss of signal/Loss of 
power supply 
0 2,0E-01 0 0 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 4,55E-01 
Loss of signal/ 
Loss of power 
supply/Calibration error 
0 2,0E-01 0 5,5E-02 0 0 2,55E-01 
Loss of signal/Error on 
output signal 
0 2,0E-01 0 5,5E-02 0 5,5E-02 3,1E-01 
Loss of signal/Error on 
output signal/Calibration 
error 
0 2,0E-01 0 5,5E-02 2,0E-01 0 4,55E-01 
Loss of signal/Error on 
output signal/Loss of 
power supply 
0 2,0E-01 0 5,5E-02 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 5,1E-01 
Loss of signal/Error on 
output signal/ 
Loss of power 
supply/Calibration error 
  
 377 
 
 
Table 95 – Rotor wing RPAS - Loss of Air Data Subsystem functionality (Cont’d) 
Loss of RPAS Air Data Subsystem functionality 
Possible  
multiple failures 
Hazards 
Incorrect 
signal 
(ADSS1a) 
Loss of signal 
(ADSS1b) 
Signal error along 
the transmission 
line (ADSS1c) 
Error on 
output 
signal 
(ADSS1d) 
Loss of power 
supply 
(ADSS1e) 
Calibration 
error (ADSS1f) 
Loss of RPAS 
Air Data 
Subsystem 
functionality 
  
0 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 0 0 0 2,55E-01 
Loss of signal/Signal error 
along the transmission line 
 
 
0 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 0 0 5,5E-02 3,1E-01 
Loss of signal/Signal error 
along the transmission 
line/ Calibration error 
0 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 0 2,0E-01 0 4,55E-01 
Loss of signal/Signal error 
along the transmission 
line/ 
Loss of power supply 
0 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 0 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 5,1E-01 
Loss of signal/Signal error 
along the transmission 
line/ 
Loss of power 
supply/Calibration error 
0 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 0 0 3,1E-01 
Loss of signal/Signal error 
along the transmission 
line/Error on output signal 
0 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 0 5,5E-02 3,65E-01 
Loss of signal/Signal error 
along the transmission 
line/ 
Error on output 
signal/Calibration error 
0 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 2,0E-01 0 5,1E-01 
Loss of signal/Signal error 
along the transmission 
line/Error on output 
signal/Loss of power supply 
0 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 5,65E-01 
Loss of signal/Signal error 
along the transmission 
line/Error on output signal/ 
Loss of power 
supply/Calibration error 
2,0E-01 0 0 0 0 0 2,0E-01 - 
2,0E-01 0 0 0 0 5,5E-02 2,55E-01 
Incorrect signal/ 
Calibration error 
2,0E-01 0 0 0 2,0E-01 0 4,0E-01 
Incorrect signal/ 
 Loss of power supply 
2,0E-01 0 0 0 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 4,55E-01 
Incorrect signal/ 
Loss of power 
supply/Calibration error 
2,0E-01 0 0 5,5E-02 0 0 2,55E-01 
Incorrect signal/Error on 
output signal 
2,0E-01 0 0 5,5E-02 0 5,5E-02 3,1E-01 
Incorrect signal/Error on 
output signal/Calibration 
error 
2,0E-01 0 0 5,5E-02 2,0E-01 0 4,55E-01 
Incorrect signal/Error on 
output signal/Loss of 
power supply 
2,0E-01 0 0 5,5E-02 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 5,1E-01 
Incorrect signal/Error on 
output signal/ 
Loss of power 
supply/Calibration error 
2,0E-01 0 5,5E-02 0 0 0 2,55E-01 
Incorrect signal/Signal 
error along the 
transmission line 
2,0E-01 0 5,5E-02 0 0 5,5E-02 3,1E-01 
Incorrect signal/Signal 
error along the 
transmission line/ 
Calibration error 
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Table 95 – Rotor wing RPAS - Loss of Air Data Subsystem functionality (Cont’d) 
Loss of RPAS Air Data Subsystem functionality 
Possible  
multiple failures 
Hazards 
Incorrect 
signal 
(ADSS1a) 
Loss of signal 
(ADSS1b) 
Signal error along 
the transmission 
line (ADSS1c) 
Error on 
output 
signal 
(ADSS1d) 
Loss of power 
supply 
(ADSS1e) 
Calibration 
error (ADSS1f) 
Loss of RPAS 
Air Data 
Subsystem 
functionality 
  
2,0E-01 0 5,5E-02 0 2,0E-01 0 4,55E-01 
Incorrect signal/Signal 
error along the 
transmission line/ 
Loss of power supply 
 
2,0E-01 0 5,5E-02 0 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 5,1E-01 
Incorrect signal/Signal 
error along the 
transmission line/ 
Loss of power 
supply/Calibration error 
2,0E-01 0 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 0 0 3,1E-01 
Incorrect signal/Signal 
error along the 
transmission line/ 
Calibration error 
2,0E-01 0 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 0 5,5E-02 3,65E-01 
Incorrect signal/Signal 
error along the 
transmission line/ 
Error on output 
signal/Calibration error 
2,0E-01 0 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 2,0E-01 0 5,1E-01 
Incorrect signal/Signal 
error along the 
transmission line/Error on 
output signal/Loss of 
power supply 
2,0E-01 0 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 5,65E-01 
Incorrect signal/Signal 
error along the 
transmission line/ 
Error on output signal/ 
Loss of power 
supply/Calibration error 
2,0E-01 2,0E-01 0 0 0 0 4,0E-01 
Incorrect signal/ 
Loss of signal 
2,0E-01 2,0E-01 0 0 0 5,5E-02 4,55E-01 
Incorrect signal/Loss of 
signal/Calibration error 
2,0E-01 2,0E-01 0 0 2,0E-01 0 6,0E-01 
Incorrect signal/Loss of 
signal/Loss of power supply 
2,0E-01 2,0E-01 0 0 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 6,55E-01 
Incorrect signal/Loss of 
signal/Loss of power 
supply/Calibration error 
2,0E-01 2,0E-01 0 5,5E-02 0 0 4,55E-01 
Incorrect signal/Loss of 
signal/Error on output 
signal 
2,0E-01 2,0E-01 0 5,5E-02 0 5,5E-02 5,1E-01 
Incorrect signal/Loss of 
signal/Error on output 
signal/Calibration error 
2,0E-01 2,0E-01 0 5,5E-02 2,0E-01 0 6,55E-01 
Incorrect signal/Loss of 
signal/Error on output 
signal/Loss of power supply 
2,0E-01 2,0E-01 0 5,5E-02 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 7,1E-01 
Incorrect signal/Loss of 
signal/Error on output 
signal/Loss of power 
supply/Calibration error 
2,0E-01 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 0 0 0 4,55E-01 
Incorrect signal/Loss of 
signal/Signal error along 
the transmission line 
2,0E-01 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 0 0 5,5E-02 5,1E-01 
Incorrect signal/Loss of 
signal/Signal error along 
the transmission line/ 
Calibration error 
2,0E-01 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 0 2,0E-01 0 6,55E-01 
Incorrect signal/Loss of 
signal/Signal error along 
the transmission line/Loss 
of power supply 
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Table 95 – Rotor wing RPAS - Loss of Air Data Subsystem functionality (Cont’d) 
Loss of RPAS Air Data Subsystem functionality 
Possible  
multiple failures 
Hazards 
Incorrect 
signal 
(ADSS1a) 
Loss of signal 
(ADSS1b) 
Signal error along 
the transmission 
line (ADSS1c) 
Error on 
output 
signal 
(ADSS1d) 
Loss of power 
supply 
(ADSS1e) 
Calibration 
error (ADSS1f) 
Loss of RPAS 
Air Data 
Subsystem 
functionality 
  
2,0E-01 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 0 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 7,1E-01 
Incorrect signal/Loss of 
signal/Signal error along 
the transmission line/ 
Loss of power 
supply/Calibration error 
 
2,0E-01 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 0 0 5,1E-01 
Incorrect signal/Loss of 
signal/Signal error along 
the transmission line/ 
Error on output signal 
2,0E-01 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 0 5,5E-02 5,65E-01 
Incorrect signal/Loss of 
signal/Signal error along 
the transmission line/ 
Error on output 
signal/Calibration error 
2,0E-01 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 2,0E-01 0 7,1E-01 
Incorrect signal/Loss of 
signal/Signal error along 
the transmission line/Error 
on output signal/Loss of 
power supply 
2,0E-01 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 7,65E-01 
Incorrect signal/Loss of 
signal/Signal error along 
the transmission line/Error 
on output signal/Loss of 
power supply/Calibration 
error 
Estimated probability of occurrence level: A 
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Figure 45 – Rotor wing RPAS Flight Control Subsystem functionality FTA 
ROTOR WING RPAS FLIGHT CONTROL 
SUBSYSTEM/FUNCTIONALITY FTA 
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Table 96 – Rotor wing RPAS – Autopilot Unit multiple failures 
Autopilot Unit single failure modes Possible multiple failures  
Failure of weak 
joint (FSS1a) 
Lack of power 
supply (FSS1b) 
Software error 
(FSS1c) 
Loss of 
Autopilot Unit 
functionality 
  
0 0 0 NO - - 
0 0 5,5E-03 YES - - 
0 5,5E-03 0 YES - - 
0 5,5E-03 5,5E-03 YES 
Lack of power supply/ 
Software error 
1,1E-02 
5,5E-03 0 0 YES - - 
5,5E-03 0 5,5E-03 YES 
Failure of weak joint/ 
Software error 
1,1E-02 
5,5E-03 5,5E-03 0 YES 
Failure of weak joint/ 
Lack of power supply 
1,1E-02 
5,5E-03 5,5E-03 5,5E-03 YES 
Failure of weak joint/ 
Lack of power supply 
Software error 
1,65E-02 
Estimated probability of occurrence level, average value: 1,24E-02 
 
 
Table 97 – Rotor wing RPAS – Detect and Avoid (DAA) subsystem multiple failures 
Detect and Avoid Subsystem single failure modes Possible multiple failures  
ADS-B IN 
receiving 
antenna 
deterioration 
(ESS2a) 
EGNOS  
receiver 
failure 
(ESS2b) 
Erroneous 
altitude  
data (ESS2c) 
Loss of Detect 
and Avoid 
Subsystem 
functionality 
  
0 0 0 NO - - 
0 0 1,0E-03 YES - - 
0 2,0E-01 0 YES - - 
0 2,0E-01 1,0E-03 YES 
EGNOS receiver failure/ 
Erroneous altitude data 
2,01E-01 
5,5E-02 0 0 YES - - 
5,5E-02 0 1,0E-03 YES 
ADS-B IN receiving antenna deterioration/ 
Erroneous altitude data 
5,6E-02 
5,5E-02 2,0E-01 0 YES 
ADS-B IN receiving antenna deterioration/ 
EGNOS receiver failure 
2,55E-01 
5,5E-02 2,0E-01 1,0E-03 YES 
ADS-B IN receiving antenna deterioration/ 
EGNOS receiver failure/ 
Erroneous altitude data 
2,51E-01 
Estimated probability of occurrence level, average value: 1,91E-01 
 
 
Table 98 – Rotor wing RPAS – Loss of Flight Control Subsystem functionality 
Loss of RPAS Flight Control subsystem functionality Possible multiple failures Hazards 
Loss of Autopilot 
Unit functionality 
Loss of Detect and 
Avoid Subsystem 
functionality 
Loss of RPAS Flight 
Control Subsystem 
functionality 
  
0 0 0 - 
Loss or degradation of rotor 
wing RPAS control 
Loss or degradation of rotor 
wing RPAS manoeuvrability 
0 1,91E-01 2,55E-01 - 
1,24E-02 0 1,65E-02 - 
1,24E-02 1,91E-01 2,715E-01 
Loss of Autopilot Unit 
functionality/ 
Loss of Detect and Avoid 
Subsystem functionality 
Estimated probability of occurrence level, range: C  A 
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Figure 46 – Rotor wing RPAS Emergency Flight Termination Subsystem functionality FTA 
ROTOR WING RPAS EMERGENCY FLIGHT 
TERMINATION SUBSYSTEM FUNCTIONALITY 
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Table 99 – Rotor wing RPAS – Flight Termination System (FTS) multiple failures 
Flight Termination System (FTS) single failure modes Possible multiple failures  
Loss of 
dedicated radio 
link (EFSS1a) 
Lack of 
functionality 
(EFSS1b) 
Unlawful 
interference on 
dedicated radio 
link (jamming) 
(EFSS1c) 
Loss of Flight 
Termination 
System (FTS) 
functionality 
  
0 0 0 NO - - 
0 0 1,5E-01 YES - - 
0 5,5E-03 0 YES - - 
0 5,5E-03 1,5E-01 YES 
Lack of functionality/ 
Unlawful interference on dedicated radio link 
(jamming) 
1,55E-01 
5,5E-02 0 0 YES - - 
5,5E-02 0 1,5E-01 YES 
Loss of dedicated radio link/ 
Unlawful interference on dedicated radio link 
(jamming) 
2,05-01 
5,5E-02 5,5E-03 0 YES 
Loss of dedicated radio link/ 
Lack of functionality 
6,05E-02 
5,5E-02 5,5E-03 1,5E-01 YES 
Loss of dedicated radio link/ 
Lack of functionality/ 
Unlawful interference on dedicated radio link 
(jamming) 
2,105E-01 
Estimated probability of occurrence level, average value: 1,42E-01 
 
 
Table 100 – Rotor wing RPAS – Emergency parachute multiple failures 
Emergency parachute single failure modes Possible multiple failures  
Loss of 
dedicated 
radio link 
(EFSS2a) 
Lack of 
functionality 
(EFSS2b) 
Unlawful 
interference on 
dedicated radio 
link (jamming) 
(EFSS2c) 
Loss of 
Emergency 
Parachute 
functionality 
  
0 0 0 NO - - 
0 0 1,5E-01 YES - - 
0 5,5E-03 0 YES - - 
0 5,5E-03 1,5E-01 YES 
Lack of functionality/ 
Unlawful interference on dedicated radio 
link (jamming) 
1,55E-01 
5,5E-02 0 0 YES - - 
5,5E-02 0 1,5E-01 YES 
Loss of dedicated radio link/ 
Unlawful interference on dedicated radio 
link (jamming) 
2,05-01 
5,5E-02 5,5E-03 0 YES 
Loss of dedicated radio link/ 
Lack of functionality 
6,05E-02 
5,5E-02 5,5E-03 1,5E-01 YES 
Loss of dedicated radio link/ 
Lack of functionality/ 
Unlawful interference on dedicated radio 
link (jamming) 
2,105E-01 
Estimated probability of occurrence level, average value: 1,42E-01 
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Table 101 – Rotor wing RPAS – Loss of Emergency Flight Termination Subsystem functionality 
Loss of RPAS Emergency Flight subsystem functionality Possible multiple failures Hazards 
Loss of Flight 
Termination 
System (FTS) 
functionality 
Loss of Emergency 
Parachute 
functionality 
Loss of RPAS 
Emergency Flight 
Termination 
Subsystem 
functionality 
  
0 0 0 - Degradation or loss of 
emergency flight termination 
functionality 
Degradation or loss of FTS 
functionality 
Degradation or loss of 
Emergency Parachute 
functionality 
Uncontrolled impact on ground 
Uncontrolled  
projection of debris 
Uncontrolled impact  
with third parties  
0 1,42E-01 1,42E-01 - 
1,42E-01 0 1,42E-01 - 
1,42E-01 1,42E-01 2,84E-01 
Loss of Flight Termination System 
(FTS) functionality/ 
Loss of Emergency  
Parachute functionality 
Estimated probability of occurrence level, range: B  A 
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Figure 47 – Rotor wing RPAS Mission Control Subsystem functionality FTA
ROTOR WING RPAS MISSION CONTROL 
SUBSYSTEM FUNCTIONALITY FTA 
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Table 102 – Rotor wing RPAS – Loss of Mission Control Flight Subsystem functionality 
Loss of RPAS Mission Control subsystem functionality Possible multiple failures Hazards 
Loss of  
mission software 
(MCSS1a) 
Physical Unit 
Degradation 
(MCSS1b) 
Loss of RPAS 
Control Subsystem 
functionality 
  
0 0 0 - 
Loss of RPAS Mission Control 
subsystem functionality 
0 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 - 
5,5E-02 0 5,5E-02 - 
5,5E-02 5,5E-02 1,1E-01 
Loss of  
mission software/ 
Physical unit Degradation 
Estimated probability of occurrence level, range: C  B 
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Note: Rotor Wing RPAS Mission Payload Sensors Subsystem FTA: not 
performed; the effects of mission payload sensor combined failures are negligible 
for the RPAS specific category operations safety. 
ROTOR WING RPAS PAYLOAD SENSORS 
SUBSYSTEM FUNCTIONALITY FTA 
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Figure 48 - Rotor Wing RPAS On Board Communication Subsystem functionality FTA 
ROTOR WING RPAS ON BOARD 
COMMUNICATION SUBSYSTEM 
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Table 103 – Rotor wing RPAS – On board transmitting antenna multiple failures 
On board transmitting single failure modes Possible multiple failures  
The on board 
transmitting antenna 
cannot process the 
control signal (CSS1a) 
On board transmitting 
antenna fade (CSS1b)  
Loss of on board 
transmitting antenna 
functionality 
  
0 0 NO - - 
0 5,5E-02 YES - - 
5,5E-03 0 YES - - 
5,5E-03 5,5E-02 YES 
The on board transmitting antenna cannot 
process the control signal/ 
On board transmitting antenna fade 
6,05E-02 
Estimated probability of occurrence level, average value: 6,05E-02 
 
 
Table 104 – Rotor wing RPAS – On board receiving antenna multiple failures 
On board transmitting single failure modes Possible multiple failures  
The on board receiving 
antenna cannot 
process the control 
signal (CSS2a) 
On board receiving 
antenna fade (CSS2b)  
Loss of on board 
receiving antenna 
functionality 
  
0 0 NO - - 
0 5,5E-02 YES - - 
5,5E-03 0 YES - - 
5,5E-03 5,5E-02 YES 
The on board receiving antenna cannot 
process the control signal/ 
On board receiving antenna fade 
6,05E-02 
Estimated probability of occurrence level, average value: 6,05E-02 
 
 
Table 105 – Rotor wing RPAS – Loss of On Board Communication Subsystem functionality 
Loss of On Board Communication  
subsystem functionality 
Possible multiple failures Hazards 
Loss of on board 
transmitting 
antenna 
functionality 
Loss of on board 
receiving antenna 
functionality 
Loss of On Board 
Communication  
Subsystem 
functionality 
  
0 0 0 - 
Degradation or loss of rotor 
wing RPAS control 
Degradation or loss of 
telemetry receipt for rotor 
wing RPAS monitoring  
0 6,05E-02 6,05E-02 - 
6,05E-02 0 6,05E-02 - 
6,05E-02 6,05E-02 1,1E-01 
Loss of on board transmitting 
antenna functionality/ 
Loss of on board receiving 
antenna functionality 
Estimated probability of occurrence level, range: C  B 
 
 390 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 49 – Fixed Wing RPAS Combustion Engine Propulsion Subsystem functionality FTA 
FIXED WING RPAS COMBUSTION ENGINE 
PROPULSION  SUBSYSTEM FUNCTIONALITY 
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Table 106 – Fixed wing RPAS – Engine Control Unit single failures 
Engine Control Unit single failure modes Possible multiple failures  
Software 
error 
(PSCE1a) 
Mechanical 
failure 
(PSCE1b) 
Loss of on 
board 
computer  
(PSCE1c) 
Carburetor 
failure 
(PSCE1d)  
Loss of Engine 
Control Unit 
  
0 0 0 0 NO - - 
0 0 0 5,5E-02 YES - - 
0 0 1,0E-03 0 YES - - 
0 0 1,0E-03 5,5E-02 YES 
Loss of on board computer/ 
Carburetor failure 
5,6E-02 
0 1,5E-01 0 0 YES - - 
0 1,5E-01 0 5,5E-02 YES 
Mechanical failure/ 
Carburetor failure 
2,05E-01 
0 1,5E-01 1,0E-03 0 YES 
Mechanical failure/ 
Loss of on board computer 
1,51E-01 
0 1,5E-01 1,0E-03 5,5E-02 YES 
Mechanical failure/ 
Loss of on board computer/ 
Carburetor failure 
2,06E-01 
5,5E-03 0 0 0 YES - - 
5,5E-03 0 0 5,5E-02 YES 
Software error/ 
Carburetor failure 
6,05E-02 
5,5E-03 0 1,0E-03 0 YES 
Software error/ 
Loss of on board computer 
6,5E-03 
5,5E-03 0 1,0E-03 5,5E-02 YES 
Software error/ 
Loss of on board computer/ 
Carburetor failure 
6,15E-02 
5,5E-03 1,5E-01 0 0 YES 
Software error/ 
Mechanical failure 
1,555E-01 
5,5E-03 1,5E-01 0 5,5E-02 YES 
Software error/ 
Mechanical failure/ 
Carburetor failure 
2,105E-01 
5,5E-03 1,5E-01 1,0E-03 0 YES 
Software error/ 
Mechanical failure/ 
Loss of on board computer 
1,5E-01 
5,5E-03 1,5E-01 1,0E-03 5,5E-02 YES 
Software error/ 
Mechanical failure/ 
Loss of on board computer/ 
Carburetor failure 
2,115E-01 
Estimated probability of occurrence level, average value: 1,42E-01 
 
 
Table 107 – Fixed wing RPAS – Engine single failures 
Engine single failure modes Possible multiple failures  
Engine control 
system failure 
(PSCE2a) 
Mechanical 
failure 
(PSCE2b) 
Engine fire 
(PSCE3c) 
Use of  
improper fuel 
(PSCE2d)  
Engine failure   
0 0 0 0 NO - - 
0 0 0 5,5E-03 YES - - 
0 0 5,5E-03 0 YES - - 
0 0 5,5E-03 5,5E-03 YES 
Engine fire/ 
Use of improper fuel 
1,1E-02 
0 5,5E-02 0 0 YES - - 
0 5,5E-02 0 5,5E-03 YES 
Mechanical failure/ 
Use of improper fuel 
6,05E-02 
0 5,5E-02 5,5E-03 0 YES 
Mechanical failure/ 
Engine fire 
6,05E-02 
0 5,5E-02 5,5E-03 5,5E-03 YES 
Mechanical failure/ 
Engine fire/ 
Use of improper fuel 
6,6E-02 
2,0E-01 0 0 0 YES - - 
2,0E-01 0 0 5,5E-03 YES 
Engine control system failure/ 
Use of improper fuel 
2,055E-01 
2,0E-01 0 5,5E-03 0 YES 
Engine control system failure/ 
Engine fire 
2,055E-01 
2,0E-01 0 5,5E-03 5,5E-03 YES 
Engine control system failure/ 
Engine fire/ 
Use of improper fuel 
2,11E-01 
2,0E-01 5,5E-02 0 0 YES 
Engine control system failure/ 
Mechanical failure/ 
2,55E-01 
2,0E-01 5,5E-02 0 5,5E-03 YES 
Engine control system failure/ 
Mechanical failure/ 
Use of improper fuel 
2,605E-01 
2,0E-01 5,5E-02 5,5E-03 0 YES 
Engine control system failure/ 
Mechanical failure/ 
Engine fire 
2,605E-01 
2,0E-01 5,5E-02 5,5E-03 5,5E-03 YES 
Engine control system failure/ 
Mechanical failure/ 
Engine fire/ 
Use of improper fuel 
2,66E-01 
Estimated probability of occurrence level, average value: 1,69E-01 
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Table 108 – Fixed wing RPAS – Loss of Combustion Engine Propulsion Subsystem functionality 
Loss of Combustion Engine  
Propulsion Subsystem functionality 
Possible 
multiple 
failures 
Hazards 
Loss of  
Engine Control Unit 
Loss of engine 
Loss of Combustion 
Engine  
Propulsion Subsystem 
functionality 
  
0 0 0 - 
Degradation or loss of fixed wing  
(jet) combustion engine RPAS propulsion 
functionality 
Degradation or loss of fixed wing  
(jet) combustion engine RPAS control 
Degradation or loss of fixed wing (jet) 
combustion engine RPAS manoeuvrability 
0 1,69E-01 2,66E-01 - 
1,42E-01 0 2,115E-01 - 
1,42E-01 1,69E-01 4,775E-01 
Loss of  
Engine Control 
Unit/ 
Loss of engine 
Estimated probability of occurrence level: A 
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Figure 50 – Fixed wing RPAS Combustion Engine with Propellers Subsystem functionality FTA 
FIXED WING RPAS COMBUSTION ENGINE 
WITH PROPELLERS PROPULSION  
SUBSYSTEM FUNCTIONALITY FTA 
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Table 109 – Fixed wing RPAS – Engine Control Unit single failures 
Engine Control Unit single failure modes Possible multiple failures  
Software 
error 
(PSCEP1a) 
Mechanical 
failure 
(PSCEP1b) 
Loss of on 
board 
computer  
(PSCEP1c) 
Carburetor 
failure 
(PSCEP1d)  
Loss of Engine 
Control Unit 
  
0 0 0 0 NO - - 
0 0 0 5,5E-02 YES - - 
0 0 1,0E-03 0 YES - - 
0 0 1,0E-03 5,5E-02 YES 
Loss of on board computer/ 
Carburetor failure 
5,6E-02 
0 1,5E-01 0 0 YES - - 
0 1,5E-01 0 5,5E-02 YES 
Mechanical failure/ 
Carburetor failure 
2,05E-01 
0 1,5E-01 1,0E-03 0 YES 
Mechanical failure/ 
Loss of on board computer 
1,51E-01 
0 1,5E-01 1,0E-03 5,5E-02 YES 
Mechanical failure/ 
Loss of on board computer/ 
Carburetor failure 
2,06E-01 
5,5E-03 0 0 0 YES - - 
5,5E-03 0 0 5,5E-02 YES 
Software error/ 
Carburetor failure 
6,05E-02 
5,5E-03 0 1,0E-03 0 YES 
Software error/ 
Loss of on board computer 
6,5E-03 
5,5E-03 0 1,0E-03 5,5E-02 YES 
Software error/ 
Loss of on board computer/ 
Carburetor failure 
6,15E-02 
5,5E-03 1,5E-01 0 0 YES 
Software error/ 
Mechanical failure 
1,555E-01 
5,5E-03 1,5E-01 0 5,5E-02 YES 
Software error/ 
Mechanical failure/ 
Carburetor failure 
2,105E-01 
5,5E-03 1,5E-01 1,0E-03 0 YES 
Software error/ 
Mechanical failure/ 
Loss of on board computer 
1,5E-01 
5,5E-03 1,5E-01 1,0E-03 5,5E-02 YES 
Software error/ 
Mechanical failure/ 
Loss of on board computer/ 
Carburetor failure 
2,115E-01 
Estimated probability of occurrence level, average value: 1,42E-01 
 
 
Table 110 – Fixed wing RPAS – Engine single failures 
Engine single failure modes Possible multiple failures  
Engine control 
system failure 
(PSCEP2a) 
Mechanical 
failure 
(PSCEP2b) 
Engine fire 
(PSCEP3c) 
Use of  
improper fuel 
(PSCEP2d)  
Engine failure   
0 0 0 0 NO - - 
0 0 0 5,5E-03 YES - - 
0 0 5,5E-03 0 YES - - 
0 0 5,5E-03 5,5E-03 YES 
Engine fire/ 
Use of improper fuel 
1,1E-02 
0 5,5E-02 0 0 YES - - 
0 5,5E-02 0 5,5E-03 YES 
Mechanical failure/ 
Use of improper fuel 
6,05E-02 
0 5,5E-02 5,5E-03 0 YES 
Mechanical failure/ 
Engine fire 
6,05E-02 
0 5,5E-02 5,5E-03 5,5E-03 YES 
Mechanical failure/ 
Engine fire/ 
Use of improper fuel 
6,6E-02 
2,0E-01 0 0 0 YES - - 
2,0E-01 0 0 5,5E-03 YES 
Engine control system failure/ 
Use of improper fuel 
2,055E-01 
2,0E-01 0 5,5E-03 0 YES 
Engine control system failure/ 
Engine fire 
2,055E-01 
2,0E-01 0 5,5E-03 5,5E-03 YES 
Engine control system failure/ 
Engine fire/ 
Use of improper fuel 
2,11E-01 
2,0E-01 5,5E-02 0 0 YES 
Engine control system failure/ 
Mechanical failure/ 
2,55E-01 
2,0E-01 5,5E-02 0 5,5E-03 YES 
Engine control system failure/ 
Mechanical failure/ 
Use of improper fuel 
2,605E-01 
2,0E-01 5,5E-02 5,5E-03 0 YES 
Engine control system failure/ 
Mechanical failure/ 
Engine fire 
2,605E-01 
2,0E-01 5,5E-02 5,5E-03 5,5E-03 YES 
Engine control system failure/ 
Mechanical failure/ 
Engine fire/ 
Use of improper fuel 
2,66E-01 
Estimated probability of occurrence level, average value: 1,69E-01 
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Table 111 – Fixed wing RPAS – Loss of the propeller 
Propeller single failure modes Possible multiple failures  
Propeller 
structural 
failure 
(PSCEP3a) 
Propeller  
connection 
failure 
(PSCEP3b) 
Abrupt stop  
of the propeller 
(PSCEP3c)  
Loss of the 
propeller 
  
0 0 0 NO - - 
0 0 1,0E-01 YES - - 
0 5,5E-03 0 YES - - 
0 5,5E-03 1,0E-01 YES 
Propeller connection failure/ 
Abrupt stop of the propeller 
1,06E-01 
1,0E-01 0 0 YES - - 
1,0E-01 0 1,0E-01 YES 
Propeller structural failure/ 
Abrupt stop of the propeller 
2,00E-01 
1,0E-01 5,5E-03 0 YES 
Propeller structural failure/ 
Propeller connection failure 
1,06E-01 
1,0E-01 5,5E-03 1,0E-01 YES 
Propeller structural failure/ 
Propeller connection failure/ 
Abrupt stop of the propeller 
2,06E-01 
Estimated probability of occurrence level, average value: 1,55E-01 
 
 
Table 112 – Fixed wing RPAS – Loss of Combustion Engine 
with Propellers Propulsion Subsystem functionality 
Loss of Propeller Combustion Engine  
Propulsion Subsystem functionality 
Possible multiple failures Hazards 
Loss of Engine 
Control Unit 
Loss of 
engine 
Loss of the 
propeller 
Loss of 
Combustion 
Engine 
Propulsion 
Subsystem 
functionality 
  
0 0 0 0 - 
Degradation or loss of fixed 
wing combustion engine 
with propeller RPAS 
propulsion functionality 
Degradation or loss of fixed 
wing combustion engine 
with propeller RPAS control 
Degradation or loss of fixed 
wing combustion engine 
with propeller RPAS 
manoeuvrability 
0 0 1,55E-01 1,55E-01 - 
0 1,69E-01 0 1,69E-01 - 
0 1,69E-01 1,55E-01 3,24E-01 
Loss of the engine/ 
Loss of the propeller 
1,42E-01 0 0 1,42E-01 - 
1,42E-01 0 1,55E-01 2,97E-01 
Loss of the Engine Control 
Unit/Loss of the propeller 
1,42E-01 1,69E-01 0 3,1E-01 
Loss of the Engine Control 
Unit/Loss of the engine 
1,42E-01 1,69E-01 1,55E-01 4,66E-01 
Loss of the Engine Control 
Unit/Loss of the engine/Loss 
of the propeller 
Estimated probability of occurrence level: A 
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Figure 51 – Fixed wing RPAS Fuel Subsystem functionality FTA 
 FIXED WING RPAS FUEL  
SUBSYSTEM FUNCTIONALITY FTA 
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Table 113 – Fixed wing RPAS – Loss of Fuel Subsystem functionality 
Loss of RPAS Fuel Subsystem functionality Possible multiple failures Hazards 
Fuel tank 
structural 
damage (FSS1) 
Fuel pump 
mechanical 
failure (FSS2) 
Fuel pipelines 
structural 
damage (FSS3) 
Loss of RPAS 
Fuel Subsystem 
functionality 
  
0 0 0 0 - 
Degradation or loss of fixed 
wing RPAS fuel subsystem 
functionality                     
 Degradation or loss  
of fixed wing RPAS propulsion                             
Degradation or loss  
of fixed wing RPAS control      
Fire on board fixed wing RPAS 
0 0 1,0E-03 1,0E-03 - 
0 5,5E-03 0 5,5E-03 - 
0 5,5E-03 1,0E-03 6,5E-03 
Fuel pump mechanical failure/ 
Fuel pipelines structural 
damage 
5,5E-03 0 0 5,5E-03 - 
5,5E-03 0 1,0E-03 6,5E-03 
Fuel tank structural 
damage/Fuel pipelines 
structural damage 
     
5,5E-03 5,5E-03 0 1,1E-02 
Fuel tank structural 
damage/Fuel pump 
mechanical failure 
5,5E-03 5,5E-03 1,0E-03 1,2E-02 
Fuel tank structural damage/ 
Fuel pump mechanical 
failure/Fuel pipelines 
structural damage 
Estimated probability of occurrence level range D  B 
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Figure 52 – Power Generation Subsystem functionality FTA 
FIXED WING RPAS POWER GENERATION 
SUBSYSTEM FUNCTIONALITY FTA 
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Table 114 – Fixed wing RPAS – Loss of the rectifier 
Rectifier single failure modes Possible multiple failures  
Overheating 
(PWGSS2a) 
Chemical failure 
(PWGSS2b)  
Loss of the rectifier   
0 0 NO - - 
0 5,5E-03 YES - - 
5,5E-03 0 YES - - 
5,5E-03 5,5E-03 YES 
Overheating/ 
Chemical failure 
1,1E-02 
Estimated probability of occurrence level, average value: 1,1E-02 
 
 
Table 115 – Fixed wing RPAS – Loss of alternate current generation functionality 
Loss of alternate current generation functionality Possible multiple failures  
Alternator mechanical 
failure (PWGSS1) 
Loss of the rectifier 
Loss of alternate current 
generation functionality 
  
0 0 NO - - 
0 1,1E-02 YES - - 
1,1E-02 0 YES - - 
1,1E-02 1,1E-02 YES 
Alternator mechanical failure/ 
Loss of the rectifier 
2,2E-02 
Estimated probability of occurrence level, average value: 2,2E-02 
 
 
Table 116 – Fixed wing RPAS – Loss of emergency battery 
Emergency battery single failure modes Possible multiple failures  
Mechanical 
failure 
(PWGSS3a) 
Thermal  
failure 
(PWGSS3b) 
Chemical  
failure 
(PWGSS3c) 
Electrical  
failure 
(PWGSS3d)  
Loss of 
emergency 
battery 
  
0 0 0 0 NO - - 
0 0 0 5,5E-02 YES - - 
0 0 5,5E-02 0 YES - - 
0 0 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 YES 
Mechanical failure/ 
Thermal failure/ 
Chemical failure/ 
Electrical failure 
1,1E-01 
0 5,5E-02 0 0 YES - - 
0 5,5E-02 0 5,5E-02 YES 
Mechanical failure/ 
Thermal failure/ 
Chemical failure/ 
Electrical failure 
1,1E-01 
0 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 0 YES 
Mechanical failure/ 
Thermal failure/ 
Chemical failure/ 
Electrical failure 
1,1E-01 
0 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 YES 
Mechanical failure/ 
Thermal failure/ 
Chemical failure/ 
Electrical failure 
1,65E-01 
5,5E-02 0 0 0 YES - - 
5,5E-02 0 0 5,5E-02 YES 
Mechanical failure/ 
Thermal failure/ 
Chemical failure/ 
Electrical failure 
1,1E-01 
5,5E-02 0 5,5E-02 0 YES 
Mechanical failure/ 
Thermal failure/ 
Chemical failure/ 
Electrical failure 
1,1E-01 
5,5E-02 0 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 YES 
Mechanical failure/ 
Thermal failure/ 
Chemical failure/ 
Electrical failure 
1,65E-01 
5,5E-02 5,5E-02 0 0 YES 
Mechanical failure/ 
Thermal failure/ 
Chemical failure/ 
Electrical failure 
1,1E-01 
5,5E-02 5,5E-02 0 5,5E-02 YES 
Mechanical failure/ 
Thermal failure/ 
Chemical failure/ 
Electrical failure 
1,65E-01 
5,5E-02 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 0 YES 
Mechanical failure/ 
Thermal failure/ 
Chemical failure/ 
Electrical failure 
1,65E-01 
5,5E-02 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 YES 
Mechanical failure/ 
Thermal failure/ 
Chemical failure/ 
Electrical failure Use of improper fuel 
2,2E-01 
Estimated probability of occurrence level, average value: 1,4E-01 
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Table 117 – Fixed wing RPAS – Loss of Power Generation Subsystem functionality 
Loss of Power Generation Subsystem functionality Possible multiple failures Hazards 
Loss of alternate 
current generation 
functionality 
Loss of 
emergency battery 
Loss of Power 
Generation 
Subsystem 
functionality 
  
0 0 0 - 
Degradation or loss  
of fixed wing RPAS  
power functionality 
0 1,4E-01 1,40E-01 - 
2,2E-02 0 2,2E-02 - 
2,2E-02 1,4E-01 1,62E-01 
Loss of alternate current 
generation functionality/ 
Loss of emergency battery 
Estimated probability of occurrence level, range: B  A 
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Figure 53 – Fixed wing RPAS Air Data Subsystem functionality FTA 
FIXED WING AIR DATA  
SUBSYSTEM FUNCTIONALITY FTA 
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Table 118 – Rotor wing RPAS - Loss of Air Data Unit 
Loss of RPAS Air Data Unit 
Possible  
multiple failures 
 
Incorrect 
signal 
(ADSS2a) 
Loss of signal 
(ADSS2b) 
Signal error along 
the transmission 
line (ADSS2c) 
Error on 
output 
signal 
(ADSS2d) 
Loss of power 
supply 
(ADSS2e) 
Calibration 
error (ADSS2f) 
Loss of  
Air Data Unit 
  
0 0 0 0 0 0 NO - 0 
0 0 0 0 0 5,5E-02 YES - 5,5E-02 
0 0 0 0 2,0E-01 0 YES - 2,0E-01 
0 0 0 0 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 YES 
Loss of power 
supply/Calibration error 
2,55E-01 
0 0 0 5,5E-02 0 0 YES - 5,5E-02 
0 0 0 5,5E-02 0 5,5E-02 YES 
Error on output signal/ 
Calibration error 
1,1E-01 
0 0 0 5,5E-02 2,0E-01 0 YES 
Error on output signal/Loss 
of power supply 
2,55E-01 
0 0 0 5,5E-02 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 YES 
Error on output signal/Loss 
of power 
supply/Calibration error 
3,1E-01 
0 0 5,5E-02 0 0 0 YES - 5,5E-02 
0 0 5,5E-02 0 0 5,5E-02 YES 
Signal error along the 
transmission line/ 
Calibration error 
1,1E-01 
0 0 5,5E-02 0 2,0E-01 0 YES 
Signal error along the 
transmission 
line/Calibration error 
2,55E-01 
0 0 5,5E-02 0 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 YES 
Signal error along the 
transmission line/ 
Loss of power 
supply/Calibration error 
3,1E-01 
0 0 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 0 0 YES 
Signal error along the 
transmission line/Error on 
output signal 
1,1E-01 
0 0 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 0 5,5E-02 YES 
Signal error along the 
transmission line/Error on 
output signal/Calibration 
error 
1,65E-01 
0 0 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 2,0E-01 0 YES 
Signal error along the 
transmission line/Error on 
output signal/Loss of 
power supply 
3,1E-01 
0 0 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 YES 
Signal error along the 
transmission line/Error on 
output signal/ 
Loss of power 
supply/Calibration error 
3,65E-01 
0 2,0E-01 0 0 0 0 YES - 2,0E-01 
0 2,0E-01 0 0 0 5,5E-02 YES 
Loss of signal/ Calibration 
error 
2,55E-01 
0 2,0E-01 0 0 2,0E-01 0 YES 
Loss of signal/Loss of 
power supply 
4,0E-01 
0 2,0E-01 0 0 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 YES 
Loss of signal/ 
Loss of power 
supply/Calibration error 
4,55E-01 
0 2,0E-01 0 5,5E-02 0 0 YES 
Loss of signal/Error on 
output signal 
2,55E-01 
0 2,0E-01 0 5,5E-02 0 5,5E-02 YES 
Loss of signal/Error on 
output signal/ Calibration 
error 
3,1E-01 
0 2,0E-01 0 5,5E-02 2,0E-01 0 YES 
Loss of signal/Error on 
output signal/Loss of 
power supply 
4,55E-01 
0 2,0E-01 0 5,5E-02 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 YES 
Loss of signal/Error on 
output signal/ 
Loss of power 
supply/Calibration error 
5,1E-01 
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Table 118 – Rotor wing RPAS - Loss of Air Data Unit (Cont’d) 
Loss of RPAS Air Data Unit 
Possible  
multiple failures 
 
Incorrect 
signal 
(ADSS2a) 
Loss of signal 
(ADSS2b) 
Signal error along 
the transmission 
line (ADSS2c) 
Error on 
output 
signal 
(ADSS2d) 
Loss of power 
supply 
(ADSS2e) 
Calibration 
error (ADSS2f) 
Loss of  
Air Data Unit 
  
0 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 0 0 0 YES 
Loss of signal/Signal error 
along the transmission line 
2,55E-01 
0 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 0 0 5,5E-02 YES 
Loss of signal/Signal error 
along the transmission 
line/ Calibration error 
3,1E-01 
0 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 0 2,0E-01 0 YES 
Loss of signal/Signal error 
along the transmission 
line/ 
Loss of power supply 
4,55E-01 
0 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 0 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 YES 
Loss of signal/Signal error 
along the transmission 
line/ 
Loss of power 
supply/Calibration error 
5,1E-01 
0 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 0 0 YES 
Loss of signal/Signal error 
along the transmission 
line/Error on output signal 
3,1E-01 
0 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 0 5,5E-02 YES 
Loss of signal/Signal error 
along the transmission 
line/ 
Error on output 
signal/Calibration error 
3,65E-01 
0 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 2,0E-01 0 YES 
Loss of signal/Signal error 
along the transmission 
line/Error on output 
signal/Loss of power supply 
5,1E-01 
0 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 YES 
Loss of signal/Signal error 
along the transmission 
line/Error on output signal/ 
Loss of power 
supply/Calibration error 
5,65E-01 
2,0E-01 0 0 0 0 0 YES - 2,0E-01 
2,0E-01 0 0 0 0 5,5E-02 YES 
Incorrect signal/ Calibration 
error 
2,55E-01 
2,0E-01 0 0 0 2,0E-01 0 YES 
Incorrect signal/ 
 Loss of power supply 
4,0E-01 
2,0E-01 0 0 0 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 YES 
Incorrect signal/ 
Loss of power 
supply/Calibration error 
4,55E-01 
2,0E-01 0 0 5,5E-02 0 0 YES 
Incorrect signal/Error on 
output signal 
2,55E-01 
2,0E-01 0 0 5,5E-02 0 5,5E-02 YES 
Incorrect signal/Error on 
output signal/ Calibration 
error 
3,1E-01 
2,0E-01 0 0 5,5E-02 2,0E-01 0 YES 
Incorrect signal/Error on 
output signal/Loss of 
power supply 
4,55E-01 
2,0E-01 0 0 5,5E-02 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 YES 
Incorrect signal/Error on 
output signal/ 
Loss of power 
supply/Calibration error 
5,1E-01 
2,0E-01 0 5,5E-02 0 0 0 YES 
Incorrect signal/Signal 
error along the 
transmission line 
2,55E-01 
2,0E-01 0 5,5E-02 0 0 5,5E-02 YES 
Incorrect signal/Signal 
error along the 
transmission line/ 
Calibration error 
3,1E-01 
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Table 118 – Rotor wing RPAS - Loss of Air Data Unit (Cont’d) 
Loss of RPAS Air Data Unit 
Possible  
multiple failures 
 
Incorrect 
signal 
(ADSS2a) 
Loss of signal 
(ADSS2b) 
Signal error along 
the transmission 
line (ADSS2c) 
Error on 
output 
signal 
(ADSS2d) 
Loss of power 
supply 
(ADSS2e) 
Calibration 
error (ADSS2f) 
Loss of  
Air Data Unit 
  
2,0E-01 0 5,5E-02 0 2,0E-01 0 YES 
Incorrect signal/Signal 
error along the 
transmission line/ 
Loss of power supply 
4,55E-01 
2,0E-01 0 5,5E-02 0 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 YES 
Incorrect signal/Signal 
error along the 
transmission line/ 
Loss of power 
supply/Calibration error 
5,1E-01 
2,0E-01 0 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 0 0 YES 
Incorrect signal/Signal 
error along the 
transmission line/ 
Calibration error 
3,1E-01 
2,0E-01 0 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 0 5,5E-02 YES 
Incorrect signal/Signal 
error along the 
transmission line/Error on 
output signal/ Calibration 
error 
3,65E-01 
2,0E-01 0 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 2,0E-01 0 YES 
Incorrect signal/Signal 
error along the 
transmission line/Error on 
output signal/Loss of 
power supply 
5,1E-01 
2,0E-01 0 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 YES 
Incorrect signal/Signal 
error along the 
transmission line/Error on 
output signal/ 
Loss of power 
supply/Calibration error 
5,65E-01 
2,0E-01 2,0E-01 0 0 0 0 YES 
Incorrect signal/ 
Loss of signal 
4,0E-01 
2,0E-01 2,0E-01 0 0 0 5,5E-02 YES 
Incorrect signal/Loss of 
signal/Calibration error 
4,55E-01 
2,0E-01 2,0E-01 0 0 2,0E-01 0 YES 
Incorrect signal/Loss of 
signal/Loss of power supply 
6,0E-01 
2,0E-01 2,0E-01 0 0 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 YES 
Incorrect signal/Loss of 
signal/Loss of power 
supply/Calibration error 
6,55E-01 
2,0E-01 2,0E-01 0 5,5E-02 0 0 YES 
Incorrect signal/Loss of 
signal/Error on output 
signal 
4,55E-01 
2,0E-01 2,0E-01 0 5,5E-02 0 5,5E-02 YES 
Incorrect signal/Loss of 
signal/Error on output 
signal/Calibration error 
5,1E-01 
2,0E-01 2,0E-01 0 5,5E-02 2,0E-01 0 YES 
Incorrect signal/Loss of 
signal/Error on output 
signal/Loss of power supply 
6,55E-01 
2,0E-01 2,0E-01 0 5,5E-02 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 YES 
Incorrect signal/Loss of 
signal/Error on output 
signal/Loss of power 
supply/Calibration error 
7,1E-01 
2,0E-01 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 0 0 0 YES 
Incorrect signal/Loss of 
signal/Signal error along 
the transmission line 
4,55E-01 
2,0E-01 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 0 0 5,5E-02 YES 
Incorrect signal/Loss of 
signal/Signal error along 
the transmission line/ 
Calibration error 
5,1E-01 
2,0E-01 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 0 2,0E-01 0 YES 
Incorrect signal/Loss of 
signal/Signal error along 
the transmission line/ Loss 
of power supply 
6,55E-01 
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Table 118 – Rotor wing RPAS - Loss of Air Data Unit (Cont’d) 
Loss of RPAS Air Data Unit 
Possible  
multiple failures 
Hazards 
Incorrect 
signal 
(ADSS2a) 
Loss of signal 
(ADSS2b) 
Signal error along 
the transmission 
line (ADSS2c) 
Error on 
output 
signal 
(ADSS2d) 
Loss of power 
supply 
(ADSS2e) 
Calibration 
error (ADSS2f) 
Loss of  
Air Data Unit 
  
2,0E-01 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 0 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 YES 
Incorrect signal/Loss of 
signal/Signal error along 
the transmission line/ Loss 
of power 
supply/Calibration error 
7,1E-01 
2,0E-01 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 0 0 YES 
Incorrect signal/Loss of 
signal/Signal error along 
the transmission line/Error 
on output signal 
5,1E-01 
2,0E-01 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 0 5,5E-02 YES 
Incorrect signal/Loss of 
signal/Signal error along 
the transmission line/Error 
on output 
signal/Calibration error 
5,65E-01 
2,0E-01 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 2,0E-01 0 YES 
Incorrect signal/Loss of 
signal/Signal error along 
the transmission line/Error 
on output signal/Loss of 
power supply 
7,1E-01 
2,0E-01 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 2,0E-01 5,5E-02 YES 
Incorrect signal/Loss of 
signal/Signal error along 
the transmission line/Error 
on output signal/Loss of 
power supply/Calibration 
error 
7,65E-01 
Estimated probability of occurrence level, average value: 3,83-01 
 
 
 
Table 119 – Fixed wing RPAS – Loss of Air Data Subsystem functionality 
Loss of Air Data Subsystem functionality Possible multiple failures Hazards 
Loss of  
Air Probe 
Loss of  
Air Data Unit 
Loss of Power 
Generation 
Subsystem 
functionality 
  
0 0 0 - 
Fixed wing RPAS  
pressure sensors failure 
Fixed wing RPAS  
misleading  
altitude indication 
Fixed wing RPAS  
misleading  
airspeed indication 
Fixed wing RPAS  
misleading angle  
of attack indication   
Fixed wing RPAS  
misleading  
stall warning 
Fixed wing RPAS  
stall 
Fixed wing RPAS  
degradation or loss of flight 
attitude control 
0 1,1E-01 1,1E-01 - 
3,83E-01 0 3,83E-01 - 
3,83E-01 1,1E-01 4,93E-01 
Loss of alternate current 
generation functionality/ 
Loss of emergency battery 
Estimated probability of occurrence level, range: B  A 
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Figure 54 – Flight Control Subsystem/Functionality FTA 
 
FIXED WING RPAS FLIGHT CONTROL 
SUBSYSTEM/FUNCTIONALITY FTA 
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Table 120 – Fixed wing RPAS – Loss of Flight Control Subsystem functionality 
Loss of RPAS Flight Control Subsystem functionality 
Possible  
multiple failures 
Hazards 
Bias 
(FCSS1a) 
Floating surface 
(FCSS1d) 
Loss of RPAS Flight Control 
Subsystem functionality 
  
0 0 0 - Degradation or loss of 
fixed wing RPAS flight 
control 
Degradation or loss of 
fixed wing RPAS 
manoeuvrability 
0 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 - 
5,5E-02 0 5,5E-02 - 
5,5E-02 5,5E-02 1,1E-01 
Oscillatory modes/ 
Increased 
deadband/stiction 
Estimated probability of occurrence level range C  B 
 
Note: due to the number of identified failure modes for RPAS Control 
Subsystem (seven different failure modes), the failure modes with higher 
criticality (Table 59) have been considered only to avoid the use of more 
sophisticated techniques to solve truth tables composed of more than four 
variables (like ‘Karnaugh Maps’, for example). This choice has been performed 
considering that more complicated issues do not provide valuable added value to 
the safety analysis object of this research work.  
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Figure 55 – RPAS Hybrid Propulsion Subsystem functionality FTA 
HYBRID RPAS PROPULSION 
SUBSYSTEM FUNCTIONALITY FTA 
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Table 121 – Hybrid RPAS – Hydrogen tank multiple failures 
Hydrogen tank single failure modes Possible multiple failures  
Structural  
damage (HPSS1a) 
Leakage 
(HPSS1b)  
Loss of  
hydrogen tank 
  
0 0 NO - - 
0 5,5E-03 YES - - 
5,5E-03 0 YES - - 
5,5E-03 5,5E-03 YES Structural damage/Leakage 1,1E-02 
Estimated probability of occurrence level, average value: 1,1E-02 
 
 
Table 122 – Hybrid RPAS – Fuel cell multiple failures 
Ground emergency battery single failure modes Possible multiple failures  
Membrane  
drying (HPSS2a) 
Water condensation 
inhibition (HPSS2b) 
Loss of Fuel Cells 
functionality 
  
0 0 NO - - 
0 5,5E-03 YES - - 
5,5E-03 0 YES - - 
5,5E-03 5,5E-03 YES 
Membrane drying/ 
Water condensation inhibition 
2,0E-03 
Estimated probability of occurrence level, average value: 2,0E-03 
 
 
Table 123 – Hybrid RPAS – LiPo batteries multiple failures 
LiPo batteries single failure modes Possible multiple failures  
Short circuit 
(PWSS1) 
Mechanical 
damage 
(PWSS2) 
Fire (PWSS3) 
Loss of LiPo 
batteries 
functionality 
  
0 0 0 NO - 0 
0 0 5,5E-02 YES - 5,5E-02 
0 5,5E-02 0 YES - 5,5E-02 
0 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 YES Mechanical damage/Fire 1,1E-01 
5,5E-02 0 0 YES - 5,5E-02 
5,5E-02 0 5,5E-02 YES Short circuit/Fire 1,1E-01 
5,5E-02 5,5E-02 0 YES 
Short circuit/ 
Mechanical damage 
1,1E-01 
5,5E-02 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 YES 
Short circuit/ 
Mechanical damage/ 
Fire 
1,65E-01 
Estimated probability of occurrence level, average value: 2,0E-03 
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Table 124 – Hybrid RPAS – Loss of Hybrid Power Generation functionality 
Loss of Hybrid Power Generation functionality Possible multiple failures Hazards 
Loss of  
hydrogen 
tank 
Loss of  
Fuel Cells 
functionality 
Hydrogen  
fire 
Loss of LiPo 
batteries 
functionality 
Loss of Hybrid 
Propulsion 
Generation 
functionality 
  
0 0 0 0 NO - 0 
0 0 0 2,0E-03 YES - 2,0E-03 
0 0 5,5E-02 0 YES - 5,5E-02 
0 0 5,5E-02 2,0E-03 YES 
Hydrogen fire/ 
Loss of LiPo batteries functionality 
5,7E-02 
0 2,0E-03 0 0 YES - 2,0E-03 
0 2,0E-03 0 2,0E-03 YES 
Loss of Fuel Cells functionality/ 
Loss of LiPo batteries functionality 
4,0E-03 
0 2,0E-03 5,5E-02 0 YES 
Loss of Fuel Cells functionality/ 
Hydrogen fire 
5,7E-02 
0 2,0E-03 5,5E-02 2,0E-03 YES 
Loss of Fuel Cells functionality/ 
Hydrogen fire/ 
Loss of LiPo batteries functionality 
5,9E-02 
1,1E-02 0 0 0 YES - 1,1E-02 
1,1E-02 0 0 2,0E-03 YES 
Loss of hydrogen tank/ 
Loss of LiPo batteries functionality 
1,3E-02 
1,1E-02 0 5,5E-02 0 YES 
Loss of hydrogen tank/ 
Hydrogen fire 
6,6E-02 
1,1E-02 0 5,5E-02 2,0E-03 YES 
Loss of hydrogen tank/ 
Loss of LiPo batteries functionality/ 
Loss of LiPo batteries functionality 
6,8E-02 
1,1E-02 2,0E-03 0 0 YES 
Loss of hydrogen tank/ 
Loss of Fuel Cells functionality 
1,3E-02 
1,1E-02 2,0E-03 0 2,0E-03 YES 
Loss of hydrogen tank/ 
Loss of Fuel Cells functionality/ 
Loss of LiPo batteries functionality 
1,5E-02 
1,1E-02 2,0E-03 5,5E-02 0 YES 
Loss of hydrogen tank/ 
Loss of Fuel Cells functionality/ 
Hydrogen fire 
6,8E-02 
1,1E-02 2,0E-03 5,5E-02 2,0E-03 YES 
Loss of hydrogen tank/ 
Loss of Fuel Cells functionality/ 
Hydrogen fire/ 
Loss of LiPo batteries functionality 
7,0E-02 
Estimated probability of occurrence level, average value: 3,5E-02 
 
 
Table 125 – Hybrid RPAS – Loss of Hybrid Propulsion Subsystem functionality 
Loss of Hybrid Propulsion Subsystem functionality Possible multiple failures  
Loss of Hybrid 
Propulsion 
Generation 
functionality 
Loss of  
DC Power bus 
Loss of DC to DC 
Converter 
Loss of Hybrid 
Propulsion 
Subsystem 
functionality 
  
0 0 0 0 - 
Loss of Hybrid 
Propulsion 
Subsystem 
functionality  
Loss of Hybrid 
Power Generation 
functionality  
Fire on board 
hybrid RPAS 
0 0 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 - 
0 5,5E-02 0 5,5E-02 - 
0 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 1,1E-01 
Loss of DC Power bus/ 
Loss of DC to DC Converter 
3,5E-02 0 0 3,50E-02 - 
3,5E-02 0 5,5E-02 9,0E-02 
Loss of Hybrid Propulsion  
Generation functionality/ 
Loss of DC to DC Converter 
3,5E-02 5,5E-02 0 9,0E-02 
Loss of Hybrid Propulsion  
Generation functionality/ 
Loss of DC Power bus 
3,5E-02 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 1,45E-01 
Loss of Hybrid Propulsion  
Generation functionality/Loss of  
DC Power bus/Loss of DC to DC 
Converter 
Estimated probability of occurrence level, range value: C  B 
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Figure 56 – RPAS C2 Radio link Subsystem functionality FTA 
RPAS C2 RADIO LINK  
SUBSYSTEM FUNCTIONALITY FTA 
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Table 126 – Loss of RPAS C2 Radio Link Subsystem functionality 
Loss of RPAS Fuel subsystem functionality 
Possible  
multiple failures 
Hazards 
C2link signal 
degradation  
(C2LSS1a) 
C2link  
signal loss  
(C2LSS1b) 
Loss of RPAS C2 radio 
link Subsystem 
functionality 
  
0 0 0 - 
Degradation or loss of 
uplink command link 
with the RPA 
Degradation or loss of 
downlink telemetry 
link from the RPA 
  
0 1,5E-01 1,5E-01 - 
1,5E-01 0 1,5E-01 - 
1,5E-01 1,5E-01 3,0E-01 
C2link signal 
degradation/C2link  
signal loss  
Estimated probability of occurrence level range B  A 
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Note: GCS Start Up Subsystem functionality FTA: not performed due to the 
identification of a single failure mode in the FMECA analysis (Table 69).
GCS START-UP 
SUBSYSTEM/FUNCTIONALITY FTA 
 414 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 57 – GCS Power Generation Subsystem functionality FTA 
GCS POWER GENERATION 
 SUBSYSTEM FUNCTIONALITY FTA 
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Table 127 – Ground Control Station – Ground generator multiple failures 
Ground generator single failure modes Possible multiple failures  
Missed start 
(GCSPWSS1a) 
Sudden stop 
(GCSPWSS1b)  
Loss of ground 
generator functionality 
  
0 0 NO - - 
0 5,5E-03 YES - - 
5,5E-03 0 YES - - 
5,5E-03 5,5E-03 YES Missed start/Sudden stop 1,1E-02 
Estimated probability of occurrence level, average value: 1,1E-02 
 
 
Table 128 – Ground Control Station – Ground emergency battery multiple failures 
Ground emergency battery single failure modes Possible multiple failures  
Low charge 
 (GCSPWSS2a) 
Lack of charge 
 (GCSPWSS2b)  
Loss of ground 
emergency battery 
functionality 
  
0 0 NO - - 
0 1,0E-03 YES - - 
1,0E-03 0 YES - - 
1,0E-03 1,0E-03 YES Low charge/Lack of charge 2,0E-03 
Estimated probability of occurrence level, average value: 2,0E-03 
 
 
Table 129 – Ground Control Station – Loss of GCS Power Generation Subsystem functionality 
Loss of GCS Power Generation  
subsystem functionality 
Possible multiple failures Hazards 
Loss of ground 
generator 
functionality 
Loss of ground 
emergency battery 
functionality 
Loss of GCS Power 
Generation  
Subsystem 
functionality 
  
0 0 0 - 
Loss of overall GCS functionality 
Loss of RPAS control due to the 
loss of overall GCS functionality  
0 2,0E-03 2,0E-03 - 
1,1E-02 0 1,1E-02 - 
1,1E-02 2,0E-03 1,3E-02 
Loss of ground generator 
functionality/Loss of ground 
emergency battery functionality 
Estimated probability of occurrence level: D 
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Figure 58 – GCS HMI Subsystem functionality FTA 
GCS HMI SUBSYSTEM  
FUNCTIONALITY FTA 
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Table 130 – Ground Control Station – Loss of GCS HMI Joystick functionality 
Loss of GCS HMI Joystick functionality Possible multiple failures Hazards 
Lack of 
calibration 
(GCSHMISS1a) 
Software 
error 
(GCSHMISS1b) 
Missed start 
(GCSHMISS1c) 
Sudden stop 
(GCSHMISS1d) 
Loss of GCS 
HMI Joystick 
functionality 
  
0 0 0 0 NO - 0 
0 0 0 5,5E-02 YES - 5,5E-02 
0 0 5,5E-02 0 YES - 5,5E-02 
0 0 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 YES 
Missed start/ 
Sudden stop 
1,1E-01 
0 5,5E-02 0 0 YES - 5,5E-02 
0 5,5E-02 0 5,5E-02 YES 
Software error/ 
Sudden stop 
1,1E-01 
0 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 0 YES 
Software error/ 
Missed start 
1,1E-01 
0 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 YES 
Software error/ 
Missed start/ 
Sudden stop 
1,65E-01 
5,5E-02 0 0 0 YES - 5,5E-02 
5,5E-02 0 0 5,5E-02 YES 
Lack of calibration/ 
Sudden stop 
1,1E-01 
5,5E-02 0 5,5E-02 0 YES 
Lack of calibration/ 
Missed start 
1,1E-01 
5,5E-02 0 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 YES 
Lack of calibration/ 
Missed start/ 
Sudden stop 
1,65E-01 
5,5E-02 5,5E-02 0 0 YES 
Lack of calibration/ 
Software error 
1,1E-01 
5,5E-02 5,5E-02 0 5,5E-02 YES 
Lack of calibration/ 
Software error/ 
Sudden stop 
1,65E-01 
5,5E-02 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 0 YES 
Lack of calibration/ 
Software error/ 
Missed start 
1,65E-01 
5,5E-02 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 YES 
Lack of calibration/ 
Software error/ 
Missed start/ 
Sudden stop 
2,2E-01 
Estimated probability of occurrence level, average value: 1,1E-01 
Main hazard: loss of RPA longitudinal and lateral attitude control; estimated probability of occurrence level:  B 
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Table 131 – Ground Control Station – Loss of GCS HMI Pedals functionality 
Loss of GCS HMI Pedals functionality Possible multiple failures Hazards 
Lack of 
calibration 
(GCSHMISS2a) 
Software 
error 
(GCSHMISS2b) 
Missed start 
(GCSHMISS2c) 
Sudden stop 
(GCSHMISS2d) 
Loss of GCS 
HMI Pedals 
functionality 
  
0 0 0 0 NO - 0 
0 0 0 5,5E-02 YES - 5,5E-02 
0 0 5,5E-02 0 YES - 5,5E-02 
0 0 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 YES 
Missed start/ 
Sudden stop 
1,1E-01 
0 5,5E-02 0 0 YES - 5,5E-02 
0 5,5E-02 0 5,5E-02 YES 
Software error/ 
Sudden stop 
1,1E-01 
0 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 0 YES 
Software error/ 
Missed start 
1,1E-01 
0 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 YES 
Software error/ 
Missed start/ 
Sudden stop 
1,65E-01 
5,5E-02 0 0 0 YES - 5,5E-02 
5,5E-02 0 0 5,5E-02 YES 
Lack of calibration/ 
Sudden stop 
1,1E-01 
5,5E-02 0 5,5E-02 0 YES 
Lack of calibration/ 
Missed start 
1,1E-01 
5,5E-02 0 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 YES 
Lack of calibration/ 
Missed start/ 
Sudden stop 
1,65E-01 
5,5E-02 5,5E-02 0 0 YES 
Lack of calibration/ 
Software error 
1,1E-01 
5,5E-02 5,5E-02 0 5,5E-02 YES 
Lack of calibration/ 
Software error/ 
Sudden stop 
1,65E-01 
5,5E-02 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 0 YES 
Lack of calibration/ 
Software error/ 
Missed start 
1,65E-01 
5,5E-02 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 YES 
Lack of calibration/ 
Software error/ 
Missed start/ 
Sudden stop 
2,2E-01 
Estimated probability of occurrence level, average value: 1,1E-01 
Main hazard: loss of RPA directional attitude control; estimated probability of occurrence level:  B 
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Table 132 – Ground Control Station – Loss of GCS HMI Throttle functionality 
Loss of GCS HMI Throttle functionality Possible multiple failures Hazards 
Lack of 
calibration 
(GCSHMISS3a) 
Software 
error 
(GCSHMISS3b) 
Missed start 
(GCSHMISS3c) 
Sudden stop 
(GCSHMISS3d) 
Loss of GCS 
HMI Throttle 
functionality 
  
0 0 0 0 NO - 0 
0 0 0 5,5E-02 YES - 5,5E-02 
0 0 5,5E-02 0 YES - 5,5E-02 
0 0 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 YES 
Missed start/ 
Sudden stop 
1,1E-01 
0 5,5E-02 0 0 YES - 5,5E-02 
0 5,5E-02 0 5,5E-02 YES 
Software error/ 
Sudden stop 
1,1E-01 
0 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 0 YES 
Software error/ 
Missed start 
1,1E-01 
0 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 YES 
Software error/ 
Missed start/ 
Sudden stop 
1,65E-01 
5,5E-02 0 0 0 YES - 5,5E-02 
5,5E-02 0 0 5,5E-02 YES 
Lack of calibration/ 
Sudden stop 
1,1E-01 
5,5E-02 0 5,5E-02 0 YES 
Lack of calibration/ 
Missed start 
1,1E-01 
5,5E-02 0 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 YES 
Lack of calibration/ 
Missed start/ 
Sudden stop 
1,65E-01 
5,5E-02 5,5E-02 0 0 YES 
Lack of calibration/ 
Software error 
1,1E-01 
5,5E-02 5,5E-02 0 5,5E-02 YES 
Lack of calibration/ 
Software error/ 
Sudden stop 
1,65E-01 
5,5E-02 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 0 YES 
Lack of calibration/ 
Software error/ 
Missed start 
1,65E-01 
5,5E-02 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 YES 
Lack of calibration/ 
Software error/ 
Missed start/ 
Sudden stop 
2,2E-01 
Estimated probability of occurrence level, average value: 1,1E-01 
Main hazard: loss of RPA trust control; estimated probability of occurrence level:  B 
 
 
Table 133 – Ground Control Station – Loss of GCS HMI 
Autopilot modes selection switch functionality 
Loss of GCS HMI Autopilot modes selection switch Possible multiple failures Hazards 
Mechanical 
failure 
(GCSHMISS4a) 
Electrical failure 
(GCSHMISS4a) 
Signal error 
(GCSHMISS4a) 
Loss of GCS HMI 
Autopilot modes 
selection switch 
  
0 0 0 NO - 0 
0 0 5,5E-02 YES - 5,5E-02 
0 5,5E-02 0 YES - 5,5E-02 
0 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 YES 
Hydrogen fire/ 
Loss of LiPo batteries functionality 
1,1E-01 
5,5E-02 0 0 YES - 5,5E-02 
5,5E-02 0 5,5E-02 YES 
Loss of Fuel Cells functionality/ 
Loss of LiPo batteries functionality 
1,1E-01 
5,5E-02 5,5E-02 0 YES 
Loss of Fuel Cells functionality/ 
Hydrogen fire 
1,1E-01 
5,5E-02 5,5E-02 5,5E-02 YES 
Loss of Fuel Cells functionality/ 
Hydrogen fire/ 
Loss of LiPo batteries functionality 
1,65E.01 
Estimated probability of occurrence level, average value: 8,25E-02 
Main hazard: loss of autopilot modes control and management; estimated probability of occurrence level:  C 
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Table 134 – Ground Control Station – Loss of GCS HMI displays functionality 
Loss of GCS HMI displays functionality Possible multiple failures Hazards 
Lack of  
power supply 
(GCSHMISS4a) 
Software error 
(GCSHMISS4a) 
Loss of GCS HMI 
displays functionality 
  
0 0 NO - 0 
0 5,5E-02 YES - 5,5E-02 
5,5E-02 0 YES - 5,5E-02 
5,5E-02 5,5E-02 YES 
Lack of power supply/ 
Software error 
1,1E-01 
Estimated probability of occurrence level: 1,1E-01 
Main hazard: loss of RPA on board systems monitoring/telemetry due to GCS displays failure;  
estimated probability of occurrence level: 
B 
 
Note: The resultant of the interaction of the above cases of loss of GCS HMI 
functionalities has not been considered due to the total physical and functional 
independence of each one of them with respect to the other ones. 
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Note: GCS Mission Payload HMI Subsystem functionality FTA: not 
performed; the effects of GCS Mission Payload Sensors HMI Subsystem loss of 
functionality are deemed negligible for the RPAS operations safety. 
GCS PAYLOAD SENSORS HMI 
 SUBSYSTEM FUNCTIONALITY FTA 
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Figure 59 – GCS Emergency Flight Termination HMI Subsystem functionality FTA 
 
GCS EMERGENCY FLIGHT TERMINATION HMI 
SUBSYSTEM FUNCTIONALITY FTA 
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Table 135 – Ground Control Station - Loss of GCS 
Emergency Flight Termination HMI Subsystem functionality  
Loss of GCS Emergency Flight Termination HMI Subsystem functionality 
Possible  
multiple failures 
Hazards 
FTS command  
switch failure 
(GCSEFTSS1) 
Parachute deployment 
command switch failure 
(GCSEFTSS2) 
Loss of GCS Emergency 
Flight Termination HMI 
subsystem functionality 
  
0 0 0 - 
Loss of GCS Emergency 
Flight Termination HMI 
Subsystem functionality  
Uncontrolled impact of 
the RPA on ground 
Uncontrolled projection 
of debris on ground  
0 1,5E-01 1,5E-01 - 
1,5E-01 0 1,5E-01 - 
1,5E-01 1,5E-01 3,0E-01 
FTS command  
switch failure/ Parachute 
deployment command 
switch failure 
Estimated probability of occurrence level, range: B  A 
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Figure 60 – GCS Communication Subsystem functionality FTA 
GCS COMMUNICATION   
SUBSYSTEM FUNCTIONALITY FTA 
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Table 136 – Ground Control Station – Transmitting antenna multiple failures 
Transmitting antenna single failure modes Possible multiple failures  
The transmitting 
antenna cannot 
process the control 
signal (GCSCSS1a) 
Transmitting 
antenna fade 
(GCSCSS1b)  
Loss of transmitting 
antenna functionality 
  
0 0 NO - - 
0 5,5E-02 YES - - 
5,5E-03 0 YES - - 
5,5E-03 5,5E-02 YES 
The transmitter antenna cannot process the 
control signal/ Transmitting 
antenna fade 
6,05E-02 
Estimated probability of occurrence level, average value: 6,05E-02 
 
 
Table 137 – Ground Control Station – Receiving antenna multiple failures 
Receiving antenna failure modes Possible multiple failures  
The receiving 
antenna cannot 
process the control 
signal (GCSCSS1a) 
Receiving 
antenna fade 
(GCSCSS1b)  
Loss of receiving 
antenna functionality 
  
0 0 NO - - 
0 5,5E-02 YES - - 
5,5E-03 0 YES - - 
5,5E-03 5,5E-02 YES 
The receiving antenna cannot process the 
control signal/Receiving 
antenna fade 
6,05E-02 
Estimated probability of occurrence level, average value: 6,05E-02 
 
 
Table 138 – Ground Control Station – Loss of Communication Subsystem functionality 
Loss of GCS Communication  
subsystem functionality 
Possible multiple failures Hazards 
Loss of transmitting 
antenna 
functionality 
Loss of receiving 
antenna 
functionality 
Loss of GCS 
Communication  
Subsystem 
functionality 
  
0 0 0 - 
Degradation or loss of link 
with the RPA 
Degradation or loss of 
RPAS control 
Degradation or loss of 
aerial segment monitoring 
through downlink 
telemetry 
0 6,05E-02 6,05E-02 - 
6,05E-02 0 6,05E-02 - 
6,05E-02 6,05E-02 1,1E-01 
Loss of transmitting antenna 
functionality/ 
Loss of receiving antenna 
functionality 
Estimated probability of occurrence level: C 
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Table 139  - Selection of hazards derived from FTA analysis 
Hazard Estimated probability of occurrence level 
Degradation or loss of rotor wing RPAS propulsion functionality D  B 
Degradation or loss of rotor wing RPAS control D  B 
Degradation or loss of rotor wing RPAS manoeuvrability D  B 
Uncontrolled projection of propeller debris D  B 
Degradation or loss of rotor wing RPAS power functionality B 
Fire on board rotor wing RPA B 
Degradation or loss of rotor wing RPAS electrical functionality A 
Fire on board rotor wing RPA A 
Degradation or loss of navigation functionality A 
Degradation or loss of GPS functionality on board the RPAS A 
Degradation or loss of EGNOS functionality on board the RPAS A 
Degradation or loss of ADS-B functionality on board the RPAS A 
Pressure sensors failure A 
Misleading altitude indication A 
Misleading airspeed indication A 
Degradation or loss of control of RPAS flight attitude A 
Loss or degradation of rotor wing RPAS manoeuvrability A 
Degradation or loss of emergency flight termination functionality B  A 
Degradation or loss of FTS functionality B  A 
Degradation or loss of Emergency Parachute functionality B  A 
Uncontrolled impact on ground B  A 
Uncontrolled projection of debris B  A 
Uncontrolled impact with third parties B  A 
Loss of RPAS Mission Control subsystem functionality C  B 
Degradation or loss of telemetry receipt for rotor wing RPAS monitoring C  B 
Degradation or loss of fixed wing  
(jet) combustion engine RPAS propulsion functionality 
A 
Degradation or loss of fixed wing (jet) combustion engine RPAS control A 
Degradation or loss of fixed wing (jet) combustion engine RPAS manoeuvrability A 
Degradation or loss of fixed wing combustion engine  
with propeller RPAS propulsion functionality 
A 
Degradation or loss of fixed wing combustion  
engine with propeller RPAS control 
A 
Degradation or loss of fixed wing combustion  
engine with propeller RPAS manoeuvrability 
A 
Degradation or loss of fixed wing RPAS fuel subsystem functionality                     D  B 
Degradation or loss of fixed wing RPAS propulsion                              D  B 
Degradation or loss of fixed wing RPAS control      D  B 
Fire on board fixed wing RPAS D  B 
Degradation or loss of fixed wing RPAS power functionality B  A 
Fixed wing RPAS pressure sensors failure B  A 
Fixed wing RPAS misleading altitude indication B  A 
Fixed wing RPAS misleading airspeed indication B  A 
Fixed wing RPAS misleading angle of attack indication  B  A 
Fixed wing RPAS misleading stall warning B  A 
Fixed wing RPAS stall B  A 
Fixed wing RPAS degradation or loss of flight attitude control B  A 
Degradation or loss of fixed wing RPAS flight control C  B 
Degradation or loss of fixed wing RPAS manoeuvrability C  B 
Loss of Hybrid Propulsion Subsystem functionality  Fuel  
Loss of Hybrid Power Generation functionality  C  B 
Fire on board hybrid RPAS C  B 
Degradation or loss of uplink command link with the RPA B  A 
Degradation or loss of downlink telemetry link from the RPA B  A 
Loss of overall GCS functionality D 
Loss of RPAS control due to the loss of overall GCS functionality D 
Loss of RPA longitudinal and lateral attitude control B 
Loss of RPA directional attitude control B 
Loss of RPA trust control B 
Loss of autopilot modes control and management C 
Loss of RPA on board systems monitoring/telemetry due to GCS displays failure B 
Loss of GCS Emergency Flight Termination HMI Subsystem functionality  B  A 
Uncontrolled impact of the RPA on ground B  A 
Uncontrolled projection of debris on ground B  A 
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Appendix C – Human factor 
analysis – Results 
The following mismatches are conceived with reference to an operative 
context involving RPAS and manned aircraft performing flight operations in the 
civil not segregated airspace. 
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Table 140 – Application of the SHELL model and derived hazards 
Interface Relationship typology 
Mismatches between interfaces from the 
remote pilot perspective 
Mismatches between interfaces from 
the manned aircraft pilot perspective 
Mismatches between interfaces 
from the ATC operator perspective 
Hazards 
L – H (Liveware – Hardware) 
Human/Physical attributes 
of equipment, machines and 
facilities 
Erroneous use of a human machine 
interface due to misleading workplace 
layout (RP1) 
Unintentional use of a human machine 
interface due to misleading workplace 
layout (RP1) 
Lack of awareness/monitoring of an 
alarm due to inconsistent 
implementation (not well visible for its 
position on the console; not well visible 
among other ones; not audible because 
without any sound associated, not 
audible because its sound is produced 
among many others) (RP3) 
Failure of warning system during 
abnormal situation (RP4) 
Erroneous use of a human machine 
interface due to low training or lack of 
training (RP5) 
Lack of manned intruder detection (RP6) 
Insufficient HMI to detect RPAS 
(MAP1) 
Failure of warning system during 
abnormal situation (MAP2) 
Insufficient HMI to identify RPAS 
(ATC1) 
Lack of separation provision 
instruction (ATC2) 
Lack of separation provision 
monitoring (ATC2) 
Incorrect separation  provision 
monitoring (ATC4) 
Misleading workplace layout 
Lack of remote pilot training 
Inconsistent or wrong 
implementation of 
warning/cautions 
Failure of warning/ 
caution system 
Loss of RPAS control 
Lack of RPAS detection 
Lack of manned  
aircraft detection 
Lack of separation  
provision from ATC 
Incorrect separation 
monitoring from ATC 
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Table  140 – Application of the SHELL model  and derived hazards (Cont’d) 
Interface Relationship typology 
Mismatches between interfaces from 
the remote pilot perspective 
Mismatches between interfaces from 
the manned aircraft pilot perspective 
with respect to RPAS intrusion on the 
track 
Mismatches between interfaces 
from the ATC operator perspective 
with respect to RPAS intrusion on 
the track 
Hazards 
L – H (Liveware – Software) 
Human/Supporting systems 
(regulations, manuals, checklists, 
publications, standard operating 
procedures, computer software) 
Lack of use of checklists from the 
remote pilot (RP7) 
Misleading indication to the remote 
pilot generated by computer software 
error (RP8) 
Insufficient or inappropriate 
operational procedures (RP9) 
Misinterpretation of confusing 
procedures and/or checklists (RP10) 
Confusing, misleading or cluttered 
documents, maps or charts (RP11) 
Irrational indexing of an operations 
manual (RP12) 
Intentional violation of standard 
operating procedures (RP13) 
Intentional violation of separation 
(RP14) 
Insufficient/inappropriate operating 
procedures to avoid RPAS intrusion 
(MAP3) 
Intentional deviation from ATC 
separation (MAP4) 
Communication errors with the 
manned aircraft pilot (ATC5) 
Communication errors with the 
with the RPAS remote pilot (ATC6) 
Lack of checklists 
Low remote pilot training  
in using checklist 
Insufficient or inappropriate 
operational procedures 
Confusing, misleading or 
cluttered documents,  
maps or charts 
Intentional violation of 
standard procedures 
Intentional violation of 
separations 
Intentional deviation from 
ATC separation 
ATC communication errors 
L – H (Liveware – Liveware) 
Persons/Persons (Flight crews, air 
traffic controllers, RPAS 
maintenance personnel, 
operational personnel) 
Communication errors with ATC (RP15) 
Low crew cooperation (MAP5) 
Communication errors due to 
misleading, ambiguous, inappropriate 
or poorly constructed communication  
within the crew (MAP6) 
Reduced performance and error from 
an imbalanced authority relationship 
within the crew (MAP7) 
Communication errors with the 
manned aircraft pilot or with the 
RPAS remote pilot (ATC7) 
Communication errors with the 
manned aircraft pilot or with the 
RPAS remote pilot (ATC8) 
Reduced physical performance to 
lack of rest, unhealthy crew 
physical conditions, high workload 
(ATC9) 
Remote pilot  
communication  
errors with ATC 
Communication  
errors from ATC 
Low manned aircraft crew 
resource management 
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Table 140 – Application of the SHELL model  and derived hazards (Cont’d) 
Interface Relationship tipology 
Mismatches between interfaces from 
the remote pilot perspective 
Mismatches between interfaces from 
the manned aircraft pilot perspective 
with respect to RPAS intrusion on the 
track 
Mismatches between interfaces 
from the ATC operator perspective 
with respect to RPAS intrusion on 
the track 
Hazards 
L – H (Liveware – Environment) 
Humans/Internal & external 
environment (temperature, 
ambient light, noise, vibration, 
air quality & weather factors, 
aviation infrastructure and 
terrain) 
Reduced physical performance to lack 
of rest, unhealthy crew physical 
conditions, high workload (RP16) 
Reduced performance and errors 
caused by stress/high workload (RP17) 
Remote pilot perceptual errors (RP18) 
Reduced performance and errors due 
to lack of rest, unhealthy crew 
physical conditions, high workload 
(MAP8) 
Crew perceptual errors induced by 
environmental conditions (MAP9) 
Reduced performance and errors 
due to lack of rest, unhealthy crew 
physical conditions, high workload 
(ATC10) 
Crew perceptual errors induced by 
environmental conditions (ATC11) 
Remote pilot/crew/ATC 
operator reduced physical 
performance 
Remote pilot/manned 
aircraft crew perceptual 
errors 
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Table 141  –  Application of the HFACS model and derived hazards 
Classification according  
to HFACS methodology 
Details RPAS remote pilot 
Manned aircraft pilot with 
respect to RPAS intrusion on the 
track 
ATC operator  with respect to 
RPAS intrusion on the track 
Hazards 
Unsafe acts      
Decision errors     
Mid-air collision  
with other aircraft 
Collision with natural/man 
made obstacles when the 
RPAS is flying in manual mode 
Violation of separations 
Violation of operational 
procedures 
Lack of RPAS detection 
Mid-air collision with the RPAS 
Error to assign separations 
Error to manage separations 
RPAS flight in adverse 
conditions 
Loss of situational awareness 
 Rule-based decisions x x x 
 Choice decisions x x x 
 Structured decisions x x x 
Skill-based errors     
 Attention failures x x x 
 Memory failures x x x 
 Technique errors x x x 
Perceptual errors     
 Misperceptions x x x 
 Misjudgments x x x 
Routine violations     
 Violation of training rules x x x 
 
Failed to comply with departmental 
manuals 
x x x 
 
Violations of orders, regulations 
and/or SOPs 
x x x 
Exceptional violations     
 Performed unauthorized operations x x x 
 Accepted unauthorized hazards x x x 
 Not current/qualified x x x 
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Table 141  –  Application of the HFACS model and derived hazards (Cont’d) 
Classification according  
to HFACS methodology 
Details RPAS remote pilot 
Manned aircraft pilot with 
respect to RPAS intrusion on the 
track 
ATC operator  with respect to 
RPAS intrusion on the track 
Hazards 
Preconditions for unsafe acts     
RPAS flight in adverse 
conditions 
Mid-air collision  
with other aircraft 
RPAS automation failure 
RPAS remote pilot missing of 
checklist performance 
Collision with 
natural/man made obstacles 
when the RPAS is flying in 
manual mode 
Environmental factors     
 Physical environment:    
 Weather x x - 
 Lighting x x - 
 Noise x x x 
 Heat x x - 
 Vibration - x - 
 Technological environment:    
 Equipment and controls x x x 
 Automation reliability/complexity x x x 
 Task and procedure design x x x 
 Manuals and checklist design x x x 
 Interfaces and displays x x x 
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Table 141  –  Application of the HFACS model and derived hazards (Cont’d) 
Classification according  
to HFACS methodology 
Details RPAS remote pilot 
Manned aircraft pilot with 
respect to RPAS intrusion on the 
track 
ATC operator  with respect to 
RPAS intrusion on the track 
Hazards 
Condition of employees     
Mid-air collision  
with other aircraft 
Collision with natural/man 
made obstacles when the 
RPAS is flying in manual mode 
Loss of situational awareness 
 Adverse mental states:    
 Complacency x x x 
 Stress x x x 
 Overconfidence x x x 
 Mental fatigue x x x 
 Distraction x x x 
 Confusion x x x 
 Adverse psychological states:    
 Physical fatigue x x x 
 Visual illusions x x x 
 Hypoxia - x - 
 Medical illness x x x 
 Physical/Mental limitations:    
 Visual limitations x x x 
 Hearing limitations x x x 
 Not current/qualified x x x 
 Incompatible physical capability - - - 
 Incompatible intelligence/aptitude - - - 
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Table 141  –  Application of the HFACS model and derived hazards (Cont’d) 
Classification according  
to HFACS methodology 
Details RPAS remote pilot 
Manned aircraft pilot with 
respect to RPAS intrusion on the 
track 
ATC operator  with respect to 
RPAS intrusion on the track 
Hazards 
Personal/interpersonal factors     Mid-air collision  
with other aircraft 
Collision with natural/man 
made obstacles when the 
RPAS is flying in manual mode 
Violation of separations 
Violation of operational 
procedures 
Lack of RPAS detection 
Mid-air collision with the RPAS 
Error to assign separations 
Error to manage separations 
RPAS flight in adverse 
conditions 
 
Communication, coordination and 
planning: 
 
  
 Failed to conduct adequate brief x x x 
 Lack of teamwork x x x 
 Poor communication/coordination x x x 
 Failure of leadership x x x 
 Fitness for duty:    
 Crew rest requirements x x x 
 Bottle to brief rules x x x 
 Self-medicating x x x 
 Poor dietary practice x x x 
 Overexertion while off duty x x x 
 Inadequate preparation skill x x x 
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Table 141  –  Application of the HFACS model and derived hazards (Cont’d) 
Classification according  
to HFACS methodology 
Details RPAS remote pilot 
Manned aircraft pilot with 
respect to RPAS intrusion on the 
track 
ATC operator  with respect to 
RPAS intrusion on the track 
Hazards 
Unsafe supervision     
Mid-air collision  
with other aircraft 
Collision with natural/man 
made obstacles when the 
RPAS is flying in manual mode 
Violation of separations 
Violation of operational 
procedures 
Lack of RPAS detection 
Mid-air collision with the RPAS 
Error to assign separations 
Error to manage separations 
RPAS flight in adverse 
condition 
Inadequate supervision     
 Failure to administer proper training x x x 
 Lack of professional guidance x x x 
 Failure to provide oversight x x x 
Planned inappropriate 
operations 
  
  
 Risk outweighs benefits X X X 
 Excessive tasking/workload X X X 
 Poor crew pairing x x x 
Failed to correct problems     
 
Failure to correct inappropriate 
behavior 
x x x 
 Failure to correct a safety hazard x x x 
Supervisory violations     
 Failed to enforce the rules x x x 
 Authorized unnecessary hazard x x x 
 Authorized unqualified crew for flight x x x 
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Table 141  –  Application of the HFACS model and derived hazards (Cont’d) 
Classification according  
to HFACS methodology 
Details RPAS remote pilot 
Manned aircraft pilot with 
respect to RPAS intrusion on the 
track 
ATC operator  with respect to 
RPAS intrusion on the track 
Hazards 
Organizational influences     
- 
Resource management     
 Human x x x 
 Monetary x x x 
 Equipment/Facility x x x 
Organizational climate     
 Structure x x x 
 Policy x x x 
 Culture x x x 
Operational process     
 Operations x x x 
 Procedures x x x 
 Oversight x x x 
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Table 142 – Hazard derived from human factor 
(SHELL and HFACS models) 
Possible hazards Estimated probability of occurrence level 
ATC communication errors Improbable - 2 [85] 
Collision with natural/man made obstacles  
when the RPAS is flying in manual mode 
Occasional - 4 
Confusing, misleading or cluttered  
operational documents, and checklists 
Frequent - 5 
Error to manage separations Occasional - 4 
Human senses limitation Frequent - 5 
Loss of remote pilot situational awareness Frequent - 5 
Insufficient or inappropriate operational procedures Occasional - 4 
Intentional violation of standard procedures Remote - 3 
Lack of specific checklists, operational procedures Frequent - 5 
Low manned aircraft crew resource management Occasional - 4 
Low remote pilot training Occasional - 4 
Performance of non-compliant operational procedure Occasional - 4 
Excessive workload Occasional - 4 
Remote pilot reduced physical performance Remote - 3 
Remote pilot perceptual errors Frequent - 5 
RPAS flight in adverse weather conditions Occasional - 4 
Unintentional violation of operational procedures Remote - 3 
Intentional violation of operational procedures Occasional - 4 
Unintentional violation of separations Remote - 3 
Intentional violation of separations Occasional - 4 
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Table 143 – U-Space Safety Risk Matrix 
Safety risk assessment 
Airspace service: U-Space 
RPAS  specific category operations 
[Flight limitations: Max height: 500 Ft., RLOS, MTOW: 25 kg < MTOW < 150 kg] 
Hazard Definition Description 
Safety risk  
probability 
Safety risk  
severity 
Safety risk 
assessment 
Tolerance 
Risk range 
description 
Recommended action 
Mitigation 
factors 
Residual risk 
RPAS Aviate functionality related hazards 
H01 
Loss  
of abort launch 
capability 
Impossibility to abort 
the RPA launch if less 
than optimal 
conditions of launch 
occur 
Remote - 3 Catastrophic  - A 3A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Use of Flight 
Termination 
system (FTS)/Use 
of recovery 
parachute 
system 
3D 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
H02 
Loss of  
flight controls 
Loss of ESC for rotor 
wing RPA; loss of the 
possibility to command 
the moving surfaces of 
fixed wing RPAS; 
degradation of RPAS 
maneuverability and 
dynamic control in 
flight; loss of the 
possibility to change 
altitude or heading 
Occasional - 4 Catastrophic  - A 4A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Use of Flight 
Termination 
system (FTS)/Use 
of recovery 
parachute 
system 
4D 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
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Table 143  – U-Space Safety Risk Matrix (Cont’d) 
Safety risk assessment 
Airspace service: U-Space 
RPAS  specific category operations 
[Flight limitations: Max height: 500 Ft., RLOS, MTOW: 25 kg < MTOW < 150 kg] 
Hazard Definition Description 
Safety risk  
probability 
Safety risk  
severity 
Safety risk 
assessment 
Tolerance 
Risk range 
description 
Recommended action 
Mitigation 
factors 
Residual risk 
H03 
Loss  of 
propulsion  
Loss of one or more 
electrical engine for 
rotor RPAS; loss of 
combustion engine for 
fixed wing RPAS; 
impossibility to change 
airspeed 
Occasional - 4 Catastrophic  - A 4A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Use of Flight 
Termination 
system (FTS)/Use 
of recovery 
parachute system 
4D 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
H04 
Loss                 
of GCS HMI 
Loss of the HMI 
functionality in the 
Ground Control Station 
Remote - 3 Catastrophic  - A 3A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Use of Flight 
Termination 
system (FTS)/Use 
of recovery 
parachute system 
3D 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
H05 
Deviation from 
steady-state  
(not- accelerating) 
flight condition 
Impossibility for the 
aircraft to perform the 
cruise phase of a flight 
mission 
Remote - 3 Catastrophic  - A 3A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Use of Flight 
Termination 
system (FTS)/Use 
of recovery 
parachute system 
3D 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
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Table 143  – U-Space Safety Risk Matrix (Cont’d) 
Safety risk assessment 
Airspace service: U-Space 
RPAS  specific category operations 
[Flight limitations: Max height: 500 Ft., RLOS, MTOW: 25 kg < MTOW < 150 kg] 
Hazard Definition Description 
Safety risk  
probability 
Safety risk  
severity 
Safety risk 
assessment 
Tolerance 
Risk range 
description 
Recommended action 
Mitigation 
factors 
Residual risk 
H06 
Loss  
of Emergency 
Flight Termination 
System 
Loss of Flight 
Termination System 
functionality 
Remote - 3 Catastrophic  - A 3A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Set autopilot on 
landing flight 
mode 
2A 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
H07 
Loss of “Return  
to home function” 
Loss of the possibility 
to use the  predefined 
procedure ‘“Return  
to home function” to 
safely recover the RPAS 
Improbable - 2 Catastrophic  - A 2A Acceptable Moderate risk 
Schedule performance of a safety 
assessment to bring down the risk 
index to the low range if viable. 
Use of Flight 
Termination 
system (FTS)/ 
Use of parachute 
recovery system 
2E 
Low risk 
Acceptable 
RPAS Navigate functionality related hazards 
H08 
Loss of  
mission plan 
Loss of mission  
plan functionality 
Remote - 3 Minor – D 3D Acceptable Moderate risk 
Schedule performance of a safety 
assessment to bring down the risk 
index to the low range if viable. 
Use the “Return 
to home” function 
2E 
Low risk 
Acceptable 
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Table 143  – U-Space Safety Risk Matrix (Cont’d) 
Safety risk assessment 
Airspace service: U-Space 
RPAS  specific category operations 
[Flight limitations: Max height: 500 Ft., RLOS, MTOW: 25 kg < MTOW < 150 kg] 
Hazard Definition Description 
Safety risk  
probability 
Safety risk  
severity 
Safety risk 
assessment 
Tolerance 
Risk range 
description 
Recommended action 
Mitigation 
factors 
Residual risk 
H09 
Loss of  
GPS signal 
Abrupt loss  
of GPS signal  
Occasional - 4 Minor – D 4D Acceptable Moderate risk 
Schedule performance of a safety 
assessment to bring down the risk 
index to the low range if viable. 
Switch to EGNOS 
service/Switch to 
inertial 
navigation/ 
Use the “Return 
to home” function 
4E 
Low risk 
Acceptable 
H10 
Loss of  
EGNOS signal 
Abrupt loss of  
EGNOS signal 
Remote - 3 Catastrophic - A 3A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Switch to GPS 
service/Switch to 
inertial 
navigation/ 
Use the “Return 
to home” function 
3D 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
H11 
Drift from the 
mission plan 
The RPAS does not 
copy the predefined 
mission profile 
Remote - 3 Hazardous - B 3B Acceptable Moderate risk 
Schedule performance of a safety 
assessment to bring down the risk 
index to the low range if viable. 
Use of ‘Return to 
home’ function/ 
Use of Flight 
Termination 
system (FTS)/Use 
of recovery 
parachute system 
3E 
Low risk 
Acceptable 
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Table 143  – U-Space Safety Risk Matrix (Cont’d) 
Safety risk assessment 
Airspace service: U-Space 
RPAS  specific category operations 
[Flight limitations: Max height: 500 Ft., RLOS, MTOW: 25 kg < MTOW < 150 kg] 
Hazard Definition Description 
Safety risk  
probability 
Safety risk  
severity 
Safety risk 
assessment 
Tolerance 
Risk range 
description 
Recommended action 
Mitigation 
factors 
Residual risk 
RPAS Communicate functionality related hazards  
H12 
Loss of uplink 
channel of the 
RPAS radio link 
Loss of command link 
to send command 
signals and controls to 
the RPAS 
Occasional - 4 Catastrophic - A 4A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Provision of a 
redundant radio 
link/Use of 
‘Return to home’ 
function/ 
Use of Flight 
Termination 
system (FTS)/ 
Use of parachute 
recovery system 
4E 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
H13 
Loss of downlink 
channel of the 
RPAS radio link 
Loss of command link 
to send command 
signals and controls to 
the RPAS 
Occasional - 4 Hazardous - B 4B Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Provision of a 
redundant radio 
link/Use of 
‘Return to home’ 
function/ 
Use of Flight 
Termination 
system (FTS)/ 
Use of parachute 
recovery system 
4E 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
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Table 143  – U-Space Safety Risk Matrix (Cont’d) 
Safety risk assessment 
Airspace service: U-Space 
RPAS  specific category operations 
[Flight limitations: Max height: 500 Ft., RLOS, MTOW: 25 kg < MTOW < 150 kg] 
Hazard Definition Description 
Safety risk  
probability 
Safety risk  
severity 
Safety risk 
assessment 
Tolerance 
Risk range 
description 
Recommended action 
Mitigation 
factors 
Residual risk 
H14 
Loss  
of ADS_B  
Failure of the ADS-B or 
degradation of its 
signal  
Occasional - 4 Catastrophic  - A 4A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Use of Flight 
Termination 
system (FTS)/ 
Use of parachute 
recovery system 
4D 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
 
RPAS Hazards avoidance functionality related hazards 
 
H15 
Presence  
of natural  
obstacles  
Flight operations 
performed in close 
proximity to hills, 
mountains or terrain  
Frequent - 5 Catastrophic - A 5A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Provision of on 
board collision 
avoidance 
systems based on 
the use of 
downward LIDAR 
or SONAR 
sensor/Provision 
of terrain profile 
data from 
mapping services 
(Like Google Map) 
to be 
implemented into 
the RPAS mission 
planner 
5E 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
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Table 143  – U-Space Safety Risk Matrix (Cont’d) 
Safety risk assessment 
Airspace service: U-Space 
RPAS  specific category operations 
[Flight limitations: Max height: 500 Ft., RLOS, MTOW: 25 kg < MTOW < 150 kg] 
Hazard Definition Description 
Safety risk  
probability 
Safety risk  
severity 
Safety risk 
assessment 
Tolerance 
Risk range 
description 
Recommended action 
Mitigation 
factors 
Residual risk 
H16 
Presence of  
man-made 
manufactures  
Flight operations in 
presence of man-made 
manufactures like 
buildings or 
other civil 
infrastructures 
(bridges, electrical 
lines,  etc.) 
Frequent - 5 Catastrophic - A 5A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Provision of on 
board collision 
avoidance 
systems based on 
the use of 
downward LIDAR 
or SONAR 
sensor/Provision 
of terrain profile 
data from 
mapping services 
(Like Google Map) 
to be 
implemented into 
the RPAS mission 
planner/ 
Provision of 
geofence 
software 
functionality  
5E 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
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Table 143  – U-Space Safety Risk Matrix (Cont’d) 
Safety risk assessment 
Airspace service: U-Space 
RPAS  specific category operations 
[Flight limitations: Max height: 500 Ft., RLOS, MTOW: 25 kg < MTOW < 150 kg] 
Hazard Definition Description 
Safety risk  
probability 
Safety risk  
severity 
Safety risk 
assessment 
Tolerance 
Risk range 
description 
Recommended action 
Mitigation 
factors 
Residual risk 
H17 
Mid-air collision 
with other aircraft 
Mid-air collision with 
other manned or 
unmanned aircraft 
Occasional - 4 Catastrophic - A 4A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Provision of 
onboard DAA 
subsystem in case 
of mid-air collision 
with cooperative 
traffic/Provision 
of on board 
collision 
avoidance 
systems based on 
the use of 
downward 
LIDAR/SONAR 
sensors in case of 
mid-air collision 
with not 
cooperative traffic 
4E 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
H18 
Loss of DAA  
functionality 
Loss of  
Detection and Avoid 
capability  
Remote - 3 Catastrophic - A 3A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Use of Flight 
Termination 
system (FTS)/ 
Use of parachute 
recovery system 
3D 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
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Table 143  – U-Space Safety Risk Matrix (Cont’d) 
Safety risk assessment 
Airspace service: U-Space 
RPAS  specific category operations 
[Flight limitations: Max height: 500 Ft., RLOS, MTOW: 25 kg < MTOW < 150 kg] 
Hazard Definition Description 
Safety risk  
probability 
Safety risk  
severity 
Safety risk 
assessment 
Tolerance 
Risk range 
description 
Recommended action 
Mitigation 
factors 
Residual risk 
H19 
No detectability 
from other 
airspace users 
Low or no detectability 
of flying RPAS from 
manned aircraft or 
from other unmanned 
aircraft 
Frequent - 5 Catastrophic - A 5A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Provision of  
on board ADS_B 
5D 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
H20 
Cooperative 
traffic intrusion 
Abrupt intrusion of 
cooperative manned or 
unmanned traffic 
Occasional - 4 Catastrophic - A 4A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Provision of 
ADS_B equipment 
and DAA 
subsystem on 
board the RPAS 
4D 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
H21 
Not cooperative 
traffic intrusion 
Abrupt intrusion of not 
cooperative manned or 
unmanned traffic 
Occasional - 4 Catastrophic - A 4A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Provision of 
secondary (with 
respect to DAA 
subsystem) LIDAR 
/SONAR sensors 
as collision 
avoidance system 
against not 
cooperative traffic 
4D 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
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Table 143  – U-Space Safety Risk Matrix (Cont’d) 
Safety risk assessment 
Airspace service: U-Space 
RPAS  specific category operations 
[Flight limitations: Max height: 500 Ft., RLOS, MTOW: 25 kg < MTOW < 150 kg] 
Hazard Definition Description 
Safety risk  
probability 
Safety risk  
severity 
Safety risk 
assessment 
Tolerance 
Risk range 
description 
Recommended action 
Mitigation 
factors 
Residual risk 
H22 
Missed 
cooperative traffic 
tracking 
Missed surveillance 
and tracking of 
cooperative traffic 
Remote - 3 Catastrophic - A 3A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Provision of 
ADS_B equipment 
and DAA 
subsystem on 
board the RPAS 
3D 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
H23 
Missed not 
cooperative traffic 
tracking 
Missed surveillance 
and tracking of not 
cooperative traffic 
Remote - 3 Catastrophic - A 3A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Provision of 
secondary (with 
respect to DAA 
subsystem) LIDAR 
/SONAR on board 
the RPA 
3D 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
H24 
Collision with 
cooperative traffic  
Mid-air collision with 
other cooperative 
manned or unmanned 
aircraft 
Occasional - 4 Catastrophic - A 4A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Provision of 
onboard DAA 
subsystem 
4E 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
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Table 143  – U-Space Safety Risk Matrix (Cont’d) 
Safety risk assessment 
Airspace service: U-Space 
RPAS  specific category operations 
[Flight limitations: Max height: 500 Ft., RLOS, MTOW: 25 kg < MTOW < 150 kg] 
Hazard Definition Description 
Safety risk  
probability 
Safety risk  
severity 
Safety risk 
assessment 
Tolerance 
Risk range 
description 
Recommended action 
Mitigation 
factors 
Residual risk 
 
H25 
Collision with not 
cooperative traffic  
Mid-air collision with 
other not cooperative 
manned or unmanned 
aircraft 
Occasional - 4 Catastrophic - A 4A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Provision of 
secondary (with 
respect to DAA 
subsystem) LIDAR 
/SONAR on board 
the RPA 
4E 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
H26 
Missed 
performance of 
avoidance 
collision  
maneuver  
Missed performance of 
collision avoidance 
maneuver: for example 
due to primary collision 
avoidance system DAA 
failure or degraded 
functionality 
Occasional - 4 Catastrophic - A 4A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Provision of 
secondary (with 
respect to DAA 
subsystem) LIDAR 
/SONAR on board 
the RPA 
3D 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
H27 
Missed 
monitoring  
of performance  
of avoidance 
collision  
maneuver  
Missed monitoring  
of performance  
of avoidance collision  
maneuver example due 
to human error  
Occasional - 4 Hazardous - B 4B Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Increase remote 
pilot training 
3B 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
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Table 143  – U-Space Safety Risk Matrix (Cont’d) 
Safety risk assessment 
Airspace service: U-Space 
RPAS  specific category operations 
[Flight limitations: Max height: 500 Ft., RLOS, MTOW: 25 kg < MTOW < 150 kg] 
Hazard Definition Description 
Safety risk  
probability 
Safety risk  
severity 
Safety risk 
assessment 
Tolerance 
Risk range 
description 
Recommended action 
Mitigation 
factors 
Residual risk 
H28 
Missed weather 
awareness 
capability 
Missed access to 
weather information 
for the remote pilot 
causing decrease in 
his/her awareness of 
weather conditions 
Remote - 3 Hazardous - B 3B Acceptable Moderate risk 
Schedule performance of a safety 
assessment to bring down the risk 
index to the low range if viable. 
Use of Flight 
Termination 
system (FTS)/ 
Use of parachute 
recovery system 
3E 
Low risk 
Acceptable 
H29 
Missed gathering 
of contingent  
weather 
information  
The human machine 
interface cannot 
enable the remote 
pilot to request 
weather 
specific to a current or 
future flight mission or 
cannot convey weather 
information to the 
remote pilot 
Remote - 3 Hazardous - B 3B Acceptable Moderate risk 
Schedule performance of a safety 
assessment to bring down the risk 
index to the low range if viable. 
Increase on 
ground routine 
maintenance/ 
checks for 
weather 
information 
gathering HMI 
2B 
Low risk 
Acceptable 
H30 
Missed avoidance 
of adverse 
weather  
The pilot shall remotely 
enable the RPAS to 
avoid adverse weather 
performing the correct 
avoidance maneuver  
Occasional - 4 Catastrophic - A 4A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Provide support 
to the remote 
pilot with an 
onboard 
miniaturized 
weather Doppler 
RADAR 
4E 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
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Table 143  – U-Space Safety Risk Matrix (Cont’d) 
Safety risk assessment 
Airspace service: U-Space 
RPAS  specific category operations 
[Flight limitations: Max height: 500 Ft., RLOS, MTOW: 25 kg < MTOW < 150 kg] 
Hazard Definition Description 
Safety risk  
probability 
Safety risk  
severity 
Safety risk 
assessment 
Tolerance 
Risk range 
description 
Recommended action 
Mitigation 
factors 
Residual risk 
Cross cutting functionalities related hazards 
H31 
Loss of RPAS 
subsystems  
health and status 
monitoring  
The RPAS health and 
status signals are not 
sent to ground  
Occasional - 4 Hazardous - B 4B Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Use of ‘Return to 
home’ function/ 
Use of Flight 
Termination 
system (FTS)/ 
Use of parachute 
recovery system 
4E 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
H32 
Loss of 
communication 
while transiting  
from LOS to 
BRLOS and vice 
versa  
Loss of communication 
while transiting  
from LOS to BRLOS and 
vice versa due to 
physical obstacles 
(natural or man-made) 
Frequent - 5 Catastrophic - A 5A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Performance of an 
accurate pre-flight 
mission planning 
in accordance 
with the RPAS 
radio link range 
capability 
4E 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
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Table 143  – U-Space Safety Risk Matrix (Cont’d) 
Safety risk assessment 
Airspace service: U-Space 
RPAS  specific category operations 
[Flight limitations: Max height: 500 Ft., RLOS, MTOW: 25 kg < MTOW < 150 kg] 
Hazard Definition Description 
Safety risk  
probability 
Safety risk  
severity 
Safety risk 
assessment 
Tolerance 
Risk range 
description 
Recommended action 
Mitigation 
factors 
Residual risk 
H33 
Unintentional 
radio link 
interference 
Unintentional  
radio frequency 
interference of RPAS 
radio link due to other 
civil sources of 
electromagnetic signals 
(telecommunication, 
airport surveillance 
systems, etc.) 
Remote - 3 Catastrophic - A 3A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Switch on 
redundant radio 
link band 
2A 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
H34 
Malicious radio 
link jamming 
Intentional unlawful RF 
interference of RPAS 
radio - link 
Occasional - 4 Catastrophic - A 4A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Switch on 
redundant radio 
link using another 
radio frequency 
band /Use of 
Flight Termination 
system (FTS)/ 
Use of parachute 
recovery system 
3D 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
H35 
Malicious radio 
link spoofing 
Intentional unlawful RF 
interference of RPAS 
radio - link 
Occasional - 4 Catastrophic - A 4A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Switch on 
redundant radio 
link using another 
radio frequency 
band /Use of 
Flight Termination 
system (FTS)/ 
Use of parachute 
recovery system 
3D 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
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Table 143  – U-Space Safety Risk Matrix (Cont’d) 
Safety risk assessment 
Airspace service: U-Space 
RPAS  specific category operations 
[Flight limitations: Max height: 500 Ft., RLOS, MTOW: 25 kg < MTOW < 150 kg] 
Hazard Definition Description 
Safety risk  
probability 
Safety risk  
severity 
Safety risk 
assessment 
Tolerance 
Risk range 
description 
Recommended action 
Mitigation 
factors 
Residual risk 
Contingencies  Failures related hazards 
H36 Fire 
Fire on board  
the RPAS 
Occasional - 4 Catastrophic - A 4A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Immediate flight 
termination using 
the Flight 
Termination 
system (FTS) 
4D 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
H37 
Loss of  
RPAS autopilot 
Loss of autopilot 
functionality 
Remote - 3 Catastrophic - A 3A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Switch on  
redundant 
autopilot/  
Use of Flight 
Termination 
system (FTS)/ 
Use of parachute 
recovery system 
2E 
Low risk 
Acceptable 
H38 
Loss of  
electrical power 
Loss electrical  
power generation  
Frequent - 5 Catastrophic - A 5A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Use of Flight 
Termination 
system (FTS)/ 
Use of parachute 
recovery system 
4D 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
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Table 143  – U-Space Safety Risk Matrix (Cont’d) 
Safety risk assessment 
Airspace service: U-Space 
RPAS  specific category operations 
[Flight limitations: Max height: 500 Ft., RLOS, MTOW: 25 kg < MTOW < 150 kg] 
Hazard Definition Description 
Safety risk  
probability 
Safety risk  
severity 
Safety risk 
assessment 
Tolerance 
Risk range 
description 
Recommended action 
Mitigation 
factors 
Residual risk 
H39 
Loss of  
inertial platform 
Loss of all inertial 
references for 
navigation 
Occasional - 4 Hazardous - B 4B Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Switch on  
redundant inertial 
platform/  
Use of Flight 
Termination 
system (FTS)/ 
Use of parachute 
recovery system 
3D 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
H40 
Loss  
of heading 
indication 
Loss of heading 
indication for example 
caused by loss of 
inertial platform 
Improbable - 2 Hazardous - B 2B Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Switch on  
redundant inertial 
platform/  
Use of Flight 
Termination 
system (FTS)/ 
Use of parachute 
recovery system 
1E 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
H41 
Loss  
of altitude 
indication 
Loss of altitude 
indication; for example 
caused by altimeter 
failure 
Improbable - 2 Catastrophic - A 2B Unacceptable Moderate risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Switch on  
redundant 
altimeter/  
Use of Flight 
Termination 
system (FTS)/ 
Use of parachute 
recovery system 
1D 
Low risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
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Table 143  – U-Space Safety Risk Matrix (Cont’d) 
Safety risk assessment 
Airspace service: U-Space 
RPAS  specific category operations 
[Flight limitations: Max height: 500 Ft., RLOS, MTOW: 25 kg < MTOW < 150 kg] 
Hazard Definition Description 
Safety risk  
probability 
Safety risk  
severity 
Safety risk 
assessment 
Tolerance 
Risk range 
description 
Recommended action 
Mitigation 
factors 
Residual risk 
H42 
Pressure  
sensors failure 
Loss of absolute or 
differential pressure 
sensor 
Frequent - 5 Catastrophic - A 5A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Switch on 
redundant 
pressure sensor/  
Use of Flight 
Termination 
system (FTS)/ 
Use of parachute 
recovery system 
4D 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
H43 
Misleading 
altitude indication 
Misleading altitude 
indication due to 
pressure sensor failure 
Frequent - 5 Catastrophic - A 5A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Switch on  
redundant 
altimeter/  
Use of Flight 
Termination 
system (FTS)/ 
Use of parachute 
recovery system 
4D 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
H44 
Misleading 
airspeed 
indication 
Misleading airspeed 
indication due to 
pressure sensor failure  
Frequent - 5 Catastrophic - A 5A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Switch on  
pressure sensor/  
Use of Flight 
Termination 
system (FTS)/ 
Use of parachute 
recovery system 
4D 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
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Table 143  – U-Space Safety Risk Matrix (Cont’d) 
Safety risk assessment 
Airspace service: U-Space 
RPAS  specific category operations 
[Flight limitations: Max height: 500 ft, RLOS, MTOW: 25 kg < MTOW < 150 kg] 
Hazard Definition Description 
Safety risk  
probability 
Safety risk  
severity 
Safety risk 
assessment 
Tolerance 
Risk range 
description 
Recommended action 
Mitigation 
factors 
Residual risk 
H45 
Misleading 
indication of the 
angle of incidence 
Misleading angle of 
incidence indication 
due to pressure sensor 
failure 
Frequent - 5 Catastrophic - A 5A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Switch on  
redundant 
pressure sensor/  
Use of Flight 
Termination 
system (FTS)/ 
Use of parachute 
recovery system 
4D 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
H46 Stall 
Fixed wing RPAS stall 
caused by misleading 
instrumental 
indications or by 
remote pilot error 
Frequent - 5 Catastrophic - A 5A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Performance of 
diving maneuver/ 
Use of Flight 
Termination 
system (FTS)/ 
Use of parachute 
recovery system 
5D 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
H47 
Loss of  
fuel cell 
Loss of fuel cell in an 
hybrid RPAS leading to 
degradation or loss of 
propulsion 
functionality and 
aircraft 
maneuverability  
and control during the 
flight 
Remote - 3 Catastrophic - A 3A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Switch on LiPo  
batteries as 
redundant source 
of electrical 
power 
3D 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
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Table 143  – U-Space Safety Risk Matrix (Cont’d) 
Safety risk assessment 
Airspace service: U-Space 
RPAS  specific category operations 
[Flight limitations: Max height: 500 Ft., RLOS, MTOW: 25 kg < MTOW < 150 kg] 
Hazard Definition Description 
Safety risk  
probability 
Safety risk  
severity 
Safety risk 
assessment 
Tolerance 
Risk range 
description 
Recommended action 
Mitigation 
factors 
Residual risk 
Contingencies  Human factor related hazards 
H48 
Remote pilot  
low training 
Lack or not appropriate 
remote pilot training 
Occasional - 4 Hazardous - B 4B Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Increase/ 
improve remote 
pilot training 
3D 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
H49 
Non-compliant 
operational 
procedures 
Lack of compliant 
operational 
procedures, check-lists, 
etc. 
Frequent - 5 Hazardous - B 5B Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Provision of 
proper 
operational 
procedures, 
check-lists, etc. 
3D 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
 
H50 
Remote pilot loss  
of situational 
awareness 
Loss of remote pilot 
situational awareness 
Frequent - 5 Hazardous - B 5B Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Increase remote 
pilot training 
3D 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
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Table 143  – U-Space Safety Risk Matrix (Cont’d) 
Safety risk assessment 
Airspace service: U-Space 
RPAS  specific category operations 
[Flight limitations: Max height: 500 Ft., RLOS, MTOW: 25 kg < MTOW < 150 kg] 
Hazard Definition Description 
Safety risk  
probability 
Safety risk  
severity 
Safety risk 
assessment 
Tolerance 
Risk range 
description 
Recommended action 
Mitigation 
factors 
Residual risk 
H51 
Human  
senses  
limitations 
Limitations of  human 
senses due to the fact 
that the remote pilot is 
on ground and not on 
board the aircraft and 
he/she has to use 
sensors and not his/her 
‘senses’ 
Occasional - 4 Catastrophic - A 4A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Increase remote 
pilot training 
3D 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
H52 
Remote pilot 
excessive 
workload 
Excessive remote pilot 
workload 
Occasional - 4 Major - C 4C Acceptable Moderate risk 
Schedule performance of a safety 
assessment to bring down the risk 
index to the low range if viable 
Increase remote 
pilot training 
3E 
Low risk 
Acceptable 
Contingencies  Weather related hazards 
H53 Cloud cover Weather hazard Frequent - 5 Major - C 5C Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Flight mission 
interruption and 
application of the 
“Return to Home” 
function 
5D 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
H54 Fog Weather hazard Occasional - 4 Major - C 4C Acceptable Moderate risk 
Schedule performance of a safety 
assessment to bring down the risk 
index to the low range if viable 
Flight mission 
interruption and 
application of the 
“Return to Home” 
function 
3E 
Low risk 
Acceptable  
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Table 143  – U-Space Safety Risk Matrix (Cont’d) 
Safety risk assessment 
Airspace service: U-Space 
RPAS  specific category operations 
[Flight limitations: Max height: 500 Ft., RLOS, MTOW: 25 kg < MTOW < 150 kg] 
Hazard Definition Description 
Safety risk  
probability 
Safety risk  
severity 
Safety risk 
assessment 
Tolerance 
Risk range 
description 
Recommended action 
Mitigation 
factors 
Residual risk 
H55 Freezing rain Weather hazard Remote - 3 Hazardous - B 3B Acceptable Moderate risk 
Schedule performance of a safety 
assessment to bring down the risk 
index to the low range if viable 
 Flight mission 
interruption and 
application of the 
“Return to Home” 
function 
3E 
Low risk 
Acceptable  
H56 Glare Weather hazard Occasional - 4 None - E 4E Acceptable Moderate risk 
Schedule performance of a safety 
assessment to bring down the risk 
index to the low range if viable 
- - 
- 
- 
H57 Haze Weather hazard Occasional - 4 Major - C 4C Acceptable Moderate risk 
Schedule performance of a safety 
assessment to bring down the risk 
index to the low range if viable 
Flight mission 
interruption and 
application of the 
“Return to Home” 
function 
4E 
Low risk 
Acceptable  
H58 Humidity Weather hazard Frequent - 5 Hazardous - B 5B Acceptable High risk 
Schedule performance of a safety 
assessment to bring down the risk 
index to the low range if viable 
Mission not to be 
performed due to 
less than optimal 
operational 
conditions 
5E 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable  
H59 Ice Weather hazard Occasional - 4 Hazardous - B 4B Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Mission not to be 
performed due to 
less than optimal 
operational 
conditions 
4E 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable  
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Table 143  – U-Space Safety Risk Matrix (Cont’d) 
Safety risk assessment 
Airspace service: U-Space 
RPAS  specific category operations 
[Flight limitations: Max height: 500 Ft., RLOS, MTOW: 25 kg < MTOW < 150 kg] 
Hazard Definition Description 
Safety risk  
probability 
Safety risk  
severity 
Safety risk 
assessment 
Tolerance 
Risk range 
description 
Recommended action 
Mitigation 
factors 
Residual risk 
H60 Rain Weather hazard Frequent - 5 Hazardous - B 5B Unacceptable High risk 
Schedule performance of a safety 
assessment to bring down the risk 
index to the low range if viable 
Provision  
of an on board 
miniaturized 
weather Doppler 
RADAR to identify 
the weather 
hazard and 
application of the 
“Return to Home” 
function 
5E 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable  
H61 Snow Weather hazard Occasional - 4 Hazardous - B 4B Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Provision  
of an on board 
miniaturized 
weather Doppler 
RADAR to identify 
the weather 
hazard and 
application of the 
“Return to Home” 
function 
5E 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable  
H62 Solar storms Weather hazard Remote - 3 Hazardous - B 3B Acceptable Moderate risk 
Schedule performance of a safety 
assessment to bring down the risk 
index to the low range if viable 
Use ‘Return to 
Home” function 
3E 
Low risk 
Acceptable 
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Table 143  – U-Space Safety Risk Matrix (Cont’d) 
Safety risk assessment 
Airspace service: U-Space 
RPAS  specific category operations 
[Flight limitations: Max height: 500 Ft., RLOS, MTOW: 25 kg < MTOW < 150 kg] 
Hazard Definition Description 
Safety risk  
probability 
Safety risk  
severity 
Safety risk 
assessment 
Tolerance 
Risk range 
description 
Recommended action 
Mitigation 
factors 
Residual risk 
H63 Temperature Weather hazard Frequent - 5 Hazardous - B 5B Acceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Mission not to be 
performed due to 
less than optimal 
operational 
conditions 
5E 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
H64 Turbulence Weather hazard Occasional - 4 Hazardous - B 4B Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Mission not to be 
performed due to 
less than optimal 
operational 
conditions 
4E 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
H65 Wind Weather hazard Frequent - 5 Hazardous - B 5B Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Mission not to be 
performed due to 
less than optimal 
operational 
conditions 
5E 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
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Table 143  – U-Space Safety Risk Matrix (Cont’d) 
Safety risk assessment 
Airspace service: U-Space 
RPAS  specific category operations 
[Flight limitations: Max height: 500 Ft., RLOS, MTOW: 25 kg < MTOW < 150 kg] 
Hazard Definition Description 
Safety risk  
probability 
Safety risk  
severity 
Safety risk 
assessment 
Tolerance 
Risk range 
description 
Recommended action 
Mitigation 
factors 
Residual risk 
H66 
Lightening 
strike 
Weather hazard Occasional - 4 Catastrophic - A 4A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Mission not to be 
performed due to 
less than optimal 
operational 
conditions 
4E 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
H67 Hail Weather hazard Occasional - 4 Catastrophic - A 4A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Mission not to be 
performed due to 
less than optimal 
operational 
conditions 
4E 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
H68 Hurricanes Weather hazard Remote - 3 Catastrophic - A 3A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Mission not to be 
performed due to 
less than optimal 
operational 
conditions 
3E 
Low risk 
Acceptable 
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Table 143  – U-Space Safety Risk Matrix (Cont’d) 
Safety risk assessment 
Airspace service: U-Space 
RPAS  specific category operations 
[Flight limitations: Max height: 500 Ft., RLOS, MTOW: 25 kg < MTOW < 150 kg] 
Hazard Definition Description 
Safety risk  
probability 
Safety risk  
severity 
Safety risk 
assessment 
Tolerance 
Risk range 
description 
Recommended action 
Mitigation 
factors 
Residual risk 
H69 Volcanic ash Volcanic hazard Remote - 3 Catastrophic - A 3A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Mission not to be 
performed due to 
less than optimal 
operational 
conditions 
3E 
Low risk 
Acceptable 
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Table 144 – ATM safety risk matrix 
Safety risk assessment 
Airspace service: ATM 
RPAS certified category operations  
 [Flight limitations: 0 Ft. < h < 500 Ft.; 500 Ft. < h < FL600, h > FL 600; VFR/IFR; Weight:  150 kg < MTOW < 600 kg (MALE class)] 
Hazard Definition Description 
Safety risk  
probability 
Safety risk  
severity 
Safety risk 
assessment 
Tolerance 
Risk range 
description 
Recommended action Mitigation factors Residual risk 
RPAS Aviate functionality related hazards 
H01 
Impossibility to 
perform 
maneuvers on 
ground 
Degradation or loss of  
functionalities to 
maneuver the aircraft 
on ground using flight 
controls, steering 
controls and 
propulsion controls 
Remote - 3 Hazardous - B 3B Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Increase RPA 
maintenance 
2B 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
H02 
Loss  
of abort launch 
capability 
Impossibility to abort 
the RPA launch if less 
than optimal 
conditions of launch 
occur 
Remote - 3 Catastrophic  - A 3A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Use of Flight 
Termination 
system (FTS)/Use 
of recovery 
parachute 
system 
3D 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
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Table 144  – ATM safety risk matrix (Cont’d) 
Safety risk assessment 
Airspace service: ATM 
RPAS certified category operations  
 [Flight limitations: 0 Ft. < h < 500 Ft.; 500 Ft. < h < FL600, h > FL 600; VFR/IFR; Weight:  150 kg < MTOW < 600 kg (MALE class)] 
Hazard Definition Description 
Safety risk  
probability 
Safety risk  
severity 
Safety risk 
assessment 
Tolerance 
Risk range 
description 
Recommended action Mitigation factors Residual risk 
H03 
Loss of  
flight controls 
Loss of ESC for rotor 
wing RPA; loss of the 
possibility to command 
the moving surfaces of 
fixed wing RPAS; 
degradation of RPAS 
maneuverability and 
dynamic control in 
flight; loss of the 
possibility to change 
altitude or heading 
Remote - 3 Catastrophic  - A 3A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Use of Flight 
Termination 
system (FTS)/Use 
of recovery 
parachute system 
3D 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
H04 
Loss  of 
propulsion  
Loss of one or more 
electrical engine for 
rotor RPAS; loss of 
combustion engine for 
fixed wing RPAS; 
impossibility to change 
airspeed 
Remote - 3 Catastrophic  - A 3A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Use of Flight 
Termination 
system (FTS)/Use 
of recovery 
parachute system 
3D 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
H05 
Loss                 
of GCS HMI 
Loss of the HMI 
functionality in the 
Ground Control Station 
Improbable - 2 Catastrophic  - A 2A Acceptable Moderate risk 
Schedule performance of a safety 
assessment to bring down the risk 
index to the low range if viable. 
Use of Flight 
Termination 
system (FTS)/Use 
of recovery 
parachute system 
2D 
Low risk 
Acceptable 
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Table 144  – ATM safety risk matrix (Cont’d) 
Safety risk assessment 
Airspace service: ATM 
RPAS certified category operations  
 [Flight limitations: 0 Ft. < h < 500 Ft.; 500 Ft. < h < FL600, h > FL 600; VFR/IFR; Weight:  150 kg < MTOW < 600 kg (MALE class)] 
Hazard Definition Description 
Safety risk  
probability 
Safety risk  
severity 
Safety risk 
assessment 
Tolerance 
Risk range 
description 
Recommended action Mitigation factors Residual risk 
H06 
Loss                 
of GCS monitoring 
displays 
Loss of the HMI in the 
Ground Control Station 
Remote - 3 Catastrophic  - A 3A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Use of Flight 
Termination 
system (FTS)/Use 
of recovery 
parachute system 
3D 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
H07 
Deviation from 
steady-state  
(not- accelerating) 
flight condition 
Impossibility for the 
aircraft to perform the 
cruise phase of a flight 
mission 
Improbable - 2 Catastrophic  - A 2A Acceptable Moderate risk 
Schedule performance of a safety 
assessment to bring down the risk 
index to the low range if viable. 
Use of Flight 
Termination 
system (FTS)/Use 
of recovery 
parachute system 
2D 
Low risk 
Acceptable 
H08 
Loss  
of Emergency 
Flight Termination 
System 
Loss of Flight 
Termination System 
functionality 
Improbable - 2 Catastrophic  - A 2A Acceptable Moderate risk 
Schedule performance of a safety 
assessment to bring down the risk 
index to the low range if viable. 
Set autopilot on 
landing flight 
mode 
2D 
Low risk 
Acceptable 
H09 
Loss of ‘Return  
to home function’ 
Loss of the possibility 
to use a predefined 
procedure to safely 
recover the RPAS 
Improbable - 2 Catastrophic  - A 2A Acceptable Moderate risk 
Schedule performance of a safety 
assessment to bring down the risk 
index to the low range if viable. 
Use of Flight 
Termination 
System (FTS) 
2E 
Low risk 
Acceptable 
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Table 144  – ATM safety risk matrix (Cont’d) 
Safety risk assessment 
Airspace service: ATM 
RPAS certified category operations  
 [Flight limitations: 0 Ft. < h < 500 Ft.; 500 Ft. < h < FL600, h > FL 600; VFR/IFR; Weight:  150 kg < MTOW < 600 kg (MALE class)] 
Hazard Definition Description 
Safety risk  
probability 
Safety risk  
severity 
Safety risk 
assessment 
Tolerance 
Risk range 
description 
Recommended action Mitigation factors Residual risk 
H10 
Impossibility to 
perform a go-
around maneuver 
Impossibility to 
perform a go-around 
maneuver during 
approach 
Occasional - 4 Catastrophic  - A 4A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Flight termination 
using emergency 
recovery 
parachute 
4D 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
RPAS Navigate functionality related hazards 
H11 
Loss of  
mission plan 
Loss of mission  
plan functionality 
Improbable - 2 Minor – D 2D Acceptable Low risk Acceptable - - 
- 
- 
H12 
Loss of  
GPS signal 
Abrupt loss  
of GPS signal  
Occasional - 4 Minor – D 4D Acceptable Moderate risk 
Schedule performance of a safety 
assessment to bring down the risk 
index to the low range if viable. 
Switch to  
EGNOS service/ 
Switch to inertial 
navigation/ 
Use the “Return 
to home” function 
4E 
Low risk 
Acceptable 
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Table 144  – ATM safety risk matrix (Cont’d) 
Safety risk assessment 
Airspace service: ATM 
RPAS certified category operations  
 [Flight limitations: 0 Ft. < h < 500 Ft.; 500 Ft. < h < FL600, h > FL 600; VFR/IFR; Weight:  150 kg < MTOW < 600 kg (MALE class)] 
Hazard Definition Description 
Safety risk  
probability 
Safety risk  
severity 
Safety risk 
assessment 
Tolerance 
Risk range 
description 
Recommended action Mitigation factors Residual risk 
H13 
Loss of  
EGNOS signal 
Abrupt loss of  
EGNOS signal 
Remote - 3 Catastrophic - A 3A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Switch to GPS 
service/ 
Switch to inertial 
navigation/ 
Use the “Return 
to home” function 
3D 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
H14 
Drift from the 
mission plan 
The RPAS does not 
copy the predefined 
mission profile 
Improbable - 2 Hazardous - B 2B Acceptable Moderate risk 
Schedule performance of a safety 
assessment to bring down the risk 
index to the low range if viable. 
Use of ‘Return to 
home’ function/ 
Use of Flight 
Termination 
system (FTS)/Use 
of recovery 
parachute system 
2D 
Low risk 
Acceptable 
H15 
Loss of mission 
plan updating 
software 
functionality 
Loss of mission plan 
updating software 
functionality (for RPAS 
capable of mission 
lasting several days or 
weeks) 
Remote - 3 Hazardous - B 3B Acceptable Moderate risk 
Schedule performance of a safety 
assessment to bring down the risk 
index to the low range if viable. 
Use of ‘Return to 
home’ function/ 
Use of Flight 
Termination 
system (FTS)/Use 
of recovery 
parachute system 
3E 
Low risk 
Acceptable 
H16 
Lack of 
communication  
of mission plan 
updating to ATC 
Lack of communication  
of mission plan 
updating to ATC 
Remote - 3 Hazardous - B 3B Acceptable Moderate risk 
Schedule performance of a safety 
assessment to bring down the risk 
index to the low range if viable. 
Increase remote 
pilot training 
2E 
Low risk 
Acceptable 
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Table 144  – ATM safety risk matrix (Cont’d) 
Safety risk assessment 
Airspace service: ATM 
RPAS certified category operations  
 [Flight limitations: 0 Ft. < h < 500 Ft.; 500 Ft. < h < FL600, h > FL 600; VFR/IFR; Weight:  150 kg < MTOW < 600 kg (MALE class)] 
Hazard Definition Description 
Safety risk  
probability 
Safety risk  
severity 
Safety risk 
assessment 
Tolerance 
Risk range 
description 
Recommended action Mitigation factors Residual risk 
RPAS Communicate functionality related hazards  
H17 
Loss of uplink 
channel of the 
RPAS radio link 
Loss of command link 
to send command 
signals and controls to 
the RPAS 
Remote - 3 Catastrophic - A 3A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Provision of a 
redundant radio 
link/Use of 
‘Return to home’ 
function/ 
Use of Flight 
Termination 
system (FTS)/ 
Use of parachute 
recovery system 
3D 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
H18 
Loss of downlink 
channel of the 
RPAS radio link 
Loss of command link 
to send command 
signals and controls to 
the RPAS 
Remote - 3 Catastrophic - A 3A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Provision of a 
redundant radio 
link/Use of 
‘Return to home’ 
function/ 
Use of Flight 
Termination 
system (FTS)/ 
Use of parachute 
recovery system 
3D 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
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Table 144  – ATM safety risk matrix (Cont’d) 
Safety risk assessment 
Airspace service: ATM 
RPAS certified category operations  
 [Flight limitations: 0 Ft. < h < 500 Ft.; 500 Ft. < h < FL600, h > FL 600; VFR/IFR; Weight:  150 kg < MTOW < 600 kg (MALE class)] 
Hazard Definition Description 
Safety risk  
probability 
Safety risk  
severity 
Safety risk 
assessment 
Tolerance 
Risk range 
description 
Recommended action Mitigation factors Residual risk 
H19 
Loss  
of ADS_B  
Failure of the ADS-B or 
degradation of its 
signal  
Improbable - 2 Catastrophic - A 2A Acceptable Moderate risk 
Schedule performance of a safety 
assessment to bring down the risk 
index to the low range if viable. 
Provision of a 
redundant ADS-B 
1A 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
H20 
Loss of 
communication 
with ATC 
Loss of communication 
radio link with ATC 
Remote - 3 Catastrophic - A 3A Unacceptable High risk 
Schedule performance of a safety 
assessment to bring down the risk 
index to the low range if viable. 
Rely on controller-
pilot data link 
communication 
channel 
2A 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
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Table 144  – ATM safety risk matrix (Cont’d) 
Safety risk assessment 
Airspace service: ATM 
RPAS certified category operations  
 [Flight limitations: 0 Ft. < h < 500 Ft.; 500 Ft. < h < FL600, h > FL 600; VFR/IFR; Weight:  150 kg < MTOW < 600 kg (MALE class)] 
Hazard Definition Description 
Safety risk  
probability 
Safety risk  
severity 
Safety risk 
assessment 
Tolerance 
Risk range 
description 
Recommended action Mitigation factors Residual risk 
H21 
Presence  
of natural  
obstacles  
Flight operations 
performed in close 
proximity to hills, 
mountains or terrain  
Frequent - 5 Catastrophic - A 5A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Provision of on 
board collision 
avoidance 
systems based on 
the use of 
downward LIDAR 
or SONAR 
sensor/Provision 
of terrain profile 
data from 
mapping services 
(Like Google Map) 
to be 
implemented into 
the RPAS mission 
planner 
5E 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
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Table 144  – ATM safety risk matrix (Cont’d) 
Safety risk assessment 
Airspace service: ATM 
RPAS certified category operations  
 [Flight limitations: 0 Ft. < h < 500 Ft.; 500 Ft. < h < FL600, h > FL 600; VFR/IFR; Weight:  150 kg < MTOW < 600 kg (MALE class)] 
Hazard Definition Description 
Safety risk  
probability 
Safety risk  
severity 
Safety risk 
assessment 
Tolerance 
Risk range 
description 
Recommended action Mitigation factors Residual risk 
H22 
Presence of  
man-made 
manufactures  
Flight operations in 
presence of man-made 
manufactures like 
buildings or 
other civil 
infrastructures 
(bridges, electrical 
lines,  etc.) 
Frequent - 5 Catastrophic - A 5A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Provision of on 
board collision 
avoidance 
systems based on 
the use of 
downward LIDAR 
or SONAR 
sensor/Provision 
of terrain profile 
data from 
mapping services 
(Like Google Map) 
to be 
implemented into 
the RPAS mission 
planner/ 
Provision of 
geofence 
software 
functionality  
5E 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
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Table 144  – ATM safety risk matrix (Cont’d) 
Safety risk assessment 
Airspace service: ATM 
RPAS certified category operations  
 [Flight limitations: 0 Ft. < h < 500 Ft.; 500 Ft. < h < FL600, h > FL 600; VFR/IFR; Weight:  150 kg < MTOW < 600 kg (MALE class)] 
Hazard Definition Description 
Safety risk  
probability 
Safety risk  
severity 
Safety risk 
assessment 
Tolerance 
Risk range 
description 
Recommended action Mitigation factors Residual risk 
H23 
Mid-air collision 
with other aircraft 
Mid-air collision with 
other manned or 
unmanned aircraft 
Occasional - 4 Catastrophic - A 4A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Provision of 
onboard DAA 
subsystem in case 
of mid-air collision 
with cooperative 
traffic/Provision 
of on board 
collision 
avoidance 
systems based on 
the use of 
downward 
LIDAR/SONAR 
sensors in case of 
mid-air collision 
with not 
cooperative traffic 
4E 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
H24 
Loss of DAA  
functionality 
Loss of  
Detection and Avoid 
capability  
Improbable Catastrophic - A 2A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Switch on 
redundant DAA 
1A 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
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Table 144  – ATM safety risk matrix (Cont’d) 
Safety risk assessment 
Airspace service: ATM 
RPAS certified category operations  
 [Flight limitations: 0 Ft. < h < 500 Ft.; 500 Ft. < h < FL600, h > FL 600; VFR/IFR; Weight:  150 kg < MTOW < 600 kg (MALE class)] 
Hazard Definition Description 
Safety risk  
probability 
Safety risk  
severity 
Safety risk 
assessment 
Tolerance 
Risk range 
description 
Recommended action Mitigation factors Residual risk 
H25 
No detectability 
from other 
airspace users 
Low or no detectability 
of flying RPAS from 
manned aircraft or 
from other unmanned 
aircraft 
Remote - 3 Catastrophic - A 3A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Provision of  
on board ADS_B 
3D 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
H26 
Cooperative 
traffic intrusion 
Abrupt intrusion of 
cooperative manned or 
unmanned traffic 
Remote - 3 Catastrophic - A 3A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Provision of 
ADS_B equipment 
and DAA 
subsystem on 
board the RPAS 
3D 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
H27 
Not cooperative 
traffic intrusion 
Abrupt intrusion of not 
cooperative manned or 
unmanned traffic 
Occasional - 4 Catastrophic - A 4A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Provision of 
secondary (with 
respect to DAA 
subsystem) LIDAR 
/SONAR sensors 
as collision 
avoidance system 
against not 
cooperative traffic 
4D 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
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Table 144  – ATM safety risk matrix (Cont’d) 
Safety risk assessment 
Airspace service: ATM 
RPAS certified category operations  
 [Flight limitations: 0 Ft. < h < 500 Ft.; 500 Ft. < h < FL600, h > FL 600; VFR/IFR; Weight:  150 kg < MTOW < 600 kg (MALE class)] 
Hazard Definition Description 
Safety risk  
probability 
Safety risk  
severity 
Safety risk 
assessment 
Tolerance 
Risk range 
description 
Recommended action Mitigation factors Residual risk 
H28 
Missed 
cooperative traffic 
tracking 
Missed surveillance 
and tracking of 
cooperative traffic 
Improbable - 2 Catastrophic - A 2A Acceptable Moderate risk 
Schedule performance of a safety 
assessment to bring down the risk 
index to the low range if viable. 
Provision of 
ADS_B equipment 
and DAA 
subsystem on 
board the RPAS 
2D 
Low risk 
Acceptable 
H29 
Missed not 
cooperative traffic 
tracking 
Missed surveillance 
and tracking of not 
cooperative traffic 
Improbable - 2 Catastrophic - A 2A Acceptable Moderate risk 
Schedule performance of a safety 
assessment to bring down the risk 
index to the low range if viable. 
Provision of 
ADS_B equipment 
and DAA 
subsystem on 
board the RPAS 
2D 
Low risk 
Acceptable 
H30 
Collision with 
cooperative traffic  
Mid-air collision with 
other cooperative 
manned or unmanned 
aircraft 
Improbable - 2 Catastrophic - A 2A Acceptable Moderate risk 
Schedule performance of a safety 
assessment to bring down the risk 
index to the low range if viable. 
Provision of 
onboard DAA 
subsystem 
2D 
Low risk 
Acceptable 
H31 
Collision with not 
cooperative traffic  
Mid-air collision with 
other not cooperative 
manned or unmanned 
aircraft 
Improbable - 2 Catastrophic - A 2A Acceptable Moderate risk 
Schedule performance of a safety 
assessment to bring down the risk 
index to the low range if viable. 
Provision of a 
secondary 
(redundant) LIDAR 
or infrared or 
SONAR sensors 
equipped collision 
avoidance system 
2D 
Low risk 
Acceptable 
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Table 144  – ATM safety risk matrix (Cont’d) 
Safety risk assessment 
Airspace service: ATM 
RPAS certified category operations  
 [Flight limitations: 0 Ft. < h < 500 Ft.; 500 Ft. < h < FL600, h > FL 600; VFR/IFR; Weight:  150 kg < MTOW < 600 kg (MALE class)] 
Hazard Definition Description 
Safety risk  
probability 
Safety risk  
severity 
Safety risk 
assessment 
Tolerance 
Risk range 
description 
Recommended action Mitigation factors Residual risk 
H32 
Missed 
performance of 
avoidance 
collision  
maneuver  
Missed performance of 
collision avoidance 
maneuver: for example 
due to primary collision 
avoidance system DAA 
failure or degraded 
functionality 
Remote - 3 Catastrophic - A 3A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Provision of 
secondary (with 
respect to DAA 
subsystem) LIDAR 
/SONAR on board 
the RPA 
3D 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
H33 
Missed 
monitoring  
of performance  
of avoidance 
collision  
maneuver  
Missed monitoring  
of performance  
of avoidance collision  
maneuver example due 
to human error  
Remote - 3 Hazardous - B 3B Acceptable Moderate risk 
Schedule performance of a safety 
assessment to bring down the risk 
index to the low range if viable. 
Increase remote 
pilot training 
1B 
Low risk 
Acceptable 
H34 
Missed weather 
awareness 
capability 
Missed access to 
weather information 
for the remote pilot 
causing decrease in 
his/her awareness of 
weather conditions 
Improbable - 2 Hazardous - B 2B Acceptable Moderate risk 
Schedule performance of a safety 
assessment to bring down the risk 
index to the low range if viable. 
Use of Flight 
Termination 
system (FTS)/ 
Use of parachute 
recovery system 
2D 
Low risk 
Acceptable 
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Table 144  – ATM safety risk matrix (Cont’d) 
Safety risk assessment 
Airspace service: ATM 
RPAS certified category operations  
 [Flight limitations: 0 Ft. < h < 500 Ft.; 500 Ft. < h < FL600, h > FL 600; VFR/IFR; Weight:  150 kg < MTOW < 600 kg (MALE class)] 
Hazard Definition Description 
Safety risk  
probability 
Safety risk  
severity 
Safety risk 
assessment 
Tolerance 
Risk range 
description 
Recommended action Mitigation factors Residual risk 
H35 
Missed contingent  
weather 
information 
gathering 
The human machine 
interface cannot 
enable the remote 
pilot to request 
weather 
specific to a current or 
future flight mission or 
cannot convey weather 
information to the 
remote pilot 
Improbable - 2 Hazardous - B 2B Acceptable Moderate risk 
Schedule performance of a safety 
assessment to bring down the risk 
index to the low range if viable. 
Increase on 
ground routine 
maintenance/ 
checks for 
weather 
information 
gathering HMI 
1B 
Low risk 
Acceptable 
H36 
Missed  
adverse weather 
avoidance 
The pilot shall remotely 
enable the RPAS to 
avoid adverse weather 
performing the correct 
avoidance maneuver  
Improbable - 2 Catastrophic - A 2A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Provide support 
to the remote 
pilot with an 
onboard 
miniaturized 
weather Doppler 
RADAR 
1B 
Low risk 
Acceptable 
Cross cutting functionalities related hazards 
H40 
Loss of RPAS 
subsystems  
health and status 
monitoring  
The RPAS health and 
status signals are not 
sent to ground  
Improbable - 2 Hazardous - B 2B Acceptable Moderate risk 
Schedule performance of a safety 
assessment to bring down the risk 
index to the low range if viable. 
Increase 
maintenance on 
ground 
1B 
Low risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
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Table 144  – ATM safety risk matrix (Cont’d) 
Safety risk assessment 
Airspace service: ATM 
RPAS certified category operations  
 [Flight limitations: 0 Ft. < h < 500 Ft.; 500 Ft. < h < FL600, h > FL 600; VFR/IFR; Weight:  150 kg < MTOW < 600 kg (MALE class)] 
Hazard Definition Description 
Safety risk  
probability 
Safety risk  
severity 
Safety risk 
assessment 
Tolerance 
Risk range 
description 
Recommended action Mitigation factors Residual risk 
H41 
Loss of 
communication 
while transiting  
from LOS to 
BRLOS and vice 
versa  
Loss of communication 
while transiting  
from LOS to BRLOS and 
vice versa due to 
physical obstacles 
(natural or man-made) 
Extremely 
improbable - 1 
Catastrophic - A 1A Acceptable Moderate risk 
Schedule performance of a safety 
assessment to bring down the risk 
index to the low range if viable. 
- - 
- 
- 
H42 
Unintentional 
radio link 
interference 
Unintentional  
radio frequency 
interference of RPAS 
radio link due to other 
civil sources of 
electromagnetic signals 
(telecommunication, 
airport surveillance 
systems, etc.) 
Improbable - 2 Catastrophic - A 2A Acceptable Moderate risk 
Schedule performance of a safety 
assessment to bring down the risk 
index to the low range if viable. 
Switch on 
redundant radio 
link band 
1D 
Low risk 
Acceptable 
H43 
Malicious radio 
link jamming 
Intentional unlawful RF 
interference of RPAS 
radio - link 
Remote - 3 Catastrophic - A 3A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Switch on 
redundant radio 
link using another 
radio frequency 
band /Use of 
Flight Termination 
system (FTS)/ 
Use of parachute 
recovery system 
2D 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
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Table 144  – ATM safety risk matrix (Cont’d) 
Safety risk assessment 
Airspace service: ATM 
RPAS certified category operations  
 [Flight limitations: 0 Ft. < h < 500 Ft.; 500 Ft. < h < FL600, h > FL 600; VFR/IFR; Weight:  150 kg < MTOW < 600 kg (MALE class)] 
Hazard Definition Description 
Safety risk  
probability 
Safety risk  
severity 
Safety risk 
assessment 
Tolerance 
Risk range 
description 
Recommended action Mitigation factors Residual risk 
H44 
Malicious radio 
link spoofing 
Intentional unlawful RF 
interference of RPAS 
radio - link 
Remote - 3 Catastrophic - A 3A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Switch on 
redundant radio 
link using another 
radio frequency 
band /Use of 
Flight Termination 
system (FTS)/ 
Use of parachute 
recovery system 
2D 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
Contingent hazards 
H42 Fire 
Fire on board  
the RPAS 
Extremely 
improbable - 1 
Catastrophic - A 1A Acceptable Moderae risk 
Schedule performance of a safety 
assessment to bring down the risk 
index to the low range if viable. 
Immediate flight 
termination using 
the Flight 
Termination 
system (FTS) 
1E 
Low risk 
Acceptable 
H43 
Loss of  
RPAS autopilot 
Loss of autopilot 
functionality 
Extremely 
improbable - 1 
Catastrophic - A 1A Acceptable Moderae risk 
Schedule performance of a safety 
assessment to bring down the risk 
index to the low range if viable. 
Switch on  
redundant 
autopilot/  
Use of Flight 
Termination 
system (FTS)/ 
Use of parachute 
recovery system 
1E 
Low risk 
Acceptable 
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Table 144  – ATM safety risk matrix (Cont’d) 
Safety risk assessment 
Airspace service: ATM 
RPAS certified category operations  
 [Flight limitations: 0 Ft. < h < 500 Ft.; 500 Ft. < h < FL600, h > FL 600; VFR/IFR; Weight:  150 kg < MTOW < 600 kg (MALE class)] 
Hazard Definition Description 
Safety risk  
probability 
Safety risk  
severity 
Safety risk 
assessment 
Tolerance 
Risk range 
description 
Recommended action Mitigation factors Residual risk 
H44 
Loss of  
electrical power 
Loss electrical  
power generation  
Extremely 
improbable - 1 
Catastrophic - A 1A Acceptable Moderae risk 
Schedule performance of a safety 
assessment to bring down the risk 
index to the low range if viable. 
Use of Flight 
Termination 
system (FTS)/ 
Use of parachute 
recovery system 
1E 
Low risk 
Acceptable 
H45 
Loss of  
inertial  
platform 
Loss of all inertial 
references for 
navigation 
Extremely 
improbable - 1 
Hazardous - B 1B Acceptable Low risk Acceptable - - 
- 
- 
H46 
Loss  
of heading 
indication 
Loss of heading 
indication for example 
caused by loss of 
inertial platform 
Extremely 
improbable - 1 
Hazardous - B 1B Acceptable Low risk Acceptable - - 
- 
- 
H47 
Loss  
of altitude 
indication 
Loss of altitude 
indication; for example 
caused by altimeter 
failure 
Extremely 
improbable - 1 
Catastrophic - A 1A Acceptable Moderae risk 
Schedule performance of a safety 
assessment to bring down the risk 
index to the low range if viable. 
Switch on 
redundant 
altimeter 
1E 
Low risk 
Acceptable 
H48 
Loss of airspeed 
indication 
Loss of airspeed 
indication 
Extremely 
improbable - 1 
Hazardous - B 1B Acceptable Low risk Acceptable - - 
- 
- 
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Table 144  – ATM safety risk matrix (Cont’d) 
Safety risk assessment 
Airspace service: ATM 
RPAS certified category operations  
 [Flight limitations: 0 Ft. < h < 500 Ft.; 500 Ft. < h < FL600, h > FL 600; VFR/IFR; Weight:  150 kg < MTOW < 600 kg (MALE class)] 
Hazard Definition Description 
Safety risk  
probability 
Safety risk  
severity 
Safety risk 
assessment 
Tolerance 
Risk range 
description 
Recommended action Mitigation factors Residual risk 
H49 
Pressure  
sensors failure 
Loss of absolute or 
differential pressure 
sensor 
Extremely 
improbable - 1 
Catastrophic - A 1A Acceptable Moderae risk 
Schedule performance of a safety 
assessment to bring down the risk 
index to the low range if viable. 
Switch on 
redundant 
pressure sensor 
4D 
Low risk 
Acceptable 
H50 
Misleading 
altitude indication 
Misleading altitude 
indication due to 
pressure sensor failure 
Remote - 3 Catastrophic - A 3A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Switch on  
redundant 
altimeter 
3D 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
H51 
Misleading 
airspeed 
indication 
Misleading airspeed 
indication due to 
pressure sensor failure  
Remote - 3 Catastrophic - A 3A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Switch on  
redundant 
pressure sensors 
3D 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
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Table 144  – ATM safety risk matrix (Cont’d) 
Safety risk assessment 
Airspace service: ATM 
RPAS certified category operations  
 [Flight limitations: 0 Ft. < h < 500 Ft.; 500 Ft. < h < FL600, h > FL 600; VFR/IFR; Weight:  150 kg < MTOW < 600 kg (MALE class)] 
Hazard Definition Description 
Safety risk  
probability 
Safety risk  
severity 
Safety risk 
assessment 
Tolerance 
Risk range 
description 
Recommended action Mitigation factors Residual risk 
H52 
Misleading 
indication of the 
angle of incidence 
Misleading angle of 
incidence indication 
due to pressure sensor 
failure 
Improbable - 2 Catastrophic - A 2A Acceptable Moderate risk 
Schedule performance of a safety 
assessment to bring down the risk 
index to the low range if viable. 
Switch on  
redundant 
pressure sensor/  
Use of Flight 
Termination 
system (FTS)/ 
Use of parachute 
recovery system 
2D 
Low risk 
Acceptable 
H53 Stall 
Fixed wing RPAS stall 
caused by misleading 
instrumental 
indications or by 
remote pilot error 
Remote - 3 Catastrophic - A 3A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Performance  
of diving 
maneuver/ 
Use of Flight 
Termination 
system (FTS)/ 
Use of parachute 
recovery system 
3D 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
H54 
Loss of  
fuel cell 
Loss of fuel cell in an 
hybrid RPAS leading to 
degradation or loss of 
propulsion 
functionality and 
aircraft 
maneuverability  
and control during the 
flight 
Improbable - 2 Catastrophic - A 2A Acceptable Moderate risk 
Schedule performance of a safety 
assessment to bring down the risk 
index to the low range if viable. 
Switch on LiPo  
batteries as 
redundant source 
of electrical 
power 
2D 
Low risk 
Acceptable 
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Table 144  – ATM safety risk matrix (Cont’d) 
Safety risk assessment 
Airspace service: ATM 
RPAS certified category operations  
 [Flight limitations: 0 Ft. < h < 500 Ft.; 500 Ft. < h < FL600, h > FL 600; VFR/IFR; Weight:  150 kg < MTOW < 600 kg (MALE class)] 
Hazard Definition Description 
Safety risk  
probability 
Safety risk  
severity 
Safety risk 
assessment 
Tolerance 
Risk range 
description 
Recommended action Mitigation factors Residual risk 
H55 Loss of fuel 
Loss of fuel due to 
failure to fuel tank or 
pipelines 
Remote - 4 Catastrophic - A 4A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Use of Flight 
Termination 
System (FTS) 
4D 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
Human factor related hazards 
H56 
Remote pilot  
low training 
Lack or not appropriate 
remote pilot training 
Remote - 3 Hazardous - B 3B Acceptable Moderate risk 
Schedule performance of a safety 
assessment to bring down the risk 
index to the low range if viable. 
Increase/ 
improve remote 
pilot training 
2D 
Low risk 
Acceptable 
H57 
Non-compliant 
operational 
procedures 
Lack of compliant 
operational 
procedures, check-lists, 
etc. 
Remote - 3 Hazardous - B 3B Acceptable Moderate risk 
Schedule performance of a safety 
assessment to bring down the risk 
index to the low range if viable. 
Provision of 
operational 
procedures, 
check-lists, etc. 
2D 
Low risk 
Acceptable 
H58 
Remote pilot loss  
of situational 
awareness 
Loss of remote pilot 
situational awareness 
Remote - 3 Hazardous - B 3B Acceptable Moderate risk 
Schedule performance of a safety 
assessment to bring down the risk 
index to the low range if viable. 
Increase remote 
pilot training 
2D 
Low risk 
Acceptable 
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Table 144  – ATM safety risk matrix (Cont’d) 
Safety risk assessment 
Airspace service: ATM 
RPAS certified category operations  
 [Flight limitations: 0 Ft. < h < 500 Ft.; 500 Ft. < h < FL600, h > FL 600; VFR/IFR; Weight:  150 kg < MTOW < 600 kg (MALE class)] 
Hazard Definition Description 
Safety risk  
probability 
Safety risk  
severity 
Safety risk 
assessment 
Tolerance 
Risk range 
description 
Recommended action Mitigation factors Residual risk 
H59 
Human  
senses  
limitations 
Limitations of  human 
senses due to the fact 
that the remote pilot is 
on ground and not on 
board the aircraft and 
he/she has to use 
sensors and not his/her 
‘senses’ 
Occasional - 4 Catastrophic - A 4A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Increase remote 
pilot training 
3D 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
H60 
Remote pilot 
excessive 
workload 
Excessive remote pilot 
workload 
Occasional - 4 Major - C 4C Acceptable Moderate risk 
Schedule performance of a safety 
assessment to bring down the risk 
index to the low range if viable 
Increase remote 
pilot training 
3E 
Low risk 
Acceptable 
H61 
Loss of separation 
provision from the 
ATC 
The separation 
provision 
instructions are no 
longer being provided 
from ATC, 
specifically to the Pilot. 
It is not loss of air 
traffic control to all air 
traffic.  
It is assumed that in 
this scenario 
the remote pilot will 
follow standard 
procedures in the 
event of loss of 
communications 
Remote - 3 Hazardous - B 3B Acceptable Moderate risk 
Schedule performance of a safety 
assessment to bring down the risk 
index to the low range if viable 
Provision of 
DAA/LIDAR sensor 
on board the RPA 
against mid-air 
conflict/collision 
risks 
3E 
Low risk 
Acceptable 
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Table 144  – ATM safety risk matrix (Cont’d) 
Safety risk assessment 
Airspace service: ATM 
RPAS certified category operations  
 [Flight limitations: 0 Ft. < h < 500 Ft.; 500 Ft. < h < FL600, h > FL 600; VFR/IFR; Weight:  150 kg < MTOW < 600 kg (MALE class)] 
Hazard Definition Description 
Safety risk  
probability 
Safety risk  
severity 
Safety risk 
assessment 
Tolerance 
Risk range 
description 
Recommended action Mitigation factors Residual risk 
H62 
Loss of separation 
provision  
from the remote 
pilot 
Loss of separation 
provision from the 
remote pilot 
Occasional - 4 Hazardous - B 4B Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Provision of 
DAA/LIDAR sensor 
on board the RPA 
against mid-air 
conflict/collision 
risks 
4D 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
H63 
Erroneous 
separation 
provision 
instruction from 
ATC 
Provision of erroneous 
separation instruction 
from ATC 
Exremely 
improbable - 1 
Hazardous - B 1B Acceptable Low risk Acceptable - - 
- 
- 
H64 
Erroneous 
execution of the 
separation 
provision 
instruction from 
the remote pilot 
The remote pilot does 
not follow correctly the 
ATC instruction 
provision 
Occasional - 4 Hazardous - B 4B Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Provision of 
DAA/LIDAR sensor 
on board the RPA 
against mid-air 
conflict/collision 
risks /Increase 
remote pilot 
training 
4E 
Low risk 
Acceptable 
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Table 144  – ATM safety risk matrix (Cont’d) 
Safety risk assessment 
Airspace service: ATM 
RPAS certified category operations  
 [Flight limitations: 0 Ft. < h < 500 Ft.; 500 Ft. < h < FL600, h > FL 600; VFR/IFR; Weight:  150 kg < MTOW < 600 kg (MALE class)] 
Hazard Definition Description 
Safety risk  
probability 
Safety risk  
severity 
Safety risk 
assessment 
Tolerance 
Risk range 
description 
Recommended action Mitigation factors Residual risk 
H65 
The RPAS does 
not comply or 
incorrectly 
responds to 
separation 
provision 
instruction 
issued by ATC 
RPAS response to ATC 
instructions is not as 
expected 
Remote - 3 Catastrophic - A 3A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Use of Flight 
Termination 
system (FTS)/ 
Use of parachute 
recovery system 
3D 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
H66 
Remote pilot 
delayed response 
to separation 
instruction 
provision from 
ATC 
Remote pilot delayed 
response to  
separation provision 
instruction from ATC 
causing ATC workload 
increase 
Occasional - 4 Major - C 4C Acceptable Moderate risk 
Schedule performance of a safety 
assessment to bring down the risk 
index to the low range if viable 
Increase remote 
pilot training 
3E 
Low risk 
Acceptable 
H67 
Excessive number 
of intentional 
deviations from 
separation 
provision 
instruction   
Excessive number of 
intentional deviations 
from separation 
provision instruction 
(for genuine reasons 
like weather and 
similar and not for 
malicious intentions)  
Frequent - 5 Major - C 5C Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Increase remote 
pilot training 
3C 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
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Table 144  – ATM safety risk matrix (Cont’d) 
Safety risk assessment 
Airspace service: ATM 
RPAS certified category operations  
 [Flight limitations: 0 Ft. < h < 500 Ft.; 500 Ft. < h < FL600, h > FL 600; VFR/IFR; Weight:  150 kg < MTOW < 600 kg (MALE class)] 
Hazard Definition Description 
Safety risk  
probability 
Safety risk  
severity 
Safety risk 
assessment 
Tolerance 
Risk range 
description 
Recommended action Mitigation factors Residual risk 
H68 
Missed 
submission of 
flight plan to ATC 
Missed submission of 
flight plan to ATC from 
the remote pilot 
Occasional - 4 Hazardous - B 4B Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Increase remote 
pilot training 
3B 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
Weather related hazards 
H69 Cloud cover Weather hazard Frequent - 5 
Negligible – E 
(IFR flights) 
5E Acceptable Moderate risk 
Schedule performance of a safety 
assessment to bring down the risk 
index to the low range if viable 
Flight mission 
interruption and 
application of the 
“Return to Home” 
function 
5E 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
Minor – D 
(VFR flights) 
5D Acceptable Moderate risk 
Schedule performance of a safety 
assessment to bring down the risk 
index to the low range if viable 
Flight mission 
interruption and 
application of the 
“Return to Home” 
function 
5E 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
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Table 144  – ATM safety risk matrix (Cont’d) 
Safety risk assessment 
Airspace service: ATM 
RPAS certified category operations  
 [Flight limitations: 0 Ft. < h < 500 Ft.; 500 Ft. < h < FL600, h > FL 600; VFR/IFR; Weight:  150 kg < MTOW < 600 kg (MALE class)] 
Hazard Definition Description 
Safety risk  
probability 
Safety risk  
severity 
Safety risk 
assessment 
Tolerance 
Risk range 
description 
Recommended action Mitigation factors Residual risk 
H70 Fog Weather hazard Occasional - 4 
Negligible – E 
(IFR flights) 
4E Acceptable Moderate risk 
Schedule performance of a safety 
assessment to bring down the risk 
index to the low range if viable 
Flight mission 
interruption and 
application of the 
“Return to Home” 
function 
4E 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
Minor – D 
(VFR flights) 
4D Acceptable Moderate risk 
Schedule performance of a safety 
assessment to bring down the risk 
index to the low range if viable 
Flight mission 
interruption and 
application of the 
“Return to Home” 
function 
4E 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
H71 Freezing rain Weather hazard Remote - 3 
Catastrophic – A 
(IFR/VFR flights) 
3A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Flight mission 
interruption and 
application of the 
“Return to Home” 
function 
3E 
Low risk 
Acceptable  
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Table 144  – ATM safety risk matrix (Cont’d) 
Safety risk assessment 
Airspace service: ATM 
RPAS certified category operations  
 [Flight limitations: 0 Ft. < h < 500 Ft.; 500 Ft. < h < FL600, h > FL 600; VFR/IFR; Weight:  150 kg < MTOW < 600 kg (MALE class)] 
Hazard Definition Description 
Safety risk  
probability 
Safety risk  
severity 
Safety risk 
assessment 
Tolerance 
Risk range 
description 
Recommended action Mitigation factors Residual risk 
H72 Glare Weather hazard Occasional - 4 
Negligible – E 
(IFR/VFR flights) 
4E Acceptable Moderate risk - - - 
- 
- 
H73 Haze Weather hazard Occasional - 4 
Negligible – E 
(IFR flights) 
4E Acceptable Moderate risk 
Schedule performance of a safety 
assessment to bring down the risk 
index to the low range if viable 
Flight mission 
interruption and 
application of the 
“Return to Home” 
function 
4E 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
Minor – D 
(VFR flights) 
4D Acceptable Moderate risk 
Schedule performance of a safety 
assessment to bring down the risk 
index to the low range if viable 
Flight mission 
interruption and 
application of the 
“Return to Home” 
function 
4E 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
based on risk 
mitigation 
H74 Humidity Weather hazard Frequent - 5 
Negligible – E 
(IFR/VFR flights) 
5E Acceptable Moderate risk 
Schedule performance of a safety 
assessment to bring down the risk 
index to the low range if viable 
- - 
- 
- 
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Table 144  – ATM safety risk matrix (Cont’d) 
Safety risk assessment 
Airspace service: ATM 
RPAS certified category operations  
 [Flight limitations: 0 Ft. < h < 500 Ft.; 500 Ft. < h < FL600, h > FL 600; VFR/IFR; Weight:  150 kg < MTOW < 600 kg (MALE class)] 
Hazard Definition Description 
Safety risk  
probability 
Safety risk  
severity 
Safety risk 
assessment 
Tolerance 
Risk range 
description 
Recommended action Mitigation factors Residual risk 
H75 Ice Weather hazard Occasional - 4 
Catastrophic - A 
(IFR/VFR flights) 
4A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Mission not to be 
performed due to 
less than optimal 
operational 
conditions 
4E 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable  
H76 Rain Weather hazard Frequent - 5 
Hazardous – B 
(IFR/VFR flights) 
5B Unacceptable High risk 
Schedule performance of a safety 
assessment to bring down the risk 
index to the low range if viable 
Provision  
of an on board 
miniaturized 
weather Doppler 
RADAR to identify 
the weather 
hazard and 
application of the 
“Return to Home” 
function 
5E 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable  
H77 Snow Weather hazard Frequent - 5 
Hazardous – B 
(IFR/VFR flights) 
5B Unacceptable High risk 
Schedule performance of a safety 
assessment to bring down the risk 
index to the low range if viable 
Provision  
of an on board 
miniaturized 
weather Doppler 
RADAR to identify 
the weather 
hazard and 
application of the 
“Return to Home” 
function 
5E 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable  
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Table 144  – ATM safety risk matrix (Cont’d) 
Safety risk assessment 
Airspace service: ATM 
RPAS certified category operations  
 [Flight limitations: 0 Ft. < h < 500 Ft.; 500 Ft. < h < FL600, h > FL 600; VFR/IFR; Weight:  150 kg < MTOW < 600 kg (MALE class)] 
Hazard Definition Description 
Safety risk  
probability 
Safety risk  
severity 
Safety risk 
assessment 
Tolerance 
Risk range 
description 
Recommended action Mitigation factors Residual risk 
H78 Solar storms Weather hazard Remote - 3 
Hazardous – B 
(IFR/VFR flights) 
3B Acceptable Moderate risk 
Schedule performance of a safety 
assessment to bring down the risk 
index to the low range if viable 
Use ‘Return to 
Home” function 
3E 
Low risk 
Acceptable 
H79 Temperature Weather hazard Frequent - 5 
Negligible – D 
(IFR/VFR flights) 
5E Acceptable Moderate risk - - - 
- 
- 
H80 Turbulence Weather hazard Occasional - 4 
Hazardous – B 
(IFR/VFR flights) 
4B Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Mission not to be 
performed due to 
less than optimal 
operational 
conditions 
4E 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
H81 Wind Weather hazard Frequent - 5 
Hazardous – B 
(IFR/VFR flights) 
5B Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Mission not to be 
performed due to 
less than optimal 
operational 
conditions 
5E 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
H82 
Lightening 
strike 
Weather hazard Occasional - 4 
Catastrophic – A 
(IFR/VFR flights) 
4A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Mission not to be 
performed due to 
less than optimal 
operational 
conditions 
4E 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
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Table 144  – ATM safety risk matrix (Cont’d) 
Safety risk assessment 
Airspace service: ATM 
RPAS certified category operations  
 [Flight limitations: 0 Ft. < h < 500 Ft.; 500 Ft. < h < FL600, h > FL 600; VFR/IFR; Weight:  150 kg < MTOW < 600 kg (MALE class)] 
Hazard Definition Description 
Safety risk  
probability 
Safety risk  
severity 
Safety risk 
assessment 
Tolerance 
Risk range 
description 
Recommended action Mitigation factors Residual risk 
H83 Hail Weather hazard Occasional - 4 
Catastrophic – A 
(IFR/VFR flights) 
4A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Mission not to be 
performed due to 
less than optimal 
operational 
conditions 
4E 
Moderate risk 
Acceptable 
H84 Hurricanes Weather hazard Remote - 3 
Catastrophic – A 
(IFR/VFR flights) 
3A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Mission not to be 
performed due to 
less than optimal 
operational 
conditions 
3E 
Low risk 
Acceptable 
H85 Volcanic ash Remote - 3 Remote - 3 
Catastrophic – A 
(IFR/VFR flights) 
3A Unacceptable High risk 
Cease or cut back operation 
promptly if necessary. Perform 
priority risk mitigation to ensure that 
additional or enhanced preventive 
controls are put in place to bring down 
the risk index to the moderate or low 
range. 
Mission not to be 
performed due to 
less than optimal 
operational 
conditions 
3E 
Low risk 
Acceptable 
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Appendix E - Barriers and 
mitigation factors - The Bow Tie 
analysis – Results 
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Figure 61 – Bow Tie depiction of hazard H01 
 
 
 
Figure 62 – Bow Tie depiction of hazard H02 
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Figure 63 - Bow Tie depiction of hazard H05 
 
 
Figure 64 - Bow Tie depiction of hazard H06 
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Figure 65 - Bow Tie depiction of hazard H10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 66 - Bow Tie depiction of hazard H12 
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Figure 67 - Bow Tie depiction of hazard H14 
 
Figure 68 - Bow Tie depiction of hazard H17 
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Figure 69 - Bow Tie depiction of hazard H30 
 
 
Figure 70 - Bow Tie depiction of hazard H32 
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Figure 71 - Bow Tie depiction of hazard H36 
 
Figure 72 - Bow Tie depiction of hazard H37 
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Figure 73 - Bow Tie depiction of an example of human factor/performance related hazard 
 
 
Figure 74 - Bow Tie depiction of an example of weather related hazard 
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Appendix F - The expert system 
logical - Results 
Expert System: RPAS U-space Risk Matrix 
 
Hypotheses:  
- Light RPAS: 25 kg < MTOW < 150 kg 
- Propulsion subsystem: Hybrid powered electric rotor engines  
 
List of variables and definition:  
 
IRGRC = INTRINSIC RPAS GROUND RISK CLASS:  
- IRGRC = 1  LOW GROUND RISK 
- IRGRC > 1  HIGH GROUND RISK 
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INTRINSIC RPAS GROUND RISK CLASS: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 145 -  Intrinsic Ground Risk Class (FROM JARUS SORA)  IRGRC [68] 
RPAS Max 
characteristic 
dimension 
1 m 
(~ 3 feet) 
3 m 
(~ 10 feet) 
8 m 
(~ 25 feet) 
> 8 m 
(~ 25 feet) 
Typical expected 
kinetic energy 
< 700 J < 34000 J < 1084 kJ > 1084 kJ 
Operational 
scenario 
 
RLOS over 
controlled area, 
located inside a 
sparsely populated 
environment  
1 2 3 5 
BRLOS over 
sparsely populated 
environment (over-
flown areas 
uniformly 
inhabited)  
2 3 4 6 
RLOS over 
controlled area, 
located inside a 
populated 
environment  
3 4 6 8 
RLOS over 
populated 
environment  
4 5 7 9 
BRLOS over 
controlled area, 
located inside a 
populated 
environment  
5 6 8 10 
BRLOS over 
populated 
environment  
6 7 9 11 
RLOS over 
gathering of 
people  
7    
BRLOS over 
gathering of 
people  
8    
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Table 146 -  ‘Expert System’ knowledge basis rules variables 
RPAS_ALT = RPAS Altitude, measured in ‘feet’ by the altimeter  
RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGA = RPAS electric engine angular speed measured in radians per 
second 
RPAS_RATE_OF_CLIMB = RPAS vertical rate of climb, measured in ‘feet per second’ 
RPAS_LIDAR_SENSOR_OUTPUT = RPAS LIDAR anti-collision RADAR sensor output 
RPAS_AUTOPILOT_ABORT_LAUNCH_MODE = RPAS autopilot abort take-off/launch mode 
RPAS_RECOVERY_PARACHUTE_CMD = Command signal to activate the RPAS recovery 
parachute 
PITCH_CMD = Pitch command sent from ground to the RPA 
RPAS_PITCH_ANGLE = RPAS attitude pitch angle, measured in degrees 
ROLL_CMD = Roll command sent from ground to the RPA 
RPAS_ROLL_ANGLE = RPAS attitude roll angle, measured in degrees 
YAW_CMD = Yaw command sent from ground to the RPA 
RPAS_YAW_ANGLE = RPAS attitude yaw angle, measured in degrees 
RPAS_LIPO_BATTERY_CURRENT = Current from a LiPo battery to feed all the other 
electric loads (engines included) 
RPAS_FTS_CMD = Command signal to activate the RPAS ‘Flight Termination System’ 
RPAS_ESC_FAILURE_SENSOR = Electronic Speed Control failure sensor 
PITCH_CMD_LONGITUDINAL_SHIFT = Longitudinal shift of pitch stick 
PITCH_CMD_ELECTRICAL_SIGNAL = Electrical signal generated by the pitch stick as 
soon as a shift of the stick is performed by the remote pilot on ground  
ROLL_CMD_LONGITUDINAL_SHIFT = Lateral shift of pitch stick 
ROLL_CMD_ELECTRICAL_SIGNAL = Electrical signal generated by the pitch stick as 
soon as a lateral shift of the stick is performed by the remote pilot on ground  
IF YAW_CMD_DIRECTIONAL_SHIFT = Directional shift of the yaw command (pedals/lever 
switch) 
YAW_CMD_ELECTRICAL_SIGNAL = electrical signal generated by the pedal  as soon as 
a shift of the stick is performed by the remote pilot on ground (pedals/lever 
switch) 
WP_ALT = Altitude of a given RPAS route waypoint, measured in meters 
RPAS_IAS = RPAS indicated airspeed 
RPAS_FTS_BIT = The ‘Built in Test’ functionality embedded in the RPAS ‘Flight 
Termination System’  
RPAS_AUTOPILOT_LANDING_MODE = RPAS autopilot landing mode 
RPAS_RECOVERY_PARACHUTE_BIT = The ‘Built in Test’ functionality embedded in the 
RPAS ‘Recovery Parachute System’  
RPAS_AUTOPILOT_RETURN_TO_HOME_MODE = RPAS autopilot return to home mode to safely 
recover the RPAS following a predefined procedure 
RPAS_MISSION_PLAN = RPAS mission plan management software functionality 
GPS_LAT = The spatial position latitude coordinate provided by the Global 
Positioning Service for civilian applications 
GPS_LONG = The spatial position longitude coordinate provided by the Global 
Positioning Service for civilian applications 
GPS_ALT = The spatial position altitude coordinate provided by the Global 
Positioning Service for civilian applications 
EGNOS_LAT = The spatial position latitude coordinate provided by GALILEO EGNOS 
service for civilian aerospace applications 
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Table  147 -  ‘Expert System’ knowledge basis rules variables (Cont’d) 
EGNOS_LONG = The spatial position longitude coordinate provided by GALILEO EGNOS 
service for civilian aerospace applications 
EGNOS_LONG = The spatial position altitude coordinate provided by GALILEO EGNOS 
service for civilian aerospace applications 
DOWNLINK_RPAS_LAT = The RPA current latitude spatial coordinate measured on board 
and sent to the ground telemetry monitoring displays via the downlink channel 
DOWNLINK_RPAS_LONG = The RPA current longitude spatial coordinate measured on 
board and sent to the ground telemetry monitoring displays via the downlink 
channel 
DOWNLINK_RPAS_ALT = The RPA current altitude spatial coordinate measured on board 
and sent to the ground telemetry monitoring displays via the downlink channel 
PLANNED_WP_LAT = The expected RPA latitude spatial coordinate value according to 
the given flight mission plan  
PLANNED_WP_LONG = The expected RPA longitude spatial coordinate value according 
to the given flight mission plan  
PLANNED_WP_ALT = The expected RPA altitude spatial coordinate value according to 
the given flight mission plan  
RPAS_UPLINK_PATH_LOSS = Loss of the signal path sent from ground on the uplink 
channel to manage the aircraft 
RPAS_ADS-B_BIT = The ‘Built in Test’ functionality embedded in the ADS-B 
RPAS_DISTANCE_FROM_OBSTACLE = RPAS distance from the detected fixed (natural or 
man-made)or moving obstacle (cooperative or not cooperative aerial traffic) 
THRESHOLD_DISTANCE = It is the distance from the obstacle less than which the 
evasive manoeuver is recommended 
MINIMAL_DISTANCE = = It is the distance from the obstacle beyond which the 
evasive manoeuver shall be commanded 
RPAS_LIDAR_SENSOR_OUTPUT = LIDAR sensor indication of the detected obstacle 
(nature or man-made obstacle or not cooperative air traffic)  
DAA_OUTPUT = DAA indication of the detected obstacle cooperative air traffic 
RPAS_ADS-B_BIT = It is the ‘Built in Test’ functionality embedded in the ADS-B 
transponder 
EGNOS_BIT = The ‘Built in Test’ functionality embedded in the EGNOS spatial 
position service provider  
RPAS_ALTIMETER_BIT = The ‘Built in Test’ functionality embedded in the altimeter 
WEATHER_DOPPLER_RADAR_BIT = It is the ‘Built in Test’ functionality embedded in 
the weather Doppler RADAR installed on the RPAS for contingent weather awareness  
HEALTH_AND_STATUS_MONITORING_BIT = It is the ‘Built in Test’ functionality 
embedded in the Health and Status monitoring subsystem installed on the RPAS 
RPAS_RANGE = It is the distance between the flying RPAS and the GCS/Hand held 
portable device covered by the radio link 
RPAS_RANGE_RLOS = It is the RPAS range under ‘Visual Line of sight condition’ 
RPAS_FIRE_WARNING = It is the signal to warn the remote pilot that a fire is 
occurring on board the RPA 
RPAS_AUTOPILOT_FAILURE_WARNING = It is the signal to warn the remote pilot the 
RPA autopilot is in failure 
RPAS_IMU_BIT = It is the ‘built in test’ functionality of the Inertial 
Measurement Unit installed on board the RPAS 
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Table  147 -  ‘Expert System’ knowledge basis rules variables (Cont’d) 
RPAS_HDG1 and RPAS_HDG2 = The two different heading indications that feed flight 
instruments on ground to warn the remote pilot if the flight parameter is correct 
or not 
RPAS_ALT1 and RPAS_ALT2 = The two different altitude indications that feed flight 
instruments on ground to warn the remote pilot if the flight parameter is correct 
or not 
RPAS_PSR1 and RPAS_PSR2 = The two different pressure sensor indications that feed 
two ground flight instruments on ground to warn the remote pilot if the flight 
parameter is correct or not 
RPAS_IAS1 and RPAS_IAS2 = The different indicated airspeed indications that feed 
two ground flight instruments on ground to warn the remote pilot if the flight 
parameter is correct or not 
RPAS_FUEL_CELL_CURRENT = It is the intensity of the electric current generated by 
the fuel cell installed on board the hybrid RPAS 
WEATHER_DOPPLER_RADAR_IMAGE = It is the meteorological condition recorded by the 
Weather Doppler RADAR and indicated on board the RPAS 
 
 
KNOWLEDGES BASIS RULES 
 
 
H01 – Loss of abort launch capability 
Definition: the contingent loss of abort launch capability when 
conditions for take-off are recognised to be less than optimal 
 
Rule number 1 
IF RPAS_ALT IS GREATER THAN ZERO feet  
AND IF RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGA
 
IS GREATER THAN ZERO radians/sec 
AND IF RPAS_RATE_OF_CLIMB IS GREATER TO ZERO m/s 
AND IF RPAS_LIDAR_SENSOR_OUTPUT IS OBSTACLE 
AND IF RPAS_AUTOPILOT_ABORT_LAUNCH_MODE = FAILED 
AND IF IRGRC IS GREATER THAN ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF ABORT LAUNCH CAPABILITY HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_RECOVERY_PARACHUTE_CMD EQUAL TO ONE  
Printout ‘LOSS OF ABORT LAUNCH CAPABILITY MODERATE RISK’ 
 
Rule number 2 
IF RPAS_ALT IS GREATER THAN ZERO feet  
AND IF RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGA
 
IS GREATER THAN ZERO radians/sec 
AND IF RPAS_RATE_OF_CLIMB IS GREATER TO ZERO m/s 
AND IF RPAS_LIDAR_SENSOR_OUTPUT IS OBSTACLE 
AND IF RPAS_AUTOPILOT_ABORT_LAUNCH_MODE = FAILED 
AND IF IRGRC IS EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF ABORT LAUNCH CAPABILITY HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_RECOVERY_PARACHUTE_CMD EQUAL TO ONE  
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Printout ‘LOSS OF ABORT LAUNCH CAPABILITY MODERATE RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_FTS_CMD EQUAL TO ONE  
Printout ‘MODERATE RISK’ 
 
 
H02 – Loss of flight controls  
Definition: the contingent partial or complete loss of flight 
control functionality during flight 
 
Rule number 1 
IF PITCH_CMD IS DIFFERENT FROM ZERO 
AND IF RPAS_PITCH_ANGLEt+1 – RPAS_PITCH_ANGLEt IS EQUAL TO ZERO 
degree 
AND IF RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGA
 
IS GREATER THAN ZERO radians/sec 
AND IF RPAS_ALT IS GREATER THAN ZERO feet 
AND IF IRGRC IS GREATER THAN ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF FLIGHT CONTROLS HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_RECOVERY_PARACHUTE_CMD EQUAL TO ONE  
Printout ‘LOSS OF FLIGHT CONTROLS MODERATE RISK’ 
 
Rule number 2 
IF PITCH_CMD IS DIFFERENT FROM ZERO 
AND IF RPAS_PITCH_ANGLEt+1 – RPAS_PITCH_ANGLEt IS EQUAL TO ZERO 
degree 
AND IF RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGAn IS GREATER THAN ZERO radians/sec 
AND IF RPAS_ALT IS GREATER THAN ZERO feet 
AND IF IRGRC IS EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF FLIGHT CONTROLS HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_FTS_CMD EQUAL TO ONE  
Printout ‘LOSS OF FLIGHT CONTROLS MODERATE RISK’ 
 
Rule number 3 
IF ROLL_CMD IS DIFFERENT FROM ZERO 
AND IF RPAS_ROLL_ANGLEt+1 – RPAS_ROLL_ANGLEt IS EQUAL TO ZERO 
degree 
AND IF RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGAn IS GREATER THAN ZERO radians/sec 
AND IF RPAS_ALT IS GREATER THAN ZERO feet 
AND IF IRGRC IS GREATER THAN ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF FLIGHT CONTROLS HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_RECOVERY_PARACHUTE_CMD EQUAL TO ONE  
Printout ‘LOSS OF FLIGHT CONTROLS MODERATE RISK’ 
 
Rule number 4 
IF ROLL_CMD IS DIFFERENT FROM ZERO 
AND IF RPAS_ROLL_ANGLEt+1 – RPAS_ROLL_ANGLEt IS EQUAL TO ZERO 
degree 
AND IF RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGAn IS GREATER THAN ZERO radians/sec 
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AND IF RPAS_ALT IS GREATER THAN ZERO feet 
AND IF IRGRC IS EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF FLIGHT CONTROLS HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_FTS_CMD EQUAL TO ONE  
Printout ‘LOSS OF FLIGHT CONTROLS MODERATE RISK’ 
 
Rule number 5 
IF YAW_CMD IS DIFFERENT FROM ZERO 
AND IF RPAS_YAW_ANGLEt+1 – RPAS_YAW_ANGLEt IS EQUAL TO ZERO degree 
AND IF RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGAn IS GREATER THAN ZERO radians/sec 
AND IF RPAS_ALT IS GREATER THAN ZERO feet 
AND IF IRGRC IS GREATER THAN ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF FLIGHT CONTROLS HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_RECOVERY_PARACHUTE_CMD EQUAL TO ONE  
Printout ‘LOSS OF FLIGHT CONTROLS MODERATE RISK’ 
 
Rule number 6 
IF YAW_CMD IS DIFFERENT FROM ZERO 
AND IF RPAS_YAW_ANGLEt+1 – RPAS_YAW_ANGLEt IS EQUAL TO ZERO degree 
AND IF RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGAn IS GREATER THAN ZERO radians/sec 
AND IF RPAS_ALT IS GREATER THAN ZERO feet 
AND IF IRGRC IS EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF FLIGHT CONTROLS HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_FTS_CMD EQUAL TO ONE  
Printout ‘LOSS OF FLIGHT CONTROLS MODERATE RISK’ 
 
Note: 
Where ‘t’ is time measured in seconds 
Where ‘n’ is each electric rotor engine 
 
 
H03 – Loss of propulsion  
Definition: the contingent partial or complete loss of propulsion 
functionality during flight 
 
Rule number 1 
IF RPAS_ALT IS GREATER THAN ZERO feet 
AND IF RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGAt+1 -  RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGAt IS SMALLER THAN 
ZERO radians/sec 
AND IF RPAS_LIPO_BATTERY_CURRENTi IS EQUAL TO ZERO Ampere 
AND IF IRGRC IS GREATER THAN ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF PROPULSION HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_RECOVERY_PARACHUTE_CMD EQUAL TO ONE  
Printout ‘LOSS OF PROPULSION MODERATE RISK’ 
 
Rule number 2 
IF RPAS_ALT IS GREATER THAN ZERO feet 
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AND IF RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGAt+1 - RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGAt IS SMALLER THAN 
ZERO radians/sec 
AND IF RPAS_LIPO_BATTERY_CURRENTi IS EQUAL TO ZERO Ampere 
AND IF IRGRC IS EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF PROPULSION HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_FTS_CMD EQUAL TO ONE  
Printout ‘LOSS OF PROPULSION MODERATE RISK’ 
 
Rule number 3 
IF RPAS_ALT IS GREATER THAN ZERO feet 
AND IF RPAS_LIPO_BATTERY_CURRENTi IS GREATER THAN ZERO Ampere 
AND IF RPAS_ESC_FAILURE_SENSOR IS EQUAL TO FAILED  
AND IF IRGRC IS GREATER THAN ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF PROPULSION HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_RECOVERY_PARACHUTE_CMD EQUAL TO ONE  
Printout ‘LOSS OF PROPULSION MODERATE RISK’ 
 
Rule number 4 
IF RPAS_ALT IS GREATER THAN ZERO feet 
AND IF RPAS_LIPO_BATTERY_CURRENTi IS GREATER THAN ZERO Ampere 
AND IF RPAS_ESC_FAILURE_SENSOR IS EQUAL TO FAILED  
AND IF IRGRC IS EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF PROPULSION HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_FTS_CMD EQUAL TO ONE  
Printout ‘LOSS OF PROPULSION MODERATE RISK’ 
 
Where ‘t’ is time measured in seconds 
Where ‘n’ is each electric rotor engine 
Where ‘i’ is each LiPo battery  
 
 
H04 – Loss of GCS Human Machine Interface 
Definition: the contingent loss of human machine interface to 
generate flight command signals on ground (in the Ground Control 
Station or on a hand held portable device) 
 
Rule number 1 
IF PITCH_CMD_LONGITUDINAL_SHIFT IS DIFFERENT FROM ZERO 
AND PITCH_CMD_ELECTRICAL_SIGNAL IS EQUAL TO ZERO 
AND IF RPAS_ALT IS GREATER THAN ZERO feet  
AND IF RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGAn IS GREATER THAN ZERO radians/sec 
AND IF IRGRC IS GREATER THAN ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF GCS HMI HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_RECOVERY_PARACHUTE_CMD EQUAL TO ONE  
Printout ‘LOSS OF GCS HMI MODERATE RISK’ 
 
Rule number 2 
 506 
 
IF PITCH_CMD_LONGITUDINAL_SHIFT IS DIFFERENT FROM ZERO 
AND PITCH_CMD_ELECTRICAL_SIGNAL IS EQUAL TO ZERO 
AND IF RPAS_ALT IS GREATER THAN ZERO feet  
AND IF RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGAn IS GREATER THAN ZERO radians/sec 
AND IF IRGRC IS EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF GCS HMI HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_FTS_CMD EQUAL TO ONE  
Printout ‘LOSS OF GCS HMI MODERATE RISK’ 
 
Rule number 3 
IF ROLL_CMD_LATERAL_SHIFT IS DIFFERENT FROM ZERO 
AND ROLL_CMD_ELECTRICAL_SIGNAL IS EQUAL TO ZERO 
AND IF RPAS_ALT IS GREATER THAN ZERO feet  
AND IF RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGAn IS GREATER THAN ZERO radians/sec 
AND IF IRGRC IS GREATER THAN ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF GCS HMI HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_RECOVERY_PARACHUTE_CMD EQUAL TO ONE  
Printout ‘LOSS OF GCS HMI MODERATE RISK’ 
 
Rule number 4 
IF ROLL_CMD_LATERAL_SHIFT IS DIFFERENT FROM ZERO 
AND ROLL_CMD_ELECTRICAL_SIGNAL IS EQUAL TO ZERO 
AND IF RPAS_ALT IS GREATER THAN ZERO feet  
AND IF RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGAn IS GREATER THAN ZERO radians/sec 
AND IF IRGRC IS EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF GCS HMI HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_FTS_CMD EQUAL TO ONE  
Printout ‘LOSS OF GCS HMI MODERATE RISK’ 
 
Rule number 5 
IF YAW_CMD_DIRECTIONAL_SHIFT IS DIFFERENT FROM ZERO 
AND YAW_CMD_ELECTRICAL_SIGNAL IS EQUAL TO ZERO 
AND IF RPAS_ALT IS GREATER THAN ZERO feet  
AND IF RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGAn IS GREATER THAN ZERO radians/sec 
AND IF IRGRC IS GREATER THAN ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF GCS HMI HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_RECOVERY_PARACHUTE_CMD EQUAL TO ONE  
Printout ‘LOSS OF GCS HMI MODERATE RISK’ 
 
Rule number 6 
IF YAW_CMD_DIRECTIONAL_SHIFT IS DIFFERENT FROM ZERO 
AND YAW_CMD_ELECTRICAL_SIGNAL IS EQUAL TO ZERO 
AND IF RPAS_ALT IS GREATER THAN ZERO feet  
AND IF RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGAn IS GREATER THAN ZERO radians/sec 
AND IF IRGRC IS EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF GCS HMI HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
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THEN SET RPAS_FTS_CMD EQUAL TO ONE  
Printout ‘LOSS OF GCS HMI MODERATE RISK’ 
 
Note: 
Where ‘t’ is time measured in seconds 
 
 
H05 - Deviation from steady-state (not-accelerating) flight 
condition 
Definition: the contingent loss of RPAS capability to maintain 
constant indicated airspeed and altitude flight conditions 
 
Rule number 1 
IF WP_ALTt+1 – WP_ALTt IS EQUAL TO ZERO meters 
AND IF RPAS_IASt+1 – RPAS_IASt IS SMALLER THAN ZERO kts 
AND IF IRGRC IS GREATER THAN ONE 
Printout ‘DEVIATION FROM STEADY-STATE CONDITION HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_RECOVERY_PARACHUTE_CMD EQUAL TO ONE  
Printout ‘DEVIATION FROM STEADY-STATE CONDITION MODERATE RISK’ 
 
Rule number 2 
IF WP_ALTt+1 – WP_ALTt IS EQUAL TO ZERO meters 
AND IF RPAS_IASt+1 – RPAS_IASt IS GREATER THAN ZERO kts 
AND IF IRGRC IS EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘DEVIATION FROM STEADY-STATE CONDITION HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_FTS_CMD EQUAL TO ONE  
Printout ‘DEVIATION FROM STEADY-STATE CONDITION MODERATE RISK’ 
 
Rule number 3 
IF WP_ALTt+1 – WP_ALTt IS EQUAL TO ZERO meters 
AND IF RPAS_IASt+1 – RPAS_IASt IS GREATER THAN ZERO kts 
AND IF IRGRC IS GREATER THAN ONE 
Printout ‘DEVIATION FROM STEADY-STATE CONDITION HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_RECOVERY_PARACHUTE_CMD EQUAL TO ONE  
Printout ‘DEVIATION FROM STEADY-STATE CONDITION MODERATE RISK’ 
 
Rule number 4 
IF WP_ALTt+1 – WP_ALTt IS EQUAL TO ZERO meters 
AND IF RPAS_IASt+1 – RPAS_IASt IS GREATER THAN ZERO kts 
AND IF IRGRC IS EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘DEVIATION FROM STEADY-STATE CONDITION HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_FTS_CMD EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘DEVIATION FROM STEADY-STATE CONDITION MODERATE RISK’ 
 
Rule number 5 
IF RPAS_IASt+1 – RPAS_IASt IS EQUAL TO ZERO kts 
AND IF RPAS_ALTt+1 – RPAS_ALTt IS SMALLER THAN ZERO meters 
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AND IF IRGRC IS GREATER THAN ONE 
Printout ‘DEVIATION FROM STEADY-STATE CONDITION HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_RECOVERY_PARACHUTE_CMD EQUAL TO ONE  
Printout ‘DEVIATION FROM STEADY-STATE CONDITION MODERATE RISK’ 
 
Rule number 6 
IF RPAS_IASt+1 – RPAS_IASt IS EQUAL TO ZERO kts 
AND IF RPAS_ALTt+1 – RPAS_ALTt IS SMALLER THAN ZERO meters 
AND IF IRGRC IS EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘DEVIATION FROM STEADY-STATE CONDITION HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_FTS_CMD EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘DEVIATION FROM STEADY-STATE CONDITION MODERATE RISK’ 
 
Rule number 5 
IF RPAS_IASt+1 – RPAS_IASt IS EQUAL TO ZERO kts 
AND IF RPAS_ALTt+1 – RPAS_ALTt IS GREATER THAN ZERO meters 
AND IF IRGRC IS GREATER THAN ONE 
Printout ‘DEVIATION FROM STEADY-STATE CONDITION HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_RECOVERY_PARACHUTE_CMD EQUAL TO ONE  
Printout ‘DEVIATION FROM STEADY-STATE CONDITION MODERATE RISK’ 
 
Rule number 6 
IF RPAS_IASt+1 – RPAS_IASt IS EQUAL TO ZERO kts 
AND IF RPAS_ALTt+1 – RPAS_ALTt IS SMALLER THAN ZERO meters 
AND IF IRGRC IS EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘DEVIATION FROM STEADY-STATE CONDITION HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_FTS_CMD EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘DEVIATION FROM STEADY-STATE CONDITION MODERATE RISK’ 
 
Note: 
Where ‘t’ is time measured in seconds 
 
 
H06 – Loss of Emergency Flight Termination System  
Definition: the contingent failure of the Emergency Flight 
Termination System intended both as the loss of the ‘Flight 
Termination System’ capable of cutting off the electrical power 
supply to rotor engines and as the loss of ‘Recovery Parachute’ 
functionality.  
 
Note: 
It is supposed that both these subsystems have a BITE (‘Built In 
Test Equipment’) capable of performing a ‘Built In Test’ of the 
Emergency Temination Subsystem main devices (FTS and Recovery 
parachute devices respectively) (BIT). 
 
Rule number 1 
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IF RPAS_FTS_BIT IS EQUAL TO FAILED 
Printout ‘LOSS OF FTS HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_AUTOPILOT_LANDING_MODE EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF FTS MODERATE RISK’ 
 
Rule number 2 
IF RPAS_RECOVERY_PARACHUTE_BIT IS EQUAL TO FAILED 
Printout ‘LOSS OF FTS HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_AUTOPILOT_LANDING_MODE EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF FTS MODERATE RISK’ 
 
 
H07 – Loss of ‘Retun to Home’ (RTH) mode 
Definition: the contingent loss of the autopilot flight mode that 
allows to use a predefined autopilot mode to safely recover the 
RPAS 
 
Rule number 1 
IF RPAS_AUTOPILOT_RETURN_TO_HOME_MODE IS EQUAL TO FAILED 
AND IF IRGRC IS GREATER THAN ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF RTH MODE MODERATE RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_RECOVERY_PARACHUTE_CMD EQUAL TO ONE  
Printout ‘LOSS OF RTH MODE LOW RISK’ 
 
Rule number 2 
IF RPAS_AUTOPILOT_RETURN_TO_HOME_MODE IS EQUAL TO FAIL 
AND IF IRGRC IS EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF RTH MODE MODERATE RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_FTS_CMD EQUAL TO ONE  
Printout ‘LOSS OF RTH MODE LOW RISK’ 
 
 
H08 – Loss of mission plan 
Rule number 1 
IF RPAS_MISSION_PLAN IS EQUAL TO FAILED 
AND IF IRGRC IS GREATER THAN ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF MISSION PLAN MODERATE RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_RECOVERY_PARACHUTE_CMD EQUAL TO ONE  
Printout ‘LOSS OF MISSION PLAN LOW RISK’ 
 
Rule number 2 
IF RPAS_MISSION_PLAN IS EQUAL TO FAILED 
AND IF IRGRC IS EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF MISSION PLAN MODERATE RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_FTS_CMD EQUAL TO ONE  
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Printout ‘LOSS OF MISSION PLAN LOW RISK’ 
 
 
H09 – Loss of GPS signal 
Definition: the contingent loss of the GPS spatial position signal 
identified with frozen GPS data  
 
Rule number 1 
IF GPS_LATt+1 IS EQUAL TO GPS_LATt 
AND IF GPS_LONGt+1 IS EQUAL TO GPS_LONGt 
AND IF GPS_ALTt+1 IS EQUAL TO GPS_ALTt 
Printout ‘LOSS OF GPS MODERATE RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SWITCH TO EGNOS SERVICE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF GPS LOW RISK’ 
 
Rule number 2 
IF GPS_LATt+1 IS EQUAL TO GPS_LATt 
AND IF GPS_LONGt+1 IS EQUAL TO GPS_LONGt 
AND IF GPS_ALTt+1 IS EQUAL TO GPS_ALTt 
Printout ‘LOSS OF GPS MODERATE RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SWITCH TO IMU SIGNAL 
Printout ‘LOSS OF GPS LOW RISK’ 
 
Rule number 3 
IF GPS_LATt+1 IS EQUAL TO GPS_LATt 
AND IF GPS_LONGt+1 IS EQUAL TO GPS_LONGt 
AND IF GPS_ALTt+1 IS EQUAL TO GPS_ALTt 
Printout ‘LOSS OF GPS MODERATE RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_AUTOPILOT_RETURN TO HOME_MODE EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF GPS LOW RISK’ 
 
Note: 
Where ‘t’ is time measured in seconds 
 
 
H10 – Loss of EGNOS 
Definition: the contingent loss of the EGNOS spatial position 
signal identified with frozen EGNOS data 
 
Rule number 1 
IF EGNOS_LATt+1 IS EQUAL TO EGNOS_LATt 
AND IF EGNOS_LONGt+1 IS EQUAL TO EGNOS_LONGt 
AND IF EGNOS_ALTt+1 IS EQUAL TO EGNOS_ALTt 
Printout ‘LOSS OF EGNOS HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SWITCH TO GPS SERVICE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF EGNOS MODERATE RISK’ 
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Rule number 2 
IF EGNOS_LATt+1 IS EQUAL TO EGNOS_LATt 
AND IF EGNOS_LONGt+1 IS EQUAL TO EGNOS_LONGt 
AND IF EGNOS_ALTt+1 IS EQUAL TO EGNOS_ALTt  
Printout ‘LOSS OF EGNOS HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SWITCH TO IMU SIGNAL 
Printout ‘LOSS OF EGNOS MODERATE RISK’ 
 
Rule number 3 
IF EGNOS_LATt+1 IS EQUAL TO EGNOS_LATt 
AND IF EGNOS_LONGt+1 IS EQUAL TO EGNOS_LONGt 
AND IF EGNOS_ALTt+1 IS EQUAL TO EGNOS_ALTt  
Printout ‘LOSS OF EGNOS HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_AUTOPILOT_RETURN TO HOME_MODE EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF EGNOS MODERATE RISK’ 
 
Note: 
Where ‘t’ is time measured in seconds 
 
 
H11 – Drift from mission plan 
Definition: the contingent drift of the RPA from the planned 
mission route 
 
Rule number 1 
IF DOWNLINK_RPAS_LAT IS NOT EQUAL TO PLANNED_WP_LAT  
AND IF DOWNLINK_RPAS_LONG IS NOT EQUAL TO PLANNED_WP_LONG 
AND IF DOWNLINK_RPAS_ALT IS NOT EQUAL TO PLANNED_WP_ALT  
AND IF IRGRC IS GREATER THAN ONE 
Printout ‘DRIFT FROM MISSION PLAN HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_RECOVERY_PARACHUTE_CMD EQUAL TO ONE  
Printout ‘DRIFT FROM MISSION MODERATE RISK’ 
 
Rule number 2 
IF RPAS_LAT IS NOT EQUAL TO PLANNED_WP_LAT 
AND IF RPAS_LONG IS NOT EQUAL TO PLANNED_WP_LONG 
AND IF RPAS_ALT IS NOT EQUAL TO PLANNED_WP_ALT  
AND IF IRGRC IS GREATER THAN ONE 
Printout ‘DRIFT FROM MISSION HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_FTS_CMD EQUAL TO ONE  
Printout ‘DRIFT FROM MISSION MODERATE RISK’ 
 
 
H12 – Loss of the uplink channel of the RPAS radio link 
Definition: the contingent loss of the command radio link on the 
uplink channel to manage the RPAS aerial segment from ground  
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Rule number 1 
IF RPAS_UPLINK_PATH_LOSS IS EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF UPLINK HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_RETURN_TO_HOME_FUNCTION EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF UPLINK MODERATE RISK’ 
 
 
H13 – Loss of the downlink channel of the RPAS radio link 
Definition: the contingent loss of the telemetry radio link on the 
downlink channel to monitor the RPAS on ground  
 
Rule number 1 
IF RPAS_DOWN_LINK_PATH_LOSS IS EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF UPLINK HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_RETURN_TO_HOME_FUNCTION EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF DOWNLINK MODERATE RISK’ 
 
 
H14 – Loss of ADS-B 
Definition: the contingent failure of the ADS-B equipment.  
 
Note: 
It is supposed that the ADS-B has a BITE (‘Built In Test 
Equipment’) capable of performing a ‘Built In Test’ of the device 
(BIT). 
 
Rule number 1 
IF RPAS_ADS-B_BIT IS EQUAL TO FAILED 
AND IF IRGRC IS GREATER THAN ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF ADS-B HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_RECOVERY_PARACHUTE_CMD EQUAL TO ONE  
Printout ‘LOSS OF ADS-B MODERATE RISK’ 
 
Rule number 2 
IF RPAS_ADS-B_BIT IS EQUAL TO FAILED 
AND IF IRGRC IS EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF ADS-B HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_FTS_CMD EQUAL TO ONE  
Printout ‘LOSS OF ADS-B MODERATE RISK’ 
 
 
Hazards H15 ÷ H25 
Note:  
The ‘Expert System’ rules deriving from hazards from H15 to H25 
are referred to the following scheme (Figure 75): 
 513 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 75 – Collision avoidance distances 
Note: 
In case of mid-air collision with cooperative aircraft(that is 
equipped with switched-on and working ADS-B equipment), the RPA 
shall use the DAA subsystem to avoid mid-air collision; otherwise, 
if the traffic is not cooperative (that is equipped with not 
switched-on and/or not working ADS-B equipment) or in case of risk 
of mid-air collision with a natural or a man-made obstacle, the 
RPAS shall use LIDAR/SONAR sensors to avoid the collision 
 
Note:  
The detectability follow the same above mentioned criteria  
 
 
H15 – Presence of natural obstacle 
Definition: an hazard related to the eventual missed avoidance of 
a natural obstacle 
 
Rule number 1 
IF RPAS_LIDAR_SENSOR_OUTPUT IS ‘OBSTACLE’ 
AND IF RPAS_DISTANCE_FROM_OBSTACLE IS SMALLER THAN 
THRESHOLD_DISTANCE 
AND IF RPAS_DISTANCE_FROM_OBSTACLE IS GREATER THAN 
MINIMAL_DISTANCE 
Printout ‘OBSTACLE HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET AUTOPILOT TO PERFORM EVASIVE MANOUVER  
Printout ‘OBSTACLE MODERATE RISK’ 
 
 
H16 – Presence of man-made manufactures 
Definition: an hazard related to the eventual missed avoidance of 
man-made manufactures 
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Rule number 1 
IF RPAS_LIDAR_SENSOR_OUTPUT IS ‘OBSTACLE’ 
AND IF RPAS_DISTANCE_FROM_OBSTACLE IS SMALLER THAN 
THRESHOLD_DISTANCE 
AND IF RPAS_DISTANCE_FROM_OBSTACLE IS GREATER THAN 
MINIMAL_DISTANCE 
Printout ‘OBSTACLE HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET AUTOPILOT TO PERFORM EVASIVE MANOUVER  
Printout ‘OBSTACLE MODERATE RISK’ 
 
 
H17 – Mid-air collision with other aircraft 
Note:  
Case of mid-air collision risk with cooperative traffic 
 
Rule number 1 
IF RPAS_DAA_OUTPUT IS ‘TRAFFIC’ 
AND IF RPAS_DISTANCE_FROM_OBSTACLE IS SMALLER THAN 
THRESHOLD_DISTANCE 
AND IF RPAS_DISTANCE_FROM_OBSTACLE IS GREATER THAN 
MINIMAL_DISTANCE 
Printout ‘TRAFFIC HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET AUTOPILOT TO PERFORM EVASIVE MANOUVER  
Printout ‘TRAFFIC MODERATE RISK’ 
 
Note:  
Case of mid-air collision risk with not cooperative traffic 
 
Rule number 2 
IF RPAS_LIDAR_SENSOR_OUTPUT IS ‘OBSTACLE’ 
AND IF RPAS_DISTANCE_FROM_OBSTACLE IS SMALLER THAN 
THRESHOLD_DISTANCE 
AND IF RPAS_DISTANCE_FROM_OBSTACLE IS GREATER THAN 
MINIMAL_DISTANCE 
Printout ‘TRAFFIC HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET AUTOPILOT TO PERFORM EVASIVE MANOUVER  
Printout ‘TRAFFIC MODERATE RISK’ 
 
 
H18 – Loss of DAA capability 
Definition: the contingent loss of DAA subsystem/functionality 
 
Note: 
The RPAS ‘Detect and Avoid’ (DAA) functionality is compromised if 
each single equipment composing DAA subsystem fails (Table 35 
items FCSS2a, FCSS2b and FCSS2c) or if any of their combined 
failures listed in Table 98 occurs during a flight sortie. 
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In order to write simpler rules for Hazard H18, the possible 
occurrence of single failures of each DAA equipment have been 
considered only, because the combined failures of those equipment 
implies their single failure occurrence by definition. 
It is supposed that DAA subsystem has a BITE (‘Built In Test 
Equipment’) capable of performing a ‘Built In Test’ of the device 
(BIT). 
Further, even if the use of proper checklists on DAA is foreseen 
among mitigation actions, the most severe case of sudden loss of 
DAA equipment functionality during the flight mission is 
hereinafter considered; therefore, in this case, the following 
rules will apply: 
 
Rule number 1 
IF RPAS_ADS-B_BIT IS EQUAL TO FAILED 
AND IF IRGRC IS GREATER THAN ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF DAA HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_FTS_CMD EQUAL TO ONE  
Printout ‘LOSS OF DAA MODERATE RISK’ 
 
Rule number 2 
IF RPAS_ADS-B_BIT IS EQUAL TO FAILED 
AND IF IRGRC IS EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF DAA HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_FTS_CMD EQUAL TO ONE  
Printout ‘LOSS OF DAA MODERATE RISK’ 
 
Rule number 3 
IF RPAS_ALTIMETER_BIT IS EQUAL TO FAILED 
AND IF IRGRC IS GREATER THAN ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF DAA HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_RECOVERY_PARACHUTE_CMD EQUAL TO ONE  
Printout ‘LOSS OF DAA MODERATE RISK’ 
 
Rule number 4 
IF RPAS_ALTIMETER_BIT IS EQUAL TO FAILED 
AND IF IRGRC IS EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF DAA HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_FTS_CMD EQUAL TO ONE  
Printout ‘LOSS OF DAA MODERATE RISK’ 
 
Rule number 5 
IF EGNOS_BIT IS EQUAL TO FAILED 
AND IF IRGRC IS GREATER THAN ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF DAA HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_RECOVERY_PARACHUTE_CMD EQUAL TO ONE  
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Printout ‘LOSS OF DAA MODERATE RISK’ 
 
Rule number 6 
IF EGNOS_BIT IS EQUAL TO FAILED 
AND IF IRGRC IS EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF DAA HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_FTS_CMD EQUAL TO ONE  
Printout ‘LOSS OF DAA MODERATE RISK’ 
 
 
H19 – No detectability from other airspace users 
Definition: the hazard deriving from the impossibility for other 
airspace users to detect an operating RPAS; the idea to manage 
this hazards is to move from the other airspace users to the RPA: 
if other users do not detect the RPA, the RPA shall avoid the 
cooperative/not cooperative obstacle as above described in 
previous rules 
 
Rule number 1 
IF DAA_OUTPUT IS ‘TRAFFIC’ 
AND IF RPAS_DISTANCE_FROM_OBSTACLE IS SMALLER THAN 
THRESHOLD_DISTANCE 
AND IF RPAS_DISTANCE_FROM_OBSTACLE IS GREATER THAN 
MINIMAL_DISTANCE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF DAA HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET AUTOPILOT TO PERFORM EVASIVE MANOUVER  
Printout ‘LOSS OF DAA MODERATE RISK’ 
 
Rule number 2 
IF LIDAR_OUTPUT IS ‘OBSTACLE’ 
AND IF RPAS_DISTANCE_FROM_OBSTACLE IS SMALLER THAN 
THRESHOLD_DISTANCE 
AND IF RPAS_DISTANCE_FROM_OBSTACLE IS GREATER THAN 
MINIMAL_DISTANCE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF DAA HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET AUTOPILOT TO PERFORM EVASIVE MANOUVER  
Printout ‘LOSS OF DAA MODERATE RISK’ 
 
 
H20 – Cooperative traffic intrusion 
Definition: the contingent intrusion of traffic equipped with 
switched on and working ADS-B equipment 
 
Rule number 1 
IF DAA_OUTPUT IS ‘TRAFFIC’ 
AND IF RPAS_DISTANCE_FROM_OBSTACLE IS SMALLER THAN 
THRESHOLD_DISTANCE 
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AND IF RPAS_DISTANCE_FROM_OBSTACLE IS GREATER THAN 
MINIMAL_DISTANCE 
Printout ‘COOPERATIVE TRAFFIC INTRUSION HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET AUTOPILOT TO PERFORM EVASIVE MANOUVER  
Printout ‘COOPERATIVE TRAFFIC INTRUSION MODERATE RISK’ 
 
 
H21 – Not cooperative traffic intrusion 
Definition: the contingent intrusion of traffic not equipped with 
switched on and working ADS-B equipment 
 
Rule number 1 
IF LIDAR_OUTPUT IS ‘OBSTACLE’ 
AND IF RPAS_DISTANCE_FROM_OBSTACLE IS SMALLER THAN 
THRESHOLD_DISTANCE 
AND IF RPAS_DISTANCE_FROM_OBSTACLE IS GREATER THAN 
MINIMAL_DISTANCE 
Printout ‘NOT COOPERATIVE TRAFFIC INTRUSION HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET AUTOPILOT TO PERFORM EVASIVE MANOUVER  
Printout ‘NOT COOPERATIVE TRAFFIC INTRUSION MODERATE RISK’ 
 
 
H22 – Missed cooperative traffic tracking 
Definition: the RPA misses to track cooperative traffic that 
enters the danger area represented in Figure 75; immediate evasive 
manoeuvre shall be commanded and executed  
 
Rule number 1 
IF DAA_OUTPUT IS ‘TRAFFIC’ 
AND IF RPAS_DISTANCE_FROM_OBSTACLE IS SMALLER THAN 
MINIMAL_DISTANCE 
Printout ‘MISSED COOPERATIVE TRAFFIC TRACKING HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET AUTOPILOT TO PERFORM EVASIVE MANOUVER  
Printout ‘MISSED COOPERATIVE TRAFFIC TRACKING MODERATE RISK’ 
 
 
H23 – Missed not cooperative traffic tracking 
Definition: the RPA misses to track cooperative traffic that 
enters the danger area represented in Figure 75; immediate evasive 
manoeuvre shall be commanded and executed  
 
Rule number 1 
IF LIDAR_OUTPUT IS ‘TRAFFIC’ 
AND IF RPAS_DISTANCE_FROM_OBSTACLE IS SMALLER THAN 
MINIMAL_DISTANCE 
Printout ‘MISSED NOT COOPERATIVE TRAFFIC TRACKING HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET AUTOPILOT TO PERFORM EVASIVE MANOUVER  
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Printout ‘MISSED NOT COOPERATIVE TRAFFIC TRACKING MODERATE RISK’ 
 
 
H24 – Cooperative traffic collision avoidance 
Definition: collision avoidance with cooperative traffic  
 
Rule number 1 
IF DAA_OUTPUT IS ‘TRAFFIC’ 
AND IF RPAS_DISTANCE_FROM_OBSTACLE IS SMALLER THAN 
THRESHOLD_DISTANCE 
AND IF RPAS_DISTANCE_FROM_OBSTACLE IS GREATER THAN 
MINIMAL_DISTANCE 
Printout ‘COOPERATIVE TRAFFIC COLLISION HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET AUTOPILOT TO PERFORM EVASIVE MANOUVER  
Printout ‘COOPERATIVE TRAFFIC COLLISION MODERATE RISK’ 
 
 
H25 – Not cooperative traffic collision avoidance 
Definition: collision avoidance with not cooperative traffic 
 
Rule number 1 
IF LIDAR_OUTPUT IS ‘OBSTACLE’ 
AND IF RPAS_DISTANCE_FROM_OBSTACLE IS SMALLER THAN 
THRESHOLD_DISTANCE 
AND IF RPAS_DISTANCE_FROM_OBSTACLE IS GREATER THAN 
MINIMAL_DISTANCE 
Printout ‘NOT COOPERATIVE TRAFFIC COLLISION HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET AUTOPILOT TO PERFORM EVASIVE MANOUVER  
Printout ‘NOT COOPERATIVE TRAFFIC COLLISION MODERATE RISK’ 
 
 
H26 - Missed avoidance collision maneuver performance 
Definition: the missed performance of avoidance collision 
manoeuvre with cooperative or not cooperative traffic 
 
Rule number 1 
IF DAA_OUTPUT IS ‘TRAFFIC’ 
AND IF RPAS_DISTANCE_FROM_OBSTACLE IS SMALLER THAN 
MINIMAL_DISTANCE 
Printout ‘MISSED AVOIDANCE COLLISION MANOUVRE PERFORMANCE HIGH 
RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET FTS_CMD EQUAL TO ONE  
Printout ‘MISSED AVOIDANCE COLLISION MANOUVRE PERFORMANCE MODERATE 
RISK’ 
 
Rule number 1 
IF LIDAR_OUTPUT IS ‘OBSTACLE’ 
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AND IF RPAS_DISTANCE_FROM_OBSTACLE IS SMALLER THAN 
MINIMAL_DISTANCE 
Printout ‘MISSED AVOIDANCE COLLISION MANOUVRE PERFORMANCE HIGH 
RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET FTS_CMD EQUAL TO ONE  
Printout ‘MISSED AVOIDANCE COLLISION MANOUVRE PERFORMANCE MODERATE 
RISK’ 
 
 
H27 - Missed collision avoidance manoeuvring performance 
monitoring 
Note: 
This is an hazard condition related to human factor performance; 
no Expert System rules are deemed applicable in this case 
 
 
H28 - Missed weather awareness capability  
Definition: the contingent miss of weather awareness capability; 
the following cases for which weather Doppler RADAR is applicable 
are considered: rain, snow and similar adverse weather conditions. 
 
Note: 
It is supposed that the Weather Doppler RADAR has a BITE (‘Built 
In Test Equipment’)capable to perform a ‘Built In Test’ of the 
device (BIT). 
 
 
Rule number 1 
IF WEATHER_DOPPLER_RADAR_BIT IS FAILED 
AND IF RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGA IS GREATER THAN ZERO rad/sec 
AND IF RPAS_ALT IS GREATER THAN ZERO feet  
AND IF IRGRC IS GREATER THAN ONE 
Printout ‘MISSED WEATHER AWARENESS CAPABILITY MODERATE RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_RECOVERY_PARACHUTE_CMD EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘MISSED WEATHER AWARENESS CAPABILITY LOW RISK’ 
 
Rule number 2 
IF WEATHER_DOPPLER_RADAR_BIT IS FAILED 
AND IF RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGA IS GREATER THAN ZERO rad/sec 
AND IF RPAS_ALT IS GREATER THAN ZERO feet  
AND IF IRGRC IS GREATER THAN ONE 
Printout ‘MISSED WEATHER AWARENESS CAPABILITY MODERATE RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_RECOVERY_PARACHUTE_CMD EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘MISSED WEATHER AWARENESS CAPABILITY LOW RISK’ 
 
 
H29 - Missed contingent weather information gathering 
Definition: the miss of contingent weather information gathering 
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Note: 
This is an hazard condition that can be verified on ground 
performing pre-flight briefing, checklists, etc.; no ‘Expert 
System’ rules are deemed to be applicable in this case 
 
 
H30 - Missed avoidance of adverse weather  
Definition: the missed avoidance of adverse weather due to weather 
Doppler RADAR failure. 
 
Note: 
It is supposed that the Weather Doppler RADAR has a BITE (‘Built 
In Test Equipment’) capable of performing a ‘Built In Test’ of the 
device (BIT). 
 
Rule number 1 
IF WEATHER_RADAR_DOPPLER_BIT IS FAILED 
AND IF RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGA IS GREATER THAN ZERO rad/sec 
AND IF RPAS_ALT IS GREATER THAN ZERO feet  
AND IF IRGRC IS GREATER THAN ONE 
Printout ‘MISSED AVOIDANCE OF ADVERSE WEATHER HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_RECOVERY_PARACHUTE_CMD EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘MISSED AVOIDANCE OF ADVERSE WEATHER LOW RISK’ 
 
Rule number 2 
IF WEATHER_RADAR_DOPPLER_BIT IS FAILED 
AND IF RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGA IS GREATER THAN ZERO rad/sec 
AND IF RPAS_ALT IS GREATER THAN ZERO feet  
AND IF IRGRC IS EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘MISSED AVOIDANCE OF ADVERSE WEATHER HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_FTS_CMD EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘MISSED AVOIDANCE OF ADVERSE WEATHER MODERATE RISK’ 
 
 
H31 – Loss of Health and Status Monitoring subystem 
Definition: loss of the RPAS Health and Status Monitoring on the 
aerial platform due to a failure occurrence 
 
Note: 
It is supposed that the RPAS Health and Status Monitoring 
subsystem has a BITE (‘Built In Test Equipment’) capable of 
performing a ‘Built In Test’ of the device (BIT). 
 
Rule number 1 
IF HEALTH_AND_STATUS_MONITORING_BIT IS FAILED 
AND IF RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGA IS GREATER THAN ZERO rad/sec 
AND IF RPAS_ALT IS GREATER THAN ZERO feet  
AND IF IRGRC IS GREATER THAN ONE 
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Printout ‘HEALTH AND STATUS MONITORING SUBSYSTEM FAILURE HIGH 
RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_RECOVERY_PARACHUTE_CMD EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘HEALTH AND STATUS MONITORING SUBSYSTEM FAILURE MODERATE 
RISK’ 
 
Rule number 2 
IF HEALTH_AND_STATUS_MONITORING_BIT IS FAILED 
AND IF RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGA IS GREATER THAN ZERO rad/sec 
AND IF RPAS_ALT IS GREATER THAN ZERO feet  
AND IF IRGRC IS EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘HEALTH AND STATUS MONITORING SUBSYSTEM FAILURE HIGH 
RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_FTS_CMD EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘HEALTH AND STATUS MONITORING SUBSYSTEM FAILURE MODERATE 
RISK’ 
 
 
H32 - Loss of communication while transiting from LOS to BRLOS and 
vice versa 
Definition: the contingent loss of communication signal path 
passing from ‘Line of Sight’ to ‘Beyond line of sight’ distance 
between the remote pilot and the aerial platform 
 
Rule number 1 
IF RPAS_RANGEt IS SMALLER THAN RPAS_RANGE_RLOS 
AND IF RPAS_RANGEt+1 IS GREATER THAN RPAS_RANGE_RLOS 
AND IF RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGA IS GREATER THAN ZERO rad/sec 
AND IF RPAS_ALT IS GREATER THAN ZERO feet  
AND IF RPAS_UPLINK_PATH_LOSS IS EQUAL TO ONE 
AND IF RPAS_DOWNLINK_PATH_LOSS IS EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF LINK WHILE TRANSITING FROM RLOS TO BRLOS HIGH 
RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_AUTOPILOT_RETURN TO HOME_MODE EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF LINK WHILE TRANSITING FROM RLOS TO BRLOS 
MODERATE RISK’ 
 
Rule number 2 
IF RPAS_RANGEt IS GREATER THAN RPAS_RANGE_RLOS  
AND IF RPAS_RANGEt+1 IS SMALLER THAN RPAS_RANGE_RLOS 
AND IF RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGA IS GREATER THAN ZERO rad/sec 
AND IF RPAS_ALT IS GREATER THAN ZERO feet  
AND IF RPAS_UPLINK_PATH_LOSS IS EQUAL TO ONE 
AND IF RPAS_DOWNLINK_PATH_LOSS IS EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF LINK WHILE TRANSITING FROM BRLOS TO RLOS HIGH 
RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_AUTOPILOT_RETURN TO HOME_MODE EQUAL TO ONE 
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Printout ‘LOSS OF LINK WHILE TRANSITING FROM BRLOS TO RLOS 
MODERATE RISK’ 
Where ‘t’ is time 
 
 
H33 – Unintentional radio link interference 
Definition: unintentional radio link interference due to the 
survey of telecommunication transmitting antennas, airport areas 
etc. 
 
This is an hazard condition that can be solved using operational 
procedures; no ‘Expert System’ rules are deemed to be applicable 
in this case 
 
 
H34 – Malicious radio link jamming 
Definition: malicious intentional cyber threat against RPAS radio 
link 
 
This is an hazard condition that can be solved using operational 
procedures: switching on secondary redundant radio frequency band 
or immediately terminate the flight; no ‘Expert System’ rules are 
deemed to be applicable in this case 
 
 
H35 – Malicious radio link spoofing 
Definition: malicious intentional cyber threat against RPAS radio 
link 
 
This is an hazard condition that can be solved using operational 
procedures: switching on secondary redundant radio frequency band 
or immediately terminate the flight; no ‘Expert System’ rules are 
deemed to be applicable in this case 
 
 
H36 - Fire 
Definition: the contingent fire outbreak on board the RPA 
 
Rule number 1 
IF RPAS_FIRE_WARNING IS EQUAL TO ONE 
AND IF RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGA IS GREATER THAN ZERO rad/sec 
AND IF RPAS_ALT IS GREATER THAN ZERO feet  
Printout ‘FIRE HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_FTS_CMD EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘FIRE MODERATE RISK’ 
 
 
H37 – Loss of RPAS autopilot 
Definition: the contingent loss of the RPAS autopilot during a 
flight operation 
 523 
 
 
Rule number 1 
IF RPAS_AUTOPILOT_FAILURE_WARNING IS EQUAL TO ONE 
AND IF RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGA IS GREATER THAN ZERO rad/sec 
AND IF RPAS_ALT IS GREATER THAN ZERO feet  
AND IF IRGRC IS GREATER THAN ONE 
Printout ‘AUTOPILOT FAILURE HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_RECOVERY_PARACHUTE_CMD EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘AUTOPILOT FAILURE LOW RISK’ 
 
Rule number 2 
IF RPAS_AUTOPILOT_FAILURE_WARNING IS EQUAL TO ONE 
AND IF RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGA IS GREATER THAN ZERO rad/sec 
AND IF RPAS_ALT IS GREATER THAN ZERO feet  
AND IF IRGRC IS EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘AUTOPILOT FAILURE HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_RECOVERY_PARACHUTE_CMD EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘AUTOPILOT FAILURE LOW RISK’ 
 
 
H38 – Loss of RPAS electrical power 
Definition: the contingent loss of the RPAS electrical power 
during a flight operation 
 
Rule number 1 
IF ∑LIPO_BATTERY_CURRENTi IS EQUAL TO 0 Ampere 
AND IF RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGAt+1 - RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGAt IS SMALLER THAN 
ZERO rad/sec 
AND IF RPAS_ALT IS GREATER THAN ZERO feet  
AND IF IRGRC IS GREATER THAN ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF ELECTRICAL POWER HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_RECOVERY_PARACHUTE_CMD EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGAt+1  MODERATE RISK’ 
 
Rule number 2 
IF ∑LIPO_BATTERY_CURRENTi IS EQUAL TO 0 Ampere 
AND IF RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGAt+1 - RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGAt IS SMALLER THAN 
ZERO rad/sec 
AND IF RPAS_ALT IS GREATER THAN ZERO feet  
AND IF IRGRC IS EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF ELECTRICAL POWER HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_FTS_CMD EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF ELECTRICAL POWER MODERATE RISK’ 
 
Note: 
Where ‘i’ is each LiPo battery  
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H39 – Loss of inertial platform 
Definition: the contingent loss of the RPAS electrical power 
during a flight operation 
 
Note: 
It is supposed that the IMU has a BITE (‘Built In Test Equipment’) 
capable of performing a ‘Built In Test’ of the device (BIT). 
 
Rule number 1 
IF RPAS_IMU_BIT IS EQUAL TO FAILED 
AND IF RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGA IS GREATER THAN ZERO rad/sec 
AND IF RPAS_ALT IS GREATER THAN ZERO feet  
AND IF IRGRC IS GREATER THAN ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF INERTIAL PLATFORM HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_RECOVERY_PARACHUTE_CMD EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF INERTIAL MODERATE RISK’ 
 
Rule number 2 
IF RPAS_IMU_BIT IS EQUAL TO FAILED 
AND IF RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGA IS GREATER THAN ZERO rad/sec 
AND IF RPAS_ALT IS GREATER THAN ZERO feet  
AND IF IRGRC IS GREATER THAN ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF INERTIAL PLATFORM HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_RECOVERY_PARACHUTE_CMD EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF INERTIAL MODERATE RISK’ 
 
 
Hazards H40 ÷ H44 
Note: 
With reference to Hazards 40 ÷ 44, , the comparison between two 
contingent indications for heading, altitude, pressure is supposed 
to be performed to determine if the given air sensor is measuring 
the correct parameter for the flight control system 
 
 
H40 – Loss of heading indication 
Definition: the contingent loss of the RPAS heading indication   
 
Rule number 1 
IF (RPAS_HDG1 – RPAS_HDG2) IS DIFFERENT FROM ZERO 
AND IF RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGA IS GREATER THAN ZERO rad/sec 
AND IF RPAS_ALT IS GREATER THAN ZERO feet  
AND IF IRGRC IS GREATER THAN ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF HEADING INDICATION HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_RECOVERY_PARACHUTE_CMD EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF HEADING INDICATION MODERATE RISK’ 
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Rule number 2 
IF (RPAS_HDG1 – RPAS_HDG2) IS DIFFERENT FROM ZERO 
AND IF RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGA IS GREATER THAN ZERO rad/sec 
AND IF RPAS_ALT IS GREATER THAN ZERO feet  
AND IF IRGRC IS EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF HEADING INDICATION HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_FTS_CMD EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF HEADING INDICATION MODERATE RISK’ 
 
 
H41 – Loss of altitude indication 
Definition: the contingent loss of the RPAS heading indication   
 
Rule number 1 
IF (RPAS_ALT1 – RPAS_ALT2) IS DIFFERENT FROM ZERO 
AND IF RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGA IS GREATER THAN ZERO rad/sec 
AND IF RPAS_ALT IS GREATER THAN ZERO feet  
AND IF IRGRC IS GREATER THAN ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF ALTITUDE INDICATION HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_RECOVERY_PARACHUTE_CMD EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF ALTITUDE MODERATE RISK’ 
 
Rule number 2 
IF (RPAS_ALT1 – RPAS_ALT2) IS DIFFERENT FROM ZERO 
AND IF RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGA IS GREATER THAN ZERO rad/sec 
AND IF RPAS_ALT IS GREATER THAN ZERO feet  
AND IF IRGRC IS EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF ALTITUDE MODERATE RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_FTS_CMD EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF ALTITUDE MODERATE RISK’ 
 
H42 – Pressure sensor failure 
Definition: the contingent loss of the RPAS pressure sensor 
failure   
 
Rule number 1 
IF (RPAS_PSR1 - RPAS_PSR2) IS DIFFERENT FROM ZERO  
AND IF RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGA IS GREATER THAN ZERO rad/sec 
AND IF RPAS_ALT IS GREATER THAN ZERO feet  
AND IF IRGRC IS GREATER THAN ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF PRESSURE SENSOR HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_RECOVERY_PARACHUTE_CMD EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF PRESSURE SENSOR MODERATE RISK’ 
 
Rule number 2 
IF (RPAS_PSR1 - RPAS_PSR2) IS DIFFERENT FROM ZERO 
AND IF RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGA IS GREATER THAN ZERO rad/sec 
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AND IF RPAS_ALT IS GREATER THAN ZERO feet  
AND IF IRGRC IS EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF PRESSURE SENSOR HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_FTS_CMD EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF PRESSURE SENSOR MODERATE RISK’ 
 
 
H43 – Misleading altitude indication 
Definition: the contingent misleading RPAS altitude indication   
 
Rule number 1 
IF (RPAS_ALT1 – RPAS_ALT2) IS DIFFERENT FROM ZERO 
AND IF RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGA IS GREATER THAN ZERO rad/sec 
AND IF RPAS_ALT IS GREATER THAN ZERO feet  
AND IF IRGRC IS GREATER THAN ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF ALTITUDE INDICATION HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_RECOVERY_PARACHUTE_CMD EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF ALTITUDE INDICATION MODERATE RISK’ 
 
Rule number 2 
IF (RPAS_ALT1 – RPAS_ALT2) IS DIFFERENT FROM ZERO 
AND IF RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGA IS GREATER THAN ZERO rad/sec 
AND IF RPAS_ALT IS GREATER THAN ZERO feet  
AND IF IRGRC IS EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF ALTITUDE INDICATION HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_FTS_CMD EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF ALTITUDE INDICATION MODERATE RISK’ 
 
 
H44 – Misleading airspeed indication 
Definition: the contingent misleading RPAS airspeed indication   
 
Rule number 1 
IF (RPAS_IAS1 – RPAS_IAS2) IS DIFFERENT FROM ZERO 
AND IF RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGA IS GREATER THAN ZERO rad/sec 
AND IF RPAS_ALT IS GREATER THAN ZERO feet  
AND IF IRGRC IS GREATER THAN ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF AIRSPEED INDICATION HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_RECOVERY_PARACHUTE_CMD EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF AIRSPEED MODERATE RISK’ 
 
Rule number 2 
IF (RPAS_IAS1 – RPAS_IAS2) IS DIFFERENT FROM ZERO 
AND IF RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGA IS GREATER THAN ZERO rad/sec 
AND IF RPAS_ALT IS GREATER THAN ZERO feet  
AND IF IRGRC IS EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF AIRSPEED HIGH RISK’ 
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=> 
THEN SET RPAS_FTS_CMD EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘LOSS OF AIRSPEED MODERATE RISK’ 
 
 
H45 – Misleading angle of attack indication 
Definition: the contingent misleading RPAS angle of attack 
indication  
Note:  
Applicable to fixed wing RPAS only; not valid for the RPAS model 
object of the ‘Expert System’ knowledge basis in object  
 
 
H46 – Stall 
Definition: aerial segment aerodynamic stall condition 
Note:  
Applicable to fixed wing RPAS only; not valid for the RPAS model 
object of the ‘Expert System’ knowledge basis in object  
 
 
H47 – Loss of fuel cell 
Definition: the contingent loss of on board fuel cell 
 
Rule number 1 
IF RPAS_FUEL_CELL_CURRENT IS EQUAL TO ZERO Ampere 
AND IF RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGAt+1 -  RPAS_ENGINE_OMEGAt IS SMALLER THAN 
ZERO radians/sec 
AND IF RPAS_ALT IS GREATER THAN ZERO feet  
Printout ‘LOSS OF FUEL CELL HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SWITCH TO RPAS_LIPO_BATTERY_CURRENT 
Printout ‘LOSS OF FUEL CELL MODERATE RISK’ 
 
 
H48 - Remote pilot low training 
Definition: hazard deriving from lack of or low remote pilot 
training 
 
Note: 
This is an hazard condition due to human factor issues: ‘Expert 
System’ rules are deemed not applicable 
 
 
H51 – Non compliant operational procedures 
Definition: hazard deriving from the application during flight of 
not compliant operational procedures 
 
Note: 
This is an hazard condition due to human factor issues: ‘Expert 
System’ rules are deemed not applicable 
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H52 – Loss of remote pilot situational awareness 
Definition: hazard deriving from the loss of the remote pilot 
situational awareness during the flight 
 
Note: 
This is an hazard condition due to human factor issues: ‘Expert 
System’ rules are deemed not applicable 
 
 
H53 – Human senses limitation 
Definition: hazard deriving from the physiological limits of human 
senses (for example during night flight operations or under low 
visibility/low light operational conditions) 
 
Note: 
This is an hazard condition due to human factor issues: ‘Expert 
System’ rules are deemed not applicable 
 
 
H54 – Remote pilot excessive workload 
Definition: hazard deriving from the excessive crew workload 
during flight operations 
 
Note: 
This is an hazard condition due to human factor issues: ‘Expert 
System’ rules are deemed not applicable 
 
 
WEATHER HAZARDS: H55 ÷ H69 (HAZARDS EXCLUDED: H56, H60, H61, H62) 
Note: 
They are hazards due to daily contingent weather conditions that 
can be managed with on ground operational procedures foreseeing 
that the flight operations cannot be performed if weather 
conditions are less than optimal or they shall be interrupted if 
less than optimal conditions occur during the flight mission 
 
 
H56 – GLARE 
Definition: weather hazard deemed to cause moderate acceptable 
risk due to the fact that the remote pilot is not on board the RPA 
 
 
H60 – RAIN 
Definition: rain adverse weather hazard 
 
Note:  
A weather Doppler RADAR is foreseen to be installed on board the 
RPAS to identify rain during an operational mission 
 
Rule number 1 
IF WEATHER_DOPPLER_RADAR_IMAGE is equal to ‘RAIN’ 
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AND IF RPAS_ENGINE IS GREATER THAN ZERO radians/sec 
AND IF RPAS_ALT IS GREATER THAN ZERO feet  
Printout ‘RAIN HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_AUTOPILOT_RETURN TO HOME_MODE EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘RAIN MODERATE RISK’ 
 
 
H61 – SNOW 
Definition: rain adverse weather hazard 
 
Note:  
A weather Doppler RADAR is foreseen to be installed on board the 
RPAS to identify rain during an operational mission 
 
Rule number 1 
IF WEATHER_DOPPLER_RADAR_IMAGE is equal to ‘SNOW’ 
AND IF RPAS_ENGINE IS GREATER THAN ZERO radians/sec 
AND IF RPAS_ALT IS GREATER THAN ZERO feet  
Printout ‘SNOW HIGH RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_AUTOPILOT_RETURN TO HOME_MODE EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘SNOW MODERATE RISK’ 
 
 
H62 – SOLAR STORM 
Definition: hazard deriving from the contingent solar storm 
occurrence during flight operations 
 
Note:  
Solar storms mainly appears as a degradation of navigation 
satellite signals that leads to all signal loss. For this reason, 
this hazard can be expressed according to these rules: 
 
Rule number 1 
IF GPS_LATt+1 IS EQUAL TO GPS_LATt 
AND IF GPS_LONGt+1 IS EQUAL TO GPS_LONGt 
AND IF GPS_ALTt+1 IS EQUAL TO GPS_ALTt 
AND IF EGNOS_LATt+1 IS EQUAL TO EGNOS_LATt 
AND IF EGNOS_LONGt+1 IS EQUAL TO EGNOS_LONGt 
AND IF EGNOS_ALTt+1 IS EQUAL TO EGNOS_ALTt 
Printout ‘SOLAR STORM MODERATE RISK’ 
=> 
THEN SET RPAS_AUTOPILOT_RETURN TO HOME_MODE EQUAL TO ONE 
Printout ‘SOLAR STORM LOW RISK’ 
 
Note: 
Where ‘t’ is time measured in seconds 
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Appendix G - System-Theoretic 
Accident Model and Processes - 
(STPA) safety analysis - Results 
 
Table 147 – STPA methodology applied to light RPAS: 
unsafe control action identification (STPA step 1) ([42], [102], [103]) 
Investigated scenario: mid-air collision of an RPAS in the VLL with a cooperative manned aircraft 
Hazardous or unsafe control actions (UCA) 
Control action (CA) Not capable of providing hazards Capable of providing hazards 
[CA1] Climb  
[UCA1] The RPA climbs to avoid the intruder 
when the DAA indicates climb evasive 
manoeuvre  
[UCA2] The RPA does not climb when the DAA 
indicates climb evasive manoeuvre [H02, H03] 
[UCA3] The remote pilot does not  command the 
RPA to climb when the DAA indicates climb 
evasive manoeuvre [H01] 
[CA2] Descend  
[UCA4] The RPA descends to avoid the intruder 
when the DAA indicates descend evasive 
manoeuvre  
[UCA5] The RPA does not descend when the DAA 
indicates descend evasive manoeuvre [H02, H03] 
[UCA6] The remote pilot does not  command the 
RPA to descend when the DAA indicates descend 
evasive manoeuvre [H01] 
[CA3] Turn  
[UCA7] The RPA turns right to avoid the intruder 
when the DAA indicates right turn evasive 
manoeuvre 
[UCA8] The RPA turns left to avoid the intruder 
when the DAA indicate right turn evasive 
manoeuvre [H02, H03] 
[UCA9] The remote pilot does not  command the 
RPA to turn right when the DAA indicates right 
turn evasive manoeuvre [H01] 
[UCA10] The RPA turns left to avoid the intruder 
when the DAA indicates left turn evasive 
manoeuvre 
[UCA11] The RPA turns right to avoid the 
intruder when the DAA indicates left turn evasive 
manoeuvre [H02, H03] 
[UCA12] The remote pilot does not  command 
the RPA to turn left when the DAA indicates left 
turn evasive manoeuvre [H01] 
[CA4] Move forward 
[UCA13] The remote pilot does not command 
the RPA to move forward when the RPA is in 
track and closer to the intruder less than the 
collision avoidance threshold distance 
[UCA14] The remote pilot commands the RPA to 
move forward when the RPA is in track and 
closer to the intruder less than the collision 
avoidance threshold distance [H02, H03] 
[CA5] Move backward  
[UCA15] The remote pilot commands the RPA to 
move backward when the RPA is in track and 
closer to the intruder less than the collision 
avoidance threshold distance 
[UCA16] The remote pilot does not command 
the RPA to move backward when the RPA is in 
track and closer to the intruder less than the 
collision avoidance threshold distance [H01] 
[CA6] Increase airspeed 
[UCA17] The remote pilot does not command 
the RPA to increase speed when the RPA is in 
track and closer to the intruder less than the 
collision avoidance threshold distance 
[UCA18] The remote pilot commands the RPA to 
increase speed when the RPA is in track and 
closer to the intruder less than the collision 
avoidance threshold distance [H02, H03] 
[CA7] Decrease airspeed 
[UCA19] The remote pilot does not command 
the RPA to decrease speed when the RPA is in 
track and closer to the intruder less than the 
collision avoidance threshold distance 
[UCA20] The remote pilot does not command 
the RPA to decrease when the RPA is in track and 
closer to the intruder less than the collision 
avoidance threshold distance [H01] 
[CA8] Deactivate   
[UCA21] The remote pilot deactivates the RPA 
when it is in flight [H02] 
[CA9] Reactivate  
[UCA22] The remote pilot does not reactivate 
the RPA when it is deactivated ad still in flight  
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Table 148 – Causal factors for light RPAS 
Identified unsafe control actions (STPA step 2) ([42], [102], [103]) 
Investigated scenario: Mid-air collision of an RPAS in the VLL with a cooperative manned aircraft 
Generic causal factor Detailed causal factor 
Causing action 
Ineffective 
control action (CA) 
Unsafe 
control action (UCA) 
Inadequate flight commands 
and controls operation 
Inherent technical flow: 
1-7, 9 
 
1. Remote control - 
2. Display - 
3. RPA 2, 6, 8, 11, 
Inadequate communication 
Signal disruption because of electromagnetic interference in the 
communication between: 
1-7, 9 
 
1. Remote controller and RPA 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 
12, 14, 16, 18, 20, 21 
2. RPA and displays 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 
12, 14, 16, 18, 20, 21 
Inadequate 
remote pilot operation 
Inadequate knowledge or skills (where applicable) in: 
- 
 
1. Authority regulation - 
2. RPA operation 3, 6, 9, 12, 16, 20, 21 
3. Terrain - 
4. Weather forecast - 
- 
Inadequate (incomplete, unclear, written in unfamiliar language to the 
operator): 
  
 
- 1. Authority regulation 
- - 
 
- 2. RPA operations procedures 
- 3, 6, 9, 12, 16, 20, 21 
- 
Exceedance of 
cognitive capacity 
- 1 - 21 
- Effects on emotional state - 1 - 21 
- Inadequate information about RPA density in the operational area - 3, 6, 9, 12, 16, 20, 21 
Insufficient 
energy level 
Chronic known physiological problems -  
Unanticipated 
physiology limitations 
- - 
Display battery depleted - - 
Remote controller 
battery depleted 
- 3, 6, 9, 12, 16, 20, 21 
RPA battery depleted - 3, 6, 9, 12, 16, 20, 21 
  
 532 
 
Appendix H - RPAS endurance and 
range performance improvement - 
A proposal solution: hybrid RPAS 
A consistent increase in light RPAS range and endurance performances is 
necessary to integrate them into the civil airspace for specific category 
commercial flight operations. A model architecture for an hybrid RPAS is 
hereinafter proposed (Figure 76 [106], [107]): it shows an RPAS electric 
propulsion subsystem fed by hydrogen fuel cells as primary source of energy and 
LiPo battery as redundant one. 
Figure 76 – Hybrid RPAS propulsion system architecture ([106], [107]) 
The fuel cells are electrochemical devices capable of converting the energy of 
a fuel (hydrogen in the present case) directly into electricity. The fuel cells are 
characterized by the same principle of operation of other cells, but they are 
particularly of interest because of their high efficient performance. The fuel cells 
are composed of an electrolyte layer in contact with an anode on one side and 
with a cathode on the either side. The fuel cell converts the chemical energy 
embedded in the hydrogen fuel by mean of an electrolysis reaction (Figure 77 
[108]) (oxidation on the anode side of the fuel cell and reduction on the cathode 
side). Among the variety of fuel cells available on the market the attention is 
focused on Polymer Electrolyte Membrane or Proton Exchange Membrane Fuel 
Cell (PEM FC) technology. Currently, this kind of fuel cell are mostly of interest 
for the low working temperature (between -25°C and 75°C) and for the particular 
properties of the polymer the cell membrane is made of [109]. 
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Figure 77 – PEM fuel cell principle of operation [108] 
With reference to the RPAS integration into the civil airspace, the main focus 
is on the parametric model associated to the proposed technical solution (Figure 
78 [107]): 
 
 
Figure 78 – Hybrid RPAS systems: safety and operational requirements model [107] 
The model identifies two groups of parameters hereinafter described and 
discussed [107]:  
• Operational parameters: RPAS weight, RPAS airspeed, RPAS 
airframe (scaling factors and aerodynamic efficiency shall be 
considered as well); the factor of utilization of the fuel cells with 
respect to its redundancy; the power line efficiency which depends on 
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the fuel cell efficiency and on altitude, pressure, temperature flight 
conditions; the necessary logistics for hydrogen supply 
• Safety parameters: in the power line they mainly deal with the LiPo 
battery package that becomes a redundant source of energy with 
respect to the fuel cell intended to be used as the primary one 
As a first estimation, the power requested to the fuel cell can be assumed to be 
directly proportional to the RPA weight for a given set of required design 
performances. A heavier RPA requests more power to the propulsion system to 
reach the same performances. As said, PEM fuel cells are highly efficient (52% 
[106]) in converting chemical into electrical energy and, as known, the hydrogen 
energy content is very high. Nevertheless, due to the low density of hydrogen, (the 
lowest among chemical elements), large volumes of it can be requested to be 
stored on ground and properly loaded on board the RPA. The weight of the tank 
necessary to embody such large volumes of hydrogen can make the fuel power 
system total weight affect the RPA flight performances. This issue suggests that 
the best compromise shall be found among the necessary quantity of hydrogen, 
the power system weight with respect to the RPA weight and the RPA flight 
performances. Hence, the hydrogen tank sizing is crucial for hydrogen fed hybrid 
RPAS design. As a general requirement, the best combination of pressure and 
volume of the hydrogen tank shall be determined after an accurate global 
evaluation of the RPA flight performance.  
The RPA airspeed and aerodynamic impact on the request of energy to the 
power line during the cruise flight phase performance (that is during most of flight 
time). Smart aerodynamic design solutions assuring high values of efficiency and 
scale factors can positively influence the RPA hydrogen consumptions and 
consequently the power line sizing.  
The power line shall be designed to be efficient both as a whole and with 
reference to each single component. The fuel cell efficiency is the ratio between 
the developed electrical power and the consumed hydrogen. The fuel consumption 
depends on the hydrogen fuel cells utilization factor with respect to the LiPo 
battery set as redundant equipment. In fact, the fuel cell will be sized to work as 
primary source of energy thus serving the RPA for the whole mission length; the 
LiPo battery will be mainly requested to satisfy peaks of energy during or in case 
of sudden highly demanding phases of flight or manoeuvers. The LiPo battery 
will be used as primary source of energy only in case of fuel cells system failure. 
The flight altitude, pressure and temperature conditions heavily impact on the 
fuel cells performances making them decrease with altitude [110]. In particular 
wrong hydrogen fuel cell thermal management makes them get dramatically 
worse: too high fuel cell temperatures cause water evaporation and membranes 
drying; too low fuel cell temperatures hinder water condensation inside the stack. 
In the first case, no hydrogen ion conduction though the membranes occurs while 
in the second one the gas diffusion and the transport of the reactants to the 
membranes are prevented to occur [111].  
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The use of hydrogen fuel cells on board RPA will request strategically 
organised logistic chain for refurbishment [107] to allow hybrid RPAS daily  
specific category operations in the civil airspaces. The hydrogen fuel cells 
installed on board the RPA are the final element of a future integrated logistic 
infrastructure able to produce, transport and store hydrogen to make it available in 
airports or other proper sites used by RPAS as basis for flight operations as it 
currently occurs with kerosene. The main concerns related to hydrogen 
transportation are closely related its natural physical properties. The hydrogen can 
be transported under the liquid or the gaseous state. The liquid state option 
ensures minor losses during transport and a higher volumetric storage density with 
less frequent refill of stationery tanks; on the other side, more energy is requested 
to liquefy hydrogen at temperatures of 21 K and at pressures of 1.3 MPa. The 
gaseous state option for transportation causes major energy expenditures due to 
the hydrogen density that is the lowest one among all chemical elements. 
The hydrogen fuel cells have demonstrated a better reliability with respect to, 
for example, small internal combustion engines (higher MTBF, up to five times 
according to some Authors [112]). In addition, the same redundancy of the LiPo 
battery working in parallel to the fuel cell system strongly extends the PEM fuel 
cell operating life and enhances the overall power line safety. Thanks to its high 
power density, the LiPo battery easily provides the excess of power requested 
during more demanding phases of flight preserving the PEM fuel cell reliability 
and durability and avoiding PEM fuel cell oversizing. As a final consideration, a 
good flexibility results from the proposed power line architecture  
Among the possible disadvantages related to the use of fuel cells the 
membrane damage caused by fuel or oxygen starvation can be mentioned also as a 
critical issue to be considered during design.  
With reference to ground and flight operational safety, the presence of 
hydrogen on board the RPA introduces the potential hazard of formation of 
explosive mixtures. The hydrogen is naturally flammable being an energy carrier. 
The pure hydrogen is not explosive or reactive, but it can be in presence of 
precursors oxidizing gas like oxygen or chlorine [113].  
In conclusion, the proposed use of Proton Electron Membrane Fuel Cells 
(PEM FC) can be considered as a realistic technical option to increase RPAS 
range and endurance performances with relatively low economic investments. 
 
